

30255

Twelfth Indian Philosophical Congress

Delhi 1936

PART II

**Editor :
S. K. Das.**

RMIC LIBRARYAcc. No. **30255**

Class No.

Date

St. /

Class.

Cat.

Bk. Card

Checked

②h

Contents

	PAGE
1.—Chairman's Speech	... i
2.—President's Address	... ix
3.—Dialectical Materialism : Prof. M. Sharif,	... 1
4.—The Revolt against Metaphysics :	... 29
D. M. Datta.	
5.—Logical Construction : R. Das.	... 49
6.—Mandana and Bhavadvaita :	... 55
S. S. Suryanarayana Shastri.	
7.—The Last Phase of Bradley's Thought :	... 69
Dr. S. K. Das.	
8.—A Realistic Theory of Illusion :	... 76
Prof. Sures Chandra Dutt.	
9.—The Nature of Sense-data : Kali Prasad.	... 84
10.—The Status of the Pre-organic Word in Idealistic	
Philosophy : K. C. Gupta.	... 94
11.—On The Nature of Relations :	... 103
N. A. Nikam.	
12.—Scepticism and its Place in Sankara's Philosophy :	
P. T. Raju.	... 114
13.—Doctrine and Expression in Mysticism :	... 126
Ram Murti Loomba.	
14.—Whitehead's idea of God :	... 135
C. V. Srinivasa Murty.	
15.—Consideration of Indeterminism :	... 145
Dr. Dharendra Lal De.	
16.—On An Extension of McDougall's Hormic Theory :	
P. S. Naidu.	... 153
17.—Metaphysical Vindication of Moral Autonomy :	
D. L. De.	... 165
18.—Emotional Intuitivism in Axiology :	... 171
Ram Murti Loomba.	

19.—Some Aspects of Belief :	...	177
Kalidas Bhattacharyya.		
20.—Philosophy of Life in Islam :	...	188
Dr. S. N. A. Jafri.		
21.—The Freudian and the Yoga Conceptions of Repression :		
Sharshi Bhusan Das Gupta.	...	194
22.—The Concept of Liberation : Dr. C. D. Deshmukh,		
	...	201
23.—The Concept of the Transcendent : S. S. Jalota	...	209
24.—Yogavasistha and Bhagawadgita :		
Prabhad C. Divanji M. A.,	...	215
25.—Idealism in Practice : Sarbeshwar Banerjee.		218
26.—Shanti Devi Further Investigated : Dr. Indra Sen.		
	...	222
27.—Santi Devi III	...	239
28.—Matrimonial Ethics ; Girdhar Gopal.	...	246
29.—Philosophy and Religion ; J. K. Daji.	...	255
30.—Dreams ; Pandit Ramdat Bharadwaj.	...	261
31.—Misuse of Logic ; Priya Govind Dut.	...	270
32.—Philosophy of Humour ; S. N. Roy.	...	277
33.—The Doctrine of Relations ; Jyotish Chandra Banerjee.		
	...	288
34.—The Dynamics of Indian Philosophy :		
M. V. V. K. Rangachari.	...	296
35.—Sri Sankaracarya's Commentary on the Yogasutra-		
bhasya : Prof. C. Kunhan Raja, M. A.,		310
36.—The Problem of Appearance and Reality : Phenomenal		
and Absolute and Standpoints. :		
Manubhal C. Pandya.	...	315
37.—Straight and crooked Thinking :	...	320
Shankat Rao.		
38.—Badarayana On Subtle Body.	...	332
Pt. Krishna Dutta Bharadwaj.		

**Address of Welcome by Rai Bahadur Ram
Kishore, Vice-Chancellor of the University of
Delhi, Chairman of the Reception Committee,
Indian Philosophical Congress,
12th Session, Delhi.**

**SIR GIRJA SHANKAR, DELEGATES TO THE INDIAN PHILOSO-
PHICAL CONGRESS, LADIES AND GENTLEMEN.**

It is my pleasant duty and proud privilege to extend to you all a cordial welcome to this session of the Indian Philosophical Congress. To those who have travelled long distances and put up with the inconveniences of a journey, which at this time of the year is hardly comfortable, the bracing air and the glorious sunshine of Delhi, and the beauties with which nature and art have endowed her, will offer, I hope, a refreshing and cheerful relief. Some of you who come from warmer parts of the country, and are not accustomed to the rigour of a Northern winter, may, I fear, find the weather a little trying. But the genial social atmosphere of the Congress and the fervent fellowship which it is sure to inspire will, I believe, mitigate to some extent, their discomfort.

For those who have not been to this historic city before, a visit to her noble monuments will be, I am sure, an enjoyable diversion. Few indeed have the time and the leisure to explore the archaeological treasures of Delhi, covering a vast area of over seventy square miles which provided the site for seven ancient cities. But it is a fascinating study, if one can afford it. The dream-like palaces, and the mosque of Shah Jehan, the lofty walls of the massive citadels of the Tughlaks, the dignified mosoleums of Humayun and other great Muslim rulers, the wonderful Kuth-Minar and its most interesting

surroundings which include the ruins of the citadel of the last Hindu King of Delhi, are but a few of the relics of the ancient glory of this famous city. They are the memorials of a tragic history of strife and ephemeral success of the rise and fall of empires and dynasties. But to you who, as philosophers, are lovers of peace and wisdom, I should specially commend one or two monuments which are not likely to impress an ordinary visitor by their mass or magnitude. The *Dargah* of Nizamuddin Aulia enshrines the memory of great religious teachers, poets and philosophers. Nizamuddin was the greatest in a succession of saints, who had for some generations trained disciples as their successors in religious thought and activities. The devout tradition of the place has been handed down to the present age, and every year, during the *Urs* celebrations, mystics and religious devotees gather in the *Dargah* and have a conference in honour of the famous saint. In addition to the highly ornate tomb of the saint, there is in the *Dargah* a tomb of the Poet-philosopher Amir Khusrau, a contemporary of Nizam-ud-din. Nearby, the simple grave of Jehanara Begam, daughter of the Emperor Shah Jehan, renowned for her culture and fine sentiments, is famous for its Persian inscription :—

“Let nothing but grass cover my grave ; for that is the covering meet for the lowly.”

The other monument which, I am sure, will interest you, is known as Hauz-Khas, midway between New Delhi and the Kutb-Minar. It was a seat of Islamic learning and culture, where a great theological college was maintained by the Pathan rulers. It has an atmosphere of tranquility and quiet charm which brings peace to the troubled soul.

The peculiar history of Delhi, characterised by incessant struggle for supremacy has not, unfortunately, been congenial to the growth and development of philosophic thought. It is true that many of the rulers of medioeval Delhi have been men of culture and learning, and some of them found it possible to

turn their minds from political activity and intermittent warfare to the promotion of culture and fine arts. Yet the dominant feature of the history of the city has been political and military rather than cultural and spiritual. With a few laudable exceptions, the civic activity of Delhi has not made for the enlightenment of the mind, nor for the nourishment of the soul. More than that, the conditions of life and the atmosphere of the place have been antagonistic to the growth of higher thought directed to the solution of the problems of existence and spiritual values. During the last seven or eight decades, however, there has been a new life, and peace and prosperity have brought with it an intellectual activity, the results of which, although not very great, are yet visible. The transfer of the Capital from Calcutta to Delhi twenty-five years ago has given a new impetus to learning and thought in this city. The young University of Delhi owes its existence largely to this new order of things. It gives me great pleasure to think that during the last few years we have been able, with our limited resources, to invite several academic conferences to this city. We had here in 1933 the Indian Economic Conference, and only last year the Indian Mathematical Conference was held in this very hall, at the invitation of the University. I am grateful to the Indian Philosophical Congress for accepting our invitation and holding their 12th Session in the University buildings.

The value of these academic conferences, particularly of the Philosophical Congress, is beyond estimate. Apart from the opportunities they afford to educated men of the same interests to exchange their views and come to a better understanding of each other's points of view, they create and stimulate intellectual interests in those to whom the privilege of attending their meetings is extended. Speaking for myself, I have found them to be of inestimable value. I have not only formed new friendships and received new thoughts, but have experienced a broadening of outlook, due to the contact with men of other

interests than mine. This is, indeed, very refreshing to the mind of the professional man, which, due to the peculiar circumstances of the case, is liable to get into a rut, from which it is difficult to escape. I particularly welcome the Philosophical Congress for at least one evident reason, for the philosopher leads our thought to one aspect of life which seldom receives the attention of the average man. Values other than commercial, realities other than the visible and the tangible, are brought before us for consideration.

"The world is too much with us ; late and soon,

Getting and spending, we lay waste our powers."

The wastage, of which the poet has complained, is one of the greatest tragedies of life. I respect the Philosopher for bringing home to us this sad truth.

The danger of a commercial and utilitarian view of life is that it gives us an inverted scale of values. What is the highest and the noblest in life is either ignored or relegated to the background, and things of little value are brought into prominence. A worthy life is a life of culture and enlightenment rather than a successful life judged by a utilitarian standard. True culture is non-utilitarian ; it owes its origin to that freedom of the mind which rises above the daily trifles of a mechanised life. Culture, considered *externally* as consisting of the means of the satisfaction of the higher sentiments, comprises religion, music and art ; considered *internally*, as consisting in a right outlook on life and the world, comprises philosophy and science. The internal aspect of culture is characterised by its universality, which, instead of dividing men into hostile camps, serves as a common bond for the whole human race. What we have to guard against, is a partial and wrong outlook on life and the world, which distorts our vision and makes us slaves of our own prejudices. We naturally turn to philosophy and science for a correct vision, and thereby a liberation from the bondage of custom and tradition.

Talking about Philosophy I am tempted to touch a point which has been in my mind for some time. I hope you will bear with me if I make one or two remarks relating to a subject which belongs more properly to yourselves as experts. I am only a layman and naturally hesitate to trespass on a field which is not my own. But the claims of Indian Philosophy for study and research, have not been admitted in practice by Indian Universities to the extent it deserves. In my own University, for instance, the curriculum for Philosophy includes Indian Philosophy only as an optional paper at the post-graduate stage. Although our department of Philosophy has included this subject in the curriculum, there is hardly any student who studies it. There may be Universities in India which have shown a greater respect for Indian Philosophy, but Philosophy is usually identified, I believe, with Western Philosophy by most Indian Universities. This undeserved neglect of the Indian systems of Philosophy is very regrettable. A curious incident, which happened here a few weeks ago, shows how unsatisfactory the present situation is. In the beginning of our University session, a highly educated and cultured French lady, now resident in Delhi, called upon the Head of our Philosophy Department and enquired if she could be permitted to attend occasionally the University lectures on Philosophy. During the interview, however, it transpired that the Philosophy taught in the University was Western Philosophy. The lady with an expression of intense surprise on her face exclaimed : "Oh, that's the Philosophy you teach ! We can study it at home. I have studied it in my University. What I want is Indian Philosophy. I have dreamt of India when at home, and have longed to be in India, not merely to see the country, but to learn and study Indian thought, and Indian Philosophy." The Head of the Department had very little to say to comfort her, and she left him in great disappointment.

Indian Universities, as you all are aware, are but imperfect

replicas of British Universities. But I do not regret the fact. Western literature and Western sciences are very profitable studies, and the Western methods of scientific investigation are now rightly accepted to be the standard for us to follow. Indeed in Science there is hardly any distinction between Eastern and Western—it is one and the same for all of us. But the history of Philosophy has been a little different. The Indian mind set before itself its own philosophical problems and it tried to solve them in its own way and in its own light. Although there is a fundamental unity of thought in Philosophy, for Philosophy in a sense is universal, yet the methods as well as the problems have not always been identical. I believe in the special genius of a people, and the special mentality which it produces. No people has, I think, found the whole truth. Where ultimate reality is concerned, people, as well as individuals, have devoted themselves to different aspects of truth. I do not claim for Indian Philosophy a complete revelation of truth, but, I hope, I shall not be thought extravagant if I claim for it a greater consideration than Western Philosophy by Indian Universities. It is far from my intention and ability to make a comparison between Eastern and Western Philosophy, or to judge their respective merits. What I really desire to say is that we have, in India, systems of Philosophy which are worth studying by all, particularly by Indian men and women whose historical tradition and cultural atmosphere make them better understood and their study more profitable than other systems of Philosophy. It has been said that an Indian is born a Philosopher. He loves speculative thought. I do not know to what extent this statement is true. But the Indian vernaculars are so replete with a philosophical vocabulary that the Indian child picks up words, early in his life, which have a philosophical significance and association. Take for instance the words 'Maya,' 'Karma,' 'Atma,' 'Prakriti,' 'Purusha' and a host of others. Indian life, the Indian social

system, Indian religious traditions and customs provide an appropriate setting for Indian Philosophical thought. And the study of Indian systems of Philosophy is, therefore, more congenial to the Indian mind.

I hope I shall not be misunderstood when I plead for a more generous provision for the study of Indian Philosophy in Indian Universities. I should indeed like to see Indian Philosophy take its deserved and legitimate place in the University courses of study, not to supplant but to supplement Western Philosophy. I shall not, however, be content to see it studied as Aristotle was studied in Europe before the Renaissance. I feel inclined to think that Indian Philosophical thought has not advanced appreciably after the well known systems had been formulated. Commentaries on commentaries have been written by distinguished scholars, but there has been little progress in original thought. The old masters have been taken as authoritative and even when a commentator has departed from the meaning of the text, he has taken good care not to make the departure evident. Even discerning and critical students have lacked the courage to say anything new, not supported by any authoritative text. On the other hand, the interpretation of the text has, if necessary, been adapted to the thought of the commentator. This attitude of the mind is not conducive to originality of thought. I hope therefore that Indian Philosophy will be taught and studied in a spirit of enquiry, and that it will stimulate thought in our students and inspire them with the love of truth so as to make constructive work possible. It is a highly encouraging sign of the advancement of Indian scholarship that several valuable books on Indian Philosophy have been written in recent years by eminent Indian scholars ; and among them our President-elect, Professor S. N. Das Gupta, who has honoured us by his presence here this afternoon, is one of the best known. His History of Indian Philosophy, of which several fat volumes have

already been published, will remain a monumental work. These are significant achievements and have their own value. But we want also original and constructive philosophical thought in India which will make new contributions to the philosophical thought of the world. Let us hope that the time will soon come when my dream will be realised.

Ladies and gentlemen, I do not desire to detain you any longer. Let me offer you again my greetings of welcome and express my wish that your brief sojourn in Delhi will be happy and that this session of your Congress will be a complete success.

Let me also express my deep gratitude to Sir Girja Shankar Bajpai who has kindly consented to open the Congress. In spite of the numerous other demands on his time, he has willingly accepted our invitation. We are indeed honoured by his presence here this afternoon, for Sir Girja Shankar is not only a high official of the Government, but a man of great culture and wide erudition. I am sure he takes a keen interest in the subject of Philosophy which has drawn so many eminent scholars from different parts of the country here to-day.

May I now request you, Sir, to open formally the Congress ?

**A SUMMARY OF THE ADDRESS OF THE
PRESIDENT OF THE ALL INDIA PHILOSOPHICAL
CONGRESS IN DELHI.**

PRINCIPAL S. N. DAS GUPTA, M. A., PH. D. (CAL).
PH. D. (CANTAB), I. E. S.

There is a difference between the mentality of the Indian people and that of the Western people. When Alexander invaded India, the naked ascetics, numerous then as now, excited his curiosity and he questioned them through interpreters. They told him roundly that he was a nuisance to the world with his silly conquests ; he had come all that way from his home only to plague himself and every one else, and all of the earth that he would ever really possess would be what sufficed for a grave to cover his bones. "Alexander", says the historian Arrian, "praised what they had said but continued to act in opposition to their advice." Alexander admired so much their singular patience and fortitude that he conceived a great desire that one of them should live with him. Most of the ascetics whom he approached dismissed his invitation scornfully. Nevertheless one, called Kalyana, yielded and went with him as far as Persia, but later on he repented it so much that he determined to enter fire. Alexander made pompous arrangements to show him honour but Kalyana paid no attention to these pomps intended in his honour. He was happy again at last and softly sang songs and hymns to the gods in his own language as he climbed the pyre and lay down on it. As the flames rushed over him, the Macedonians marvelled that he lay quite still and moved not at all. Alexander himself had withdrawn unable to endure a sight so painful. It is difficult for a European to understand the mentality of the Indian and

it is for this reason that the Europeans find it so difficult to appreciate the spirit of India's civilisation, her art, her poetry and her philosophy. Though Schopenhauer in the middle of the nineteenth century appreciated the wisdom of the Upanishads, yet ever since Maxmüller wrote his superficial six systems of Indian Philosophy, there had been a strong current of European thought which sought to dismiss Indian philosophy as nothing more than some sort of scholastic theology or bombastic nonsense ; but during the last fifteen years European opinion about Indian Philosophy has been slowly changing. Those who know Indian Philosophy well and are acquainted with the vast commentary literature know that almost all the concepts in their metaphysical and epistemological applications as current in modern or ancient European thought were also current in India with kindred significance and that there are many systems of European thought which find their parallels in the Indian intellectual sphere. But inspite of this great advancement in thought, Indian Philosophy started with some general assumptions and postulates which have on the one hand given it its uniqueness and distinctive features and have on the other hand somewhat retarded its spontaneous and free growth. These postulates are as follows :—

(1) The self-validity of the Vedas, (2) the doctrine of Karma (3) the doctrine of re-birth, (4) the doctrine of emancipation. Buddhism and Jainism did not believe in the authority of the Vedas but they accepted the other three creeds. The acceptance of a permanent beatific state with the associated belief in the law of Karma and re-birth moulded in a peculiar way not only the metaphysical and ethical position of the Indian thought but it found its expression also in various types of Indian art. After the eleventh or the twelfth century when the creative side of Indian Philosophy became more and more sleepy, there was an awakening of the logical side which with

its tendency and over-emphasis for logical definition, precision of expression and dialectical discussion grew in such an alarming way that it almost engulfed the spirit of Philosophical spontaneity and fresh imagination by the 17th or the 18th century. I fear that both England and the continent are at the present moment passing through a similar crisis.

With the introduction of studies in European Philosophy and Science we have before us a world of new facts and relations. Our present awakening with a new spirit of national consciousness is enlivening us with a new courage and self-confidence. Our poets have sung a new tune and contributed a new melody to the symphony of the world orchestra and our painters are creating new forms of beauty. This is just the time when our philosophers should show that they are capable of giving new responses and reactions in consonance with the spirit of the age. During the last fifteen years we have had some historians and interpreters of Indian thought but it is unfortunate that there has hardly been any attempt at the creation of new thought on the basis of the old in harmony with the new facts or relations that the present world has brought before our purview. The teaching of Philosophy in the colleges is in a moribund condition. Our Lecturers and Professors supply our students with summaries of the philosophy of some European thinkers which they are expected to memorise and reproduce in the pages of their script papers in the examination halls. We in India are not in touch with the living philosophies of Europe and our houses are not on fire with the flames of their enlightenment. The fires that our forefathers had kindled at their sacrificial altars have long gone out. The light that we are getting from the West or from the hoary days of our past through the books that are still preserved for us is coming to us through many reflected mirrors and has thereby lost all its warmth and much of its illumination also. Our philosophic light has thus grown

dusky, and chilly. It is time for us that we should kindle our lights anew from the faggots collected from the East and West. This light should be an expression of our new personalities as members of a new world of civilisation and culture which has inherited from the past the great traditions of culture which at one time enlivened the whole of Asia and probably to some extent a part of eastern Europe also. Our political and economic aspirations howsoever keenly they may be felt are not alone sufficient to discover the path of progress. The manufactory of light is run by the philosophers and not by the administrators of state. Whether in the capacity of a metaphysician, logician, a social or economic thinker, it is the philosopher, whose fresh and spontaneous imagination milks new thoughts from the mother Nature and it is through the nourishment of this new thought that the world can feel itself strong. We can be loyal to our past heritage only as far as it is practicable under the new conditions of life and only so far as it is consonant with the new truths that are known to us. Our loyalty to the past should not be merely lifeless conservative bigotry. We should accept the experiences of the past teachers of our country as well as those of the teachers of other countries of the past and the present. And with our fresh and spontaneous imagination not too much over-loaded with barren logicism, we should tackle the new problems that are facing us and give new life to philosophy not as the philosophy of India or as the philosophy of Europe but as the philosophy of humanity.

The Spiritual life and its Realisation ¹

By

SUSIL KUMAR MAITRA, M. A., PH.D.

Lecturer in Philosophy, University of Calcutta,

That science delivers truth while religion is a pleasing self-deception may be one of the Freudian idiosyncrasies with which western thought on the whole may not agree, but in respect of its objective emphasis it does represent, and is so far typical of, that objectivistic, externalistic view of the spiritual life which marks out the western outlook as radically distinct from that of the east. Freud's speciality may be his insistence on an objective science as distinguished from a religion that is subjective and wish-motivated, but the belief in an objective salvation of the spirit is common both to the Freudian who believes in a scientific liberation and his theological antagonist who looks forward to a religious deliverance from isolation and subjectivity. Common ground between the Freudian and his devout opponents is the belief that the spirit realises itself in trans-subjectivity and self-transcendence, that it is in the object and the right seeking of it through knowing, feeling and willing that the spirit's true fruition lies. What in the Freudian view is to come through an objective science and its empirical methods, is, according to religious belief, a matter of trans-empirical realisation in a supra-scientific objectivity.

The general trend of western thought is thus towards an empirical or a metempirical objectivity as the spirit's highest end and destiny. This objective view dominates alike the

1. Writer's address as president of the "Ethics, Social Philosophy and Religion" Section of the Indian Philosophical Congress held in December, 1936.

western conception of the theoretical and the practical consciousness. It underlies its theories of the intellectual life quite as much as its theories of morality. The goal of the theoretical consciousness, according to western ideas, is the rationalisation of the given reality, the spirit's self-finding in that which is the other, and so far independent of, the spirit. The task both of science and philosophy is the spirit's self-affiliation to the given objectivity, a spiritual self-merging in the object. We are told that it is the spiritualisation of matter rather than the materialisation of spirit, but the fact remains that looked at from the side of the spirit the process does not appear to be anything else than one of despiritualisation and self-alienation. Thus the logical consciousness as distinguished from the alogical is thinking objectively, the subject's self-merging in the object entailing the renouncing of all subjective preconception, prejudices and associations. The progress of the theoretical consciousness is a movement towards an increasing objectivity, a progressive objectification of the self in a process of self-finding in that which is not itself. Theoretical progress is thus a march towards an increasing objectivity with a correspondingly receding subjectivity, the subject's progressive self-discovery in a reality which is independent of itself, self-realisation through self-negation, living through perpetual self-dying. That the intellectual effort is never crowned with complete success and that our highest scientific and philosophic achievements fall short of that complete intelligibility that logic proposes to itself as its goal, is neither a proof of the futility of the objective effort nor conclusive of its inherent antagonism to spirit. Our partial achievements are only temporal reproductions of a timeless rationality which is the completely objectified reality of the absolute spirit. Thus religion is laid under contribution to make good the deficiencies of an ever-incomplete science that never realises the absolute rationality it aims at. The western

view of the practical consciousness is only a further extension of its theoretical outlook in this respect. Here also we have the self-same objective conception of the spirit as unceasing movement from a less satisfactory to a more satisfactory objectivity, as the progressive self-objectification of the spirit in an increasingly coherent whole of will-positing objectivity. The practical consciousness is thus a supplement to the theoretical objectivity, being the reconstruction and transfiguration of the given reality into a more satisfactory realisation of the spirit's unfulfilled aspirations. The difference between the theoretical and the practical consciousness does not lie in respect of the objectivity of the outlook but arises from a different emphasis as to the source of the original objective impulse. Thus while the theoretical consciousness adapts itself to an objectivity which it finds and does not itself bring into being, the practical consciousness aims at an objectivity that is not found but only ideally suggested by the given reality. The stress however in both attitudes is on an objective fruition of the spirit either as the spirit's self-finding in a given objectivity or as its self-objectification as a suggested objectivity transcending the given actuality. The progress of the moral life is thus a process of unceasing self-objectification, an endless progression from a less satisfactory to a more satisfactory objectivity as the spiritual ideal to be accomplished. That the process drags on without end driving spirit from one object to another in an eternal spiritual unrest argues, we are told, no defect in the moral ideal. What is timelessly realised in the eternal life of the absolute spirit is being reproduced as an endless progression in the temporal lives of finite creatures. Thus religion once more is requisitioned to make good the deficiencies of an unceasing object-seeking that never realises its desired end. What is a mere ideal and therefore a something to be is, we are reminded, the eternally accomplished reality which the moral

life only recapitulates and does not bring into being. The goal both of the theoretical and the practical consciousness is thus the spirit's self realisation in a completed and finished objectivity, its self-affiliation to the absolute spirit as a completely objectified divine personality.

The above, we contend, is a fair presentation of the general trend of western thought. The underlying idea throughout (with perhaps the solitary exception of Kant) is that of an objective fulfilment and realisation of the spirit. It colours western logic, western ethics, western art and western religion. In respect of the objective emphasis there is hardly any difference between western realism and western idealism. All schools agree as to an objective consummation of the spiritual life, their differences arising only in respect of the kind of object that is to constitute the spirit's fruition and fulfilment. The governing principle of western thought is thus that of the incarnate spirit or the spirit concretised and objectified as a trans-subjective reality.

It is this objective idea of the spirit, *e. g.*, that inspires Hegel's idealism. Hegel's advance on Spinoza, we are told, consists in his conception of the absolute as concrete self-conscious spirit, *i. e.*, as spirit realising itself in the consciousness of its objective modifications. It is this self-realisation through conscious self-objectification that constitutes, according to Hegel, the life of the Absolute as concrete spiritual reality. Spirit unconscious of itself, spirit without conscious objectivity is empty, abstract spirituality without life, the dead carcase mistaken for the concrete, living spirit. Reality is spiritual as an eternal self-filling and self-concretion—it is spirit conscious of itself as objective and objectified experience. The movement of experience is the objective unfolding of the eternal spiritual reality, the spirit's self-mediation in conscious self-objectification. The life of the absolute is thus a perpetual give and take, a giving forth of itself as objective content and a conscious self-

attaining and self-fulfilment in the consciousness of its objectivity. The eternal reality mediates itself through itself in the consciousness of the finite—its outgoing as objectified reality is also an incoming or returning into itself as concrete self-conscious spirit. Art, religion and philosophy represent the successive stages of this self-mediation through self-objectification. Art is the absolute mediating itself in the consciousness of the finite as objective sensuous image : it is the self-concretion of the absolute as the form of the artistic object, the absolute objectifying itself to sense as symmetry or harmony of sensible form. But art necessarily falls short of the spiritual content it represents : the absolute content as spiritual necessarily transcends the sensuous limitations of artistic representation. The religious consciousness represents an advance on the artistic in this respect : it is the experience of the absolute content as a personal self-communication of the absolute to the finite spirit, a dual reciprocal objectivity of the absolute to the finite and of the finite to the absolute, the self-communication of God to man and man's spiritual unity with God through prayer, devotion and love. Here the form being better suited to the nature of the content, the religious plane represents a higher level of absolute consciousness than does artistic representation in symmetry and beauty of sensuous form. But even religion does not take one into the heart of the spiritual reality. It presents the absolute content as felt experience, *i. e.*, as feeling or subjective certitude. Thus the absolute of religion lacks objective necessity, *i. e.*, falls short of its character as self-justifying reality. And so as art is superseded by religion, religion in its turn merges into philosophic realisation. Philosophy is the realisation of the absolute as self-necessitating objectified experience. Philosophy thus represents the highest stage, the fruition and fulfilment of the absolute consciousness. What religion presents as a subjective necessity of feeling, philosophy realises as an objec-

spirits. Thus what the visible state fails to achieve through the egoism of politicians and the larger egoism of an exclusive nationalism, the pious man realises in the higher religious consciousness of the divine life as realising itself in the lives of finite creatures. By living up to this higher consciousness, man lifts himself above the narrowness of a political morality and the illusoriness and unreality that characterise the merely moral standpoint. Thus morality without religion may be an illusory phantom-chase void of purpose and meaning, but morality transformed and transfigured in the fervour of religious emotion is neither an unmeaning pursuit of an elusive phantom nor the seeking of an egoistic political end subserving the interest of a powerful minority.

All this, we contend, is true, but not strictly relevant to the issue. Before the point of the argument may be conceded, the preliminary issue to be decided is whether a religious extension of the moral consciousness can be justified in the light of actual experience or whether it has to be taken on trust and accepted as a matter of faith. The fact must not be overlooked that the religious content being not translatable into actual vision (we are discounting mystical realisation) has much greater need of an empirical justification than any ordinary belief easily convertible into its cash-value in experience. The lesson of the moral life, it should be noted, is decidedly against any such objective satisfaction of the spirit as is usually held out by religion to be the spirit's ultimate end or goal. If morality teaches anything it is the futility of the objective effort, the illusoriness and unreality of the object hunger as capable either of fulfilment or satiety. Nor does the progress of the intellectual life presage that objective unity or wholeness of the spirit which religion assumes as the reality we reproduce piecemeal in our finite lives. For the unity uniting one fact to another is unity only as the annulment of their empirical diversity and is thus the negation of their respective

individuality. The ideal unity of the intellectual life is thus the negation and cancellation of all empirical objectivity, the deobjectified unity of the subject affirming itself as the negation of the objective. That the intellect fails to achieve what it aims at arises from its aiming at the impossible, *i. e.*, at an unity that will be the resolution as well as conservation of all empirical differences. Hence the evidence both of the theoretical and the practical consciousness is against the reality of the religious content, *i. e.*, of an objective consummation of the spirit as a coherent whole of experience. Where vision fails, faith is a legitimate supplement, but a faith which is not merely trans-empirical but also contra-empirical, a faith, in other words, which is a direct negation of experience and its express teachings, is nothing but a pleasing illusion and a wilful self-deceiving.

Religion as personal communion with an objectified absolute spirit we hold, then, to be an illusion which we deliberately nurse and foster with the object of strengthening the illusory object-chase of our intellectual and moral life. It is needless to say that here we are in agreement with Freud's estimate ¹ of religion as a pleasing self-hypnotism and an unconscious self-deception. But we also differ from Freud in so far as we repudiate Freud's view of science as the panacea that will cure the spirit's object-longing. We hold that science, morality Mysticism is in no way better situated in this respect than ordinary religion. What is a matter of faith for ordinary

1. Cf. "The Future of an Illusion" by S. Freud.

and religion (as ordinarily conceived) sail here in the same boat, that all alike are illustrations of an illusory object-lust that never will be satisfied, but that while science and morality have this advantage that they are also an education in disillusionment through the experience of futility and failure, religion as a soaring into the trans-empirical void lacks a corresponding corrective in experience.

religion and justified by faith alone is for the mystic a matter of immediate vision, an object of mystical realisation in a supra-rational experience of the unitive life. Thus what ordinary religion is unable to defend except on grounds of a faith not translatable into experience, mysticism claims as a matter of immediate realisation in the personal experience of the mystic. The fact must not be overlooked however that mystics very rarely agree amongst themselves as regards the content of their mystical experiences. If the mystical content were an over-individual objective filling of the individual life as the mystics claim it to be, it would hardly admit of that wide diversity and variety which characterise the mystics' descriptions of their respective experiences. The widely divergent and sometimes conflicting accounts of mystical deliverances thus create a just suspicion of a subjective touch in mystical realisation which therefore cannot be taken as an unmediated revelation of an objective content. We conclude then that mysticism is in no way better off than ordinary religion and that common piety and mystical realisation are alike illustrations of a self-fostered illusion which thrives for want of an empirical corrective.

Some remarks on Bergson's view of a dynamic religion as distinguished from static will not be out of place in this connection. Static religion, according to Bergson, is the creative life-impulse arrested in its onward march; it is life-impulse confined within the specialised type of a particular society. It is thus the religion of closed societies, the circular movement of the life-impulse round about a fixed form. It is repetitive rather than creative, a stabilising force that conserves the realised form through myth-made tribal deities. As distinguished from this static religion which aims at the preservation of a fixed type, dynamic religion appears as unrestricted creative life impulse, *i. e.*, as transcendence of all fixed forms and types. Thus while static religion is tribal and confined to a

closed society, dynamic religion is universal and embraces the whole of humanity. Dynamic religion is the creative life-impulse focussing itself as the intuition of the religious mystic.

All this, we hold, does not touch the essentials of the problem of spiritual life. Neither static religion as a force of conservation nor dynamic religion as a power of creation offer anything but an objective fulfilment and the question which Bergson neither tackles nor solves is whether an objectified fruition can ever satisfy the autonomous subject. Dynamic religion may be of value as installing spirit into the very heart of the objective progression, but it does not cure the soul's unrest nor bring the wished-for peace and spiritual self rest. Bergson's own view of dynamic religion as intuition of unceasing creative impulse is an indirect avowal of its spiritual bankruptcy as endless creativity that knows no rest nor satisfaction. We hold, then, that a dynamic religion as the intuition of a self-objectifying life impulse is as far from being an effective healer of the troubled spirit as is ordinary religion with its illusory divine guarantor of the ultimate triumph of our object-longings.

Art, we hold, stands higher in this respect than both mystical and ordinary religion. Art is the spirit contemplating its own objectification with detachment. It is not mere intuition as individualised expression of inner tumult, as Croce says; it is also the unruffled and so far the disinterested and detached contemplation of the objectified self-expression. This is true both of art as creation and art as appreciation, both being at once the objectification of the spirit and its detached, and so far free, contemplation and enjoyment. Art is an advance on the logical consciousness in this respect, being conscious freedom from the obsession of a limiting reality. The object which to logic is part of a reality that circumscribes and limits is to art a logically neutral object that is matter only for contemplation and enjoyment. Art is thus the subject's

emancipation from a reality that engrosses and so far restricts the free spirit.

Art however represents only the first stage of spiritual emancipation from the objective thralldom. What is only negatively foreshadowed in the intellectual and the practical life as an inherently futile object-seeking is first of all adumbrated in art as the positive freedom of spiritual detachment, i. e., as the unruffled contemplation of the self-objectivity. Art is thus both self-objectification and its transcendence at the same time, enjoyed objectivity as well as conscious self-freeing as the witnessing of the enjoyed self-objectivity.¹ The absence of reality-consciousness is only a reflex of this witnessing consciousness: as detached witnessing art is also freedom from the reality of the enjoyed objectivity. A higher level of spiritual freedom is reached when the disappearance of the reality-consciousness goes with the appearance of an unreality-consciousness in its place. Here the spirit contemplates its objectification not as a neutral objectivity but as unreal appearance. This is the penultimate stage of Vedantic intuition, the realisation of spirit as the unrealisation of the objective, spirit's self-affirmation as the eternal negation of the objective unreality. This however falls short of the complete subjectivity of *svatūpāveśthiti*, the pure self-rest of spirit, for it entails at least a negative relation to the falsified objective appearance. The highest stage is thus that of *asamprajñātasamādhi*, of pure self-centred subjectivity wherein the negative relation to the object

1. The distinction may be illustrated by the case of the jaundiced man seeing yellow. One may see yellow without knowing that the internal jaundice is the cause of the seeing. One may again see yellow and at the same time realise that the internal disorder is the cause of the seeing. In the latter case, the seeing is also a seeing through and so far self-freeing from the object seen.

vanishes as a mere semblance of a relation. This is the Brahmahood of the spirit (corresponding to the *Ātmasākṣāt-kāra* of Sāṅkhya), the rest of the spirit in itself which is free even from a negative relation to the non-spirit.

In the above we have elaborated the Yoga and the Vedānta view of the self-realisation of spirit as the spirit's self-finding as the un-objective light that illuminates all objectivity. We have thereby rejected the western conception of the spiritual life as the spirit's self-concretion and objectification. It may however be urged against our view that it reduces the objective movement of the spirit as a purposeless self-deceiving that explains away instead of explaining the positive values of life. We confess to the force of the objection, but we contend that it is the very nature of the spirit as the self-certifying absolute which amuses itself as it were in this perpetual undoing of its own doing. We may call it *līlā* or sport but it is the sport of the absolute as spirit which philosophy can neither make nor unmake but simply recognise and analyse. Elsewhere² we have defined religion as "an experience of recovered unity with reality after one of estrangement or alienation" and our definition aimed at a sufficiently comprehensive concept that will embrace all religions instead of applying only to any particular type of it. We claim that Vedāntic self-realisation is religion in our sense, being spirit's unity with reality through the cancellation of an illusory objectivity.

We have described the general trend of western thought as objectivistic and have endeavoured to substantiate our contention by reference to important western philosophers. We may qualify our statement however by one reservation.

2. Cf. Writer's paper on "Religion and Magic, etc.:" Calcutta University Journal of the Department of Letters, Vol. XXVII.

We hold that Kant is an exception to the general run of western thinkers in this respect. He appears to us to be the only western philosopher who has not surrendered to the objective obsession. With a sure intuition which is almost oriental, Kant repudiates the objectivity of the spirit both as intelligence and will. That the intellect objectifies without being itself objective, that the spirit knows without being a known content is the conclusion he arrives at as the result of his critical enquiry into the theoretical consciousness. The same view he reaffirms in the second Critique in his concept of the moral will as a will that wills itself. Criticisms of Kantian ethics show a perverse misunderstanding of Kant's real views in this respect. Kant's pure will is the subject affirming its self-autonomy as the denial of the sensuous objectivity. Hence the moral life is an unceasing struggle against the life of inclinations: it is the spirit realising itself as the subject emptied of all objective determination, an unceasing self-emancipation from the heteronomous objectivity. The Kantian ethics thus show a truer hold on the essentials of the spiritual life than do the Hegelian reconstructions of it on objective lines. The flaw in the Kantian view is not in the concept of a moral will that wills itself, but in that of spirit realising itself as will. Even this however is hardly a just criticism of Kant as the objection is forestalled by Kant himself in the conception of the moral consciousness as law-revealing rather than law-making. It is in the self-alienated empirical subject that the pure spirit is an imperative to be accomplished: the realisation is the empirical subject's deobjectification in time, the casting off its objective vestments that the spirit in its purity may declare itself.

The Indian Philosophical Congress

1936.

Dialectical Materialism

BY

PROF. M. SHARIF

President, Logic and Metaphysics Section, 1936

(Aligarh Muslim University)

It appears that for sometime past the professional Philosopher has been too reluctant to pay attention to the movements of thought which have arisen beyond the four walls of academics and schools. He has seldom descended from his high pedestal to observe, and observing, interpret what has moved vast masses of humanity to an activity the like of which history has never seen. But nothing in nature is too low and too humble to deserve scrutiny, much less so are the great upheavals and tempests of the vast sea of life.

No doubt, since the beginning of this century efforts have been made to bring philosophy within the reach of the common man, but no appreciable attempt has been made by the orthodox philosopher to bring his study to bear upon those currents of thought which are penetrating deep into the minds of the

younger generation and moulding their entire outlook on life.

In this country for a whole decade we have been busy chiefly at digging the dry bones of ancient doctrines and have almost entirely ignored all that the present has in store for us. It is, of course, true that we must save these crumbling relics and treasure them as our veritable heritage. But while we pay homage to the sanctified past, we must not regard the present as too profane to deserve sustained attention. We must remember that the owl is no longer the bird of wisdom and the goddess of learning no longer favours mossy sanctuaries, dismal tubs, dusky caves and musty book-shelves. Her abode is now nature and life and philosophers can hardly ignore with impunity any aspect of nature or any phase of life without courting her wrath.

Recently two great social movements have almost shaken the very foundations of the existing social order. By these I mean Fascism and Communism. The former has its philosophy still in the making, but the latter is backed by a complete philosophical doctrine. As you are all aware, this doctrine is called Dialectical Materialism. In this address my aim is briefly to expose and examine this doctrine.

Although Dialectical Materialism was never elaborated by its founder, Karl Marx, its basic principles, however scattered are all found in his works in almost clear cut terms. These principles were further worked out by Engels and Lenin into a well-rounded system, and it is this system of which I now proceed to give a brief account.

I

Dialectical Materialism has been defined as "the science of general laws of the motion—both of the external world and of human thinking."¹ Whether it is a science or not, it certainly is a philosophical doctrine, and as such it can be viewed as a

1. Engels, *Ludwig Feuerbach*, p. 54.

theory of existence, a theory of knowledge, a theory of social life and a theory of the fundamentals of economics.

Dialectical Materialism, as a theory of existence, declares that reality is *material* in the sense that it is fundamentally *concrete and objective* and *not ideal and subjective*. The various forms of idealism (rational, empirical, transcendental and dialectical) propounded by a whole train of idealists from Plato to Hegel and the Hegelians are all false. Reality is essentially *existence*. Primarily it consists of just the world of concrete objects, which in "scientifically controlled perception" and "ideas induced"² thereby we know in their entirety. Our scientific knowledge truly reflects the world of objects, and the proof of it lies in human action. "The proof of the pudding is in the eating. From the moment we turn to our own use these objects, according to the qualities we perceive in them, we put to an infallible test the correctness or otherwise of our sense-perceptions. If these perceptions have been wrong, then our estimate of the use to which an object can be turned must also be wrong, and our attempt must fail. But if we succeed in accomplishing our aim, if we find that the object does agree with our idea of it, and does answer the purpose we intended it for, then that is positive proof that our perceptions of it and of its qualities, *so far*, agree with reality outside ourselves. And whenever we find ourselves face to face with a failure, then we generally are not long in making out the cause that made us fail; we find that the perception upon which we acted was either incomplete and superficial, or combined with the results of other perceptions in a way not warranted by them—what we call defective reasoning."³ "If you know all the qualities of a thing, you know the thing itself; nothing remains but the fact that the said thing exists without us; and

2. Engels, *Historical Materialism*, p. 7.

3. Engels, *Historical Materialism*, p. 7.

when your senses have taught you that fact, you have grasped the last remnant of the thing in itself, Kant's celebrated unknowable *Ding an sich*."⁴ That our knowledge of things leaves nothing of them behind, is proved by the fact that they have been "analysed, and, what is more, *reproduced* by the giant process of science ; and what we can produce, we certainly cannot consider as unknowable. To the chemistry of the first half of this century organic substances were such mysterious objects ; now, we learn to build them up one after another from their chemical elements, without the aid of organic processes. Modern chemists declare that as soon as the chemical constitutions of no matter what body is known, it can be built up from its elements. We are still far from knowing the constitutions of the highest organic substances, the albuminous bodies ; but there is no reason why we should not, if only after centuries, arrive at that knowledge, and, armed with it, produce artificial albumen. But if we arrive at that, we shall at the same time have produced organic life, for life, from its lowest to its highest forms, is but the normal mode of existence of albuminous bodies."⁵

Thus reality being just the world of concrete objects many of which are reproducible, all religious entities, God, angels, soul and the like, are mere mental fictions and false notions. They have no concrete reality. The objects of the concrete world of objects, are *not fixed, static, eternal, immutable, "fully fashioned"* entities. Nor are they made of fixed, eternal, immutable entities, like the atoms of Democritus, the numbers of Pythagoras, the monads of Leibnitz or the 92 elements of old chemistry. "The world is not—a complex of readymade *things*, but—a complex of processes in which the things apparently stable, no less than

4. *Ibid.* p. 7.

5. Engels, *Historical Materialism*, p. 8.

their mind-images in our heads, the concepts, go through an uninterrupted change of coming into being and passing away.⁶ The stars, the planets, stones, trees, animals, men, atoms, electrons, and the ether are all in a state of interaction and motion, ever changing their qualities and passing from one into another. Everything in the world of objects is perpetually *changing* and its change is not a mere mechanical change determined by sheer external forces. Objects are self-moving, which means, they are processes and processes essentially organic, each being "qualitatively more in its totality than the sum" of its parts and involving *development* or ascent from the lower to the higher.⁷ They are in time, have a beginning and an end and a history in between. Existence itself is in time and has a history. The doctrine of the evolution of organic species is now universally accepted. Nor is the theory of the evolution of inorganic matter of the universe from original nebulae to the "ever hardening, cooling masses of the stars and the planets is now questioned." But this recognition is not enough.

The process of development from the lower to the higher is a process in essence unique. It is movement or development, involving an emergent and a necessary procedure. This procedure is not of *mechanical causation*, for that fails to explain development and account for the laws of organic life as revealed by Biology. Nor is it the evolutionary process of the evolutionists, i. e. evolution by mere struggle for existence. Objects change by *necessity* but not by a mere necessity. They change rather by a dialectical necessity. The world-process develops by a dialectical determination or dialectical causation—causation through contradictions and their syntheses.

6. Engels, *Ludwig Feuerbach*, Ed. by C. P. Dutt, p. 54.

7. Rudas, *Dialectical Materialism and Communism*, p. 15.

The process of reality is a process of becoming and becoming is not 'being.' It is always 'A—becoming-not-A-but B.' Hence it involves emergence of contradictions and their syntheses. A is the *thesis*, its opposite, not-A, the *antithesis* and B in which both are united is the *synthesis*. A section (horizontal so to say) of the dialectical process which completely exhibits its dialectical necessity consists of (1) one objective reality in a lower form (2) its development by creating from its own being its opposite or negation, (3) the unity of the two into a synthesis. As appearance of the synthesis causes disappearance of the negation, it is aptly called the '*negation of negation*.' This also implies the reappearance of the thesis in the synthesis in a new garb. The birth of synthesis is the death of the negation. The dialectical process is not, therefore, only a process of creation but is also at the same time a process of destruction. It creates the new by destroying the old. It is a development in which *decomposition* and *disintegration* have a dialectically assigned place.

The thesis and the antithesis are not absolute opposites—not always and all-through perfect contradictorials. Every set of opposites, even the same set of them, possesses at different stages of development, varying degrees of contrariety, from mere difference to complete contradiction. Moreover the opposites are not static, discontinuous, isolated, abstract entities. They are not "rigid, dead and unconnected" opposites. To think of opposites as separate things is to misunderstand their concrete reality. They are also inseparably linked together. They are concrete opposites which, though discrete, are yet continuous. Although the synthesis results from the dominance of the antithesis, the thesis is not altogether destroyed, nor the antithesis wholly retained. Though both disappear, what is dialectically valuable or useful for development in the thesis as well as in the antithesis is retained

in the synthesis, though in a different and a higher form. In this lies their continuity.

The linkage of concrete opposites is not a mere mechanical linkage. In their continuity, they involve *reciprocal struggle, interpenetration and interdependence*. Both the thesis and the antithesis struggle against each other, penetrate into each other, till the antithesis gets dominant and the time is reached when it may result in the antithesis.

But this struggle may take thousands of years, as in nature, or a few centuries or years, as in social life, or even a few minutes, as in experimental science. Where consciousness plays a part, effort is made to reduce this time to the minimum.

In the struggle of the thesis and the antithesis sometime one may get stronger, sometime the other. There are ups and downs. When the thesis gets stronger, there is the phenomenon of retrogression, but this is always a temporary and an accidental retrogression. Finally the struggle must result in the dominance of the antithesis and culminate in the appearance of the synthesis. Indeed it is by virtue of the inter-struggle, interpenetration and interaction of the thesis and the antithesis that the synthesis results and the dialectical process develops.

What is true of objects is equally true of movements and laws. So far as they are interconnected, they are continuous, and in so far as they are distinct from one another, discrete. Continuity of all systems is expressed in the fact that each higher system contains within itself the lower ones as "accessory forms, as subordinate elements." Their discreteness is expressed in their distinctive qualitative differences. Discreteness and continuity are themselves dialectical opposites and they get their unity in every synthesis.

The natural process being dialectical, its development is not gradual. It is a development by 'leaps' rather than by

gradual succession. The opposites struggle with each other, act and react upon each other, penetrate into each other and when gradually the antithesis gains dominance, which by dialectical necessity it must gain, at once with a sudden leap comes into being a new entity, the synthesis. This sudden change is characteristic of all existence. Chemical combinations for instance, are all examples of a sudden change. Molecules of Hydrogen and Oxygen at a certain temperature, not gradually, but suddenly change into water. The quantum theory is a recognition of the fact that "the process of nature involves leaps." Darwin's evolutionary theory recognised the organic nature of animals and plants and their *gradual* change and development but it failed to see in evolution the place of revolutions and leaps and bounds. This defect of the evolutionary theory was remedied by De Vries' theory of mutations. The old belief in *natura non facit saltus* (nature makes no leaps) is, therefore, utterly false.

The leaps of the dialectical process are the landmarks of discreteness. Each sudden change brings into existence new qualities, distinct from others. These qualities are not subjective. They are as objective as quantities, for they, as much as quantities, express the real nature of things, and it is by virtue of these alone that things are discrete and distinguishable, one from another. Mechanism recognises the objectivity of quantities, but fails to discern the same in qualities. But in fact both are not only objective but also changeable into each other. There is a transformation of quantities into qualities and *vice versa*. Beyond specific limits quantitative changes result in changes in quality. Quantitative atomic change results in qualitative change or transformations of elements. Change the electrons of the atoms of Iron from 26 to 27, it changes into Nickel; change them to 28, it becomes Cobalt. Similar is the case with molecular changes. The process of a rise in the temperature

of specific quantities of Oxygen and Hydrogen at a certain point suddenly transforms them into water, a quality formerly non-existent. Similarly in the process of a rise in temperature from 0° to just below 100°c, given certain terrestrial conditions, water remains liquid and preserves this quality, but at 100°c, this specific quantity of water turns into gas and so gets transformed into a new quality. What is true of this is true of all phenomena.

On the contrary, qualities change into quantities. A species, at first, numerically small, rises in number by the quality of adaptation to environments. Nature abounds with such instances.

So far we have analysed just the process of thesis, anti-thesis and synthesis; but this process repeats itself unceasingly and the entire dialectical process of the world of objects consists of all these repetitions. But its content is never repeated in its native form. In nature once a stage is gone, it is as such for ever gone. Whatever is repeated is repeated, so to say, on a higher plane. Movements at a plane carry with them movements of lower planes as accessories or elements. Mechanical motion is accessory to molecular motion and these both are accessories to thermal and electrical changes while all these combined are accessories to organic change.⁸

To sum up, "the world is not to be viewed as a complex of fully fashioned objects, but a complex of processes, in which apparently stable objects, no less than the images of them inside our heads (concepts), are undergoing incessant changes, arising here and disappearing there and which, with all apparent accidents and in spite of all momentary retrogres-

8. Engels, *The Dialectic of Nature*. Also cf. V. Adoratsky, *Dialectical Materialism*. p. 49.

sions, ultimately constitutes a progressive development."⁹ It is a concrete 'process of motion, proceeding according to a law.' It is a development caused by contradictions, the conflicts of different forces and tendencies, involving interdependence and the closest indissoluble connection of all sides of every phenomenon. It is "a development in leaps and bounds" with "intervals of gradualness", involving the death of some phenomena, the birth of others (negation of negation) and exhibiting "transformation of quantity into quality" and quality into quantity. It is again a "development, that repeats, as it were, the stages already passed, but repeats them in a different way on a higher plane"—"a development, so to speak, in spirals, not in a straight line."¹⁰ Such indeed is the nature of existence, according to Dialectical Materialism.

II

We have seen the nature of existence, according to Dialectical Materialism. But dialectical materialism is not only a theory of being—"a science of Nature and History." It is also a theory of knowledge—a "science of thought and its laws." As an epistemological theory it declares that to consider reality and thought as separate is a mistake; to take reality as active and thought as passive or thought as active and reality as passive, is a blunder. Neither plays a passive role. Knowledge is not something apart from reality. It is not a secretion of the brain as the 'crude materialist' would say. Nor does it consist of heaven-sent ideas as the idealist would hold. Man and his ideas are as much facts of experience as any facts. 'If we enquire—what thought

9. Engels, *Ludwig Feuerbach*, p. 52. quoted by Lenin, "*The Teachings of Karl Marx*", 1933 Burleigh Press, Bristol, p. 14. also cf. C. P. Dutt's Eng. Ed. of Engels, "*Ludwig Feuerbach*", p. 51.

10. Lenin, *The Teachings of Karl Marx*, p. 15.

and consciousness are, whence they come, we find that they are products of the human brain, and that man himself is a product of nature, developing in and along with his environment. Obviously, therefore, the products of the human brain, being in the last analysis likewise products of nature, do not contradict the rest of nature."¹¹ Human knowledge and theories and methods of gaining are, therefore as much subject to the emergent dialectic law and are as much parts of the dialectical process as any parts. Objects and our consciousness of them are mutually exclusive opposites. Of consciousness and reality, reality is primary and consciousness has grown out of it as its dialectical opposite. But as in any other part of the dialectical process, so here, they are not absolute opposites nor isolated opposites.¹² They are interdependent and interrelated and their unity consists in "the transformation of the unknown but knowable 'thing-in-itself' into the thing for us,' of the 'essence of thing' into 'phenomena,' in the unity of brain and consciousness" and in the fact that consciousness faithfully reflects the objective world.¹³

As knowing is a part of the dialectical process, it develops and, therefore, at no stage of it is it final. It is relative, conditional approximate, historical and transitory. But it also has an aspect of absoluteness and objectivity. It bears the mark of absoluteness, because it also develops dialectically i. e. by conflict, and "conflict of mutually exclusive

11. Engels, *Anti Duhring*, p. 31, quoted by Lenin, "*The Teachings of Karl Marx*," 1933, Burleigh Press, Bristol, p. 12, also cf. Eng. Tr. of Engel's "*Anti Duhring*," by Emile Burns, Ed. C. P. Dutt, p. 44.

12. Lenin, *The Teachings of Karl Marx*, p. 13.

13. Lenin, *Absolute and Relative Truth*; also *Materialism and Empirio-criticism in Collected Works, Vol. XIII*, p. 103.

opposites is absolute" ¹⁴—not relative. Its objective aspect consists in its inevitably and truly reflecting the nature of that stage of the world process out of which it springs. It is the child, born of nature and a child who inherits and, inheriting, and supplementing inheritance by the influence of the company of the mother, exhibits all her traits. In so far as it does this, it is objective.

'Thought, however, may do more than this; it may pass from reality to phantasy. "The approach of the mind (of man) to a particular thing, the taking of a cast of it (in other words, an impression) is not a simple, direct act; a *lifeless mirror reflection*, but a twofold, complex, zig-zag act, which harbours the possibility that the phantasy may entirely fly away from reality; what is more it harbours the possibility that the abstract conception, the idea, may be transformed (imperceptibly and unwittingly on the part of man) into phantasy (and in the long run into God.)" ¹⁵ This transformation of man's true thought of reality into phantasies like demons, spirits, angles, gods, is mainly due to a conflict with multitarious natural and social forces.

What is true of thought in general, is equally true of sciences and theories. They are all dialectically related. all reflect the surrounding world and are liable to run into falsehoods by conflict with natural and social forces. "By the dialectical advance of knowledge, the scientific doctrine of structure of substances or the chemical composition of food and the electrons may become antiquated with time", and so may any other theories. ¹⁶ But each will give place to a dialectically more developed theory.

14. Lenin, *Lenin Miscellany*, Vol. XII, p. 324, Russian Ed.

15. Lenin, *Lenin Miscellany*, Vol. XII, p. 399; cf. also "on Dialectics" *Selected Works*, Vol. XI.

16. Lenin, *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism*, p. 152.

Likewise, dialectic as a procedure is the best method of discovery and research. "A phenomenon must be grasped as a whole, in its totality and in the systematic and inevitable relationship and development."¹¹ A study which adopts this method, "gives a true picture of the objective world". The natural sciences have already apprehended this truth and have followed it for over a century with much profit. Their method of discovery, however, must be modified further by the procedure of looking for contradictions and their syntheses, because procedure by contradictions and syntheses, is the absolute law of all nature. Induction is a correct method of study but it is only an element in the dialectical procedure.

This account of dialectical materialism as a theory of knowledge is not complete. It reveals only one aspect of it and there is another aspect, no less important. And that is this, that thought is dialectically related to its opposite, action, and of the two action is primary. "It depends for its significance on the activity of nature, society and man which embody it." Thinking arises out of living. Ideas and ideals arise out of active life and it is the latter which determines the former. "By acting upon the world and changing it, is the world knowable."¹² Utopias, being unaccompanied by action are, therefore, mere phantasies and dreams. Likewise, theory is dialectically linked with its opposite, practice, and depends for its significance on practice. Thought arises out of the activity of nature, society and man, and is moulded into theory. Theory again becomes a guide to practice ; but though a guide to practice, it gets further modification and enrichment from practice. Truth is the union of thought and action and of theory and practice. "Theory without practice is sterile, and practice without

17. V. Adoratsky, *Dialectical Materialism*, p. 34.

18. Marx, *Essays on the Materialists Conception of History*.

theory is blind" and either without the other fails to reflect nature. They are then mere phantasies and abstractions rather than truths. "It is in practice that man must prove the truth." Dialectical materialism as a theory is, therefore, at once an interpretation and a process of changing the world.¹⁹

The synthesis of ideas and practice is found in experimental science. Dialectical materialism as a method is, therefore, essentially experimental, but its experiments proceed dialectically.

Apart from the dialectical nature of knowledge and its relation to action, there is yet another aspect of it that needs attention, and that is its freedom. While thought and existence are both controlled by dialectical necessity, thought is regarded as free and existence determined. But there is no discrepancy here. Necessity in relation with consciousness is dialectically transformed into freedom.²⁰ "Freedom is the appreciation of necessity. *Necessity is blind only so far as it is not understood.*"²¹ Consciousness of determination leads to conscious determination. "In nature and also up to now for the most part in human history", a set of dialectical laws asserted themselves unconsciously in the form of external necessity. But the dialectical laws of human thought, though "identical" with the above set "in substance", differs from them only in "expression, in so far as the human mind can apply them consciously."²² Conscious application of these laws to bring about changes is the essence of freedom.

19. Lenin, *The Teachings of Karl Marx*, Burleigh Press, Bristol, p. 14.

20. *Ibid.* p. 13.

21. Engels, *Anti Duhring*, p. 130.

22. Engels, *Ludwig Feuerbach*, Ed. by C. P. Dutt, p. 54. also cf. Lenin, *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism*, Collected Works, Vol. XIII, p. 153.

No theory of knowledge is complete unless it supplies a criterion of truth. What then is this criterion, according to dialectical materialism? Materialism of the old type gave no standard of truth, for how could mechanically determined ideas be true or false? Its rescue in correspondence theory was hopeless, because correspondence implies some identity and to hold this is to make reality and ideas identical, admitting which is opening a way to Hegelian idealism. Nor is the criterion of idealism any criterion of truth at all, for truth, according to it, can be found only in the coherence of all knowledge, and to judge the truth of a single judgement, one has to have the whole of knowledge, which indeed is impossible.

That theory alone is true which, on the bases of its principles, can forecast events and its predictions come out true. In the establishment of communism and in the recurrence of crises in the capitalist world, the predictions of the founder are said to have come out true and, therefore, the doctrine stands established.

III

This completes our account of dialectical materialism as a theory of knowledge. We have discovered all the alleged laws of the movement of things and thought. Now we proceed to consider dialectical materialism as a philosophy of social life or historical materialism, as it is otherwise called. This theory traces the dialectical laws we have already studied in social history. Social history is not a loosely connected pageantry of kings and heroes, but a complex of self-developing interconnected phenomena. Society, like nature and thought, by its inner move, evolves and evolves by dialectical necessity in a spiral pattern, embodying all the dialectical laws like negation, interpenetration, regression, negation of negation, transformation of quality into quantity and quantity into quality, knowledge through action, necessity, freedom etc.

Nature gives birth to human life with an impulse to maintain itself. This impulse develops itself dialectically into the various forms of "productive forces." These forces cause "production of the means of life" and thus determine maintenance of life. Dialectical development in the production of the means of life ultimately determines the dialectical development of the relations into which human beings necessarily and inevitably enter. These relations are thus at bottom productive relations, and "the totality of these productive relations constitutes the economic structure of society." This economic structure of society is "the real basis upon which a legal and political super-structure arises." The dialectically developing modes of production of the material means of life thus determine, in general the social, political and intellectual processes of life. "At a certain stage of their development", the material productive forces of society 'come into conflict with existing productive relationships, or, what is but a legal expression for the same thing, with the property relationships within which they have hitherto moved.' Far from being the source of growth to the productive forces, "these relationships turn into their fetters;" and, the more they become so, the greater is the effort of these forces to free themselves of them. After a zig-zag struggle, which may last for centuries or years and after accidental and temporary regressions, they free themselves from their shackles with a jerk or a leap, taking, like all jerks and leaps, a *comparatively very small period of time*. This leap or jerk is a "change in the economic foundation of society and with this the whole gigantic super structure, is more or less rapidly transformed" into a qualitatively different and new social order. And this process of social life repeats itself at higher and still higher planes and forms the great ever-rising spiral of social development.²³ All phenomena of

23. Marx, Preface to *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy*, Chicago, 1904.

social life, government, private property, capital, freedom and the like, are supposed to illustrate this scheme of things.²⁴

Struggle between the productive forces and property relationships takes the form of class struggle for the control and ownership of the means of production between the propertied and the propertyless, between the oppressor and the oppressed. The dynamic factor in history is the struggle for dominance between social classes, themselves set in motion by economic conditions. This struggle goes on dialectically, giving rise to new forms of production and new social structures, each more developed than the preceding one. Antagonism between free men and slaves, patricians and plebeians, barons and serfs, guild burghers and journeymen, have resulted, by the resolution of the antagonism, through dominance of the second factor, by revolutionary jumps, in the formation of social epochs, in broad outline, designated as the Asiatic, the classical, the feudal and the capitalist forms of production and social orders—each performing its historic task and passing away to make room for its successor. The capitalist social system has given rise to two mutually antagonistic classes, the bourgeoisie and the proletariat and the struggle between these classes is inevitably leading to the dominance of the latter and, by revolutions, to the consequent transformation of the system into communism, a private-propertyless and, for that reason, classless, social order, now in the making.²⁵

The economic development of society ultimately determines its intellectual processes as any other processes. "It is not the consciousness of human beings that determines their existence, but, conversely, it is their social existence that

24. Engels, *Anti-Duhring*, Part II, p. 167ff.

25. Marx, *The Communist Manifesto*.

determines their consciousness."²⁶ "Social consciousness is the outcome of social existence."²⁷ Social ideas and social ideals are the results of social economic conditions. But, as Engels holds, ideologies, arising from social relations, acquire a power of their own and can retard or accelerate social development and become instrumental aids to the historical process.²⁸ Social theory itself is a guide to action. "Theory.....alone, can give to a movement confidence, guidance, strength and understanding of the inner relations between events, it alone can help practice to clarify the process and direction of class movements."²⁹ History gives "no ready-made samples." In the historical process there is a place for ideal planning. Ideas go beyond the real, and that they must do in order to guide action, but the more they are based on concrete experience and the nearer they are to a dialectical forecast, the more useful will they be to social development.

To create right ideology, to plan schemes and to construct social theories, a scientific leadership and a foresight based on the study of actual state of affairs is needed.³⁰ Social movements are not mere mechanical movements and historical behaviour is not a complex of mere reflexes. It needs conscious planning and an organised lead. It is organised leadership and disciplined following which carry the historical process to higher and yet higher planes.

26. Marx, Preface to *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy*, Chicago, 1904.

27. Lenin, *The Teachings of Karl Marx*, p. 16.

28. Engels, *Ludwig Feuerbach*.

29. Stalin quoted by V. Adoratsky, *Dialectical Materialism*, p. 9.

30. V. Adoratsky, *Dialectical Materialism*, p. 9.

This is a brief exposition of dialectical materialism as a philosophy of history and with this I finish my account of Dialectical Materialism.

In view of the fact that study must proceed from the apprehension of a part to the comprehension of a whole, the study of the dialectical process may begin from any part of the process, but partly because it is one's social surroundings which one is chiefly interested to know and change, partly because of the influence of the Humanism of Feuerbach and others, and partly because of a justified personal bitterness against the then existing society, the founder of Dialectical Materialism actually began this study with the dialectic of society, though, of course, logically and historically, the dialectic of existence and knowledge are prior to the dialectic of society. Dialectical Materialism as a philosophy is chiefly used to back dialectical materialism as a social theory.

IV

This sketch of Dialectical Materialism, brief as it is, brings out the fact that the doctrine combines within itself elements drawn from several currents of thought. It is a synthesis of the 19th century Hegelianism, Post Hegelian Humanism, Materialism, revolutionary Socialism, classical economics and natural sciences. From Hegelianism it takes its dialectics leaving out its idealism. From Humanism it accepts its realism, historicity, communism, its emphasis on the social foundations of religion and its bias for making man and his needs the central theme, rejecting, at the same time, its ethics (Moses Hess), pantheism (Strauss), criticism (Bruno Bauer), liberalism (Arnold Ruge), ultrism, anarchism (Max Stirner), religiousness, sensationalism, anthropomorphism (Ludwig Feuerbach), ideologies and doctrines of truth.³¹ From French materialists and revolutionary socialists, it

31. Sidney Hook, *From Hegel to Marx*.

borrowed its socialism and materialism, rejecting its absolutism and utopianism. From classical economics it gets its theory of value leaving out its husk of individualism, egoism and hedonism. From physical sciences it takes their notions of energy and motion, discarding their purely quantitative viewpoint and from Biological sciences, their concept of organism, modifying their concept of evolution.

Before I offer any adverse criticism of Dialectical Materialism, I should like to make a few appreciative remarks. It seems to me that in spite of its diverse sources, the doctrine has a remarkable unity of conception. Its most distinguishing feature is its emphasis on the relation of knowledge and practice. The doctrine which was developed by the great trio of Greek philosophers with regards to ethics, has been rightly applied to the whole sphere of knowledge. Experimental sciences, technology, and even mysticism bear testimony to the union of thought and action.

Further it does not seem likely for an impartial judge not to appreciate the war of Dialectical Materialism against solipsism, 'vulgar' materialism, mechanism, anarchism³² and capitalism. Nor does it seem possible for one to resist its appeal in its cry against individualism, egoism, hedonism, aggrandizement, exploitation, oppression and in its emphasis on equality of opportunities, planned activity, communal life, self-help, unity, service, discipline and the like—an appeal which, in spite of the non-ethical nature of the doctrine, appears to me at bottom in most cases moral rather than intellectual. Whatever the professions of its authors it is consciousness of human needs and social injustice which spurred their

32. Marx's revolt against anarchism, terrorism and secretly organised armed bodies is clear from his criticism of Max Stirner, his conflict with Bakunin and his rage against Lessalle, cf. R. W. Postgate, *Karl Marx*, p. 52, also cf. Sidney Hook, *From Hegel to Marx*, p. 180ff.

thought to dialectical flight and it is chiefly these, despite their veil of material terminology, which appeal to humanity.

Dialectical Materialism seems to explain certain phenomena of nature and life. It escapes the vicious circle of the modern cost of production theory of economics which explains value by value or price by price. Its predictions of repeated economic crises and rise of communism have come out true, though why this rise of communism should have been in Russia, a semi-feudal and semi-industrial country and not in England and America, is yet, in spite of all efforts to explain it away, not dialectically clear. It is also true that many scientific theories lend support to it. Besides, dialectical materialism as a method, though not infallible, is yet a useful tool of investigation. It has more utility than the dialectical method of the Greeks. Its tridents are suggestive of hypotheses about concrete realities. Much insight into the nature of phenomena can be gained by looking into their contradictions, contraries and their syntheses, if syntheses are there.

Yet with all this, the doctrine can hardly be said to have been established. The scientific theories which lend support to it are after all working hypotheses, and working hypotheses cannot be considered final. They have changed in the past and there is no guarantee that they will not change in the future. Take, for instance, the theory of mutation. The occurrence of mutation and hereditary transmission, under some conditions, of the characters so appearing, is a fact; but whether the process has played an *important* role in the evolution of species is yet a disputed question. A doctrine which borrows its main strength from working hypotheses, can itself be nothing more than a working hypothesis. At best it can be a plausible hypothesis. But for the supporters of the theory it is not so. For them it is unquestionable, absolute truth. Nothing else is absolute but this. To an average Dialectical Materialist it is an article of faith. It

has indeed some practical value. Its optimistic conclusion that the final victory of the proletariat is inevitably ensured by the dialectical law of nature, has spurred the proletariat to action and, through action, to a large measure of achievement. But strong optimistic beliefs, of whatever nature, have always led to action and achievement. Does not History amply show that belief in God and divine assistance has led people to the conquest of vast empires? For the dialectical materialist, however, belief in God is a falsehood and a phantasy. But then in that case belief in such falsehoods and phantasies has as much practical value as belief in Dialectical Materialism, if not more. Again if mere practical value be the criterion of value, such alleged falsehoods also become truths—a glaring contradiction. Truth is that the practical value of which is *abiding*. The practical value of mathematics, for example, is lasting, not confined to phenomena limited to moments, hours, years or even centuries. Dialectical Materialism has yet to stand this test.

But what about its test of prediction? A few of its predictions have undoubtedly come true, but predictions can be made on wrong premises, in fact even without premises. They can be mere conjectures, and it is an undoubted fact that even conjectures haphazardly made come out amazingly true. A few predictions by themselves can hardly establish theories, however much they may add to their plausibility.

Having made these general remarks I should now like to subject Dialectical Materialism to a close examination.

The word materialism as used for this doctrine is a misnomer. It is not used in its ordinary sense—not in the sense that reality is ultimately made of one irreducible, unique stuff, matter, though that is also sometimes implied.³³ It is

33. Engel, *Historical Materialism*, New York, 1902, p. 8.

primarily used in opposition to idealism. "The great basic question of all, and especially of recent philosophy", says Engels, "is the question of the relationship between thought and existence, between spirit and nature.....Which is prior to the other: spirit or nature? Philosophers are divided into two great camps, according to the way in which they have answered this question. Those who declare that spirit existed before nature, and who, in the last analysis, therefore, assume in one way or another that the world was created.....have formed the idealist camp. The others, who regard nature as primary, belong to the various schools of materialism"³⁴ "Any other use", agrees Lenin (in a philosophical sense), of the terms idealism and materialism is only confusing."³⁵ The word materialism in this case is thus employed to distinguish reality from thought and to express that reality is prior to thought. These ideas are better expressed by the word realism. Dialectical realism is, therefore, a more appropriate name for the doctrine in view.

John Macmurry's main criticism against Dialectical Materialism is that it takes no cognizance of the fact that human development is not only a process of adaptation to environment but also an effort to adapt the environment to man.³⁶ But this objection is due to a misunderstanding of the doctrine. In spite of sundry remarks, even of Marx, to the contrary,³⁷

34. Engels, *Ludwig Feuerbach*, 1927, p. 27ff. quoted by Lenin, "*The Teachings of Karl Marx*", p. 13. also cf. C. P. Dutt's Eng. ed. of Engels "*Ludwig Feuerbach*", p. 31.

35. Lenin *The Teachings of Karl Marx*, Burleigh Press, Bristol, p. 13.

36. John Macmurry, *The Philosophy of Communism*; p.71ff.

37. "In the social production of the means of life, human beings enter into necessary relations which are independent of their will." Marx, Preface to *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy*, Chicago, 1904.

the dialectical materialist does recognise the effort to adapt the environment to man as much as any other doctrine. Its very idea of labour i. e. effort made to use the wealth of nature for the production of things which satisfy human needs, is enough to falsify his view. Dialectical Materialism does recognise in the scheme of things a place for theorising, conscious planning and moulding the environment. Human relations, according to the doctrine, are not, as he assumes, simply the mechanical relation of an effect to its cause and the organic relation of reaction of an organism to stimuli, but also the relation of a conscious and active agent to its environment--of an agent who changes the world around him to suit his needs—who, determined as he is, determines his surroundings.

Although John Macmurry is, I believe, wrong in bringing against Dialectical Materialism the above mentioned charge yet he is right in pointing out that the doctrine fails to recognise some ultra-economic (which he calls ultra-organic) relations between man and man. In human society, class-struggle in class-interest is not the only relation that counts. To hold this is to make the same mistake as liberalism does in assuming that individual competition in self-interest is the sole relation which determines economic life—an assumption which none has condemned more strongly than the Dialectical Materialists themselves. But the phenomenon of cooperation is as much responsible for the development of the capitalist society as individual competition. Human affections and loyalties play as great a role in social life as human antagonism, and one will not be far wrong in saying that the former are as much responsible for social development as the latter. Even class-struggle is impossible, if there is no class solidarity. It may be said that the role of class solidarity in human society is recognised by dialectical materialism. Yes, it is, but only as subordinate to class-struggle, and it is this

subordination of it which is questioned here. It is very doubtful if class-antagonism is the motive-force in the development of society or *peace and harmony of motives*. If the society of ants and bees and some species of birds can give us the clue, it is perhaps the latter. If so, where remains the dialectical process ?

But even if class struggle has been the cause of social development in the past, there is no reason why it should be also in future. This view is repugnant to the Dialectical Materialist, but, strange as it may appear, it is an implication of his own position. In a classless society class-struggle ceases, and if it ceases the dialectical process must come to an end.

Indeed, there is only one way out of this for the dialectical process to continue, and that lies in thought-struggle. In a perfectly classless society, not classes but ideas may arise develop into their opposites and result in syntheses. But then to hold this, is not to hold Dialectical Materialism but Hegelian Idealism, against which we are warned at every step.

It may be said that in classless society thought would be linked up with action. If so, the struggle between thoughts would be nothing but a struggle between thinkers, i. e. class struggle. A classless society would then be a society in which classes would struggle. That is, of course, impossible, because self-contradictory. Thus if classless society is possible, historical dialectic is impossible and if historical dialectic is possible, classless society is impossible.

But if the historical dialectic is saved at the expense of classless society, what follows ? It follows that even communist society shall always have class conflicts. But then, there being no private property, the class struggle shall not be a *class struggle for the control and ownership of the means of production*. The economic basis of the struggle will thus

disappear, and the historical dialectic will lose its alleged moving force and so cease to be a process at all.

To the criticism that the dialectical process will cease with the ceasing of class struggle, Lenin replies that "antagonism and contradiction are far from being the same. The first will disappear, the second will remain in socialism."¹¹ But antagonism is really opposition or contradiction in action, while contradiction without action is a mere thought-contradiction. If mere thought-contradiction remains in socialism, the dialectical process does continue, but only as a thought process; and to hold this, as I have said before, is nothing but to hold Hegelian idealism.

The same conclusion follows from Engels' statement that thought movement is the highest stage of the dialectical process. If this is true, then thought contradictions really are the contradictions which would work in a highly developed society and shall guide will-movements of men. In such a case, not action will determine thought, but thought will determine action, for lower processes are mere accessories to the higher ones. Thus dialectical materialism, with each effort of getting out of idealism, lands itself into idealism.

Further it fails to prove its own absoluteness and the absoluteness of the dialectical law. We are told that each theory reflects the stage of development from which it arises. Dialectical Materialism on its own principles then reflects the environment from which it has come out and not existence as a whole, which it claims in declaring the absoluteness of the law of dialectic. Besides, the fact that it reflects one particular environment, shows that it is not final and must be replaced by a doctrine which would reflect the next higher stage—a doctrine which may have no place for the dialectical law.

Is there any other proof of the absoluteness of this law? It cannot be proved empirically, for how can we know from past instances as to what will follow in the future? It can not be considered *apriori*, because nothing according to dialectical Materialism is *a priori*. It cannot be deduced from other laws, for it is the highest law of all. Nor can it be said to be self-evident, because so many deny it. So we cannot but conclude that it cannot in any known way be proved, and is, therefore, a so-far-unestablished hypothesis, serving the purpose of a faith.

From whichever side we may approach the doctrine of dialectical materialism, its inconsistencies stare us in the face. These inconsistencies may, however, be said to be dialectical contradictions. If so, then these contradictions may temporarily unite into consistency and again breed inconsistencies. The doctrine will then be an evergoing sequence of consistencies and inconsistencies—not a bright prospect, I am sure.

Again the usual criticism against Hegel's tridents equally applies to the tridents of dialectical materialism. At times they are too artificial and facts seem to have been distorted to fit into them. But this is hardly unexpected in a theory which is designed expressly with the motive of serving a specific end. This artificiality of tridents is shown by the fact that the tridents given in the Holy Family and those given in the Capital, do not in all cases tally.

Moreover, the so-called contradictories of the tridents are sometimes contradictories, sometimes contraries and sometime mere differentials. Concrete contradictories and contraries involve an element of opposition, but they equally involve an element of identity and the latter element is as important to their nature as the former. Red is not green, but though both are different, they are yet both colours. They are as much opposed as they are united in colour. It may be said

that in colour lies their dialectical synthesis. To say this would perhaps be right, on Hegelian idealism, but if existence is prior to thought, then it is in yellow that they unite and not in colour. Similarly contradictions are all contradictions within an identity. Red and not-red as contradictories are yet united in the identity, colour, for 'not-red' is nothing but 'all colours but red.'

This is about contraries, and contradictories, but opposites of the tridents are sometimes 'mere others' or mere different. But to tell us that in existence there are *different* things and new things are formed by the combination of these different things, no prophet is needed.

In support of Hegel's statement that a different in the dialectical process is a different, not "absolutely different from any other, but from *its* other," Lenin remarks: 'very true and important: the other as *its* other, development into *its* opposite.' But in point of fact everything has *everything else* as *its* different. What is implied by these statements is that apart from *its mere others* everything has a *correlative other*. Life and death, matter and thought are indeed correlatives, but what, one may ask, is the correlative of space, time, the sun, the moon, the earth, the peacock throne or the Taj?

Thus the idea that reality moves dialectically lands us in difficulties. But does thought move dialectically? Hegel, indeed, did say so, but for him thought process was not in time. To ascertain the value of his view we could not appeal to psychology. But for the dialectical materialist, existence, including its highest stage, thought, moves in time. Thought-process-in-time is a subject of psychological study and modern psychology does not seem to lend support to this view.

The Revolt against Metaphysics.

*(A Critical Examination of Contemporary
Logical Positivism)*

BY

D. M. DATTA.

(Putna College)

PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS.

(Indian Philosophy Section)

In departing from the usual custom of discussing some ancient theme of Indian philosophy in the presidential address of this section of the Congress, I owe a personal explanation. I am interested in Indian philosophy not as a mere historical fossil, but in so far as it contains some living issues and ideas, not yet antiquated by the progress of human thought. One of the immortal elements of Indian philosophy is its method of ascertaining truth after considering *first* the views of *all* possible opponents. When we find that even the most orthodox schools earnestly studied and examined the views of the most heretic thinkers known to them, we feel no doubt that had the current of ancient philosophic thought continued here uninterrupted, the study and consideration of the modern western views would form an integral part of its discussions. And if Indian Philosophy, by which I mean philosophizing in India by its modern inhabitants, is once more to acquire life, it must move out of the antiquarian's sanctum and squarely face all modern problems. It must criticise its own ideas in the light of the western and the western ideas in the light of its own. The recognition of this important function of Indian philosophy encourages me to discuss the anti-metaphysical movement which has just been gathering force in some parts of Europe

and threatening the possibility of *all* metaphysics western as well as eastern.

Brief history of Logical Positivism.

This movement has come to be known as Logical Positivism and is flourishing most in Germany, Austria and Poland, though it originated chiefly from the logical researches and the philosophical views of some Cambridge philosophers like *Wittgenstein*, *Moore* and *Russell* and Positivists like *Comte* and *Mach*. It was cradled in Vienna by a philosophical group, known as the *Wiener Kreis* or the Vienes circle, the out-standing members of which were *Carnap* and *Schlick* and it has been gradually spreading, though not without splitting into opposite wings led by these two thinkers. The German philosophical magazine, *Erkenntnis* is devoted to the dissemination of the views of this school. But its doctrines, as well as criticisms of them are also being published in English journal like *Mind* and *The Journal of Philosophy*. Its chief feature—and the one with which we are directly concerned here, is its revolt against metaphysics.

Its Anti metaphysical Attitude.

Logical Positivism is more systematic and thorough-going than many earlier forms of revolt against metaphysics. It does not merely point out the mistakes of metaphysical theories; nor does it merely show the impossibility of metaphysics by proving the unknowable character of reality or the limitations of human mind. It goes further than Hume and Kant to hold that the very problems of metaphysics are *meaningless*. If there is no significant problem at all, the so-called historical metaphysical problems are *pseudo*-problems and the answers to them, that is, metaphysical theories are neither true nor even wrong, they are all meaningless.

The Grounds : (1) Conception of metaphysics, (2) Criterion of meaning.

This attitude of Logical Positivism rests on two chief grounds, namely its *conception of metaphysics* and its *criterion of meaning*.

By metaphysics these positivists mean any theory about reality behind the experienced phenomena. As Mr. Ayer, an English follower puts it in his article, *Demonstration of the Impossibility of Metaphysics*, in *Mind*, July 1934.

"For, it is the aim of metaphysics to describe a reality lying beyond experience and therefore any proposition which would be verified by empirical observation is *ipso facto* not metaphysical." "The fundamental postulate of metaphysics," according to him is that "There is a super-(or hinter—) phenomenal reality." (p. 339.)

To this conception of metaphysics, these positivists apply their peculiar criterion of meaning, namely that 'the meaning of a proposition consists in its method of verification' (*ibid*). From these two premises they deduce the conclusion that metaphysics (i. e., both, the problems and the assertions of metaphysics) is meaningless. Briefly the argument is :

All significant propositions are at least theoretically verifiable by experience.

No metaphysical proposition (dealing with super-phenomenal reality) is so verifiable.

Therefore, no metaphysical proposition is a significant proposition.

The Proper function of Philosophy.

It would appear that in condemning metaphysics, they do not condemn the whole of philosophy ; but philosophy in so far as it tries to enquire, or assert theories, about any reality lying beyond experience. Besides this illegitimate function of philosophy, there is its legitimate part, which it can

profitably play by analyzing propositions about empirical facts.

How is philosophy related then to science? Regarding this, the logical positivists as well as the dominating group of contemporary philosophers at *Cambridge, Vienna, Prague, Warsaw* and *Lwow* tend to the same answer. The task of investigating empirical facts belongs to the special sciences. Philosophy has no right to trespass into these scientific preserves. It should not even try to build systems by piecing together scientific discoveries. The task of synthesizing the partial truths of science into a grand view of the universe as a whole used to be the privilege of philosophy especially under the auspices of Hegelian metaphysics. But the wisdom of this course is seriously questioned. If the so-called 'science of sciences' is to justify its claims, its method should be strictly scientific and experimental and its results should be scientifically verifiable. But no system of synthetic metaphysics is able to justify its world view by experimental verification. Really these synthetic views are the work of poetic and aesthetic imagination and should be classed apart with them and not confused with scientific views.

But if philosophy is driven, on the one hand, from the study of any reality behind phenomena on the ground that it is a meaningless pursuit, and, on the other hand from the study of empirical facts because it is a trespass into the domain of the sciences, where does it stand? Deprived of its territory philosophy should rather be allowed to die, than live the pitiable life of a dethroned Emperor condemned to life-long penal servitude. Unfortunately, this is what befalls the lot of philosophy.

The Logical Positivists and their allies return the same verdict. Philosophy must continue, but it must also observe the following conditions strictly.

- a. It must shed all meaningless inquisitiveness regarding reality behind phenomena.
- b. It must give up all ambitions of lording it over the sciences by playing the absurd role of the science of sciences and building world-views.
- c. It must restrict its activity to logical analysis of scientific findings; it must never question the authority of the sciences, but only try to clarify the meanings of scientific propositions, by reducing the more complex and abstract propositions to the simplest and the most concrete ones.

While it is the duty of the sciences to discover empirical facts and their laws, it is the duty of philosophy to analyze the propositions given to it by the sciences and find out their relations. This has been sometimes expressed by saying that 'philosophy is an activity, not a doctrine.' (*Mind*, July 1934, p. 337) or that "statements about syntactical or logical relations can be regarded as the specific doctrinal content of philosophy, which is not metaphysics". (*Journal of Philosophy* Jan. 16, 1936, p. 37).

To put it more pointedly, science needs the help of many analysts chemical, bacteriological and even logical. The office of logical analysis is mercifully allotted to philosophy.

How Indian Philosophy is Affected ?

But we are concerned here not so much with the history of the movement, as with the problem, how far, if at all, it affects Indian Philosophy. Apparently any Indian system that believes in any reality beyond the grasp of empirical experience becomes *ipsa facto* the object of its criticism. If the logical Positivist be right, Monistic *Vedānta* with its belief in the falsity of the phenomenal and the reality of the absolute would be a totally absurd philosophy. But this would not be all. The other schools of *Vedānta*,

in so far as they believe in God, soul, immortality and liberation beyond earthly existence would not escape refutation. Similarly, the *Sankhya* belief in the unexperienceable first cause or *Prakriti* and spirits, the *Mimamsa* belief in gods, souls, *apurva*, *sakti* and *karma* (all of which are non-physical realities beyond empirical experience), and even the *Nyaya-Vaisesika* belief in God, senses, atoms, *adrsta*, time, space, *akasa* and similar unperceivable entities and laws would be equally condemned. Of the heretical schools, the *Charvukas* would perhaps be the only one unaffected. The *jainas* believe in the extra-mundane eternal existence of the soul and also in similar imperceptible objects like, *akasa*, atoms, time, *karma*, influx of *karma* etc., and, therefore, they also expose themselves to similar criticism. Even the *Buddhas*, do not escape this fate altogether. For though the philosophical Buddhists are empirical enough to disbelieve all substances, spiritual and physical, they believe yet in the imperceptible law of *karma*, the continuity of life beyond this birth and even *nirvana*, which is not total extinction but a blissful extra-mundane existence, at least according to some.

It is not far to seek, therefore, that if any system of Indian thought (except the *Charvaka* which can be hardly called a system) has to maintain its existence in the modern international field of philosophy, and not merely live in the minds of blind followers, it must regard this strong new movement as a formidable opposition i. e. as a *purvapaksu*, that has to be met boldly.

Critical Estimate of the Movement.

I shall attempt in the following pages a critical estimate of the movement, as a student of Indian Philosophy, though not on behalf of any particular system of thought. I should like very much to invite the followers of the different systems to consider the arguments of the positivists from their respective points of view and try to meet them in their own ways.

But, for the views expressed here, I should not like either to conform or apologise to any of them.

Though I do not fully agree with the spirit of this movement of Logical Positivism, I value it for some good points which I should mention first, before criticizing its defects.

Its Merits:

(a) *Philosophical analysis of Language.*

The greatest service it has done, is to emphasize the vital importance of *philosophical analysis of Language*. This marks a *new epoch in western philosophy*. Hume and especially Kant revolutionized philosophy in Europe by according priority to Epistemology. It was achieved by showing that before we philosophize we should examine the nature and competence of our mind, the instrument of philosophizing. But the other important fact that our thinking and at least the philosophical expression and enunciation of all our thoughts depend on language, which instrument also should be philosophically examined, was not so long realized by modern western thinkers. Moore and Wittgenstein realized it; their continental followers, the Logical Positivists have succeeded in carrying their thoughts further, so as to achieve a new revolution in philosophy by giving to the philosophy of language the supreme place which Epistemology enjoyed since the days of Kant.

It is important to note that Indian thinkers, recognised the necessity of the philosophical analysis of language and grammar many centuries ago. The philosophy of the meanings of words, propositions, syntax etc. which is being developed today by the Logical Positivists in the west was discussed threadbare by these Indian philosophers. It is a pity that this part of Indian philosophy has not attracted much attention of the modernized students of Indian philosophy, and possibly because western philosophy, whose standard of valuation they follow,

did not so long attach any philosophical importance to the analysis of language. But as this attitude of western philosophy has changed, it may be expected that Indian speculation on language would receive closer attention. It will be found that the *Sabda-Khaṇḍa* of later Nyāya, as well as the methodology of Mīmāṃsā, contains a rich store of linguistic theories which can compare very favourably with the modern researches. To these we may add the many works on grammar and rhetoric, in which also we find here and there, materials for the study of the philosophy of language.

(b) *Elimination of Pseudo-problems.*

A good result of the positivists' method of analyzing complex and abstract philosophical propositions into the simplest and the most concrete ones to ascertain their exact significance and correctness is the clarification of problems. Though we may not accept fully the positivist's criterion of significance, we must agree with them, in the main, that there are many problems in philosophy which are found on analysis to be meaningless or vague and, therefore, it is a waste of energy to try to answer them. It would always be desirable, therefore, to analyse the problem before we exercise our mind over it. To give some examples of our own : The problem "Does God exist" cannot be answered. The positivist will declare that this question is *meaningless*, because it is about some super-phenomenal reality beyond experience and verification. Even if we do not go so far, we must admit that this question is at least *vague* and cannot be answered without ascertaining the meanings of the words 'God' and 'exist', which carry for different persons widely different meanings. Similarly, the problem of the one and the many would be found to be vague and unanswerable, unless we fix the meaning of "unity". To take an example from Indian Philosophy, when a critic of Nyāya asks, "If a *jāti* or universal like cowness is eternal, where does the cowness in a particular cow go, when it dies ?", the question is

found to be meaningless. Because the question of 'coming' and 'going' i.e. of movement in space is significant only regarding a *substance* and that also if it occupies *space* and only if that space is *limited*. These conditions being absent in a *jati*, the question is meaningless.

Kant also showed it long ago, that by the force of blind habit we try to predicate of certain things predicates which are inapplicable to them and thus many of the metaphysical puzzles and quarrels arise to keep us uselessly busy for ages. If we can sift away the pseudo-problems from the real ones, the burden of philosophy would be considerably lightened.

(c) *Clear distinction between Science and Philosophy.*

Another good teaching of the positivists is the clear distinction they make between scientific and metaphysical doctrines. There are everywhere philosophers who are fascinated by the success and popularity of the special sciences and try to pass their pet philosophical theories as scientific. Even in India, we find some scholars, as well as, half-informed propagandists busy capturing the popular mind by demonstrating the scientific nature of Vedānta, Sāṅkhya etc. The positivists have done a service by pointing out clearly that metaphysical doctrines (those that deal with superphenomenal reality) cannot be likened to scientific ones, because unlike the latter they are experientially unverifiable. It is true that the word 'science' has a sense wider than the one we find in 'special sciences,' and that sense is 'systematic knowledge.' But this is so common and unattractive, that very few among philosophers who envy really the fortune of the special sciences would care to own it.

The realization of the distinction between the scientific and philosophical theories is absolutely necessary, for the correct interpretation of Indian Philosophy in this scientific age. For though it might not prevent the attempt of Indian *missionaries* abroad who imitate their Christian colleagues and

weave science into Yoga and Vedānta to recruit western followers, yet it should at least be able to prevent Indian scholars from thinking, for example, that Vedānta can be scientifically justified by proving the identity of chaitanya with electrical energy, or the identity of māyā with the most modern Einsteinian relativity.

Objections :

In spite of these good points there are certain serious objections against the general outlook and some particular doctrines of the Logical Positivists, which we should discuss next.

1. The Assumption of the Absoluteness of Scientific method.

The most important point to note is that while Logical Positivism in one way tries to keep the boundary between philosophy and science clear by warning off philosophers from the study of empirical facts like space, time, causality etc., it forgets this boundary line in another way. By ignoring the possibility of any other standard of value except the scientific, it tries to *affiliate Philosophy to science*. Lest the old vessel of

Philosophy would sink in modern scientific waters, it lightens the burden of philosophy by throwing overboard every other cargo, except the 'Analysis of propositions scientifically certified'. Philosophy thus shrinks into Logic and Logic confines itself to the grammar and syntax of Language. It shuns metaphysics and is indifferent to Ethics, theology and political philosophy.

This liquidation of Philosophy in favour of Science is psychologically due to the blind awe and admiration at the triumph of the special sciences and forgetting the distinction between science and philosophy. Positivism covets the honour enjoyed by science and tries to put on the scientific garb.

It may be true that if Philosophy must be scientific, things could not be otherwise managed. But the most important question to ask is: Why must Philosophy be scientific and not philosophical?

In an age the atmosphere of which is full of admiration for science this question would perhaps sound absurd to the layman and even to some philosophers. They might ask, "Should philosophy then be unscientific?" The reply to this would be—"No, Philosophy may be *non-scientific*, though not unscientific." It may also be added, that philosophy can even be scientific, if 'science' is taken in the wider sense of 'systematic knowledge'; and then it may not be necessary for it to satisfy the canons of the experimental sciences, which the positivists apply to philosophy. The Positivist might reply to this, that philosophy must confine itself to empirical reality and therefore must obey the scientific canons because metaphysics of the super-empirical is meaningless.

2. The Criterion of Meaning is Defective.

Let us then examine the view that if metaphysics deals with super-phenomenal reality it deals with meaningless problems. This proposition rests, as already shown, on the central doctrine of Logical Positivism, namely that a sentence is significant only if it is verifiable, if it is not verifiable it is meaningless. This has come to be known as the verification theory of meaning and is sometimes stated by saying that the meaning of a statement depends on the mode of its verification. Stace has pointed out some objections against this criterion of meaning in his article *Metaphysics and Meaning in Mind*, October 1935 and has suggested the amendment that the criterion of meaning should be experiencibility rather than verifiability. But yet, we think, the criterion is not satisfactory.

(a. *Confusion between Intelligibility and Verifiability.*

Because this criterion of meaning involves a confusion between two distinct attitudes we can have about a statement namely *understanding its meaning* and *believing in its truth*.

We are aware that the Positivists' conception of verification

has undergone development and also differs with different adherents. Consequently we are liable to be accused of misunderstanding their criterion. Let us anticipate those objections

The English exponent, Ayer, might point out, with the support of Schlick, that the criterion of meaning is not *practical* verifiability but *theoretical* verifiability *in principle* that a statement like, "There is a mountain 10,000 feet high on the other side of the moon", is quite significant. There is no lack of theoretical possibility of verification in this case. "If we got to the other side of the moon we should know how to settle the question." (*Mind* p. 340, 1934)).

But in spite of this modified enunciation of the criterion we would ask, when we read in a story, or better, in a scrap of paper picked up from the street, 'Once upon a time, a dog got a bone on the street', do we understand its meaning? And if the meaning is understood, (which must be admitted unless the usual meaning of 'meaning' is changed by these common-sense philosophers), we would ask where is the theoretical possibility of verifying this statement? Can we even imagine any situation in space-time whence this could be verified to be true or false?

That Mr. Ayer forgets the commonsense distinction between the questions of understanding a statement and believing it—between significance and truth—is quite clear from some of his statements. Speaking about the meaning of the statement about the existence of a mountain on the other side of the moon, he says :

"We know what sort of observation would verify or falsify it." Again in another place he observes, "to give the meaning of a proposition is to give the conditions under which it would be true and those under which it would be false." It would be found here that while attempting to show what observations or conditions would make a statement significant, he speaks of what will make it true or false, as though

the conditions of truth and falsity were identical with those of significance.

There seems, therefore, to be a serious defect in the formulation of the criterion of meaning, on which the Positivists' logical superstructure raises its head to scoff at metaphysical problems as meaningless.

Even Stace's amendment does not remove the defect. The sentence, 'Once upon a time a hungry dog got a bone on the street' occurring in a story cannot be said to be experienceable by any extension of imagination, forward or backward.

But the Positivist or his supporter might contend, that this criticism might affect the verbal formulation of the criterion but not its spirit. It may be said by him that though the sentence as it is may not be verifiable as a whole, its elements namely 'a dog', 'its being hungry', 'a bone', 'its being on the street' etc, are ultimately based on some past experience of the writer and in order that the reader might understand the meaning of the sentence he must be able to recall from his past experience the meanings of the words by referring to such elementary experiences. If the reader has never had any direct or indirect experience of what is meant by a dog, bone street etc., the sentence would convey no meaning to him. It would be a meaningless jumble of sounds.

(Granting that the meaning of each word or simple proposition in which it occurs is learnt in connection with some experience, we may still ask how do we know whether the words combined into a sentence make any meaning? Does the significance of a sentence as a whole also depend on the possibility of its being theoretically verifiable? To be consistent with the criterion of meaning formulated by him, the answer of the Positivist should be in the affirmative (vide Nagel's statement in J. Ph., Jan. 16, 1936, p. 35). If so, then a sentence like "An iron ball released from the hand rises into the air" is significant, because it can be verified and found to be false.

And exactly for similar reasons sentences like "This circle is square", "This barren woman has one child", "The grandfather of Johnson was a bachelor", would also be significant; these sentences can be found to be false by verification.

We find then that the Positivists' criterion of meaning according to which a statement is significant if it is theoretically possible to verify it, logically leads, us to strange consequences: All statements in stories, like "A hungry dog got a bone etc.," are meaningless, whereas statements like "The circle is square" etc., are all meaningful.

We have often heard the realistic precursors of the Positivists' complain that Idealism ignores the very facts from which it starts and on which it stands, does not the same criticism also apply to this outrage on the commonsense meaning of significance which is the starting point of Positivism? It is all the more strange because, some Positivists explicitly declare, like Sankara, that as to meanings of words we have to depend on usage and have no right to legislate. (Ibid, p. 36).

If this criterion of meaning be the chief foundation of Positivism, as many competent exponents and critics declare, a refutation of this might be considered sufficient criticism of the whole superstructure. Consequently the criticism of the Positivist that metaphysical problems are meaningless would carry very little force, as it explicitly depends on a very defective criterion of meaning.

Indian theories about meaning.

Let us mention incidentally that the conditions on which significance of statement depends were discussed by Indian thinkers, the grammarians, rhetoricians, Naiyāyikas, Mimāṃsakas and other schools during a few centuries and the resultant views might be found to be more weighty than the views of the Positivists in their present experimental stage. We

have discussed these Indian views elsewhere and it would be out of place to repeat them here (vide author's *Six Ways of Knowing* ; Allen & Unwin, 1932).

(b) The criterion renders even science meaningless.

But we should also mention a few other difficulties of Positivism. Supposing for a moment, that statements about super-phenomenal reality are meaningless, what becomes of the reports of science about the reality of electrons, protons, energy, etc. ? Are they themselves empirically verifiable ? Can we perceive any of these really ? Or do we not simply perceive their effects or some phenomena which are explained with the help of these non-perceptible reals ?

Similarly does not science believe in the continuity of realities during the unperceived inter-perceptual moments ? But is it even theoretically possible to conceive that verification is possible about the statement of the continuity of an object during the moments it is not perceived by any body ?

Again, does not science believe that a reality, like the Sun, perceived by many scientists is identical ? But is it possible to verify, in the light of an individual's own experience, that the object of another man's experience is identical with the object experienced by him ? If not, would not scientific statements about such identity be meaningless according to the Positivist's criterion ?

It would appear, from all these, that the criterion formulated by the Positivists does not simply make metaphysical statements meaningless, even some basic scientific statements are rendered meaningless by it.

3. Positivism is ultimately forced to reform science.

It is at this point, that Positivism is forced to declare that science as it stands to-day requires purging and reformation ; that it still harbours much of the old superstitious habits of thinking and speaking. (vide *J. Ph.*, p. 146, March, 13, 1936)

The criticism may be correct, but the interesting thing to note is that the Positivist starts with the humble mission of *accepting* scientific statements as authentic and only analysing and clarifying them, but *the process of analysis and interpretation gradually brings back the role of a critic and a reformer of science*. He commits the same folly of which he initially accused the metaphysician.

4. Positivism also lapses into metaphysics.

Hans Reichenbach, who, with a few others, has founded the more recent centre of this movement in Berlin, has surveyed the history of the movement in his article, "*Logicistic Empiricism in Germany and the Present State of its Problems*" in *The Journal of Philosophy*, March 12, 1936. He has indicated in this article with a creditable frankness, the many changes which the initial faith of the school has been undergoing. Of these various changes we briefly note only the more important few to show that this scientific philosophy is no longer bound down to the creed of unquestioning obedience to science but is rather implicitly lapsing back into the uncertain sphere of metaphysics.

The Positivists declare that theories like realism and idealism are meaningless, because we cannot ascertain with absolute certainty, whether the object perceived is real or ideal (*Mind* p. 339, 1934, Ayer's statement,).

But we find that in practice Positivists are unwillingly drawn to believe in theories which cannot be verified by experience, and about the certainty of which they themselves differ. A few illustrations will make this clear.

Following Wittgenstein, some positivists hold that words can communicate *only the structure* of our experience which is common to all persons, but *not the content* of experience, which is incommunicable. How can this assertion be verified, without comparing one another's incommunicable experience which is

ex hypothesi impossible? Do not the Positivists then hold a meaningless view, and violate their own precept?

Again, Positivism reduces all meaningful statements to 'given elements'; words can refer only to these elements and not any reality behind them. These given elements were taken at first to be 'mental objects' possessing 'psychical existence.' Under the influence of behaviourism Neurath, an important member of this school, challenged this and he has persuaded Carnap to accept that, what is given to us is not psychical; that the so-called given experience is really, "nothing but a physiological process in our brains." Thus Positivism has recently taken a new turn by identifying itself with materialism, as Reichenbach points out (*J. Ph., loc. cit.*).

(a) *Even the nature of the given undecidable.*

This change of position is significant. It shows that uncertainty (i. e., inability to decide a question with absolute certainty, either in the affirmative or in the negative) does not simply belong to metaphysical questions about reality beyond given experience; *uncertainty also belongs to questions regarding the nature of 'the given itself.'* If the nature of what is given were absolutely certain how would even the Positivists differ among themselves and with their own previous selves? And once the doubt is raised about the very nature of observation and the observed fact in general it cannot surely be removed by observation itself, which is doubted. Are not, then positivists themselves also dealing with problems and theories which are meaningless, according to their own criterion?

(b) *Theoretically, materialism, as undecidable as Idealism.*

It is found that Neurath himself realises that there is an *uncertainty* even about propositions containing the report of *immediate experience*, because the report comes somewhat later than the experience and may, therefore, be distorted and false. (*vide* Reichenbach's statement in *J. Ph.*, p. 150, March, 1936.)

But it is strange that inspite of this uncertainty and inspite of this rigorous desire for absolute certainty, he chooses to cast in his lot with behaviourism and consequently materialism, though the latter is as good an uncertain metaphysical theory as idealism, judged by the positivistic standard.

(c) *Behaviourism leads Positivism to Physiological solipsism.*

It is important to realise that solipsism by which the Logical Positivists were scared from holding Mach's theory of atomic sensory facts as the meanings of words (vide Nagel's statement in *J. Ph. Jan.*, 16, 1936, p. 35) is present in another form in behaviourism too. If as, Reichenbach states,—the given experience is 'nothing but physiological process in our brains', (*loc. cit.* the very legitimate question arises,—“How do we become aware of any object other than the brain?” If the answer be, the brain process implies the existence of its cause, the extra-cerebral object, we may still ask, how can we think of the external cause without first proving the existence of any extra-cerebral object; If, however, the answer is that our experience of response implies an object responded to, the difficulty is not removed. For even response is nothing more than a condition of the body. How can we prove the existence of an external object, responded to, by the very response itself? (Are there not false responses, even as false ideas?) We are then confined to the knowledge of our own bodies and cannot assert the reality of any external fact.

Behaviourism, is logically driven therefore to this position which threatens the possibility of the positive sciences. We can name this position '*physiological solipsisms*' to distinguish it from '*idealistic solipsism*'. The former can be legitimately certain only of the physiological ego ('I, the body, only exist') just as the latter was certain only of the spiritual ego ('I, the mind, only exist').

Is not positivism then driven to another form of solipsism which is suicidal to itself, as well as to science?

Conclusion.

We have stated the views of the Positivists and examined their merits and defects. The answers to the questions about the possibility of metaphysics and the utility of metaphysics must be obvious from this discussion and we may sum them up briefly ;

1. The criterion of meaning which renders all metaphysical problems meaningless is defective. Therefore the case against the possibility of metaphysics is unproved.

2. But if the criterion be assumed to be true then :

(a) There arises a confusion between intelligibility and verifiability, that renders propositions like, 'This circle is a square', intelligible and propositions like those found in stories meaningless—a *total reversal* of the common sense idea of meaning !

(b) A substantial part of current science which believes in unexperiencable objects of knowledge like Energy, (specially Potential Energy), Force, Electrons, Interperceptual continuity of objects, Identity of object perceived by different scientists etc. would be altogether meaningless.

(c) Therefore, the conceptions of current science have to be modified to suit the criterion.

(d) And then Logical Positivism assumes the role of a critique of science and gives up its original attitude of unquestioning acceptance of scientific statements.

(e) Even the problem of the nature of the 'given' the bed-rock of Positivism, becomes meaningless, because it cannot be decided with certainty, as disagreeing positivists themselves prove.

(f) The distinction between the structure and the content of Experience made by the positivists becomes meaningless, because this is not verifiable.

3. By allying itself with a thorough-going behaviourism, Positivism commits itself to materialism (which is empirically

unverifiable like Idealism and therefore meaningless, according to its own criterion) and it lapses into metaphysics.

Though the accusation against metaphysics might be shown thus to be rationally unwarranted, the attitude of Logical Positivism has come to stay, at least as long as the blind force of reaction against transcendental metaphysics and the awe for scientific achievements is not spent up. The quest for absolute certainty, the resolve to stay within the sphere of the positive and the certain have periodically recurred in the history of philosophy in the East and in the West. But even the most rigorous anti-metaphysical sceptic has once and again unwittingly lapsed into beliefs which are suicidal to his attitude. Buddha refused to discuss the questions of supersensuous metaphysical realities like God, soul and immortality. Wittgenstein solemnly preaches almost in Buddhistic strain, "Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent". But it is curious that the followers of both unwittingly develop metaphysical tendencies and step beyond the certain. In the very enunciation of a criterion of certainty the positivist uncritically assumes some metaphysical theory and the number of such assumptions go on increasing with the working out of the system. The short history of the youthful movement is a repetition of this historical phenomenon. Metaphysics, it is found, is not simply useful, but to a certain extent it is *inevitable*. One who tries to propound systematically the impossibility of metaphysics, only teaches another system of metaphysics. The contemporary revolt against metaphysics has already begun to prove once more this ancient truth.

Logical Construction

By

R. DAS.

The phrase 'logical construction' is gaining some currency in the philosophical literature of the present day. When it was first introduced into philosophy, even the author of the phrase was not probably very clear as to its exact meaning and significance, and those who heard it for the first time, of course, misunderstood it in various ways. But although misunderstood, it was at least supposed to have an important philosophical meaning with a metaphysical implication. Subsequent writers have tried to clear up the misunderstanding and to define its exact meaning. It is interesting to consider whether the phrase when cleared of the misunderstanding, still retains any philosophical meaning and whether the notion even when exactly defined, does not give rise to other difficulties of its own.

I do not know who was the original author of the phrase, but I believe it was from Russell that I first learnt that a physical thing, e. g. a table, was a logical construction. I tried to understand it in some such way. Sense-data alone are directly given to our experience, but they vary with different experients and do not exist when the experience ceases. But a physical thing is the same for different experients and exists both before and after the act of experience. A physical thing as such can never be given to our experience. As it is not originally known at all, we cannot even infer it from sense-data. Thus a physical thing is not a fact of experience at all, and still if we are to explain our notion of a physical thing, we can do so by the theory of logical construction. Out of the transient sense-data of our actual experience, we construct the idea of a standing physical thing. The physical

object is regarded as a construction out of sense-data, because we can know it only in terms of actual and possible sense-data. Why the construction was called 'logical' was not very clear to me ; I took the construction to be a work of the mind. The metaphysical implication of this view consisted in the idea that a physical object was no part of actual reality in which in fact only sense-data were to be found, the physical object being but a mental fiction or ideal construction.

It is now pointed out clearly by competent writers that the idea of a physical object being a logical construction involves no such consequences.¹ We are told that to say that tables are logical constructions out of sense-data is merely to assert a verbal proposition to the effect that to say something about tables is to say something about sense data.² In other words when one says that tables are logical constructions, one merely means that sentences about tables can be translated into other sentences in which the term tables does not occur at all, but in which we suitably use the term sense-data instead. It is not to be supposed that we can simply substitute the word 'sense-data' in the place of the word 'tables' or what we say about tables can be said about sense-data. Sense-data and physical objects are things of different order, and if we said about the one class what we said about the other, we should only produce nonsense. We have to make use of the relevant term in the translation suitably, so that the resulting sentences should be meaningful and be equivalent to the original sentence.

But why should we take the trouble of translating sentences about material things into other sentences which do

1. *Mind*, 1931, p. 194 (John Wisdom : *Logical Constructions*.)

2. A. J. Ayer : *Language, Truth and Logic*, p. 74.

not refer to material things? The answer is:—‘It serves to increase our understanding of the sentences in which we refer to material things.’³

Another point to be noted in this connection is that when *e* is a logical construction out of *b*, *c*, *d*, etc., *b*, *c*, *c*, etc., are not to be thought of as parts of or elements in *e*. So a material thing, which is a logical construction out of sense-data, is not a sum or aggregate of actual and possible sense-data as Hume or Mill supposed.

The whole situation as presented by the theory of logical construction appears somewhat confusing to me. It seems that logical construction is exclusively concerned with the translatability of certain sentences. In the last resort it means nothing but the linguistic equivalence between statements referring to different things. But the original sentences are either intelligible by themselves or they are not. If they are not intelligible, they can not possibly be translated. And if they are intelligible, to what end should we take the trouble of translating them? The translation is supposed to increase our understanding of the original sentences. Is it really the case? and how is it possible? Suppose the original sentence is about a material thing and you translate it into other sentences which refer to sense-data. The original sentence speaks about a material thing and our understanding of it may be said to be increased only when in the translation we are given better information about the material thing; but that information cannot possibly be given when you are speaking of something else altogether different from the material thing. By speaking about *Y*, you cannot possibly give any light whatever about *X*, which is altogether different from it. You say that your statements about sense-data are equivalent to your statement about

the material thing. But how am I to understand the equivalence? I could some how understand the equivalence, if the sense-data were parts of, or elements in, the material thing. But you say there is no such relation between the sense-data and the material thing. And when no other intelligible relation is suggested between them, your assertion of equivalence between the two classes of sentences cannot properly be understood. On the contrary, it is apt to produce confusion, at least to the extent that it suggests either that sense-data are elements in a material thing or that 'material thing' is only a way of speaking.

It seems quite clear that if sentences about sense-data are to be equivalent to a sentence about a material thing, then there must be some relation between the sense-data and the material thing. It cannot possibly be suggested that the entire relation between them consists merely in the fact that a statement about the material thing is equivalent to statements about sense-data. For it is in order to understand this linguistic equivalence that we seek for an intelligible relation between sense-data and material things, and we cannot be satisfied by being told that the required relation is nothing but this linguistic equivalence. I do not know of any theory that satisfactorily explains the relation between sense-data and physical things as we understand them. And until that is done, the mere assertion that the two sorts of statements literally say the same thing will bring no enlightenment and carry no conviction.

If you said that there are no physical things and sense-data alone exist, we could understand that while we speak of physical things we are saying something about sense-data. But when you grant that physical things exist and there are also objective entities like sense-data, I do not see how a statement about a physical thing can be literally equivalent to another statement or a number of statements about sense-

data. These statements may be somehow implied by a statement about a physical thing. But to be implied by a statement is a very different thing from saying the same thing that the other statement says.

Supposing that a statement about a physical thing is equivalent to some other statements about sense-data, is it the case that the statements about sense-data are more intelligible than the statement about a physical thing? I think not. I assert that in the present state of our consciousness we are primarily aware of physical things, and it is only by abstraction and much reflection, if ever at all, that we become conscious of sense-data. It is a physical thing, or something in physical embodiment, that we see or touch, love or hate, fear or admire, and it is only by some effort of abstraction that we can raise from the bosom of physical things the ghostly apparitions which we call sense-data. A sense-datum which is not associated with a physical thing is scarcely intelligible. Even in an illusion the sense-datum is understood, however falsely, as being a mode of physical existence. I cannot understand a sense-datum without referring it, on the one hand, to an act of sensation, and on the other, to a physical object which is sensed. But a physical object can be well understood, so it seems to me, without any such extraneous reference. Thus it appears that we do not understand a statement about a physical thing better by translating it into statements about sense-data, but that a statement about a sense-datum is intelligible only when it ultimately refers to a physical object.

Let us even suppose that a statement about *e* is better understood when it is translated into statements about *b*, *c*, *d*, etc. But what do we gain thereby? Does this translation serve any philosophical purpose? I am aware that there are some people according to whom this is the only work that is genuinely philosophical. They call it philosophical analysis.

By this sort of analysis we are supposed to give a philosophical definition of a term, not by providing its explicit synonym, but by translating a sentence in which the term occurs into other sentences in which it is absent. I may frankly recognise that when a sentence is translated in this way, we have in many cases a better understanding of the original sentence. As much confusion and vagueness prevails in our ordinary thought and speech, this work is undoubtedly quite valuable. But I do not see that this amounts to anything more than linguistic clarification. Since the translation is equivalent to the original assertion, it cannot say in substance anything more than what is already said. It will particularly decide nothing as to the truth or falsity of the original statement. If this so-called philosophical analysis adds nothing to, or does not in any way alter, our ordinary views about life and the world, I do not see in what sense it is philosophical at all. To the great philosophical question of extending, modifying or justifying our knowledge of the world or reality the theory of logical construction is absolutely indifferent. Philosophy, I suppose, is expected at least to criticise or justify our ordinary views of the world. The idea of logical construction as now-a-days defined does not seem to have any relevance to this kind of work. I therefore conclude that logical construction which involves so-called philosophical analysis and ultimately means nothing but a kind of translation, cannot claim any great philosophical significance.

Mandana and Bhavadvaita

By

S. S. SURYANARAYANA SHASTRI.

The place of negation in reality is as intricate as it is intriguing. Many of our judgements are negative in character; on the common sense view that our judgements, if true, correspond to reality, we look for a corresponding reality in the case of those judgements too; and if such reality be not itself negative, in so far forth we have a lack of correspondence and a failure of the judgement to be true; therefore negation has a place in reality, and 'nothing' is as real as any 'thing' of which we may make an affirmative statement.

Such a naive position, however, does not hold the field long. The correspondence-notion of truth is found to be untenable unless correspondence is reduced to the pragmatic sense of working. And negative judgements may conceivably work without a negative reality to correspond; judgements, negative as well as affirmative, would be different modes of approach to a positive reality. And if one goes a step further and adopts a non realist position, where judgement is always an approximation to reality, the need for and possibility of a negative reality becomes much less. Abhāva would be no longer a *padārtha*, as for the Naiyāyikas, but only a mode of empirical usage in respect of the real.

A view of this kind gets confirmed by a consideration of the nature and function of the negative judgement. It is well recognised that negation is not primary as affirmation is, that it pre-supposes an affirmation actual or possible. The negation "roses are not blue" is significant as compared with "virtue is not square", for, in so far as roses are

material objects capable of possessing colour, there is the possibility of affirming "blue". To deny then is not to know, but at best to know better, to discriminate. Negation does not add to knowledge, but clarifies it. When its function is thus conceived, there seems no longer any need to look for a negative reality corresponding to negation. One and the same reality may be spoken of affirmatively or negatively, affirmatively in respect of its own nature, negatively in respect of the nature of others. Nor does such a position necessarily commits us to the recognition of a plurality of reals. The Advaitin holds that affirmation too falls short of the real, and in so far as *this* affirmation is negative in character, negation takes us nearer to reality than affirmation. And though like the Bhāṭṭa, he recognises a distinct *pramāṇa* for the immediate apprehension of non-existence,¹ this is not in the recognition of non existence as a reality; for to him non-

1. Even this is not granted by Maṇḍana, according to whom there is no *pramāṇa* wherewith to cognise negation. Perception is affirmative; it cannot be primarily negative, since negation involves the prior cognition of the locus and content of negation; it cannot be both affirmative and negative at the same moment; nor could negation succeed the affirmation; since what has once discharged a function (affirmation) cannot be understood to rise again to discharge another function. Since inference, presumption, etc. are based on perception they cannot apply where perception does not. Nor is non-perception in better case. For it is not ignorance, but the failure to cognise some particular that causes the so-called 'primary negative judgment'. And the failure, which functions through being itself cognised, could not be cognised in the absence of prior knowledge of X as distinct from the locus. Thus cognition of negation involves prior cognition of negation and so on *ad infinitum*. Even if we distinguish a

existence like other categories is infected with self-contradiction and is phenomenal; the sufficient reason for acknowledging anupalabdhi is not the reality of a distinct category of knowables, but the existence of a distinct negative mode of apprehension; abhāva may be nothing more than *adhikarāṇa-svarūpa*, but it is not always apprehended in that way; hence the need for distinguishing anupalabdhi from *pratyakṣa*.

From the advaitin's point of view then it is one and the same reality that appears and is apprehended both affirmatively and negatively, as existent and again as non-existent. Non-existence is a mode of the real, just like existence; neither is co-eval with reality; for even the existent, that of which affirmative predications are made, is phenomenal, since existence involves the phenomenal categories of time, space and

bailed state of the mind from a blank state (as Dr. Datta does; see *Proceedings of the Indian Philosophical Congress* Lahore, p. 105), the bafflement must be cognised as concerned with this X in relation to a locus Y; else there would be bafflement in respect of all or none; infinite regress cannot then be helped. Dr. Datta's answer to the difficulty is not convincing. Nor will his comparison of non-perception with perception (p.107) stand much scrutiny. The unsophisticated person who sees a table whether on the floor or in a mirror does judge it to exist; if later he revises his judgment it is because of sublation. In absolute darkness, however, the same person would suspend judgment or say that he sees nothing but darkness; he would not first judge the non-existence of a thing and then be corrected by sublation. In any case the negative judgment is not primary in the same sense as the affirmative, since the former requires the prior affirmative cognition of the subject and predicate of negation. See the *Brahmasiddhi*, particularly, pp. 57, 58.

causality ; and the phenomenal is that which is neither real nor unreal, nor a combination of both ; it is that which is indeterminable as real or unreal. Nor can the non-existent be equated with the unreal ; for the unreal cannot be immediately apprehended, while non-existence (as of pot on the ground) can be so apprehended. Both existence and non-existence fall within the real ; they are modes of approaching and designating the real ; they are forms of empirical usage.

As distinguished from this position, there seems to have been another view called bhāvādvaita, which granted the reality of non-existence (abhāva) but would not admit that this detracted from non-dualism. Such advaitins appear to have been influenced partly by the Naiyāyika treatment of abhāva and its sub-classes, and partly by the status of the negation of the Universe. We had occasion to note earlier that negation, in advaita metaphysics, approximates closer to reality than affirmation ; we know Brahman not by what it is, but by what it is not, not by defining it thus or thus, but through the negations not thus, not thus. If negation be unreal, the universe negated should be real, and we can no longer maintain the sole reality of Brahman. It seemed to the bhāvādvaitin the only safe course to maintain the reality of negation, without conceding the possibility of its detracting from the sole positive reality of Brahman. Such a view fails to note the purely secondary function of negation, that it serves only to clarify and discriminate, and that it has no significance apart from the very positive immediate apprehension of one's own self, which is never absent and which alone is fulfilled in what is called Brahman-intuition. The starting-point and the goal are both positive ; negation comes in between with an intermediate function ; why grant its reality ? Again, the bhāvādvaitin ignores this vital defect that the reality of abhava is meaningless. The negation of the universe does *work* in the sense of leading to the realisation of the

Absolute ; hence, on Naiyāyika standards, it should be admitted to be real ; if this is all that is claimed, what we should say is that abhāva is real, as the Naiyāyika conceives reality, though it is anirvācya by our own standards ; for, the real, according to the advaitin, is the self-luminous. Can anything be self-luminous, other than the self ? If negation is not self-luminous, it cannot be real ; if it is self-luminous, it is nothing other than the self and we come to the same position as the advaitins who do not maintain the reality of abhāva. Again, if the reality of negation is not to militate against non-dualism, its reality must be such that it does not count as reality, that is to say, though real, it is yet not real ; what is this but indeterminability ?

For a long time, since the days of the *Advaitasiddhi* and Brahmānanda's commentary thereon, the name of Maṇḍana has been identified with the bhavādvaita doctrine.² A study, however, of the *Brahmasiddhi* (recently published, thanks to the labours of Mahamahopadhyaya S. Kuppaswami Sastri) seems in no way to justify the ascription. A view more or less akin to this seems certainly to have been known to Maṇḍana. He holds that Brahman is of the nature of bliss and that bliss is positive, not merely the negation of misery. In the discussion occurs the following passage ;³ "Others think thus :— attributes are twofold, positive and negative ; of these, the negative do not militate against non-duality, e. g., 'one (i. e. non-different), unborn, immortal' ; the negation of difference,

2. See *Advaitasiddhi*, p. 81, Kumbakonam Edition), and *Laghubhāṇḍikā*, p. 112, p. 252 (Kumbakonam Edition). Compare M. Hiriyanna on *Suresvara and Maṇḍana Mīśra* (*Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society*, 1923, p. 259 ; 1924, p. 96). Prof. Kuppaswami Sastri pushes the date back to that of an early commentator on the *Saṅkṣepasūtrīka*.

3. *Brahmasiddhi*, pp. 5, 6, the translation is ours,

origination and destruction is not indeed an entity,⁴ so as to import duality. And if bliss be positive, if that be the substrate, knowledge (Vijñāna) would be its attribute; next, if knowledge be the substrate, bliss (would be) the attribute; truly two forms are not consistent in the case of one and the same, because of contradiction; hence, there being difference between bliss and Brahman, which are positive and (are mentioned as) attribute and substrate in Brahman is knowledge, bliss, there is failure of non-duality. It may be (contended) thus: 'the attribute too is not different from the substrate, since if they were different like cow and horse, the relation of attribute and substrate would be unintelligible'. That is unsound; since that (relation) would be unintelligible, even if they were non-different, like the nature of the substrate itself; therefore, the attribute is in some way different; and thus the scriptural declaration of the absolute non-existence of difference, 'one only without a second,' would fail to fit in; similarly for him too who understands two forms of one and the same (The said text declaring absolute non-duality fails to fit in). Therefore the word 'bliss' in (its application to) Brahman, of the nature of knowledge is determined only by the non-existence of sorrow, just as words like 'not-gross, non-subtle, non-short' are determined (in their application solely) by the non-exis-

4. Even this denial of being an entity (*vastu*) would seem to show that the view mentioned here is not *bhāvādvaita*, which, according to Hiriyanna, is "monism excluding only other positive entities and not also the negative," (*JRAS*, 1923, p. 261). It is possible, of course, to render "*vastu*" as "positive entity"; but there seems to be little justification for this unless one is committed to reading *bhāvādvaita* into the passage. It needs no philosopher to tell us that the negative is not "positive"; if the denial in the text is to be significant, it must relate to the "entitateness" not to being "positive".

tence of grossness etc. Nor is it that there is but identity of the words 'knowledge' and 'bliss', because of the futility of using two words. How again can there be identity of what are denoted by non-synonymous words? Therefore, the meaning of the word 'bliss' with reference to Brahman is but the cessation of sorrow."

The next paragraph goes on to refute the above view, starting with the possibility of non-synonymous terms referring to a single entity. The distinction between positive and negative attributes, the allegation that the latter are consistent with non-dualism, these are not referred to again or refuted. The silence may be construed as a passive assent to bhāvādvaita; but such an argument is exceedingly weak, as recognised by the learned editor of the *Brahmasūdhī*. Further, it is more than doubtful whether the doctrine here mentioned is bhāvādvaita at all. There is no attempt to establish any "irreducible negative reality present as such alongside the absolute Brahman;"⁵ rather do we have a declaration that the negation of difference etc., is "not an entity". Further, what the objector there wants to make out is not the consistency of non-dualism with the admission of a negative reality, but the possibility of making several negative predications of a single subject, without disrupting its identity.

Mm. S. Kuppuswami Sastriar, however, is persuaded that the ascription of *bhāvādvaita* to Maṇḍana stands on other unassailable grounds, to be discovered in the *Brahmasūdhī*. Principal among these he places the emphatic declaration in the fourth chapter that 'the negation of the Universe is declared by (Scriptural) testimony.' If this negation and not Brahman be within the special purview of Scripture, constituting its purport, such negation should be real; for how

5. Mm. S. K. Sastri's Introduction, p. 19.

can Scripture have for purport anything other than the real? Such appears to be the trend of the learned editor's argument.⁶ But surely such a question presupposes an unconscious confusion. Brahman is the whole and the sole real. If any means of knowledge claims to be valid it must in so far forth relate to Brahman. Thus not Scripture alone but perception too, not to mention inference, has Brahman for its sphere. What then is the distinctive value of Scripture? In this very question is presupposed the need for Scripture relating to what is other than reality, since reality is the sphere for *pratyakṣa* etc. Starting with this pre-supposition it is unreasonable to claim again that what is the sphere of Scripture viz., the negation of the Universe, is a reality. The truth of course is that neither Scripture nor any other means of valid knowledge can encompass Reality. All that can be hoped for is an approximation through channels positive and negative; it is characteristic of Scripture that it is a negative channel; since what has to be apprehended is the limitless, it is more suitable than *pratyakṣa* which seeks to limit the object by one or more positive characterisations. "It (the negation of the universe) is, however, declared to be conditioned by testimony alone, since perception etc., are associated with nescience since they do not apprehend their content (Brahman) in the form in which all difference is resolved, since the resolution of difference is known through testimony (alone)"⁷. This sentence and the verse on

6. "...he (Maṇḍana) points out that the total negation of the world *prapañcābhāva* is the absolutely irreducible minimum of truth that could be exclusively attributed to Upaniṣadic teachings...he stresses the reality of *Prapañcābhāva* and emphatically declares it to from the final and the otherwise non ascertainable (*pramāṇāntarānādhigata*); import of the Vedāntic texts" (Introduction, p. 19).

7. *Brahma-siddhi*, p. 157.

which it is a commentary seem to suggest that the negation alone is the purport of Scripture ; what the author, however, is interested in and seeks to maintain is the superiority of the negative channel, as leading to realisation of Brahman as pure and not associated with nescience ; this is evident from the commentaries of Citsukha⁸ and Ānandapūrṇa⁹ on the passage in question. "Since then Brahman is the sphere of perception etc., how can it be the sphere of Scripture alone ? To this, he says : 'since perception etc.' ; that, though the object of cognition in all cognitions, is only what is associated with nescience but not the pure ; this is the meaning" (Citsukha). Ānandapūrṇa is even clearer : "Since Brahman is established by other means of knowledge and since it is admitted that the negation of the universe is known from the sacred teaching, *how can it be that Brahman is what is propounded in the Upanisads ?* To this he says, "It is, however, declared to be conditioned by testimony alone". The purport of Scripture then does not stop with the negation of the Universe, but extends to Brahman as pure ; otherwise the claim could not be sustained that Brahman is *upanisada*.¹⁰

Forms of designation, modes of approach, both positive

8. R3553, Govt. Oriental Mss. Library, Madras, p. 213.

9. R3967, Govt. Oriental Mss. Library, Madras, p. 314.

10. The teachings of the *Brahmasūdhī* in regard to the sphere of perception etc., were adopted and further expounded in the *Tattvasūdhī* by Jñānaghanaṇḍa. The concluding sentences of the first chapter of this work (Mss. No. R2597 of the Government Oriental Manuscripts Library, Egmore) meet the the same objection as that faced by Maṇḍana, in the passage under discussion; and they sound the same note as the commentaries just noted : the relevant passage of the *Tattvasūdhī*

and negative, do lie side by side; it will be neither possible nor desirable to reduce the one to the other. Maṇḍana is fully aware of this; but there is no trace of justification for the view that he would treat *prapañcābhāva* "as an irreducible negative reality, present as such alongside the absolute Brahman." All that Maṇḍana does say¹¹ is that "even of one and the same entity there is verbal usage both as existent and as non-existent (i.e. positive and negative), e.g. 'when the pot is destroyed, the potsherds are originated' ". Here the

is therefore given here as an extract :

"*tasmāt sannātra-viśayaṃ api pratyakṣam ajñāna-viśiṣṭa-viśayatvān nā 'jñānam upamānāti; āgamas tu viruddha-padārtha-sāmānādhikaranyā'* bhidhāna-mukhena samasto'-pādhi-vinirmukta-vastu-svarūpa-mātram lakṣyaṃ nāntariyakatayā tadajñāna-tatkārye nivartayatī 'ti yuktam eva 'gamasya 'jñāna-nivartakatvam dṛṣṭā hi devadattaikve 'bhijñā-pratyakṣeṇa 'parokṣikṛte deśa-kālo-'pādhi kṛta-bheda-bhramā-'nuyvṛttiḥ, tanmātra-viśayenā 'pi pratyabhijñā-pratyakṣeṇa bhrānti-nivṛttiśca, tasmād ihā 'pi 'prameya-viśeṣa-'bhāve 'pi pramāṇa-viśeṣād eva pratyakṣādinā aparokṣa-grhite 'py advaite nā' jñāna-nivṛttiḥ, āgamenā 'parokṣikṛte tannivṛtti' iti sarvaṃ suvya-vadātam."

It should also be noted that, in the fourth Kāṇḍa, Maṇḍana is but expanding what has been briefly indicated in the first : "*anadhigatamapi pramānāntāreṇa 'nadhigata-sambandhām ca sva-śabdena śakyam śabdena nirūpayitum viś sa-pratiśedha-mukhena, viśeṣa-śabdānām nañśca yithayantham arthair vidita-saṃgatitṛāt; tathā ce'tham eva tad upadiśyate 'asthulam'* iti sarva-viśeṣā-'tigam etat kathayati-bheda prapañca-vil'ya-dvārene ti etat ca vakyata iti" (*Brahmasiddhi*, p. 26). Even the Scriptural negations teach then not the mere negation of the world, but Brahman.

reality is one and the same, viz., a certain transformation; it is not two-fold, a positive and a negative; it is spoken of, however, both positively and negatively. This is quite in line with what we have said earlier about the advaitin treating both existence and non-existence as phases of the real, refusing to identify existence with the real or non-existence with the unreal.

Mahamahopadhyaya S. Kuppuswami Sastriar is keenly alive to the fact that Maṇḍana reduces *avidyā-nivṛtti* (the cessation of nescience) "to a positive form by equating it with *vidyā*;"¹² he does not, however, see any inconsistency between this reduction and the adumbration of *bhāvādvaita* by Maṇḍana. But surely if negation has no significance but for and other than its positive basis, if the cessation of bondage and ignorance is itself release, there is no justification for investing the negation as such with *irreducible* reality. The contrast between the two positions is clearer in the treatment of it by Rāṅgarāja.¹³ At an early stage, he espouses the *bhāvādvaita* view in these words: "Now, even the negation of the universe, which is the content of such scriptural texts as 'there is no diversity here', should be illusory according to you; if this be said, no, since that is real like Brahman

12. *Brahmasiddhi* p. 121. Prof. Kuppuswami Sastri would distinguish between the states of *avidyā-nivṛtti* and that of the negative statements of Scripture. There is some point in this; but even such statements, in Maṇḍana's view seem not to have stopped short with the negation, but to have propounded Brahman, as is evident from p.26 of the text and the commentaries cited in this paper, on the passage in p.157 of the text.

13. *Advaitavidyāmukura*, a fragmentary manuscript in the Mysore Oriental Library; see further an article on that subject in the *JORM*, ix, iv, p.279-294.

(brahmavat satyatvāt); nor is there abandonment of non-dualism, since we adopt the doctrine of *bhāvādvaita*.¹⁴ But the objector counters with the statement that for the advaitin everything, including negation, is but the self. "You are indeed getting wise" replies the author, and proceeds thus: "When indeed it is known that everything, the universe or its negation, is but the self, then since that itself is what is made known by Scripture, and since that (self) is real, Scripture does not teach what is other than real; hence there is no room to doubt its validity."¹⁵ Elsewhere too he follows the procedure of stating *bhāvādvaita* as the initial position and then improving on it. "Nor is there abandonment of non-dualism, if there be admitted the absolute reality of negation in all three times, since there is not admitted any *positive* entity over and above Brahman. In truth, however, this negation in all three times is not other than Brahman itself, just as in the system of the Logicians, the non-existence of prior non existence is not other than the counter-correlate itself, and in the system of the Guna (Prabhākara), the non-existence of a thing is not other than the locus itself."¹⁶ A careful study of pp. 119-21 of the *Brahmasiddhi* will show that Maṇḍana's position is wholly identical with the improved position set forth by Raṅgarāja. And though Maṇḍana was not infallible, it is difficult to maintain that he so far ignored the need for consistency as to maintain *bhāvādvaita* in the same breath.

Is there no justification then for the ascription made by Madhusūdana, Brahmanānda etc.? One possible explanation, and that a very thin one, is that they refer to some other Maṇḍana, not to the author of the *Brahmasiddhi*. This is not impossible,

14. *Op. cit.* p. 30

15. *Op. cit.* pp. 30-31.

16. *Op. cit.* p. 75.

but not very plausible. A less unsatisfactory hypothesis is that the ascription was made because *bhāva* and *abhāva* came to be identified with *sat* and *asat*. That such an identification was made at one time is evident from the use of the phrase *bhāvābhāvavilakṣaṇa* in the place of *sattvāsattvavilakṣaṇa*¹⁷ as a definition of *nescience*; the former phrase is philosophically unmeaning and unsound, but it seems to have crept in somehow. Once granted usage, it is easy to mistake the ascription of parallel value to *bhāva* and *abhāva* forms, for the ascription of parallel and independent reality (*sattva* to both. Reality is neither existential nor non-existential ;¹⁸ these are

17. Compare *Aivaitasiddhi*, p. 121, 123.

(Kumbakonam edition)

The confusion (if one may so call it) seems to have been present even in Mandana ; see for instance p. 91, when he says : ‘*apica abhāvanyā*’ pi prameyatvān na pramāṇa-yogyatā *sattu-lakṣaṇam* ; tatha hi—

asat prameyam ca tathā yathai’va sthāpayatyayam etc.

18. Cp. *bhāvābhāvavivarjitā* of the *Lalitāsahasranāma*; *Devi* is also *sadasandrūpadhāriṇī* in the sense that the Absolute is its own Other. Even if such an interpretation is turned down as too Hegelian, it will be seen that Bhāskararāya, in his commentary, does not equate *asat* with *abhāva* in the Tārkika sense ; he first identifies *sat* with Brahman, and *asat* with the universe ; next he takes *sat* to be the final psychosis that intuitively Brahman, while *asat* denotes all lower psychoses ; lastly he equates *sat* and *asat* with existence and non-existence ; but here “existence is what is permanent and unchangeable” so that anything fleeting (as the whole phenomenal world is) is *asat*. In commenting on the other epithet (No. 680) however he says *bhāva* is substance, quality, etc., and *abhāva* is antecedent non-existence etc.

but modes of approximating thereto, of the eternal real eternally realising itself, negation and affirmation are but instrumental, the former being secondary as compared with the latter, such is the truth understood and expounded by Maṇḍana; and to dub him an expounder of bhāvādvaita, the product of philosophic confusion, is to fail to do him barest justice

The Last Phase of Bradley's Thought.

By

DR. S. K. DAS.

The steadily increasing modification by Bradley of his original position is signalised in the *Essays on Truth and Reality* which Dr. F. C. S. Schiller characterised in the pages of *Mind* as "New Developments of Bradley's Philosophy." Further modification along one line of reflection appears to have crystallized in the *Second Edition* of the *Principles of Logic*, incorporating the *Terminal Essays* and the *Additional Notes*. This edition of the *Logic*—verily his last will and testament to his philosophical successors—may in all fairness be taken as marking the last phase of Bradley's thought.

To the discerning student of Bradley's philosophy what can scarcely fail to appear is the way in which he stresses his modified theory that "Reality as the subject of our judgment is always a selected reality."¹ As it stands, it cannot be said

1. *Principles of Logic*, Vol II, *Terminal Essays* 11 p. 629

to have entailed a radical modification of his theory of Judgment. Could it have been dissociated from metaphysical assumptions weighing upon his theory of Judgment and taken along with other noteworthy amendments, it would have vitally affected the theory in question. The claim which he repeatedly puts forward in the Second Edition of the *Logic* on behalf of this 'limited' or 'selected reality' seems to have been really anticipated in the *Essay* of which the underlying principle is "justice in the name of the whole to each aspect of the world according to its special place and proper rank—Reality everywhere through self-restriction in claim and denial."² Everything turns, in fact, upon the nature of the whole, and the manner of justice that can possibly be rendered to each aspect of the world is dependent upon the nature of the whole. In spite of all that Bradley has to offer on the subject of 'selection' or 'selected reality' in the Second Edition of the *Logic* specifically in the *Terminal Essay* on 'Judgment,' the impression remains that the claim of 'a selected reality' as the subject of the judgment has not been vindicated; for here, as elsewhere, justice is always administered in the name of the whole, which is really the one subject of our judgment, and 'the selected reality' simply records a silent vote. It has either no *de facto* claim to register, or its claim is summarily overruled. Hence the true form of predication turns out to be not "S is P" but "Reality is such that S is P," the "such" in our 'Reality is such that' remaining 'in the end and in detail not wholly knowable.'³ Bradley does indeed acknowledge that the judgment 'is in every case mediated, though not mediated explicitly and formally,'⁴ but the reference to Reality remains in the end unmediated. For what the judgment eventually imports is a connection of qualities,

2. *Essays on Truth and Reality* pp. 470-1

3. *Logic* Vol II p. 639

4. *Ibid* p. 638

somehow held together by the predicative relation which is required in order to indicate such connection of qualities in the one ultimate subject or supreme Individual, R. The two-fold nature of Reality becomes, in such a case, a misnomer, and the justification for it is hard to find.

One reason why the claim of a 'Selected reality' to be the subject in a judgment had always, in Bradley's view, to be subordinated to the whole Reality was the concern which he evinced all along for maintaining the integrity of the judgment as 'asserting one idea,'⁵ the traditional necessity for 'two ideas' in a judgment being 'a mere delusion.'⁶ Following Sigwart in his 'insistence on belief in the objective reality of the content,'⁷ Prof. Hobhouse indeed tried to show that the claims of the special subject could be justified to the fullest extent without detriment to the oneness of the 'ideal meaning'⁸ within which it occurs. But for Bradley there was, in the end, only one Reality as the subject, overriding all 'selected reality' as pseudo-subject just as there was, from the metaphysical point of view, only one Absolute Individual revealing itself through the multiplicity of pseudo-individuals. As Bosanquet states the position 'there is ultimately but one true individual Real. of which all contents that can be affirmed in judgments are ultimately predicates', all finite individuals being 'in ultimate analysis connexions of content within the real individual to which they belong.' Bradley was equally emphatic in urging that 'the real, which appears in perception, is not identical with the real just as it appears there'; for, 'though given as fact every

5. *Logic*, Vol I p. 11

6. *Ibid*, p 50

7. Hobhouse, *The Theory of knowledge* (3rd edition) p 152 (f. n.)

8. *Logic* Vol I ch. i. A.N. 14. p. 39.

part is given as existing by reference to something else,' and thus is 'adjectival on what is beyond itself.'⁹

In spite of Bosanquet's subtle distinction between 'substantive' and 'substantival',¹⁰ it is plain that this theory of judgment expressly repudiates the Aristotelian notion of 'substance' as *πρώτη ουσία*, as the subject which cannot stand in a judgment as predicate, and proceeds, on the basis of the Spinozistic notion of Substance, to confer a modal or adjectival character on every finite individual thing. This is, indeed, a crucial question but little help is afforded by such lines of consideration as those suggested by Bosanquet viz. consideration of 'what is special to a finite spiritual being as against concrete thinghood.'¹¹ Indeed, what seems to me to vitiate Bosanquet's treatment of the problem is the intrusion of teleological considerations—'the teleological status of finite spirits in the universe' being really the ground of his determination of the issue with regard to the status of the logical subject. The issue seems to me, at any rate, to be an unambiguous one—whether 'this reality' or the so-called 'selected Reality' has sufficient independence to maintain its status as the logical subject in predication. To rule out even its restricted claims on the ground that it would have to be self-existent, in the same sense in which the absolute whole of being is self-existent, is nothing short of an *ignoratio elenchi*. The question is whether as logical subject it does not possess so much independence as is owned by a substantive in relation to its adjectives. Let it be granted that everything except the universe is a fragment or part of a wider whole, it is still agreeable that both it and the whole to which it belongs may be ultimate subjects of predication. Bradley does, indeed,

9. *Logic* vol 1 pp. 70, 71

10. *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* 1917-18 p. 479

11. *Ibid.* p. 489

seem to concede the point so far as to admit, in his revised version of the nature of Judgment, that 'the Reality to which in fact we refer is always something distinguished,' some 'special and emphasized feature in the total mass,'—that is to say, Reality as the subject of our judgment is always a 'selected reality,'¹² although, as I have said, he seems to take away with one hand what he gives with the other. If, however, the judgment is really what it always purports to be—an assertion about some concrete fact, then its subject is the representation in the form of content of that concrete fact from which the person judging starts, and the discriminating activity which is originative of the judgment answers exactly to the twin processes of selection and rejection. Thus, if we are in earnest with the function of 'selection' in judgment, it is no longer possible to rest in the unqualified affirmation that there is 'in the subject an aspect of existence which is absent from the bare predicate.'¹³ If the object judged about be always a 'selected reality,' then 'the selection of such a content' clearly implies that 'the object already is ideal.'¹⁴

What weighed with Bradley in insisting that the whole Universe, or reality, is the ultimate subject of all predication was the assumption that a crude pluralism was the only alternative to an absolutist theory of predication. But it is altogether gratuitous to assume that any theory of predication other than the absolutist is committed to a doctrine of ultimately self-subsisting, atomic, and unrelated reals—such as we have in Herbart, for example. The universe may be an inter-related system without everything in it being merely 'adjectival.' The bare statement of the fact of inter-relatedness does not, it is true, carry us very far. In fact taken by itself, it may seem, as

12. *Logic* vol II. p. 629

13. *Appearance and Reality*, p. 169.

14. *Logic*, vol I p. 7

Bosanquet urged, to be 'an evasion,' there being 'nothing in experience to suggest drawing a line between inter-relatedness and non-relatedness.'¹⁵ The really decisive consideration for Bosanquet was, to quote his own words, this: 'When I say that certain apparent subjects are adjectival I do not merely deny non-relatedness; what I am at denying is co-ordinate relatedness.' The term 'adjectival' meant for him 'subordination' in place of co-ordination—the 'character of being something which has its main being and value as a qualification of a whole, which includes it.'¹⁶ What I would note here in passing is that it is hardly open to the objection which Pringle-Pattison brought to bear upon it. Much as I agree with the main drift of Pringle-Pattison's observation on that count, I think that his criticism on this particular issue was somewhat misdirected owing to the abrupt manner in which he turned 'the confessedly metaphorical' use of the word 'adjectival' into a literal one. When Bradley argued that every part of reality is infected with relativity, and is adjectival on what is beyond itself, or that 'judgment adds an adjective to reality'¹⁷ he surely did not mean anything so absurd as to render his argument exposed to the criticism that 'things are not adjectives of one another.'¹⁸ What Bradley did mean, and was concerned to maintain in logical interest is the notion of an ultimate ground which 'is a whole pervaded essentially by connection and implication, and is, in some sense, a system which throughout justifies its contents.'¹⁹

In estimating the incidence of this growing emphasis upon selection and selected reality in his latest writings, one

15. *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* 1917-18 p. 487

16. *Ibid.*, pp. 487, 489

17. *Logic*, vol I p. 71; *Appearance & Reality* p. 164

18. Pringle-Pattison, *The Idea of God* p. 274.

19. *Logic*, Vol II p. 683.

would not be wrong in concluding that Bradley was increasingly conscious of the need of 'saving the appearances' from their grave in absolutism—a need for which realists of our century trotted a strong plea and ended by defining a thing as a "synthesis of appearances." How far Bradley would have been prepared to follow this centrifugal development of his own thought is a different matter altogether. But these are clear finger-posts which call for a revision and recantation of our stock criticism of Bradleyan metaphysics.

A Realistic Theory of Illusion.

By

PROF. SURES CHANDRA DUTT.

An illusion is a wrong perception. It is a common place of philosophy that the distinction between a valid perception and an illusion is not psychological at all, but ontological. It is the purpose of this paper to show that even *their ontological status is the same*, that valid perceptions have no better credentials in theory than illusions, that no perception is wrong *per se*, that every perception is veridical in principle, and that *the distinction between the two is entirely practical*. In fact, in one sense, though a very limited one, every perception of an object may be declared as illusory relatively to another ; but from the absolute point of view they are all equally valid.

Such statements are no doubt paradoxical, but their soundness becomes obvious as we begin to reflect on the conditions of perception, both subjective and objective. The first step in understanding the problem is to take full cognizance of the fact that perception is not such a one-sided affair as radical idealists, on the one hand, and extreme realists, on the other, would have us believe : but it is an active interaction of two equally real agents, viz, the perceiving subject and the object perceived. Neither does the mind conjure up the object out of airy nothing through its own ideas, nor does the object simply manage to get itself reflected on an impotent mirror called mind which has no power either to add to or alter the object. But there is an active give-and take between the perceiving mind and the thing perceived. But for perverse metaphysics, nothing is plainer than that when I see a given tree, my capacity to see is as

much responsible for this phenomenon as the power of the tree to appeal to me.

It is patent that a percept is relative to, and dependent on, a host of conditions. It has, on the one hand, such subjective conditions as the degree of intelligence, soundness of mind, previous experience, in-born aptitude and such objective conditions, on the other, as the intrinsic nature of the object, and its relation to other objects and to the physical organism of the perceiver, the nature of the medium through which it *acts on the* sense-organ, and finally the organism itself with its nervous mechanism. Indeed the only condition that finally counts on the objective side is the net result of the operation of all other conditions on the brain process, which is supposed to be in direct correspondence with the mental process of perception.

A calm consideration of all these conditions enables us to realise that there is no difference of kind between an illusion and a veridical perception. While the former is an appearance of the real thing under abnormal conditions, the latter is an appearance of the same under normal conditions : in both it is reality that appears.

An object of perception *is* what it *appears* to the perceiver mind; and it appears as such and such by *acting* on the mind and thereby arousing a specific reaction or process in that mind. And the specific kind of action on the mind depends on the conditions present. What then is implied when I say that the orange I see before me is yellow? It means that the object named orange has the capacity of awakening in me the cognition of yellow provided the sun shines, the ethereal medium co-operates and my eyes, the nervous system and the mental frame for the moment, to mention only the most essential conditions, are sound. The orange would not produce that effect on the mind, if any of these conditions were wanting, namely, if there were no sun or no ether or no eyes

or no clue to the recognition of this colour in the shape of previous experience of the perceptive mind.¹ Naive Realism is wrong in holding that the orange is in itself yellow in the sense that even if the world were enveloped in darkness and there were no eyes to see, it would yet *be yellow*, which means *look yellow*. Scientific Realism is no less wrong in supposing that the orange is in itself colourless, and its yellow colour is a fabrication of our mind. The one says that the orange *remains yellow in all* circumstances, whether there are eyes or no eyes, light or darkness. The other says that it *remains* colourless in itself in spite of all its appearances to the contrary. The one errs in supposing that the yellow colour is a rigid, inert, unchangeable something somehow inhering in the orange; the other in making it an unreal apparition. The true view is that what permanently (so far as the orange itself does not rot or change) remains in the orange is the *potential capacity* to excite, under specific conditions, the reaction in our minds called the sensation of yellow. We may even generalise and say that any attribute of anything is such a capacity to influence other things: it is essentially *dynamic*.² But this is not denying the *static*

1. Cf. Hoernlé, *Studies in Contemporary Metaphysics*, P. 114— "The judgment, 'this is blue', made in the moment of perception, will not now be taken to mean, 'This is blue always, however light and other conditions may vary', but 'This is blue here and now.' And the 'here and now' says Hoernlé, means 'under conditions such as these'. Again on the same page, he continues, "The principle, then, here advocated for the saving of appearances demands that the possession of qualities by an object be taken, not as absolute but as relative".

(2). Ibid, Pp. 109-110....."The thing 'by itself' is a self-contradictory fiction. A thing's qualities vary with

or abiding aspect of an external thing, e. g., the orange. The capacity to excite the sensation of yellow is an abiding, though potential, character of the orange. In other words, it *acts* as yellow only in some circumstances, while it *tends* to do so always. So we come to the final meaning of the assertion that the orange is yellow : it is *actually* yellow only in the presence of a spectator, light and other conditions and it is *potentially* yellow always; but its yellow colour is always *relative* to the aforesaid conditions, actual or supposed, and is unmeaning without reference to them.

Let us now consider the status of an illusion with reference to the stock example of a stick appearing bent when one end of it is dipped in water. Why is this appearance of crookedness regarded as an illusion? Because the stick looks straight as soon as it is drawn out of water and it appears straight to touch both in and out of water. Here the testimony of touch is considered superior to that of vision and the more usual sort of vision superior to the less common sort, and all this for *a purely practical consideration*. As is well known, for the practical manipulation of things, e.g., using the stick for walking, beating a dog, measuring space etc, touch is a better guide than sight, and sight under normal conditions (e.g, through the medium of air) than the same under unusual conditions (e.g., partly through water and partly through air); namely, it is *more convenient* to regard the stick as straight than to regard it as bent. But apart

 different conditions.....Identity of course, we want but not the static, abstract, identity of a supposed thing "by itself", but a mobile identity in difference. "

Hence we cannot accept Dr. Moore's contention, "There is no contradiction in supposing that there are patches of colour, which yet are not experienced" *Philosophical Studies*, p. 169.)

from any consideration of utility and from a strictly impartial point of view, any visual or tactual appearance of the stick is as good as another and the stick is crooked in as real sense as it is straight. 'The stick is crooked' in this context means that it excites in the observer, when seen partly through water in the special way described, a reaction which may be called the perception of the crooked shape of the stick. It means further that the power to excite the above reaction in the perceiver is patent in the stick only when those conditions are satisfied, and otherwise it is always latent in it. 'The stick is straight' means, *mutatis mutandis*, precisely the same thing. The latter has, on theoretical grounds, no higher credentials than the former.³ Dr. A. C. Ewing finds the direct realist impaled on the horns of a dilemma : the latter, according to him, is either landed in untenable self-contradiction by holding that the real stick is both bent and straight or compelled to fly into the arms of his opponent the representationist. But this alleged sorry plight of the direct realist is an over-drawn picture. The first horn is absolutely blunt and safe, and the dilemma can be easily caught by this horn and summarily dismissed. There is no more contradiction in this than in saying that John is both kind (*viz.* to his friends) and unkind (*viz.* to his enemies).⁴

Hence Dr. Ewing's method of inferring, from such alleged contradiction in *sensa* themselves, the existence of *unsensed*

3. Cf. J. E. Turner, *A Theory of Direct Realism*, p. 73. In a similar context, he says, "Both the "real" size and the "apparent" size alike are sensual qualities of the physical object."

4. Cf Dr. A. C. Ewing's *Idealism : A Critical Survey* (1934) p. 273 f.

sensa behind them, has no justification.⁵ Rather his conception of *unsensed sensa* itself involves contradiction and is as unmeaning as Mill's *permanent possibility of sensation* considered as a theory of physical existence.

Taking the case of a half-immersed oar, Prof. Stout similarly misapplies the test of coherence or consistency and wrongly condemns the percept of the crooked oar on the score of its incoherence with other perceptions.⁶ But this is failure to grasp the dynamic and relative nature of the object. The heresy of the crooked oar lies not in its infringement of any law of reason, but in its rarity and consequent uselessness.

Is there then no illusion, no error, no deception in the judgment 'The stick is crooked'. Certainly, there is. 'The error consists in ignoring or failing to realise the specific conditions of perception, and then generalising the attribute, namely, wrongly expecting that the stick will appear crooked even to touch while immersed and will appear so to sight even when taken out of water, in short, that it will behave in the same way under all conceivable conditions.

Perception is essentially a selective process. Of the varying appearances of an object some are selected as norms, and the rest are considered as insignificant in themselves and only serving as signs of the former. Thus the top of an ordinary table assumes various trapezoid forms when looked at from different sides and corners, and looks rectangular only when seen from above, i. e., when *one stoops* over it. But this last appearance is regarded as the norm, the real shape, and the other appearances are dismissed outright automatically and unconsciously as mere irrelevant subjective aberrations. Thus even when from a side the

5. *Ibid*, p. 357.

6. Cf. G. F. Stout, *Mind and Matter*, p. 259.

top of the table has a trapezoid visual appearance (as is well known to the painter), we believe we see it rectangular.

But the principle of selection by which one appearance out of a host is dubbed Reality and the rest designated by the humbler appellation of Appearance is entirely pragmatic¹. That sensuous appearance (i. e., Stout's 'Sensum' or 'presentation', Turner's 'sensed content') which is most helpful to our efficient manipulation of the object or to the effective adjustment of our own behaviour to it is the real object. Hence the most vivid and stable sensum is necessarily the real object, as it is the most useful. Thus the near view of an object in broad daylight is naturally thought more real than a distant view or the twilight view of the same. Another important test of reality, often belittled, is consensus or unanimity of social opinion. The vote of the majority, the democratic principle, is a determinant factor. The verdict of the jaundiced man that the world is yellow is discredited, because he is outvoted by an overwhelming majority. It is only an appearance, as it destroys social efficiency. And social efficiency is a mode of utility.

An appearance, though pragmatically unreal, is ontologically real. But every appearance does not deceive us, and it is *only a deceptive appearance that is called illusion*. The bent stick never deceives an experienced adult. He lightly dismisses it as irrelevant or useless, that is, as a mere appearance. But an inexperienced child will be deceived, he will expect it to behave as bent under normal conditions also. Such deceitful appearance alone is illusion. So we sum up: reality,

7. Cf. J. E. Turner, *A Theory of Direct Realism* p. 75. Speaking of the naive realist of the plain man, he says, "His own criterion then between 'reality' and 'appearance' is not theoretical but pragmatic; not ontological but validatory."

appearance and illusion have the same ontological status, though they represent three grades of utility, standing respectively for the useful sensum, the useless sensum recognised as such and the useless sensum masquerading as the useful.

The Nature of Sense-data.

I

By

KALI PRASAD.

(Lucknow University)

An investigation of the problem of knowledge cannot be profitably undertaken without a prior inquiry into the nature and status of sense-data which are supposed in some sense to constitute the basis of knowledge. But what this means is no easy matter to decide 'Sense-data', 'basis' and 'knowledge' are terms which in spite of (or rather because of) their such frequent use are scandalously ambiguous and an attempt to make their meaning clear is always a task of extreme difficulty. The present paper is confined to the consideration of only *some* of the aspects of the problem in so far as it concerns the nature of sense-data. The more general questions relating to the bases of knowledge and connected problems are obviously impossible to discuss within the limits imposed upon us at the present occasion.

There are three well known ways in which sense-data are often considered viz.,

- I. That they are phases or states of the objects that we perceive by means of them. In other words, they are Physical in nature.
- II. That they are events in the perceiver's mind. That is, they are Psychological.
- III. That they are events in the perceiver's brain. That is, they are Cerebral.

It is not possible to discuss even these three alternatives

as they are regarded by those who hold them. We shall, therefore, further confine our discussion mainly to the second of the above alternatives.

Sometimes when sense-data are regarded as events in the perceiver's mind a very queer theory of mind is held and this must be disposed of first. The perceiver's mind according to this way of looking at the matter is treated as an independent substratum of which sense-data are some phases or aspects. In this connection the following questions arise : (1) Do sense-data *reveal* the mind as they are supposed to reveal the physical object ? (2) Are sense-data of the *same nature* as mind ? (3) Do sense-data *comprehend* the nature of the mind ? and (4) Does the mind revealed by sense-data exist independently of them or is it dependent on them ? Now, if sense-data are revelatory in character we may ask what exactly do they reveal ? And, the answer is unmistakeable on the mental substratum theory : they reveal the mental substance, which in itself is independent of them. Now apart from the difficulty of understanding the process of revelation the notion of the mental substance is unintelligible in the extreme. For, even if there could be some plausibility in holding that sense-data are phases of the object or the material substance which they reveal and which does not appear as such or as a whole to any one, seeing that it exists independently outside our ordinary conscious life, there could be no sense at all in holding that sense-data are phases of the mind which in itself cannot be comprehended in them and which is different in essence from them all. In other words, while it would be wrong to conceive an independent material substratum existing as a permanent possibility, it would be fundamentally absurd to imagine an independent spiritual substratum which resides in the unknown and unfathomed chambers of non-being, and yet of which the sense-data are phases and to which they evidently belong. This

is impossible. Sense-data, then, cannot be *phases* of a Mind which is other than they and which stands over against them as an unmitigated residuum.

But if sense-data are not phases of the mind, in what sense are they mental? It will be answered, in the sense that they 'belong to' the mind, for they do seem obviously to belong to it in some sense. But what do we mean by this relation of 'belonging to'? There are several ways in which this relation is understood and the following occur easily: Belonging to the mind may signify (1) affection or modification of the mind, (2) dependence on the mind (3) produced by the mind, (4) inherence in the mind, (5) being *in* the mind, (6) being *for* the mind, (7) being in spatial or temporal proximity to the mind, (8) quality or attribute of the mind (as red 'belongs' to the rose). We shall examine some of these in detail.

That sense-data are affection of the mind is an old doctrine. Among the philosophers and psychologists alike it has flourished as the theory of 'subjective modification.' For instance, in Locke and the empiricists we have the doctrine of representative perception which treats all ideas (which according to them is another name for sense-data) as essentially 'modification' of the soul or soul-substance though they are *somehow* representations of the object outside mind. As a theory of the perception of external objects the doctrine utterly failed, for there could be no possibility of checking independently whether the so-called representations were representations of the object at all. If ideas *alone* were perceived then we could not talk about the object. Of course, the ideas were of the object, but this was just what had to be explained viz., how far, if at all, the ideas were ideas of the object. As a matter of fact one could only have ideas of ideas of ideas etc., leading to an infinite regress (as Green pointed out long ago); we could not possibly have ideas of objects. The

passage from idea to object was utterly cut off because of the fundamental disjunctiveness of mind and object assumed as the starting point of the theory. But the difficulty was not confined merely to explaining or justifying a reference of ideas to objects or showing how ideas could be ideas of the objects. It went deeper. It could not even be explained how the ideas were ideas of the mind or modification of the soul (mind). Green's objection already stressed this point when he showed that ideas could be referred only to themselves; they could be only of *ideals* and of nothing else. In other words, it was a pure assumption to hold (as the subjectivists held: that ideas were of the mind at all, much less *its* modifications. An idea could modify or qualify an idea only: how could it modify anything else? How could there be anything *else* at all? Thus, the subjective modification hypothesis eventuated into a scepticism of a most hopeless and forlorn type.

There is another sense in which sense-data may be regarded as affections of the mind or mental. We may say that sense-data are not affections in the sense of being *in* the mind in any meaning in which the word is ordinarily used. They are not in the mind in any spatial sense though they are in the mind in some sense. It may be suggested that they are in the mind in so far as they *depend* upon it. But we may ask depend for what? Do they depend upon the mind for their origination or their continuance or meaning or what? In other words, is the dependence causal? Does the mind cause or produce the sense-data?

We have only to formulate the question in this manner to return a negative answer to the theory of dependence. We cannot answer why sense-data occur, why they continue (if they do) and how they mean, without assuming some one or other principle which in itself would need justification. If we say that mind causes them because they would

not be if mind was not then we are arguing in a circle, for how do we know? We cannot divest ourselves of mind in order to see whether we can have sense-data or not. Besides, the causal theory arbitrarily assumes (1) mind to be cause without explaining what the mind itself is and (2) that there are no other causes. A causal explanation is inherently defective and incomplete: it leads from one assumption to another in an infinite regress until it assumes either a final cause i. e., gives up the notion of causality or it lands us in a sceptical position which is beyond justification or cure.

But it will be said that if sense-data are not caused by the mind they at least *inhere* in it and in this sense are its affections. But what is inherence? A quality inheres in something when (1) it attaches or qualifies it permanently (2) when it is supported or continually held by that in which it inheres. In both cases it is a relation between substantive and adjective and not between substantives alone. There may be inherence of some quality or attribute in something or there may be inherence of something into something else. In the former case it would be better to say not that the quality or attribute 'inheres' in the thing but rather that it *characterises* it. When however the characterising relation holds between two things or events there is inherence.¹ It is, however, evident that inherence is usually used in the first sense viz., in the sense of *characterising* of a thing or substance by an attribute or quality. In this sense inherence is a relation between substantive and adjective, rather than between substantives. In other words, the relation of inherence would hold (!) when a quality or attribute attaches or characterises in an 'internal' or *necessary* way (2) when it is supported or based and continually held by

1. Cf. Johnson : *Logic* Pt. III p. 66.

that in which it is supposed to inhere and (3) when it belongs permanently and not temporarily or momentarily to the thing or substance.

Now it would be obvious, in the first place, that this notion of inherence is part of the substance attribute doctrine and, in consequence, is bound up with the theory of causality which we have already found to be untenable. But we may inquire in what sense are sense-data *internal* and *necessary*? Ordinarily they are held to be external but even if it is granted that they are internal in some sense we may still inquire how far they are *necessary*? And, what is meant by 'necessary'? Are they necessary in the same sense as whiteness is 'necessary' for milk? Do the sense-data inhere in the mind in the same sense as whiteness inheres in milk? There are two ways of understanding how whiteness inheres in milk: (1) It may be held that whiteness is a universal which *somehow* characterises milk which is *one of its ways of appearing*. Whiteness does not *exist* but only *characterises* or *means*. It is an abstract logical continuum. The white that we see is only a poor imitation or reflection of the universal whiteness which, of course, can neither be visualised nor even understood in the ordinary way. It has its own realm of being or rather non-being. What would be the status of sense-data on this theory of inherence? That sense-data are not universals is not difficult to show and moreover this has not been held seriously. So that we shall not enter into any discussion of this matter here. As a matter of fact there can be no relation whatever between sense-data and mind in this sense. They would be facts of two very different order such that if there could be a relation between them it would be essentially unintelligible.

But it may be said (2) that whiteness does not inhere in milk in the sense of a universal but as a *white-sensum* symbolising milk. In this sense sense-data would be *symbols*

of the mind. Now, there are at least two ways of symbolising: (a) When X symbolises A it may stand outside A and bear no necessary relation to it. In this sense red is signal of danger, or the cross a sign of self sacrifice etc. Here the relation between the symbol and the thing symbolised is *external* and arbitrary or conventional. In another (b) sense a symbol may be part or aspect of the thing symbolised. For instance, taking an outpost is regarded as a symbol of war or the onset of cold and bodily pain is treated as symbol of influenza, or a knitted brow is looked upon as a symbol of hard thinking or worry. In this sense the symbol is really a part of the object itself; the relation between them is organic and internal. Taking an outpost is part of war and cold and pain *do* constitute influenza and knitted brow *is* thought or worry. In fact, the symbol *is* the thing symbolised. The white-sensum symbolises milk in the second sense only, not obviously in the first because white is in the milk not outside it. Can we say then that sense-data similarly symbolise the mind? If this were so, there would be no absurdity in saying that I redden when I see a tomato or I am cold when my body has low temperature. But when it is said that sense-data *inhere* in mind, is this the meaning? Obviously not, because in this sense sense-data would not *inhere* in mind: they would *be* mind and yet sense-data are looked upon as external *to* the mind. For the inherence view does not take the sense-data as equivalent to the mind. It contemplates mind as a residual substance *in* which sense-data (among other things, perhaps) *inhere*. If sense-data *are* mind, then why talk about inherence? It is sheer tautology to say that mind inheres in mind or sense-data *inhere* in sense-data. When sense-data are held to be mental the implication, on the contrary, is that they somehow belong to the mind without, of course, exhausting the latter's being or nature. When whiteness inheres in milk, it does

not follow that milk is nothing but whiteness. Even if whiteness is taken to *be* milk, milk is certainly something more than that. At any rate, this would seem to be the meaning of those who say that sense-data are mental. They place the emphasis upon *mental* and *not* upon *are*. That is to say, while there may be many other things or facts which are mental, sense-data are definitely such. The defect of this formulation is that it is based upon substance-attribute and causal theory. And we must repeat that there is no way of finding whether in this sense sense-data are or are not mental. For, how do we know that they are either attributes or are caused by the mind? And, what is mind on this theory? When it is said that sense-data are mental the implication is that we know fully what the adjective mental means, just as when we say that the wind is icy-cold we know perfectly well what the adjective icy-cold means. If, however, we do not know what mental means then to say that sense-data are mental is to utter an unintelligible proposition—a proposition which is neither true nor false for the simple reason that it is not a proposition at all. Thus, the inherence theory fares no better than the causal theory upon which it must be based in order to have even a show of plausibility and like the latter must be rejected.

But there is another view which may be suggested to support the theory that sense-data are mental. It will be said that sense data are *for* the mind and are therefore mental. That is, unless sense-data are presented to the mind they are not sense-data. The phrase *for* the mind might have two meanings: It may mean that sense-data depend for their existence and qualities on the mind or our awareness. But here again we are confronted with the ambiguous notion of dependence and causality and it would be obvious that we

could not at all decide whether sense-data are caused or are supported by the mind. In the nature of the case the mind could no more cause sense-data than it could move mountains. In order to do something like this it must have at least a substantival existence which it obviously cannot have. But 'for' may mean something else. It will be said that just as a work of art is *for* the artist (or for artistic appreciation) and fodder is for the animal so also are sense-data for the mind. But we may at once point out that the artist is not scattered in the painting and the animal is not cut up in the fodder (no animal would consent to such food !) We do not say that fodder *is* animal or that the painting *is* the artist, except perhaps when we are speaking metaphorically or hyperbolically. That is, if we accept that sense-data are *for* the mind we cannot also accept that they are mental. They are presentative or apprehensive in character but that does not mean that they are mental or that they inhere in the mind.

As a matter of fact the second sense that we have been discussing and which is somewhat plausible is not what is in the mind of those who hold that sense-data are mental. The latter take the first sense of 'for' i. e., dependence on the mind and that we have already shown to be untenable.

To sum up : We have rejected the theory that sense-data are mental in the sense that they are phases or states or affections of the mind or that they inhere in the mind. We have shown that ultimately the theory in its various aspects and formulations rests fundamentally upon the substance cause category, a category which in view of its apriori bases is entirely ill-adapted to the work of observational analysis and, in consequence, must be discarded. This does not, however, mean that sense-data are not mental in *any* sense. For there may be *some* way in which they may be mental besides being

something else. But again, it is not at all necessary that they *should* be mental. In fact, whether they are or are not mental may be a matter of indifference and, contrary to prevailing opinion, the least important of any inquiry regarding sense-data.

The Status of the Pre-organic World in Idealistic Philosophy.

By

K. C. GUPTA.

Modern idealism, it has been repeatedly pointed out, should be clearly distinguished from phenomenalism, subjectivism or mentalism. While emphasising the mind-dependent character of the physical world modern idealism does not seek to reduce it to the flickering states or processes of finite individual minds. It is consistent with idealism to maintain that the world of our sense-perception is genuinely external to individual minds and yet that it can exist only through them and is thus only a complement of mind or consciousness. Critics of idealism have not, however, failed to point out the contradiction which such a position involves—a contradiction which is supposed to arise out of two conflicting tendencies in the idealistic argument. On the one hand there is the tendency to differentiate between the stream of processes which constitute a mind and the objects which are presented to it and on the other the tendency to make the existence of mind essential to that of objects. But if nature has 'being in its own right' or nature moulds minds or is the instrument for their sculpturing—as is maintained by some modern idealists—it cannot also at the same time be true that nature is 'for' mind or 'presupposes' mind. This contradiction seems to come to a head when idealism attempts to give us an account of the existential status of the pre organic world in consonance with its own principles. If we accept, as every sensible idealist unhesitatingly does, a state of the universe prior to the exis-

tence of human minds or even of living organisms it may be reasonable to take the view that all minds which appear subsequently are moulded or conditioned by the pre-existing physical world but how can it also be asserted at the same time that this pre-organic world depends for its existence on mind or consciousness ? Through what mind or minds does this world come to be ? To assert that the pre-organic world depends for its existence on its relation to the Absolute Mind would be open to two serious objections. In the first place this would imply that the Absolute Mind is something different from finite minds—a proposition which modern idealists would reject without hesitation; and in the second place this would come into conflict with the very premises on which the entire idealistic argument is based. After having deduced the dependence of the physical world on mind from the specific nature of the cognitive relation between finite minds and that world it would be extremely illogical to make it dependent on the Absolute Mind whose relation to the physical world may be, for aught we know, entirely different in nature from that of finite minds to their environment.

Thus if the physical world is 'for' mind and 'presupposes' mind it would be entirely meaningless to speak of a world which existed before the appearance of finite minds. If on the other hand we admit the existence of a pre-organic world we must admit that it was for its existence independent of any finite mind or minds inasmuch as *ex hypothesi* there was no such mind to cognise it when it existed. Can modern idealism solve this difficulty ?

It seems to me that a satisfactory answer to this question would depend upon a correct view of the nature of the relationship in which the physical world stands to mind according to idealism. The type of dependence to which reference is made when we assert that the physical world exists 'through' mind or that it 'presupposes' mind is to be clearly distinguished from

other types of dependence such as spatial dependence, causal dependence etc., if any clear thinking is to be possible. This relation may be best described as ontological dependence. It would be wrong to assume that such a relation necessarily implies that the minds and the objects which depend on them would necessarily occupy the same position in the temporal series as experienced by us. The world of the remote past is an object of knowledge to the minds which exist now and if the knowledge-relation is a constitutive relation at all that world must also depend for its existence on its relation to minds which know it now. But such a statement, it is quite evident, is hardly likely to satisfy a man of commonsense much less a philosophical realist. It will be argued that the pre-organic world may be said to depend on the minds which exist now only in the sense that it is a thing of the past and lives only in our imagination but this does not imply in any sense the truth of the idealist principle so far as that world is concerned. The real question is : On what minds did that world depend for its being when it actually existed ? From the ordinary commonsense point of view such a question seems to be capable of being answered only in one way but a little reflection will show that the question itself makes assumptions which require careful analysis and examination. It is assumed, for instance, that the flow of time stretches backwards even beyond the first appearance of mind or consciousness and that a state of the world prior to the existence of all minds actually existed in the past, the world 'actually' being taken as identical with the expression "independently of what we do, think or experience at present." It is no wonder that once these assumptions are made the question mentioned above admits only of one answer, viz, that given by realism.

Now, we may be ready to admit that the pre-organic world existed or even that it *actually* existed in the remote past but we may have to interpret the word 'actually' in a sense

different from that given to it by uncritical commonsense or even by philosophical realism. Let us examine the evidence on which our belief in the past existence of the pre-organic world is based. How do we know that there was a stage of the universe before the first appearance of sentient beings? Why should we not suppose that the universe came into existence simultaneously with life and mind? It is important to raise the question since the sort of evidence that we use in order to prove the past existence of the pre-organic world would determine the sense in which that world may be said to have existed and any attempt to go beyond the proof must be regarded as unwarranted. The belief in the past existence of a pre-organic world can be based only on some such reasoning as the following. As the causal law holds good in respect of every single event in the universe the present state of the universe as a whole must be regarded as having been caused by the state of the universe immediately preceding it and that again by the previous state and so on. We must be prepared to go backwards in time in this manner without halting if we are to account for the present characteristics of the world completely. We cannot suppose that time itself came into existence at any particular instant since the creation of time would be an event and as such must take place in time. In attempting to account for each preceding stage of the universe we inevitably come to an epoch when this earth (which alone is known to certain sentient creatures) must have been a blazing mass of fire which could not possibly contain any living being. Thus our knowledge of the present state of the universe compels us to admit the existence of a period in the world-history during which there were no sentient beings at all. The supposition that the world as a whole came into existence simultaneously with the appearance of life and sentience would do violence to the law of causality and therefore cannot be entertained from the scientific point of view. The world as it

was presented to the earliest percipient or conscious being must have been preceded by another out of which it was generated but which was not presented to any such being at all.

From this it is clear that the sole evidence for the past existence of the pre-organic world is contained in the nature of the present world as experienced by us now. No finite mind has a direct memory of the objects and events belonging to that world, nor is it possible for us to possess man-made chronicles of such objects and events. There is thus no other evidence which can prove that the pre-organic world existed and therefore none which can show that it existed as something unconnected with the present world. The past existence of the pre-organic world can be established only on the ground of its being the sole and sufficient, though remote, cause of the world of the present day. Whatever we know of the former is derived from our experience of the latter. In other words, all the different stages of the world form one unitary system and the world of the remote past must be looked upon as the continuation or prolongation of the world in the midst of which we 'live and move and have our being.' If we have reasons to believe that this world of our experience has no reality apart from its relation to conscious centres the same may also be said of any remote stage of the universe. To say that the pre-organic world actually existed does not then mean that it existed at any time independently of conscious minds but only that such a world is as necessary for the world of the present day as some objects which we do not perceive are necessary to complete the existence of those which we do. The assumption that the pre-organic world existed independently of conscious minds existing now requires proof which is not forthcoming.

I will now try to meet the most obvious objection that may be urged against what has been said here. All that the

foregoing argument has established, it will be said, is that our knowledge of the pre-organic world is derived from that of the present world but this does not show that the pre-organic world itself, while it existed, was dependent on us in any way whatsoever. This objection will be found to be invalid if we keep in view the real force of the argument. The point which should be emphasised is not merely that our knowledge of the present world enables us to infer the pre organic world but that it proves the latter to be essentially of the same nature as the former. The relation between the pre organic world and the present world of our experience is not analogous to the relation between the thing-in-itself and phenomena or even between the scientific object and sense. The two are essentially of the same texture throughout and there is unbroken continuity between them. The materials of which the world of the remote past is composed are exclusively drawn from the present world and the data supplied to us by the latter cannot be manipulated in any way so as to yield the notion of a world essentially different in nature from it. The world of any moment taken as a whole must be regarded as the sole and sufficient cause of the world of the succeeding moment taken as a whole. If a cause is identical in essence with the sum total of all its immediate effects the pre-organic world must be essentially identical with every succeeding stage of the universe in turn and therefore with the world which we experience to-day, and if the present day world depends for its existence on minds we have every reason to hold that each preceding stage of the world including the pre-organic world must be likewise mind-dependent in character.

We may now dispose of another objection which may be urged against the position taken up here. It may be contended that the pre-organic world can really explain the nature of the subsequent stages of the universe only if we assume

it to have existed in the past in the realistic sense and the idealistic argument can proceed at all only if this assumption is made. If the pre-organic world is to explain the next succeeding stage of the world causally it must be supposed to have existed before the latter and before any body could begin to think about it. It cannot now come into existence through the processes of thinking which take place in a mind or minds since in that case it would not precede the successive stages of the world which we have known and thus cannot causally explain any of them. In reply to this objection we should point out that by saying that the pre-organic world depends on mind or consciousness idealism does not mean that it is to be reduced to a dream or phantasy existing in an individual mind or minds or that it is generated by their thought-activity. We have to reconstruct the pre-organic world strictly on the basis of the data supplied to us by the present world and in accordance with universal principles such as those of causality, conservation of energy etc. Our private desires and inclinations in so far as they are recognised as such have nothing to do with the construction of the different stages through which the world has passed. The pre-organic world thus constructed existed objectively in the past but the illusion that this world, while it existed, was independent of mind or consciousness arises out of our habit of contemplating a stage of the world-history as complete in itself. In as far as all the different stages of the world are regarded as forming a single unity we must assign the same status to the universe as a whole though one part of it is in the past and another in the future. Thus the statement that the pre-organic world existed objectively before the emergence of life and sentience is not inconsistent with the statement that it was dependent for its existence on the minds which exist now. The existence of any stage of the world would have been impossible unless there were at some place and at some time centres of sentience and

thought to know it. It is not necessary to assume that the world of the remote past existed in the realistic sense.

We have thus seen that the essential nature which we can ascribe to the pre-organic world on the strength of the evidence which we possess is compatible only with the idealistic view of its ultimate status in relation to conscious experience. The difficulty arising out of the temporal interval between the pre-organic world and the minds which exist now should not stand in the way of our accepting this conclusion if we bear in mind that according to the idealistic doctrine maintained here the incidents of temporal sequence fall on the side of appearance rather than on that of reality. It is not possible to undertake a thorough discussion of the nature of time at this place but the fact that the temporal aspect is only a fragmentary and therefore unreal aspect of the universe becomes clear when we find that the character of time is closely connected with the imperfections and limitations of our experience. The temporal aspect is but the perspective in which the world appears to a finite being when he looks at it from the particular standpoint of his own 'now.' The distinction between the past and the future exists only in relation to his 'now.' In so far, however, as we are able to transcend the limitations of our standpoint we find that the past, the present and the future coalesce together and the succession of events in time loses its significance. If the ultimate reality is not in time at all minds are really co-eternal with inanimate nature and the fact that a vast temporal interval apparently separates a particular fragment of the universe from minds should not be taken to imply that the former cannot be ontologically dependent upon the latter. The universe viewed under the temporal aspect is a mere string of unconnected sections or phases exhibiting a multiplicity of detail the inner significance of which is not apparent to ordinary commonsense, while to philosophic insight the universe exhibits its inner unity as the embodiment of a coherent

system. In such a system the temporal aspect is relegated to a subordinate place and the status of each element in that system is to be determined by reference to its connection with the whole. The difficulty in ascribing an idealistic status to the pre-organic world vanishes when we view it as an element in the total scheme of reality.

On The Nature of Relations.

By

N. A. NIKAM

I propose to discuss in this paper the objection, or the sort of objection that F. H. Bradley has taken to the reality of relations. He seems to think that a relational proposition issues in a contradiction and that the nature of relations is self-contradictory. The proposition for instance of the form 'A having the relation R to B' would in Bradley's language entail an *infinite regress*. Now, I shall make, what to most people might seem a verbal distinction, a distinction between a 'vicious-circle' fallacy and a fallacy of "infinite regress." Bradley really means, or I think he intends to mean, that the nature of relations involves a *vicious-circle* fallacy. In my opinion, there is need to distinguish between the two kinds of fallacies; and the distinction is not, I think, wholly a verbal one. I admit that, in some respects, the two kinds of fallacies are similar; for instance, in both the argument is endless. In some arguments the fallacy is due to only one kind: "infinite regress", such as for instance, in the arguments about the infinite divisibility of space and time, or about the infinite divisibility of particulars that McTaggart raises in his book: *The Nature of existence-Vol. I*. The distinction between the two kinds of fallacies is not wholly a verbal one; because we know how to deal with the nature of a series that is endless without our reasoning issuing in a contradiction. But, to go into detail how this is done is not relevant to my paper.*

* I might mention in passing that there are two ways, so far as I know, and there might be other ways, in which we

I think it necessary, however, to distinguish between the two kinds of fallacies ; and, to denote the fallacy involved in endless divisibility of space and time by the words "infinite regress"; while reserving the usage of the words "vicious-circle" to fallacies such as are alleged to be involved in the could deal with the nature of a series that was endless, or that involved only the fallacy of the "infinite regress."

(a) Suppose there is a statement such as : "This is true", then there would be another statement ' It is true that this is true" and so on. In such cases, we might admit that there is an infinite regress, but we might refuse to admit that it issues in contradiction ; because, *all* the other statements are mere *repetitions* of the previous one.

(b) Or we might deal with it in this way. Suppose it is proved that there is nothing simple that is existent in the universe. Then, every existent thing or entity would be endlessly divisible, and each would have an infinite series of parts. Such an existent something would entail a contradiction ; because, in order to know the nature of the precedent parts we have to know the nature of the last member of the endless series of sequent parts or sequent set of parts. But, as we have *no* last member, therefore, we could never know the nature of the precedent parts or set of parts or of *any* of the parts of the existing something. There is here a fallacy of the "infinite regress." But, we could get over this difficulty by the argument, that any precedent part or set of parts *implied* (or *entailed*) sufficient description about the nature of its endless series of parts. If this is true, then the fact that there were endless series of parts would prove no logical difficulty in understanding the nature of that series. This is the kind of argument employed by McTaggart in his book *The Nature of Existence*. Vol. I. See chapters XXII & XXIII. For myself I see no difficulty in accepting McTaggart's argument in general.

nature of relations. If Bradley intended to mean that the nature of relations involved only the fallacy of the "infinite regress", I think, his objections would be trivial, as we know how to deal with that fallacy. If, on the other hand, he does mean that the nature of relations involves a "vicious-circle" fallacy, then, I think his objection is logically a serious one, if it is true.

It is obvious, if Bradley's argument is true, how the alleged fallacy arises in the nature of relations. If any two terms a and b have the relation R , it is supposed that between ' a ' and ' R ' there is another relation R_1 ; and so on. Let us see what this means. For instance the two terms a and b might be related by a material or non-formal relation such as of space, or time, or the non-formal relation of fatherhood. Does Bradley's argument mean only that any material, relation requires or pre-supposes, not another material relation but a *formal* relation? If it is so, would the "infinite regress" stop at the stage where we reach, formal relations? No; Bradley seems to think that *any* relation material or formal ends in a vicious-circle fallacy.

Let me illustrate this point. Suppose the relation R , in the fact ' aRb ', is the non-formal relation of fatherhood. Then, on analysis we reach the formal relation in which one term is "referrent to" and another term is "relatum to" to the formal relation R^1 . Bradley's objection must be supposed to apply even to formal relations; and would imply that in order to understand the meaning of "referrent to" or "relatum to" we should have to understand what "referrent to referrent to" or "relatum to relatum to" means.

I shall put the objection in another way in order to bring out the alleged paradoxical nature of relations. We know that a relation is *between* terms; while a "predicate" is

1. Terms used by Russell in his *Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy*. P. 48.

of or in a term. If I assert a relational proposition, aRb , Bradley's objection would seem to imply that the ground for my asserting aRb is that I have asserted or implied a previous proposition about aR, R etc, and that unless I have done so, I cannot understand or assert a relational proposition of the form ' aRb '. I have stated the objection in this way in order to bring out the fact that the alleged fallacy involved in the nature of relations is of the same kind as the fallacy that would be involved in the Law of Excluded Middle on a wrong view of it.

That Law in the form : "Every proposition is either true or false", is a proposition ; but if I were to infer from this that the Law of Excluded Middle is either true or false, I am obviously committing *the same kind of fallacy* as is alleged to be involved in the nature of relations. This is the thesis of my paper : that the kind of fallacy involved in the nature of relations is of the same kind as the fallacy that is involved on a wrong view of the Law of Excluded Middle. If this assumption is correct, a great part of this paper would prove to be correct ; otherwise, much of what I shall say may appear to be doubtful. But, it is worthwhile pursuing this view, because, I believe, even if what I shall say may prove to be false, I shall at least succeed in drawing attention to the wide range of the occurrence of the vicious-circle fallacy : in propositions such as the Law of Excluded Middle, in propositional functions, and, at least, in some perpetual judgments. I should probably have designated my paper differently because of the scope of the paper ; but I hope that this will not be a serious defect.

II.

There is a minor point which me keeps me worried, which I wish to deal with before proceeding to deal at length with the alleged paradoxical nature of relations. Might it not be the case that the alleged vicious-circle fallacy about relations

arises, only where we supposed that relations were "external," while the fallacy would disappear if relations were "internal" ? That there are certain suggestions in Bradley's writings to this view, appears to me certain ; because, in his philosophy the proposition "relations are internal" is *more true* than the proposition "relations are external" although the relational form is of appearance. I can only say that the question put above is irrelevant. It does not seem to me to be a relevant answer to the question "Are relations real" ?, to say, that relations are either external or internal. I am asking the question whether it is true that the nature of relations involves a vicious-circle fallacy ; and there might well be certain other properties of relations as denoted by the words "external" and "internal", with which I am not concerned. I might even say truly that in some cases I do not know whether a relation is external or internal ; and it does not seem self-evident that relation should have one or the other of the two properties denoted by the words "external" and "internal." This, at any rate, seems to me certain : that in order to understand the meaning of relation I need not have to understand the meaning of the words external and internal. My question is whether the conception of relation is necessary and is such as to be free from contradiction in order to describe existence.

III

At one time I believed that Bradley had proved his point ; that the nature of relations involved a vicious circle fallacy, and that there was no way out of it ; and that the sort of argument in Bradley's *Appearance and Reality* was quite fatal to the conception of relation. And, I believed that the only way out of the vicious-circle fallacy entailed by the nature of relations, was to suppose that relational propositions were really, and on "Complete analysis" *predicates* (qualities) of terms.

I have now reasons to think otherwise. I do not know whether relations are real or unreal; but, I am inclined to think that the sort of argument used by Bradley has no tendency to show that relations are unreal, rather, there is something fallacious in the kind of argument used by Bradley. And, I am led to this conclusion by reflection upon the fact that a great many objects, besides relations, would lead to the fallacy of the vicious-circle; and that the occurrence of this fallacy is of wider range than we have supposed. From this fact we should draw the conclusion that the nature of all these objects, such as Propositional functions, the notion of property, classes, (at least some) perceptual judgments, would issue in vicious-circle fallacies.²

I will show that even where we reduce relational propositions to predicates, the notion of a predicate issues in a vicious-circle fallacy. But the fact that we have not apparently thought they would, should mean either (a) that we are really ignorant about the nature of these objects; or (b) that they

2. I might say how the vicious-circle fallacy is incurred in (at least) some perceptual judgments. If I make a statement about a situation which I perceive, say "This book is on the table" I am referring to an objective situation. Now there is something common between my judgment and the objective fact to which my judgment refers. And, what is common between my judgment and the fact to which it refers, cannot itself be expressed in language. It must be pre-supposed; otherwise, the fallacy of the vicious-circle would be incurred. This is a point on which Dr. Wittgenstein has laid stress in his *Tractatus-Logico-Philosophicus*: 412. "Propositions can represent the whole of reality, but they cannot represent what they must have in common with reality in order to be able to represent it—the logical form." See also *PRINCIPIA MATHEMATICA* Vol. 1—page 45-46.

issue in vicious-circle fallacies only on our having a wrong notion, about these objects. And if, as I contend, the nature of the fallacy is the same in each of these objects then the same conclusion would force itself: that the nature of relations issues in the fallacy of the vicious-circle only because of our having wrong notion about its nature or because of our reasoning about it. And, it would imply that we could detect the fallacy in the reasoning about these objects: Propositions, classes, relations, predicates etc.³

Since this paper is a discussion of the nature of relations, it might appear irrelevant to refer to other objects which issue in vicious-circle fallacies.

I admit that it is of direct importance to confine the discussion to the nature of relation; and to show whether there is a fallacy of the kind involved or not; and how to remove it if it does involve. If I refer to the nature of other objects such as Propositional functions, etc., I do so with the belief that it will support on general and analogical grounds, the conclusion that I shall draw on other grounds as well: that the alleged fallacy issues only on our having wrong conception of the nature of relations.

IV

I shall follow Russell's analysis of propositions stated in the *Principia Mathematica*⁴ Vol. I, and in the *Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy*.⁵ Let me take, for instance, the proposition "Socrates is human." This proposition, on analysis, means that a certain *propositional function* is always true or sometimes true. In this case the propositional function is *always* true. "Socrates is human" means that a propositional function "X is human" is always true. It is clear that we could substitute for the variable X, any value:

3. See page 67 *Principia Mathematica* Vol. I.

4. Chapter II.

5. Chapter XV.

either Socrates, or Plato etc. And only where values are assigned for the variable X does the propositional function "X is human" become a proposition : "Socrates is human."

I am not interested just now in explaining the theory of propositional functions ; rather, I am interested in drawing two consequences that follow from what I have said briefly about them ; and, to point out wherein the vicious circle fallacy (of the kind alleged to be involved in the nature of relations) is incurred.

It is clear what these immediate consequences are : (a) that the nature of a propositional function is essentially *ambiguous* ; that is, unless we assign determinate values for 'X' in "X is human", it can have no well-defined meaning. It follows that, although the nature of a propositional function is to be ambiguous, yet, it has well-defined meaning, provided that values are assigned to it. I am not now interested in laying stress on the ambiguity of propositional functions. Let me pass on to the second consequence. And it is this : (b) that no function can have as its argument or value anything which pre-supposes the function ; "for, if it did we could not regard the objects ambiguously denoted by the function as definite unless its values are definite." If a function had among its values something which pre-supposes that function it is obvious that the kind of fallacy alleged to be involved in the nature of relations, would be incurred. But here, as in the nature of relations, the fallacy arises only on a wrong view of the nature of propositional functions, or our reasoning about these objects. If what I have said above is correct, my argument in principle is correct ; and it is not now necessary for me to illustrate the point further with reference to objects like perceptual judgments, etc.

V

It now remains for me to say whether the notion of "predicate" involves a vicious-circle fallacy. Most of our

judgments are of these forms : (a) Something-being - characterised-by-something or something - being - predicated - of-something ; or (b) Something - being - in - relation - to - something. (The two "somethings" may refer to the same term as in Reflexive relations : I love myself.) When we reject the notion of relation as invalid because of the vicious-circle fallacy, it would mean that judgments of the former kind are logically simpler and that we could reduce all judgments of the second (b) into the former kind (a). At any rate, this is what is implied by those who say that all propositions are of subject - predicate in form. (I do not wish to deny the possibility that *some* expressions containing the notion of "being-in-relation" are really expressions containing the notion of "being-predicated-of". But, this would not prove that the notion of relation is invalid).

Now I cannot help asking questions : What do we mean by the notion of being predicated-of ? Is this logically the simpler notion ? Is it the case that this notion is free from the vicious-circle fallacy ? I shall now say what seems to me to be a possible answer to these questions, rather one question put in different forms.

The proposition "Socrates is wise" is of the form : Something characterised-by-something. And, it seems to me that in the words "is wise" I am asserting or assigning a value to a *predicative* function of the proposition. I am led to construct, on the analogy of *propositional* functions, the notion of a *predicative* function. Every statement or assertion which contains expressions like "is mortal" "is wise" etc, *pre-suppose* the predicative function or our understanding of the nature of that function. The predicative function expressed by the word "is" is not determinate unless we assign values to it. In some cases the word 'is' is ambiguous ; that is, it stands for, what I have called, the predicative function as well as the determinate values of

that function. In the proposition, for instance "This is" I am asserting a *predicate* : existence ; and, I am *pre-supposing*, what I have called the notion of a predicative function. But, the predicative function, like the propositional function, cannot have itself as the argument ; therefore, the mere assertion of "is" without it being an assertion either of "a-so-and-so" or "the-so-and-so" or "the-so-and-so of such and such" has no well-defined meaning. If we did suppose that the predicative function of propositions had as its argument another predicative function, etc., then, the fallacy of the vicious-circle of the same kind as involved in the nature of relations, would be incurred. But the fallacy would be incurred, as is apparent, only where we held a wrong view of the nature of the predicative function.

I have dwelt on this point in order to show (a) that the sort of fallacy alleged to be involved in the nature of relations, also arises in the notion of "predicate". (b) that we have no reason to suppose that that notion is logically simpler than the notion of relation ; (c) and that (this is what the argument implies) if we are consistent we should reject both the notion of quality and relation as involving the fallacy of the vicious circle.

I shall now conclude this paper with a brief summary. The alleged fallacy in the nature of relations arises, (as in other objects like propositional functions and predicates etc) only where we have wrong view about their nature ; that is, only where we treat relations as *particulars*, as Bradley's argument does, needing another relation, etc, instead of treating relations *as* relations. Why should we have to suppose that a relation requires another relation to relate ? If the first relation does not relate neither does the second. Nor, shall we escape the fallacy if we reduce relations to predicates, of terms, as Leibniz does. If what I have said about "predicates" is true, even predicates are open to the

same objections as Bradley's objection against relations. In all these objects the vicious-circle fallacy is incurred because of our wrong view about the nature of these objects. What Bradley's argument has proved, it seems to me, is that in all objects such as, relations, predicative functions, etc., our argument tends to a fallacious reasoning. I think we could detect the fallacy in such arguments and remove the contradictions supposed to be involved. Whitehead and Russell have attempted in the *Principia Mathematica*, to remove the contradictions, by their theory of Logical Types, supposed to be entailed by such objects as: Propositional functions, perceptual judgments, classes etc. I cannot help thinking that the alleged contradiction about the nature of relations could be removed by a similar argument: that the vicious-circle fallacy arises only on our having a wrong view about the nature of relations.

Scepticism and its Place in Sankara's Philosophy

By
P. T. Raju.

The question, whether Sankara is a sceptic, may draw different and even quite opposite answers. It has been usual to regard Sankara as a sceptic and an agnostic for the reason that he time and again declares that the absolute reality is beyond thought. Sankara maintains,¹ like Bradley, that reality is neither substance nor attribute, neither cause nor effect; in short, it is none of the things which we perceive and think of. The advaitin or the Sankarite tells us that perception is not the sole guide to truth² and sometimes its deliverances are to be set aside; even inference is unreliable.³

On the other hand, it may be maintained that Sankara is not a sceptic because he holds that the ultimate reality can be experienced.⁴ Like the Greek sceptic, he does not end in blind subjectivism, but maintains that knowledge is of the object.⁵ He does not accept the *syūlvāda*, the theory⁶ that every cognition is full of contradictory possibilities, of the Ārhatas.

1. We read in Sankara's commentary on *Brahmasūtras* that Brahman is the cause of the world. But what Sankara means here by 'cause' is a moot question. Yet it is certain that he does not use the word in the ordinary sense.

2. See *Advaitasiddhi* 3. *Sārīrakabhāṣya*, II, 1, 11.

4. *Anubhavaikavedya* 5. *Sārīrakabhāṣya*, II, 2, 28.

6. *Ibid*, II, 2, 33.

In view of these conflicting possible interpretations it is necessary to determine whether and how far Sankara is a sceptic. It is also necessary to find out whether the scepticism present in Sankara's philosophy, if any, is of a disconcerting type and vitiates his system. Very often we come across critics of absolutism and supra-rationalism questioning how, if an entity is unknowable or unthinkable, it is possible to talk about it, while in the same breath deriding absolutism as unhealthy mysticism, if it is said that some kind of contact with the absolute is possible. It is therefore incumbent on all supra-rational absolutists to answer them.

I

Scepticism is mainly an epistemological theory according to which certainty is not attainable by the human intellect. There are some philosophers, like Descartes, who have adopted scepticism for methodological purposes. They say that it is necessary to doubt before reaching truth. Yet they do not deny the possibility of right knowledge through human intellect. Even Hegel, by considering scepticism to be an essential moment in the dialectical process of reaching truth,⁷ follows Descartes to some extent. Yet Descartes' aim is to reach the indubitable by doubting everything that can be doubted, and then reach the latter through deduction from the former. It is in this spirit that he teaches us to analyse everything complex into its simple components and then see that these simples are not deniable without self-contradiction. But the acceptance of scepticism as a moment in his method does not lead Hegel to analyse a concept into its simple components in order to ascertain its truth. Coming after Kant and having the advantage of the discoveries of the critical philosophy, he uses scepticism as a means to eliciting the whole within which the conflict

7. Wallace : *The Logic of Hegel*, p. 141.

that generates scepticism occurs. Scepticism thus provides the spur to the discovery of a synthesis that quiets the conflict of scepticism. But in this discovery the sceptical spirit, Hegel maintains, is not left back, but is carried up, sublimated, and turned into an essential moment of speculative reason. The conflicting moments, thesis and anti-thesis, become moments of the synthesis.

Even in Advaita we can discern some scepticism which is significant as a method. The advaitin's denial of every finite concept as not the reality, as *neti, neti*, and consequently the denial of all the instruments of determinate knowledge to grasp the ultimate real has much in common with scepticism. This denial is a gradual process which, if it does not lead to any positive conclusion, would be little different from scepticism of the most morbid type. In fact, the sceptic presupposes some reality; for without this presupposition there would be no meaning in doubting. We doubt the certainty of our judgment only on the assumption of a fact about which the judgment is made. It may be objected that we may doubt whether there is any object at all. But then the doubt about our judgment would be of the form, If there is an object,—and I am not sure of its existence,—then my judgment would be of doubtful validity. But the difficulty would be to understand how the first occasion for doubting whether there is any object at all arises, if from the beginning of our knowledge we were not conscious of the existence of any object. Sankara's position is unambiguous on this point. His declaration that cognition is dependent on the object,⁸ and that illusion has a positive real basis⁹ leaves no room for a controversy. It is the Vijnānavādins who maintain that, because of the relativity of our knowledge of things, there are no objects, and objects

are nothing but our ideas. They fail to see that the difference in our knowledge of things is not a sufficient ground for maintaining that there are no objects at all. It is a sufficient ground only to maintain that the innate nature of the object is not revealed to us through our senses and mind. The very presence of error and evil shows that there is something not ourselves in this world.

It is the aim of Sankara to point to the innate nature of the object, and he declares that none of the concepts express it, and none of the means of finite knowledge enable us to grasp it. Thus even in Sankara's system scepticism is made a stepping stone to the attainment of truth. But unlike Hegel, he does not carry up what is discarded and make the sceptical spirit a moment of the Absolute Spirit. The former completely disappears and finds no place in the Absolute.

It is, however, to be noted that Sankara did not consciously recognise the usefulness of scepticism as a method. Its presence in his system is a result of our analysis. In fact, every rationalistic philosophy is more or less sceptical. Rationalism is iconoclastic, it is destructive of all superstitions and falsities. It therefore doubts whenever the slightest contradiction is found. Some philosophers may use the method of doubt, and express it in formulas; others may unwittingly make use of it. Sankara has no formula of doubt to apply systematically. Yet his scepticism of the final certainty of the finite knowledge leads to the view that the Absolute alone carries final certainty and that it is experienceable.

Another important point to note is that Sankara, unlike Descartes, does not begin with doubting. Any interpretation to the contrary conflicts with the Advaitin's view that knowledge is its own criterion.¹⁰ For Sankara every cognition is its own test, and is not to be doubted unless some contradiction is

perceived. For instance Sankara would not dismiss a cognition as uncertain for the reason that its contradictory is conceivable. Hume draws a distinction between the propositions about fact and mathematical propositions, and treats the validity of the former as always open to doubt as their contradictories are conceivable. But this attitude lands him in absolute scepticism. But Sankara's attitude is quite healthy and realistic and does not lead to the scepticism of Hume.

There could be no clear-cut line of demarkation between scepticism as a method and scepticism according to which positive and certain truth is not attainable by human intellect. We have seen how Sankara may be said to have used scepticism as a method; yet he declares that human intellect cannot achieve final certainty. Yet the second kind of scepticism may deny the possibility of certainty in any way, and the difference between the two would then lie in the assumption by the former of the reality and the experienceability of something which cannot be doubted. Sankara, therefore, is not a pure sceptic. He may be called a mystic; yet he is not a mystic of the pathological type. His mysticism is based on rationalism. It is the result of a system of philosophical thought, and is not adopted as a method. We may therefore say that he is a sceptic in method—not forgetting that he differs from Descartes even here—and a mystic in results. Every form of mysticism, by maintaining the truth of an ultimate reality not realisable through the senses and the intellect, may be regarded as a methodological scepticism. In this sense, Plato, Aristotle, Spinoza, Kant, Bergson, Bradley, and a number of other great philosophers are mystics and sceptics. But this scepticism in no way lowers the value of their philosophy. In fact, one who cannot appreciate music is a sceptic with regard to music and its influences. There are different levels of consciousness and different levels of reality corresponding to them. Every level

of reality cannot be known by every level of consciousness. Therefore scepticism is an unavoidable phenomenon of our life. Yet this kind of scepticism is not a sign of morbid intellectual condition.

If we consider Sankara's epistemological theory our doubt that his is a self-defeating scepticism will be easily dissipated. His theory that truth is self-revealing leaves no room for such doubts. We should of course be careful not to identify his theory with the coherence theory of Western philosophy, which also holds that truth is self-revealing. For the latter view there is only one truth, which as the Absolute, is all-inclusive. This all-inclusiveness makes it impossible for anything else which could be the standard of truth to exist. This view leaves no place for finite truth ; and even if finite truth exists, it cannot be self-revelatory, it cannot be its own standard. Thus, as Joachim complains, no way is open between the finite and the absolute truths. The finite truth is made truth only by its coherence with other truths. Thus the standard of finite truth lies outside itself. But according to Sankara, even finite truth could be self-revealing. No truth is made truth by anything external to itself though every untruth is made untruth by something external. The system which could maintain that every true cognition is true by itself, that even at the empirical level every empirical truth, unless empirically contradicted, remains an empirical truth, cannot be reasonably dubbed scepticism. On the other hand, the Naiyāyika, who is a realist and a pluralist, is nearer to scepticism than the advaitin, by maintaining that no cognition is either true or false by itself, but is made so by other considerations,¹¹ such as some *guna* or good quality in the instruments of cognition, other cognitions with which it coheres, and the pragmatic tests. This view implies that

11. *Parvatah prāmāṇyavāda*.

at first every cognition is doubted and doubtable, and is made truth only by coherence and other considerations. Logically, only coherence counts, for even other considerations result in judgments the coherence of which with the judgment in question makes it truth. But in this chain of coherent judgments the truth of no judgment is self-revealing, and therefore absolute scepticism is inherent in the Naiyāyika epistemology.

II

Thus, paradoxical though it may seem, Sankara appears to have very admirably blended and incorporated into his system both scepticism and its rival, direct realism. But by the presence of direct realism scepticism is made harmless. Speaking of advaita, Professor Urquhart writes : We are thus left without guidance, and into the emptiness in the house of the intellect thus swept and garnished, undesirable guests may enter. If our fundamental belief presents us with no deterring positive characters, we are at the mercy of arbitrary authority, superstition, and even of our capricious invention..... Distrust of our faculties may produce a permanent and disconcerting mood of scepticism in which we despair of arriving at any universal standard"¹² By this objection the presence in Sankara of direct realism seems to be overlooked. True, Sankara distrusts finite intellect as inadequate to grasp the nature of ultimate truth. For him, the ultimate truth is known by a consciousness above finite intellect but continuous with it. This view, one may imagine, leaves room for all kinds of superstition and spiritism. Further, it may be thought that Sankara's view that every cognition is its own standard of truth supports and encourages all superstitions. But no. The other part of Sankara's epistemological theory, that every cognition is made untruth by something other than itself,¹³ dissipates all superstitions. The critical or

12. *The Vedānta and Modern Thought*, p. 227.

13. *Paratuh aprāmāṇyavāda*.

negative function of thought, which turns every cognition contradicted into an untruth, is made good use of by him.

It might be questioned whether the doctrine of *māyā* is not in principle a sceptical doctrine. *Māyā* of course involves some scepticism, but not the scepticism of despair. *Māyā* is the principle of inexplicability, which regards the world as a hard and stubborn fact. We may try to understand the world in terms of cause and effect, reason and consequent, creator and created; but we always fail. We fail to understand the nature of even a finite thing fully. There is always some core of individuality and impenetrability left out in our explanations, which is irreducible into terms and relations. The doctrine of *māyā* is the necessary outcome of the view that intellect cannot grasp the ultimate reality. The doctrine results as the postulation of a non-rational element by the intellect as the very condition of explanation. Unless the nature of ultimate reality is known fully and in detail, we cannot understand the nature of the phenomenal world. We have to bring down the Absolute to the level of the phenomenal world in order to fully explain it. But this is an impossible task. So the phenomena have to be accepted without full explanation. Yet we can understand them enough for our practical life. Hence Sankara's scepticism does not land us in despair and inactivity. As we have already noted, Sankara's scepticism is inherent in our very conscious life with its different levels. Every lower level must be sceptical of its powers to grasp the experiences of the higher, unless it rises up. But then it ceases to be what it was at first.

We may repeat that, as regards empirical truth, Sankara is not at all sceptical. He tells us, unlike the *Mādhyamika*, that illusion or *prātibhāsikā sattā*, is based on empirical truth or *vyāvahārikā sattā*. He is confident that even this *vyāvahārikā sattā* is directly known and its truth is self-revealed. The doubt about *vyāvahārikā sattā* arises, not

because it does not produce any certainty, but because it does not produce ultimate certainty. So Sankara's scepticism is really due, not to epistemological considerations, but to logical and metaphysical. As regards empirical truth, a Sankarite could, consistently with his principles ask, Why should I doubt when my perception is not contradicted? But when the question of final truth is raised, he begins to doubt. The considerations that lead to this doubting are many and various. Sometimes the relativity of our senses, of the medium, etc., and at other times the conflict between senses and reasoning are made the ground for rejecting phenomena as ultimate reality. These can all be reduced to the consideration of the agreement between the object and our conception of it. While examining this agreement logical and normative considerations arise. I do not mean that epistemology has no logical and metaphysical presuppositions; but when the question of these presuppositions is raised, we leave pure epistemology and enter the sphere of metaphysics. My judgment, "The rose is yellow", is false because I perceive later that the rose is red. But the unreality of the judgment, "The rose is red", is not proved by any subsequent empirical perception, but by considerations other than merely epistemological.

Sankara's scepticism,—it, after all the above consideration, we agree to call it scepticism, and some may even refuse to call him sceptic for the reason that the meaning of the word has to be so much extended that it would lose its sting,—is thus a motive force that impels us to move to higher levels of consciousness always in the hope that final reality is realisable by man. Because consciousness is identified by many of the Western philosophers with thought, when it is said that thought cannot have final certainty, it is understood that man cannot have it. But for Sankara the self is more than the intellect. Final certainty which the intellect fails to have can be had by the self.

III

It may be asked : If the intellect is unable to grasp the final reality, how is it able to recognise its presence ? How is it certain of its existence ? This has been a very common objection against many kinds of agnosticism and scepticism. Some recent writers seem to satisfy these objectors by unquestioningly yielding to them. Professor C. A. Campbell in his *Scepticism and Construction* accepts the existence of an unknowable principle on logical grounds, but will have nothing to do with it in the moral sphere, for a sceptical and unknowable principle cannot form a standard of morality, which has to be consciously applied. But the sceptical principle or the absolute which Professor Campbell accepts owes its recognition mainly to normative considerations. Only when the question of perfect truth arises is the sceptical principle postulated. Perfect truth, like the perfect man is a normative category. If this principle works as a norm in logic, it should also be able to work as a norm in morals. If the absolute is truth, its presence should be felt not only in the sphere of logic but also in that of morals. Otherwise, the usual charge that idealism is a sublime fairy tale without any basis in fact cannot be met.

Professor Santayana in his *Scepticism and Animal Faith*, approaching the problem from the side of critical realism, admits the unknowable on moral considerations, but rejects thought as having anything to do with it. Existence is an object of animal faith and action and not of consciousness, which therefore should treat it as an unknowable. The objects of consciousness are essences, which have no existence, and between which any and every relation is possible. But even this position cannot avoid the critic, who would urge that if Professor Santayana had not consciously experienced existence, he would not have been able to bring the experience to the level of consciousness and argue about it.

Hence we have to interpret our experience of the unknowable, whether it is the Absolute as in Sankara and Campbell or matter as in Santayana, as certainly due to consciousness, but to a different level of it from thought or pure reason. But all the levels of consciousness are continuous and the conscious subject is the same all through. In absolutism the Absolute and the supra-intellectual consciousness are postulated as the very condition of the phenomena and our intellect. The critic of the unknowable has to be met by saying that our conscious life is too complex to fit into the deterministic explanation of the intellect.

Similarly, the contrary criticism that any experience of the supra-rational is a sign of unhealthy mysticism is also due to deliberately ignoring the complexity of our conscious life and the inordinate desire for deterministic explanations. This criticism too has therefore to be met by saying, as above, that human beings possess different levels of consciousness which are continuous and overlapping. If we were endowed merely with animal faith, we would have wondered how reasoning could be a good guide to existence. Similarly, we wonder from the level of the intellect what pure supra-rational consciousness would be like. Yet in the experience of beauty and in moments of moral conversion we feel that we rise above ourselves. These facts cannot be deterministically explained. At this point we cannot attach too much significance to the demands of our moral consciousness that we should rise above ourselves and our circumstances. This idea of perfection may be very vague for the intellect; it may take this or that form; yet the human being is dissatisfied with each and is able to say, it is not this, it is not this. He feels the stirrings of the ideal within. This feeling may perhaps be dismissed as a pathological state of mind. Yet that really is at the root of all moral, nay, even all human progress. The presence of the ideal may not be felt by each

and every person just as music, painting, philosophy and so forth are not appreciated by every man. Even when felt it is possible to ignore it by not caring to push explanations in logic and ethics to their ends. The presence and the work of this ideal in history and in the individual show that the subject is not a mere counterpart of the object and explainable, like it, mechanistically, but passes beyond it, and is in touch with something more than the object and itself. Our contact with the Absolute is therefore not a sign of unhealthy mysticism, but is an essential fact the truth of which is supported by many rational considerations.

Doctrine and Expression in Mysticism

By

RAM MURTI LOOMBA.

There is a tendency in contemporary philosophical studies of mysticism to classify mystic doctrine into several distinct and even opposed types on the analogy of the classifications already in vogue in psychological studies of the development of mystic experience. Psychologists in their own field, are not agreed upon the justifiability and value of such dichotomic or several-headed classifications. While M. Norero has insisted on our keeping in mind the rich variety of the mystic's immediate consciousness, M. Delcroix has held out hopes of finding a single law for all mystic development.

Leaving aside, however, psychological investigation into the development of the mystic's consciousness, and also ethical study of the practical discipline and procedure of the mystic's life, it may be here suggested that the philosophical intention of all mystic doctrine is always the same with every real mystic school or individual.

This is not to deny that there are really many different ways in which mysticism has found expression in metaphysical doctrine. What is suggested here, is that all these different metaphysical expressions of mysticism are expressions of the same intent, means of conveying the same fundamental principle, and born of and actuated by one and the same motive. The fundamental principle of all the seemingly different mystic doctrines is the principle of ineffability. And the common motive by which they are actuated is an attempt to express the inexpressible.

The mystic claims that there is a certain immediate and intimate knowledge of ultimate reality or ultimate truth,

sharply distinguished in character from perceptual experience as well as from rational speculation, which is not commonly testified to but is nevertheless a fact. But he says that this knowledge cannot be expressed. The secret of spiritual life is ineffable.¹ As Ramkrishna put it, what Brahman is no tongue can express; one who realizes it can not give information about it to others.² The mystic, thus refuses to tell us what he knows. He would invite you, as the Buddha invited the five monks in his first sermon at Sarnath³ to follow his path and, if you may, attain the state of perfect knowledge. But to all questions as to the exact character of the experience his answer is always that he can not really say anything. Often in the Buddhist Suttas do we find this ineffability very forcefully expressed. The Mahāyana Suttas are never tired of the adjective unspeakable, indefinable. Insistently does the Brihadāranyaka Upanishad repeat *Neti, Neti*.

In milder form this principle takes the form of statements that what the mystic has ever preached or taught is only a barest fraction of what he knows. The Buddha, we are told, once took a few simsapa leaves and urged that as these did not exhaust the leaves of the forest, even so the truths he had announced were not all the truths that he had learnt.⁴ Ibnul Farid, the Muslim mystic poet, has told us that what he has declared in his odes is only "the frontispiece of my state" and that, due to inability to express

1. Ramadasa, XX.

2. *Diary of M. (Prabuddha Bharata, Vol. XXXIX, No. 2, 1934.)*

3. Radhakrishnan: *Tracking of Buddha by Speech and by Silence. (Hilbert Journal, Vol XXXII. No. 3, 1934)*

4. *Samyutta Nikaya, L. vi. 31.*

deeper truths, he had refrained from speaking of them.⁵ The Greek, Plotinus, has likewise asked us to remember that there are parts of what it most concerns us to know which he cannot describe to us.

The mystics make no secret of the value of the inexpressibility of truth. Firstly, that preaching of intuitive truth is not calculated to spiritual progress⁶, being liable to excessive authoritarianism, to professionalism in mystic preaching and, consequently, to a dulling of intuitive capacities. And, secondly, that it is likely to be not understood and to be misunderstood and abused by the vulgar and the uninitiated.⁷

While the initiated may always reorient his understanding and comprehension of received expressions of mystic truth by reference to his own personal experience, and while to him, consequently, the slightest and the most inadequate expression is of the greatest help as a symbol which leads him on automatically to the whole truth, the medium of understanding for the uninitiated is only the bare form of expression in language without any chance of modification, verification or correction by positive personal experience. In language, however, it is pointed out, mystic intuition can possibly find no such adequate expression.⁸

For this inadequacy of language to express mystic truth four principal reasons have been pointed out : firstly, that the

5. Ibnul Farid : *Odes* 34, 35.

6. *Samyutta Nikaya*, Cula-Malumkyaputta Sutta, Majjhima 1, 426. Abu Saïd. St. Paul. Plato : *Timæus*.

7. *Lankavatara*. Clement : *Stromatris*. Dhu'l-Nun : *Qushayri*. Abu Saïd. St. Paul. Plato : *Timæus*.

8. *Lankavatara*. Narada : *Bhakti Sutra*. Plotinus : *Ennead*, VI, 9, 10. Rama Tirtha : *Diary* (Kulyat-i-Rama, Vol. II, p. 97). Plato : *Seventh Epistle*.

truth is infinite ⁹, secondly, that it is too 'sweet' and enrapturing to be told, ¹⁰ thirdly that it can not be described in terms of the categories of the intellect which are also necessarily the categories of language, ¹¹ and last, that the subject-object identity which is the essential mark of mystic experience makes description impossible. ¹²

For all these reasons several mystics adopted indeed a course of complete silence on ultimate questions. The silence of the Buddha about ultimate reality has grown famous to the point of misinterpretation of his philosophy as atheism. There are several well-known passages in the canon where the Buddha or his followers are reported to have answered a series of metaphysical questions by silence. ¹³ It is literally an argument *a silentio*. It is clearly understood without a doubt among mystics and among those who understand them that the mystic is silent not because of ignorance or of scepticism or atheism but because he can not explain what he has known. Indeed the very term 'mysticism' is related to the word 'mum' which denotes the condition of one who must not or can not speak. Silence is thus often viewed among them not merely as a necessary limitation but even as a virtue, as indeed the distinguishing mark of the mystic. ¹⁴ Silence, thus, becomes, in fact, the language of the mystic.

Had, however, all mystics adopted for themselves the rule of complete silence, great difficulties would have arisen. All

9. Kabir : *Shabda* 12. King Pasendi's interpretation of Buddha's silence to Mum Khema, *Jewish Cabalism*

10. Ramakrishna, quoted in Diary of M. (*Prebuddha Bharata*, op. cit.)

11. Svadhimukti-daridra.

12. Plotinus : *Enneads* VI, 9. 10. *Vimalakirti Sutta*. Shandilya : *Bhakti Sutra*.

13. *Vimalakirti Sutra*

14. Lao Tze : *Tao Teh King*.

the philosophical interest in mysticism which is in these days at a stage of vigorous revival would be impossible ; the valuable studies of mysticism we possess today would have never been written. Nay, the religious man's pursuit after 'experience of the Deity' would have remained an unguided journey on an unlighted road. Fortunately for mankind, mystics have, instead of adopting the muteness of silence, left rather profuse accounts of their experiences and observations. However small a fraction it may be of all that has been written, however unsystematic to the extreme and therefore hard to correctly follow and understand, the wonder is that we possess so much of mystic literature as we do in spite of the principle of ineffability and the injunctions of the mysteries. The mystics have been unremitting in their efforts to express the inexpressible.

For the knowledge we have of mysticism we owe considerable thanks to the initiated. Its usefulness and meaningfulness for the initiated, and the sympathetic, rendered worthwhile the attempt on the part of the mystic to express the inexpressible, however vague, inadequate, indefinite, unusual, oblique or cryptic the expression be.¹⁵ And the effort has never been vain. Mystics have always been found to understand each other thoroughly by these same oblique and cryptic expressions. The mystic, however, does not necessarily have always the utility of his description or the possibility of its being understood or enjoyed by others at heart when he chooses to write or speak of his intuitive realizations. More often it is a spontaneous bursting forth of expression from within, an outlet for the joy and ecstasy of intuitive knowledge.¹⁶ The mystic longs to express himself, to articulate the truths he has realized. He even prays for it ; for the single direction

15. Plotinus : *Enneads* VI, 9, 10.

16. Abū Saïd.

of his life demands it. He has dedicated the whole of himself to this truth ; every aspect, of his life, must be utilised and concentrated on that truth, intellect and speech to be no exception.¹⁷

Now, evidently, in the nature of the case, such expression can virtually come to nothing more nor less than expression of the principle of ineffability itself. But this expression takes several different forms which sometimes even appear to denote mutually opposed types of metaphysical doctrine. Yet a little careful survey of some of these types will show that it is the same common intent, the principle of ineffability, and the same common motive, expression of the inexpressible, that pervades and actuates them all in spite of the differences which appear to lie between them.

The commonest type of expression which the mystic adopts to articulate his knowledge, in Indian as well in Western mysticism, is expression in the language of what might be called negativism. Plotinus' description of the mystic vision is full of negatives ; it is a state in which there is no movement, no emotion, no desire, no reason or any thought, no concern with the beautiful, no self-presence before the gods, and finally no vision.¹⁸ The description of Brahman offered by Upanishadic mysticism is famous, nay, some would say, notorious, for its negativism. We are offered only a bundle of negations. But the mystic does not thereby reduce himself to any barren or meaningless position ; the complaint against negativism on this account is hardly reasonable. Mystic truth, ineffable as it is, can not be de-scribed in terms of the intellectual categories of language. The best course, accordingly, for him who burns to express himself is to take these categories one by one and to

17. Rabindranath Tagore : *Stray Birds*.

18. Plotinus : *Enneads* VI .9, 10.

reject them as not being applicable to the absolute experience.¹⁹

It will be particularly interesting here to note a peculiar type of extreme negativism in the history of mysticism, where it culminates in something that has the appearance almost of nihilism and is also very often confused with it. This is the type instanced in the Chinese mystic Lao T'zo's work, *Tao Teh King*, where the absolute reality, 'Tao', is named the Non-existent, in the Buddhist mystic Nagarjuna's doctrine of Shunyata, which is rendered by many scholars as a theory of 'Void' or 'Non-being', and in Silesius' Cherubinischer Wandersmann, which calls God a lauter Nichts, a perfect Naught. Neither the doctrine of the Tao, however, nor that of Shunyata, nor, again, that of the lauter Nichts, amounts really to a metaphysical nihilism. All of them are characterised by a fundamental insistence on the realization in personal experience of a positive ultimate reality or 'essential nature' of the universe. But they also specially take it upon themselves to emphatically voice the inadequacy of the categories for its characterisation.²⁰ Since the absolute does not belong to any category it is neither this, nor that, nor anything else. It is sought to express this emphatically by calling it Shunyata, the Non-existent or the Naught.

Negativism is often coupled, for instance, in Vedantism, with another type of mystic expression which might be called paradoxism. Having asserted that the absolute truth is neither this, nor that, nor anything else, it is then stated that it is this as well as that and also everything else. This, in spite of appearances, is really not contradictory or opposed to the negation of all categories which characterises the first type.

19. Rabindranath Tagore : *Foreword to Radhakrishnan's 'The Philosophy of the Upanishads'*.

20. Rene Grousset : *In the Footsteps of the Buddha*.

It is really expressive and elaborative of the same fundamental principle that was therein given expression. For all it intends is only that while no category of language is adequate enough to express mystic truth, all categories fundamentally characterise it, however different and incompatible they might be among themselves, and that in this sense even mutually contradictory categories which may be equally denied may also be equally affirmed of the same truth.

The same principle of ineffability, again, finds expression in what has the appearance of pure abstractionism in mystic writings. This happens in the case of mystics of speculative calibre like Sankara and Eckhart, where mystic truth is described only in terms of purely abstract universals, avoiding all determination in terms of concrete perceptual categories. This expression of the principle of ineffability in abstractionism is often also carried one step further by an insistent transcendentalization of all the principal terms or names that are employed, the device being particularly favoured by theological mystic writers.

Of a character very different from and quite contrary to all these mentioned above is the type of mystic mode of expression which is called symbolism. It is almost universally characteristic of Sufi mysticism and is also common in Christian and Hindu mysticism. It appears for the most part in the form of allegory, poetry, painting or sculpture. The perfect is here sought to be interpreted by the imperfect, the ultimate and permanent by the transient and superficial. Its categories are the categories of every day life of the 'wordly', and the 'materially minded man'. The adoption of these categories has earned for it a certain disrepute. Symbolism among mystics is criticised as savouring of a very low, immature, undeveloped and primitive level of the understanding and is decried as a degradation to the spirit of philo-

sophical thought.^{2 1} But all the while it is forgotten that the mystic is the loudest of all in his opposition to materialism. If he does so often speak in symbolic language, it is only because he feels deeply and wishes to emphasise the inherent incapacity of thought and language to rise above materialistic terms. He is, here, as always, actuated by the same one motive, expression of the inexpressible. Only, perceptual categories are, for two reasons, preferred to catagories of pure reason as instruments of expression. Firstly intellectualistic or rationalistic terms are themselves permeated through and through by perceptual elements. And, secondly, of the two, —the sensible and the rational,—the sensible can serve better in indicating the nature of ultimate truth than the abstract and the rational. The concrete image is, inspite of the traditional bias to the contrary, a better help to the true and positive understanding of reality than the universal concept.

— — — — —

21. W. T. Stace: *A Critical History of Greek Philosophy*, pp. 11-12.

Whitehead's idea of God.

By

C. V. SRINIVASA MURTY.

The Philosophy of Whitehead is described as the 'philosophy of organism'. The construction of a system of philosophy as the one he has given us is impossible for any one who has not the breadth of learning, deep metaphysical insight and a firm conviction in the possibility of 'fathoming the deeper depths of the manysidedness of things'. The understanding of his thought demands the rare combination in one of the mathematician, the scientist, and the philosopher. He attempts to combine in one grand scheme the permanent values contained in the biological concept of evolution whose philosophical implications are brought out by Alexander, Lloyd Morgan, and Bergson ; the importance of plurality and objectivity emphasized by the various schools of realism and pragmatism, in doing which he looks back to the "pre-Kantian modes of thought." Any metaphysical system is difficult. But as Earl Russel points out "the difficulty is undoubtedly increased by the obscurity of Whitehead's style, by his queer choice of words, and by his failure to provide definite examples elucidating his main conceptions." (*Mind*, 1930). With this preface I propose to examine the status of the concept of God in the philosophy of organism.

I confine myself to the three later works of Whitehead : '*Science and the modern World*', '*Religion in the Making*,' and '*Process and Reality*'. The final metaphysical system is elaborated in the last mentioned work. In defining his attitude to philosophical problems Whitehead protests against what he calls the 'fallacy of misplaced concreteness'. In chapter, II of his '*Process and Reality*' Whitehead gives a "sketch

of the primary notions which constitute the philosophy of organism". We may expound the thought of Whitehead by a consideration of the most important notions :—Actual entity, Prehension, Nexus, Eternal objects and Creativity.

Part I

Actual Entity.

The philosophy of the organism is concerned exclusively with "the becoming, the being and the relatedness of actual entities." Whitehead takes his notion of an 'actual entity' from the Cartesian notion of substance. While Descartes emphasized 'quality', Whitehead insists on the 'relatedness' of 'actual entities' (viii). He denies the notion of a substance possessing qualities and builds up a modified form a monadology. The monads of Leibnitz are still passive, while the actual entities are always a process. "Actual entities—also termed 'actual occasions'—are the final real things of which the world is made up. There is no going behind actual entities to find anything more real. They differ among themselves: God is an actual entity, and so is the most trivial puff of existence in far off empty space" (P. and R. p.24). Starting from a plurality of actual existences, he is anxious to point to the unity exemplified in the course of actual occasions. Hence he hastens to point out that "though there are gradations of importance, and diversities of function, yet in the principles which actuality exemplifies all are on the same level. The final facts are, all alike, actual entities, complex and inter-dependent" (P.R.p.24-25).

Prehension.

In the philosophy of organism every actual entity is an emergent from prior actual entities. The analysis of an actual entity in its process of concrescence is termed prehension. "A prehension" says Whitehead, "reproduces in itself the general characteristics of an actual entity : it is referent to an external world and in this sense will be said to have

'Vector character'; it involves emotion and purpose, and valuation, and causation.....Every prehension consists of three factors : (a) the subject which is prehending, (b) the datum which is prehended, (c) the subjective form which is *How* that subject prehends that datum. Prehensions of actual entities are termed 'physical prehensions' and prehensions of eternal objects are termed 'conceptual prehensions'. Consciousness is not necessarily involved in either type of prehension. (P.R.p. 31.)

There are two species of prehensions : (a) Positive prehensions which are termed feelings and (b) Negative prehensions which are said to 'eliminate' from feeling. Negative prehensions also have subjective forms. A negative prehension holds its datum as inoperative in the progressive concrescence of prehensions constituting the unity of the subject. This distinction helps Whitehead to maintain that every item in the universe is prehended negatively, or positively, by every actual occasion. Every actual entity in process of concrescence prehends only those entities which further its self-formation, that is, takes in only the *relevant* entities and the other entities become irrelevant. The notion of relevance is determined by the subjective aim of each actual occasion.

Nexus.

Nexus is regarded as one of the important categories. "Actual entities involve each other by reason of their prehensions of each other. There are thus real individual facts of the togetherness of actual entities, which are real, individual and particular. Any such particular fact of togetherness among actual entities is called a nexus."

Eternal Objects.

Eternal objects are the fifth category of existence. They are the pure potentialities for the specific determination of facts or forms of definiteness. The permanences exhibited by the passing flux of events are traced by Whitehead to

the 'ingression of eternal objects'. An actual occasion finds its explanation in an eternal object. The unique contribution of an eternal object is made in respect of a number of actual occasions but it varies from one occasion to another in respect of its mode of ingression. An eternal object by virtue of its 'relational essence' is systematically related to other eternal objects and it is this 'relational essence' that determines how it is possible for the object to have ingressions into actual occasions. Whitehead admits internal as well as external relations. The relation of eternal object *A* to an actual occasion *a* is a determinate internal relation. But the actual entity *a* accepts this particular mode of ingression in preference to other alternative suggestions. It is free to accept or reject it. The relation in this case is external. The freedom of an actual entity is thus secured. While the relation of an eternal object to an actual entity is determinate, that of the latter to the former is indeterminate. These eternal objects are not things simply floating in a realm of their own. According to the ontological argument the reason why something is what it is, must be found in the nature of the thing itself. The possibilities are not mere abstract possibilities. "Possibility is that in which there is achievability." The mode of existence of these possibilities is conceptually apprehended by actual entities. Whitehead points out that "there are no new eternal objects". There is a complete envisagement of all possibilities, the complete conceptual realization of possibilities relevant for any process of becoming whatsoever. This is called the primordial nature of God.

Creativity and the World-process.

'Creativity' is one of the fundamental characteristics of the ultimate fact. "Creativity", says Whitehead, "is the universal of universals characterizing ultimate matter of fact. It is the ultimate principle by which the many, which are the universe disjunctively become the universe conjunctively.

Creativity is the principle of novelty. ...The 'Creative advance' is the application of this ultimate principle of creativity to each novel situation which it originates"

Part II

GOD

In the light of such a philosophic background Whitehead attempts to explain the facts of religious experience. But his mind appears to be divided as to the possibility of such an explanation. He tells us that "we must investigate dispassionately what the metaphysical principles, here developed, require on these points, as to the nature of God. There is nothing here in the nature of proof. There is merely a confrontation of the theoretic system with a certain rendering of the facts.... Any cogency of argument entirely depends upon elucidation of somewhat exceptional elements in our conscious experience—those elements which may roughly be classed as religious and moral intuitions" (P.R.p. 486). But in the very next sentence he seems to be expressing a different view. We are told that "God is not to be treated as an exception to all metaphysical principles, invoked to save their collapse. He is their chief exemplification" (P.R.p. 486). He does not deny the need for a metaphysical basis of religion. God as the principle of concretion is woven into the very texture of his metaphysical scheme. This conception of God is substantiated in *'Science and the Modern World.'* According to Whitehead the whole universe is a systematic whole of experience. He conceives it as an aesthetic order. In this respect Bradley's influence is evident. But Whitehead differs from him in his characterization of the details of experience. The whole universe exhibits a process. It is a creative advance into novelty. It is not change or movement of a single spirit but of diverse actual entities. Every actual occasion is prehensive, possesses a 'vector character' and is referent to ideals beyond

—viz, the eternal objects. The eternal objects 'ingress' into the actual occasions. It is this process of ingression that is creative. It is a relation of actualities to unfathomable possibilities. The eternal objects by themselves cannot stand without a subjective aim. It is at this Point that God takes his place in the metaphysical scheme. The actual realization of all the possibilities constitutes the subjective aim and the final satisfaction of God. God conceptually prehends all the eternal objects. There are no new objects that come into being without being envisaged by God. But what is new, is the order brought into existence by the conerescent process. New actual entities emerge owing to the *nexus* of actual entities and the ingression of eternal objects into them.

There are some difficulties in such a conception :—

1. The freedom of actual entities becomes a mere illusion. It is true that actual entities have the capacity to prehend positively as well as negatively. But their prehensions are limited by the existence of possibilities whose number is constant.

2. God is only one actual entity among a number of other actual entities. He becomes an absolutely powerless being. He cannot envisage new eternal objects, and he cannot guide 'originative decisions' of actual entities. This is practically admitting that both his knowledge and power are limited. In such a system neither God nor man is free.

3. God is regarded as 'the primordial limitation' without which mere abstract creativity can produce nothing. Whitehead has not pointed out clearly the relation between Creativity and God. Though God has a complete conceptual realization of the whole realm of eternal objects he cannot be identified with Creativity, because God is the primordial *limitation*, while Creativity is boundless. Creativity becomes a more comprehensive concept than God. Such a God is

certainly unsatisfactory to the religious consciousness. God, in such a scheme becomes a metaphysical surd, an ultimate irrationality.

The conception of God developed in *'Religion in the Making'* is different from that of the *'Science and the Modern World'*. In *'Science and the Modern World'* we find that creative advance of actual entities into novelty is impossible without an ultimate limitation. This ultimate limitation is God. But His existence cannot be fathomed by reason. He states in very clear terms that 'God is the ultimate limitation and his existence is the ultimate irrationality. For no reason can be given for just that limitation which it stands in his nature to impose. God is not concrete, but He is the ground for concrete actuality. No reason can be given for the nature of God, because that nature is the ground of rationality.' (*Sc. & M.W.* p. 222). But in *'Religion in the Making'* God is defined in terms of feeling. "The metaphysical doctrine here expounded, finds the foundation of the world in aesthetic experience, rather than—as with Kant—in the cognitive or conceptive experience. All order is therefore aesthetic order, and the moral order is merely certain aspects of aesthetic order. The actual world is the outcome of the aesthetic order, and the aesthetic order is derived from the immanence of God," (*Religion in the Making*, p. 91-92). This idea of aesthetic values as fundamental, and of God as the 'measure of the aesthetic consistency of the world' is worked out in explicit detail in *'Process and Reality'*.

As we have seen 'God is an actual entity, and so is the most trivial puff of existence in far off empty space' (*P & R.* p. 24). Every entity bears within itself the reason for its existence. God, being an actual entity bears within himself reasons of the highest absoluteness. Everything including the general potentiality of the universe, must thus be refer-

able to some actual entity. God is the ground for the entry of the unrealized eternal objects into the temporal process of the universe. This character of God is described as the 'primordial nature' of God. "The primordial nature of God is the acquirement by creativity of a primordial character" (P.&R. p. 487). "Viewed as primordial, he is the unlimited conceptual realization of the absolute wealth of potentiality".....In this abstraction, he is 'deficiently actual'—and this in two ways. His feelings are only conceptual and lack the fullness of actuality. Secondly, conceptual feelings, apart from complex integration with physical feelings, are devoid of consciousness in their subjective forms". He is the unconditioned actuality of conceptual feeling at the base of things; so that, by reason of this primordial actuality, there is an order in the relevance of eternal objects to the process of creation." "God is the goal towards novelty."

Let us pause to consider this aspect of god's nature.

1. God acquires his 'primordial' character by creativity. God thus becomes 'a creature of creativity' and He is at the same time regarded as the goal towards novelty.

2. God is the primordial limitation on creativity. Without God, this limitation, there can be no temporal process. But from whence is the first limitation which issues in God? The answer of Whitehead is that God is the primordial *accident* of creativity. The term 'accident' is not clearly explained. If it bears its usual meaning the explanation is a confession of ignorance. It is as good as accepting says Emmet that 'No sufficient reason can be given in the nature of substance for the accident being as it is; and there is thus an arbitrariness about it.'

3. God conceptually prehends the whole realm of possibilities, both realized and unrealized. What is the status of unrealized possibilities? What is to happen to *some* of these

possibilities if they are rejected for ever by the actual occasions which have freedom of self-determination.

The consequent nature of God.

The primordial character of God does not exhaust His nature. God as primordial is incomplete. God, like all actual entities is dipolar. He has a mental as well as a physical pole. God has a primordial nature as well as a consequent nature. "The perfection of God's subjective aim, derived from the completeness of His primordial nature issues into the character of His consequent nature." The primordial nature of God "is free, complete, primordial, eternal, actually deficient, and unconscious. The other side originates with physical experience derived from the temporal world, and then acquires integration with the primordial side. It is determined, incomplete, consequent, 'everlasting', fully actual, and conscious." The expression of the primordial nature of God into the temporal course of events is called the consequent nature of God. The temporal process is the process of realization of God's subjective aim. In the words of Emmet "By the integration of God's conceptual nature with the evolving events of the physical world, God becomes fully actual and conscious." It is further pointed out that "the relation between the primordial and the consequent nature of God is not a temporal relation but only a distinction of reason". "God is not *before* all creation but *with* all creation." In spite of these statements, though Whitehead may not intend it to be a temporal relation, the relation does appear to be a temporal one. "The completeness of God's nature into a fullness of physical feeling is derived from the objectification of the world in God." But such a complete realization of God's primordial nature has not yet taken place. To that extent God is incomplete. When it does take place there would be no world.

With all the grand scheme of the philosophy of the organism and its elaborate machinery Whitehead departs from the metaphysical explanation of God as the 'principle of concretion' to a form of religious mysticism. From cold logical reasoning he passes on to a poetic expression. (cf. P.R. p.490).

Consideration of Indeterminism

By

Dr. DHIRENDRA LAL DE,

Here we shall briefly consider the position of the Indeterminists. The essence of the Indeterminist position consists in the fact that human action is, in the last resort, not determined even by human character. There is a power of undetermined or unmotivated choice, called free will of indifference inherent in human nature, in virtue of which, a man's acts, or at least those of them in respect of which he is morally accountable, are free in the sense of being independent of his character. Every action on this view is an absolutely new creation. The action is due to the man certainly, but not simply to the man as he is born, or even the man as he has made himself by previous acts of choice, but to the man as he makes himself at the moment. It is this power of making himself anew by successive acts, unfettered even by his previous self, which more than anything else constitutes him a moral being. The act flows from the self but the self is a self-creative self. Freedom, as the indeterminists believe, consists in the ability indifferently to adopt either of the two alternative courses. An individual cannot be regarded as a moral and accountable being so long as one alternative is closed to him. He is free in following his purpose only when he can equally well follow its direct opposite. The arguments in support of the position, over and above the general contention that mechanical determination by antecedents is incompatible with the notion of moral responsibility, rest mainly upon an appeal to immediate feeling. Thus the indeterminists tell us that when we act from choice and not under compulsion we always have the immediate

feeling that we could equally well act in the opposite direction ; and that it is a matter of direct experience that, in resisting temptation we can and do act in the line of greatest resistance, and that the will is therefore independent of determination by motives.

2. Such a doctrine, as expounded above, is psychologically untenable and logically indefensible. Liberty of indifference is a psychological absurdity, in-as-much as the materials for an exercise of will must always be supplied by impulses. A mere will without any motive is chimerical and contradictory. We never will to will, we always will to do this or that, as indicated by inclination or duty. To maintain that the will is not at all affected by impulses or motives is to avoid the problem altogether, and thus to leave undecided the case when the will is influenced by them.

Even if we admit the facts as an indeterminist states them, they do not warrant the inference he bases upon them. It is rather impossible to hold that we can indifferently express in our behaviour the purposes which constitute our individuality or their opposites. It is no doubt true that we often are aware, in resolving upon a certain course of action, that we could, if we pleased, act differently. But the conditional clause by its presence makes all the difference between rational, moral or teleological determination and no determination at all. It is no genuine fact of experience that we could violate all the habits of life-time, practice all the crimes we most abhor, and neglect all the interests to which we are most devoted. We could do all this if we pleased, but before we could as we please we should have to become different men. Indeed, as Hartman has urged, if there were a human being burdened with a *liberum arbitrium indifferens*, he would require the same treatment from society as the mad man, for his acts would be as little reached by any punishments or moral suasion. Before the possibilities of such a free will

one might well stand in terror. Nothing would more certainly cut the nerve of all social and moral endeavour than the general belief, accepted and acted upon, that men are capable of uncaused acts, acts which break the continuity of developing mental and moral life, and which stand out of all relation to the great web of social, moral, and historical events.

3. The Indeterminist talk of conquest of temptation as the line of greatest resistance is altogether meaningless. This contention of the indeterminist is open to two possible interpretations. Either the resistance of which he speaks must be measured by our actual success in resisting the suggestion to act, and in that case the very fact that we do not yield to the temptation shows that for us yielding would have been the line of greatest resistance ; or resistance must be measured by the extent to which the rejected alternative still persists as a psychical fact after its rejection. The whole thing would amount to this, that we can, in obedience to training or conviction, refuse to act upon suggestions which as psychical facts have sufficient intensity to remain before the mind even after refusal. This alleged experience can by no means justify the denial of rational or teleological determination of our conduct.

4. The most serious objection which can be urged against indeterminism is that it involves the denial of rational connection between human actions. The denial of the determination of conduct by character involves the virtual admission that it is chance which ultimately decides how we shall actually behave in a concrete case. Chance, after all, is another name for the absence of rational connection. The only piece of definite information that can be extracted from this position is the conclusion that human conduct is not the expression of coherent purpose. This is why the indeterminist view leads in the end, if consistently carried out, to the same metaphysical absurdity as the determinist. Both the rival

theories absolutely deny teleological or rational determination, on account of their common failure to see the rational interconnection of human acts implied in the attribution of praise or blame to an agent on the score of his conduct. Thus the determinist replaces teleological determination by the fiction of a purposeless mechanical necessity, and the indeterminist by the equal fiction of blind chance.

5. One important question to be discussed is whether any demand of moral consciousness really necessitates the theory of indeterminism. The best way of raising the question will be to state as clearly as possible the position of those who assert the necessity of indeterminism. They do not deny that men are born with natural tendencies to good or evil, or that such tendencies are modified by education and environment, physical and social. And these inborn or acquired tendencies exercise an influence upon their actual conduct. But in pronouncing a man good or bad, we must, it is contended, make an abstraction of all that is due either to original endowment or to subsequent environment. It is not these things that make a man good or bad, but only that portion of his actual conduct and character which can be traced to the use that he makes of his free will. In short, the will of an individual, if it be the outcome of birth and education, possesses no moral value whatever. According to this school there is absolutely no difference between a determined saint and a determined sinner.

The indeterminist position, as stated above, contradicts the plainest deliverances of the unsophisticated moral consciousness. Granted, for the moment, that there is such a thing as undetermined choice, and that for certain purposes in order to pronounce our final judgment upon a man it may be necessary to take into consideration, not merely the character of his volitions but also the extent to which his will was undetermined; yet it is certain that we do not attribute

exclusive moral value to that part of a man's character which would have been the same, no matter what his original character and subsequent environment. Supposing I come across a man whose antecedents are quite unknown to me, but whom I find spending his life in the practice of every virtue under the sun. But one day he gives me his history. He has enjoyed the best of education, and been fortunate in having a long line of exemplary ancestors. Certainly a knowledge of these facts may somewhat weaken my admiration for his character. They may even suggest that a less sheltered life might produce a lowering of moral level. But if I am sure his will would now be proof against the strongest temptation, the mere knowledge that without that exemplary ancestry and excellent education, his will would have been different would not produce even the slightest lowering of my moral esteem.

The above considerations show that indeterminism can gain no support from the commonsense morality to which it generally appeals. They show that the element in a man's character which is due to the hypothetical element of undetermined choice cannot without paradox be regarded as the only element which possesses value. Granted that an inmost kernel of undetermined choice exists, it is something which is wholly inaccessible to human observation. Even if we admit the significance and supreme value of this hypothetical element of undetermined choice, still it will be hardly tenable to maintain that those elements of character which are accessible to observation have no value at all in so far as they are due to anything else but undetermined choice. Such a contention would carry with it the consequences that our estimates of character and conduct are generally erroneous and that they bear no relation whatever to the realities of the case. In venerating a patriot, we may mistakenly be venerating a bad man to whom favourable circumstances may have given self-sacrifice which is morally worthless because

determined. If such extravagances are to be avoided, we must admit that the actual character and volitions of individuals, as they stand revealed directly to introspection or indirectly to observation, have a real value. Our ordinary moral judgments cannot be divested of all meaning and significance even if we grant the existence of some higher sphere of transcendental morality for which indeterminism may be a necessary postulate.

6. The review of foregoing facts makes it abundantly manifest that the indeterminists are led to impossible results because of their non-recognition of an essential type of causation which dominates the mental and moral world, namely, teleological or antisequential causation. Having at the outset excluded genuine teleological determination from their conception of the world of change, indeterminists are precluded from the correct understanding of those psychical processes for the comprehension of which teleological categories are indispensable. Causation is universal. No such thing as an isolated event is known. Should one occur there could be no evidence of it lying as it would be outside our entire universe. In our world everything has connection with a past and a future. But this connection manifests itself in a twofold form. The first, called mechanical or sequential causation, dominates physical objects. The second, called purposive or antisequential causation, is characteristic of rational, intelligent or moral beings. Human beings are to a large extent things also and to that extent are sequentially caused. They derive what they now are from what they and the world have been. But there is also in them a strange power of imaginative forecast by which they can lay hold of the future and make it a factor in shaping the present; and this is antisequential causation—the ground of freedom. Freedom being the fixing of a single issue out of two or more possible ones it will always be present where teleological causation occurs.

For in this case there will have been at least the alternatives of purposive or unpurposive action, and probably also a variety of possible purposes will have been surveyed, with different means of their execution. If there is any such thing as purposive causation, then freedom is a reality. No event occurs without a cause, but the future is as great a storehouse of causation as the past. Between the two stands the queer creature man who through a forward-stretching, backward-rooted consciousness is accessible to each and capable, by voluntary adjustments, of cutting off or granting approach to either. He thus possesses a freedom unknown elsewhere.

The development of reflection and self-criticism, of self-direction and moral effort on the part of the self are essential conditions of human freedom, a freedom in and through determination by rational insight. We are, then, capable of determination by ideals and ideas, a determination in which the final cause of action is also efficient cause. In this fact is to be found the source of freedom. Intelligence thus contains a genuine element of transcendence, by which we are delivered from subjection to the moment. The indeterminist is however prone to assume that whatever is within the sphere of such final causation is necessarily outside that of efficient causation. This assumption is doubtless one source of the dualism of thought concerning freedom and necessity. But the separation cannot be justified. It is never the future, as such, and as separated from present and past events, that is causally effective, but the present representation of the future event. The end can never have the slightest influence save as present idea which has been constituted out of antecedent elements. If it be contended that to insist upon the strict continuity of the life of the self from its earliest beginnings is, in effect, to reduce man to a part of nature, it may be answered that in this case one's thought of nature must be made rich enough to make room for spiritual processes. Certainly the

dignity and worth of man's self-directed life, of his control of impulse and appetite, of his aspirations after truth and goodness, are not one whit lessened by the view that all these processes are within the reach of laws. It is a far greater menace to human dignity to regard our life as in any degree the sport of caprice or chance.

On An Extension of McDougall's Hormic Theory.

By

P. S. NAIDU.

(Annamalai University.)

In a recent paper¹ I expressed a conviction that the Hormic Theory is bound to outlast other psychological theories, since it is the only theory that is likely to emerge successful from the severe tests imposed by Social Psychology. I do not, however, suggest that the theory as it stands today is complete and perfect, and that it does not need extension or revision. There are other psychological theories for which their respective sponsors claim not only absolute validity, but also sole validity. Such are the Gestalt, the Freudian Psycho-analytic and Jung's Collective Unconscious theories. Moreover the facts discovered by the Society for Psychic Research after prolonged and patient

1. "The Horme and the Gita" (submitted in the Congress 1935)

experimentation cannot be neglected. In this paper we shall review briefly certain attempts that have been made to extend Professor McDougall's theory, and shall point out the only direction in which a satisfactory extension is possible.

The Hormic Theory may be extended in several ways. The facts discovered by the other schools, which are of a compelling nature but which have been overlooked by this theory may be examined, and it may be shown that they do not conflict with the Hormic view point. Professor McDougall himself has pursued this line of extension in connection with the facts revealed by Psycho analysis. When his book '*The Energies of Men*' was first published, the reviewer in *Mind*² voiced forth a bitter complaint against the author's neglect of the Psycho analytic School. 'The complaint is not that he does not accept them but that he does not even discuss them'. The recent publication of *Psycho analysis and Social Psychology* has removed the cause for such a complaint. In the Preface to this very interesting work Professor McDougall says, '.....I hold Freud's system to be nearer than any other to the system elaborated by myself.' The three lectures that follow indicate how through the gradual and progressive recognition of certain instincts of the non-libidinous group, Freud has so completely overhauled his pan-sexualistic outlook that he is on the point of repudiating his fundamental libido dogma. The Neo Freudian doctrine outlined in the *New Lectures, Group Psychology and Civilization and its discontents* recognises aggression, unconscious guilt, deep seated fear, the tender impulse and suggestion. '.....there still remained in me' writes Freud, 'a kind of conviction that the instincts could not all be of the same nature.'³ Having made this admission, that some of the major propensities of human nature are independent of the sex propensity on

2. *Mind*, N. S., XLIII, Jan., 1934.

3. '*Civilisation and Its Discontents*', p., 96.

the one hand, and of one another among themselves on the other, it is claimed that if the great leader of the Psycho-analytic movement developed his views he would arrive at a theory very similar to the Hormic theory.

The facts on which Freud bases his thesis are beyond dispute, and any psychological theory worth the name has to explain those facts. Professor McDougall says, 'It is not so much that one cannot accept many of Freud's statements of fact; but rather that all his statements of fact are made in terms that imply unacceptable theories.'⁴ And some of the facts are so stubborn and yet so elusive that they do not come under the Hormic hypothesis as it stands today. These facts are of a very disturbing nature and of supreme social significance. While McDougall has attempted to make his theory cover several of these facts, he has brushed aside those that cannot be so covered. I am referring, in particular, to the facts dealt with by Jung in the recent edition of his book *Modern Man in Search of a Soul*. An extension of the Hormic Theory is bound to come, but in what direction is the question. I have no hesitation in saying that it should be in the direction which would cover the Collective Unconscious of Jung.

Objection has been taken to the pluralistic individualistic nature of instincts as described by McDougall. An instinct is a concrete fact of mental structure and, even after allowing for certain instincts like those of Curiosity and Combat which either lead to other instincts or derive their impulse from others, there are certain fundamental instincts which are unique and hence independent of one another. Such an attitude leads to the postulation of a plurality of mental patterns. McDougall, no doubt, points out that there are no such things as static fixed mental patterns called instincts, but only dynamic tendencies rightly termed propensities in his *Energies of Man*. Still

4 'Psycho-analysis and Social Psychology,' p. 18.

when independent propositities are spoken of, there is a danger of relapsing into the fallacy of faculty psychology. To surmount this difficulty Dr. Garnett proposes to locate the instinctive patterns in the nervous system. This is one possible direction in which the Hormie theory could be extended to cover the phenomena covered by the all embracing epithet 'Unconscious.' 'We may regard an instinct structurally considered' says Garnett, 'as consisting of a disposition, or neurone pattern. But it must be remembered that an instinct is an abstraction, and that the term refers merely to a supposed fact of the physical structure of a creature which tends to have certain effects upon its conscious experience and behaviour. An instinct then is an innate neural structure... ..'^{5.6} The unity of the mind is thus preserved by pushing the organised patterns down to the physical level. The urge of life is no doubt mental. But the differentiation of the urge into patterns of behaviour is the result of static organisations in the nervous system. Such localisation of the instinctive action patterns in the body taken with a certain novel concept of 'Expectation'⁷, it is claimed explains all aspects of human behaviour including those controlled by the unconscious level of the mind.

Dr. Lundholm, one of Professor McDougall's colleagues at the Duke University, extends the Hormie theory in another direction. He traces the independent instinctive tendencies to a fundamental basis. Accepting the 'URGE' as a primal fact of mental life Lundholm proceeds to show how this 'urge' differentiates into various tendencies under the guidance of what he calls primordial curiosity. The nature of curiosity can be studied only through introspection. 'Curiosity is a peculiar im-

5. A. C. Garnett, *Instinct and Personality*, p. 36.

6. *Ibid.* p., 36.

7. For an exposition of 'Expectation' vide ch. III. of *Instinct & Personality*.

pulse, differing from all instinctive impulses in one important respect, notably, that its aim is merely to promote comprehension.' Controlled and directed by this primordial curiosity, conation goes through three stages of differentiation. The first is to be found in the mental life of a simple hypothetical organism, the second in the organism of the pre-neural level, and the third in the animal with a well organised nervous system. The fully developed instincts are formed at the third level. 'An instinct may be defined as an innate disposition to a specific kind of adaptive behaviour subserving the satisfaction of a specific biological need of the organism...Each instinct, as a unit of mental activity, has to be thought of as a source of energy, but the energy of the different instincts must be considered as qualitatively equivalent...In other words, the differentiation of conation into instinctive impulses does not constitute a metamorphosis of energy, an individualisation of energy into a number of kinds. We should strictly adhere to the view that while urge is individualised in the different instincts, energy remains the same.'⁸ This hypothesis, which while postulating the differentiation of instincts in the mental make-up of the organism preserves the unity of the mind, is certainly more acceptable to us than the view which attempts to cover up the difficulties by locating the differentiations of behaviour patterns in the nervous system. The latter view is dangerously near mechanistic behaviourism. When it is admitted that all the complexity and adaptability of purposive behaviour is merely the working out of a certain neurone pattern, then what is required to set the organism going is merely a stimulus which may very well originate from the external world. He who adopts this attitude needs take but one more step to join the ranks of the mechanistic behaviourists.

Professor McDougall sounded a note of warning against the temptation to identify instincts with motor mechanisms.

8. *Conation and our Conscious Life*, p. 26.

While criticising the views of Shand and Lloyd Morgan, he says, 'I see no reason why these complex coordinated movements should be regarded as the expression of so many distinct instincts... We have to regard such motor mechanisms not as instincts, but merely as the instruments of instinct.'⁹ 'There are complex and well organised motor mechanisms in the body, but these are merely the tools of instinct. Any motor mechanism may be used by any instinct, there being no rigid connection between a given instinct and a particular type of neural organisation. 'We must therefore define any instinct by the nature of the goal, the type of situation, that it seeks or tends to bring about.'¹⁰

In the analysis of meaning Dr. Lundholm displays rare insight. What is of interest to us is the Doctor's assimilation of the Gestalt position in his extension of the Hornic Theory. In Professor McDougall's earlier discussions of perception and meaning there is no reference at all to the Gestalt theory and even in the '*Enquiries of men*' only a passing reference is made to this very original and ingenious theory. The founders of Gestalt, we are told, are antagonistic to any theory which recognises an enduring mental structure. The Gestalt emphasises the function of the mind to the utter exclusion of the structure and such emphasis is claimed to be the source of all the fallacies in psychology. Dr. Garnett, in his book '*Instinct and Personality*,' make a very promising start with his analysis of meaning, but breaks off just at the point where we should expect a discussion of the Gestalt position. Dr. Lundholm on the other hand clearly proves that the very essence of the perception of the Gestalten is conation or the primal urge. At the very commencement of his exposition he points out the intimate relationship between conation and meaning. '...Conation seems

9. *An Outline of Psychology*, pp., 116-7.

10. *op cit*, p 193.

to determine meaning...and meaning (in the sense of perception) seems to precede and evoke conation. Here is a dilemma that does not appear to me resolvable by the postulation of various levels of meaning, the very simplest being the one calling into play conation. For, inevitably, this simplest meaning would have to be interpreted as emergent anoetic, sentience, the latter being a concept incompatible with consistent urge psychology.¹¹⁻¹² This difficulty is overcome by postulating the primordial curiosity. It is of the very nature of this primordial curiosity to cooperate with a secondarily differentiated conation and to yield an organisation of sensory symbols which will act as the stimulus to the release of instinctive impulse. 'If Gestalt Psychology' says Dr. Lundholm, 'is correct in the notion that, by virtue of purely physical arrangement in the field, certain psychological unlikes form configurations which are perceived upon a background, this phenomenon can be integrated into our hypothesis if we postulate :that, on the level with which we are concerned, primordial curiosity yields more than the simple discrimination of unlikes, establishing, in addition, the synthesis of certain unlikes into a configuration of Gestalt. This would represent an appreciation of relations far beyond the sheer discrimination of unlikes. It might be appropriate to incorporate into our hypothesis, in the way I have suggested, the theory of the Gestalt in this simple sense.'¹³

These extensions of the Hormic theory have covered several important regions, but have not yet covered other equally important regions. Many of the facts discovered by Psychoanalysis have been explained by the Hormic theory. But there is an unjustifiable neglect of other facts, the facts grouped to-

11. *Conation and our Conscious Life*, pp. 37 & 48

12. *Ibid.* p. 8.

13. *Conation and our Conscious Life*, p. 43.

gether under the concept of the collective unconscious and the phenomena dealt with by Psychic Research, being two groups thus neglected.

The cause for the neglect of several important phenomena is deep seated. Professor McDougall and those who have attempted to extend his theory proceed on the following set of postulates:

1. Body and Mind are unlike each other.
2. Body and Mind interact.
3. The URGE of life is an indisputable fact.
4. Mental energy and Physical energy are unlike each other.
5. The behaviour of living organism is purposive or goal-seeking.

Add to this the fact that the great leader of the Hormio school speaks deprecatingly of unconscious motivation, then the explanation for the limitations of Hormism is easily found. The postulates mentioned above do not check the temptation of the contemporary psychologist to fall a prey to mechanism, for, as M. Bergson pointed out, Teleology is after all only inverted mechanism. Dr. Garnett had almost fallen a victim to the temptations of mechanism. He located the instincts in the nervous system in spite of Mc Dougall's protests. Yet it is he who points the way to a better and more satisfying psychology.

In the preface to his thesis *'Conation and our Conscious Life,'* Dr. Lundholm raises a significant question—May not mind extend even into the realm of plants? (We have no hesitation in giving an emphatic affirmative answer to the question). In the course of the elaboration of his thesis the Doctor suggests that the individual mind might be part of a vast psychic continuum. That an Occidental psychologist should postulate an endless psychic continuum with which the individual mind could make contact is

very significant indeed. Again in speaking of the memory continuum he says, 'Is there an unknown master mind which, swayed by some supreme urge in one visionary synthesis, embraces this ocean of experience, which causes to resound through a powerful expenditure of energy of every part of this boundless structure? Who shall tell? In our creed we have surmised such a master-mind when we conceived the omniscient deity. If he is a true psychological symbol of an actuality, his citadel is in the psychic-continuum.¹⁴ In another place the Doctor admits the possibility of the transmigration of souls. Strange utterances these from an Occidental Scientist! Perhaps this is not so strange when we notice the direction in which the king of Sciences—Mathematical Physics is moving.

Dr. Garnett frankly admits the insufficiency of any theory of instincts which does not take into account the fact that man strives after ideals. 'Instinct is not the whole of life. The mind is not merely a bundle of separate instincts. For the solution of the 'central mystery of life and mind and will' we must go behind instinct to find a life movement which is primitive and fundamental. The inadequacy of instinct as an explanation of the mental forces that maintain and shape all the life of individuals and societies becomes manifest.....in connection with the highest moral thought and conduct of man.¹⁵ Instead of making vague suggestions and raising hesitant questions Dr. Garnett takes a confident stand and devotes a whole chapter of his book to the discussion of 'The Ideals'. 'The spirit' he says, 'is a name given by philosophy to that part of us which has certain desires that are not of the flesh. Spirit is known by its desires, which are different from those of the flesh and can only be satisfied by different means. These 'desires of the spirit' are unconditional and ultimate; but they are not discrete and arbitrary. They are a trinity of ultimates

14. *Conation and our Conscious Life*, p. 63.

15. *Instinct and Personality*, p. 51.

which are yet a unity because they are but three different aspects of the spirit's one desire. The one desire of the spirit is the desire for life and for life ever fuller. The lesson of the psychology of those deeper human motives is that life is the ultimate end of a life. Not that life of the individual living organism is the ultimate end for itself—that would be to say that a man lives so that he may live.....but that there is a 'Universal' life which is the ultimate end for which every creature lives.' ¹⁶

We may now proceed to point out the only direction in which the Hormic Theory may be extended in a satisfactory manner. In the first place there should be a frank recognition of a fact that has been neglected by the West,—the superconscious. In the second place the entire group of postulates mentioned above should be rehabilitated. The urge *of* life and the urge *to* life are facts, but this urge does not differentiate itself into mental energy and physical energy. Energy (*śakti*) is the same wherever it is found. This, perhaps, is not so repulsive to the contemporary physical scientist at the present day as it would have been to his predecessor three decades ago. The concept of the interchangeability of matter and energy has smoothened the path for this new principle. Body, we suggest, is merely the concretisation of mental effort. When it is possible to conceive of the crystallisation of immaterial energy into matter, there should be no difficulty in conceiving the body as the condensation of mental energy, for after all the body is the tool of the mind. The behaviour of such a body, it is said, is purposive or goal seeking. It must be understood that the goal is sought after by the mind which uses the body as its tool, and not by the body itself. But what is the goal? Hormic Psychology of the present day contemplates only a biological goal. We have to rise above this biological goal and get a glimpse of the Cosmic Spirit, for the identification with

16. Ibid pp. 112-3.

which the individual spirit is striving. Sakti or primal energy activates the living organism, and the natural goal of the activity is the merging of the individual in the Universal Spirit.

We propose the following as postulates for a Neo-Hormic Psychology :

1. The dynamic psychic continuum is real, and the only real.
2. The individual psychic entities called minds, have differentiated themselves from this continuum.
3. Primal energy (*sakti*), which is the essence of the individual mind, urges the latter on to union with the continuum.
4. Energy is the same wherever it is found. Sometimes it works simply as such, but often concretises itself into bodies, which may serve as tools for the mind.
5. The ideals, Truth, Beauty and Goodness are three aspects of the continuum comprehended by man of the present day.
6. The three aspects are the highest aspects beyond doubt. Yet they are only aspects which stand between the Universal Mind and the individual mind. When the final goal is reached, if it is ever reached, these ideals will cease to have any significance.

The formidable objection may be raised that these are not postulates but highly speculative hypotheses. Our answer is that they have been asserted in unhesitant language by the most highly evolved minds whose experience is as concrete as the experience of the experimental scientist in his laboratory. We have no hesitation in saying that it is on experimental evidence that they have made their statements.

The ancient seers with their finely developed intuition saw the truth, and now contemporary experimental scientists of the higher order are working up inductively to the same conclusion on the basis of experimental evidence. Experimental Physics, experimental Biology and experimental Psychology point without any ambiguity to the existence of a supra-empirical world of reality.

Metaphysical Vindication of Moral Autonomy.

By

D. L. DE.

1. Freedom is the *conditio sine qua non* of morality. All the interests of moral consciousness are undeniably bound up with the assertion of freedom. Any scientific explanation to prop up a pseudo-morality is doomed to failure. The living throbbing experience of the moral man—contrition and retribution, approbation and reward, all the grief and humiliation of his life, all its joy and exaltation—imply an ineradicable conviction that his destiny is, in its grand outline, in his own hands, to make or to mar it, as he will. A man cannot escape from the imperative of duty without ceasing to be a man. All the passion of his moral experience gathers itself up in the conviction of his infinite and eternal superiority to nature. Engulfed in the necessity of nature, he could still conceive himself as living the life of nature, or a merely animal life, but no longer as living the characteristic life of man, i.e., a life in free obedience to a consciously conceived ideal.

2. The grand characteristic of moral life of man, is obligation. The conception of obligation, with its implicate of freedom, is not an artificial product, or a foreign importation into the universe. It is a genuine and authentic exponent of the universe itself. It is the voice of reason—the voice of universal reality. Absolute determinism which would choke its utterance is a libel not only upon human nature, but upon the universe itself. Our moral nature is inexorable in its demands and relentless in its penalties for failure to satisfy them. To resolve the 'ought' into 'is', would be to falsify the healthy moral consciousness of mankind.

3. Freedom, thus, is a patent fact minus which moral judgment

becomes a polite fiction. Freedom is another name for teleological determination which is an essential feature of a self-seeking and self-distinguishing consciousness. Determinism which is based upon sensationalistic metaphysics refutes itself by overshooting the mark and proving too much by resolving the subject of experience into an abstraction ; it denies the reality of experience altogether. Indeterminism, too, by denying all rational connection between human actions, contradicts the plainest deliverances of the unsophisticated moral consciousness. Freedom, in the sense of self-determination, can fairly satisfy the demands of morality.

4. A negative, as well as a positive, vindication of freedom is possible—the former by the condemnation of the categories of science as insufficient, the latter by the provision of higher categories for its explanation. Even if we fail to formulate a theory of freedom, or categorise the moral life, we might still vindicate its possibility.

That the problem of freedom is ultimately a metaphysical one, is indicated by the fact that all deterministic theories base themselves, either explicitly or implicitly, upon a definite metaphysic. The materialistic metaphysic makes no room for freedom, or self-determination. Evolutionism too, has closely trodden on the heels of materialism in denying freedom. Moral life is interpreted as a series of adjustments of the individual to his environment. All pantheistic systems energetically maintain that man's conception of moral freedom is an illusion, destined to disappear in an adequate knowledge of the universe, or of the true self.

The connection between the interpretation of human life with the general metaphysical theory is obvious enough. The psychological theory of determinism is logically dependent upon metaphysical empiricism or sensationalism. If I am merely the series, bundle or mass of sensations and appetites, desires affections and passions which constitute my experience ;

if, in short, my existence is entirely phenomenal, then the phenomena which are "me" can be accounted for, or refunded into their antecedents, like any other phenomena which are animals or things.

Here then emerges the sole possibility of a metaphysical vindication of freedom—namely, in another than the empirical account of moral self. The nature of the self is a metaphysical question and must be investigated as such. The nature and function of the self is the pivotal problem of morality and knowledge alike. We have to choose between an empirical and transcendental solution of both problems. If, on the one hand, the phenomenal states constitute the self and exhaust its nature, the case for freedom is lost. If, on the other hand, the self is something over and above the successive experiences, if, in short our moral experiences presuppose at each stage the presence and operation of a permanent self, the case for freedom is made good.

That the latter, and not the former, is the true statement of the case, has been finally proved by the transcendental analysis of experience. The empirical view, when offered as a metaphysic, is at once seen to be inadequate. Neither the moral nor the intellectual man can be resolved into his experience. We must regard the moral, equally with the intellectual life, as the product of the activity of the self. Moral experience does not mean merely its resolution into a series of states, but the gathering up of these in the continuous and single life of an identical self. Determinism gives a mere anatomy of the action. Under its dissection, the living whole of the action itself is dissolved into its dead elements; thus the constitutive synthetic principle of the ethical life is done away with. That principle is the moral personality to which the action must be referred if we should see it as a whole and from within. Motives, circumstances, temperament and character—the several parts of the determinist whole—all imply such an activity of the

self, if they are to enter as living factors into the moral situation. And the self which is shown to be the source of this original and formative activity is thereby proved to be free.

The transcendental proof is the necessary complement of the empirical view. For the question of questions in metaphysics is: How is experience possible? Experience, not being self-explanatory, requires to be explained. The empirical self is not ultimate, but only phenomenal. The psychologist is only concerned with the empirical process. But if, in an intellectual reference, it can be shown that the presupposition of knowledge is a constant activity on the part of the self in the synthesis of the presentational data; that, without a unifying self, the ordered unity of experience would be impossible, it is no less evident that, without a similar synthetic activity on the part of a single central rational self, the unity of moral experience would be impossible. The self weaves the web of its own experience, intellectual and moral. Out of wants, out of the provocation of sensibility, the self by an activity of appropriation, constitutes motives of its own activity. To press the empirical view, is to rest in a superficial view when a deeper view is possible and necessary. The phenomenal self may be regarded as the mere sum of motive forces, of tendencies and counter-tendencies whose resultant describes its life. But when we ask what a motive is, we find that it is nothing apart from the self; it is mine, I have made it. I am not merely the permanent deposit of tendencies. I am the theatre of the entire process; it goes on within me and is conducted by me.

Hence the well marked limits of psychological explanation. The life of man, which is essentially a personal life, is regarded by psychology as an impersonal stream of thought, a series of phenomenal states of consciousness. But metaphysics must correct the abstractness of psychology generally, and must review the moral life from the standpoint of that selfhood

which, as unifying principle, is not to be phenomenised, because, without its constant operation, there would be no phenomenal process at all. The subjective or personal reference constitutes the very form of consciousness. It is only by hypo-tatising experience or consciousness that the case for psychology without a soul seems plausible at all.

We have now to consider the meaning of psychological phenomenon, to see the necessity of this subjective reference. We speak of conscious states. But the state is not conscious of itself, it is a state of my consciousness. Abolish me and it ceases to exist ; to separate it from the individual mind is to contradict its very nature and to destroy it. We speak of mental phenomena. But what is a phenomenon that appears to no mind ? To phenomenalise the self, to objectify the subject, to reduce the I to a complex of presentations is impossible, for the simple reason that an un-phenomenal self is necessary to the existence of phenomena. The resolution of the subject into a series of presentation would be equivalent to saying that there are phenomena which appear to no one, objects that are over against nothing, presentations that are never presented.

The objective view of mental life is thus seen to be self-contradictory and suicidal. The phenomenal reality stands or falls with the reality of the transcendental self. If the self did not do everything, if it were not present in every presentation, it could never emerge as the product of their aggregation. No combination of zeroes will produce a number.

Psychology may confine itself to a statement of the law of the mind ; but an ultimate explanation must take account of the mind itself, as the source of that activity. Psychological terms, such as apperception, association, etc., are inexplicable without a reference to a permanent organic centre of unity.

The theory that "all is sensation" is a rank absurdity. Can we explain how the "particular sensation can acquire a wholly

new kind of independence, and come to measure the worth of other sensations, or constitute the attitude in which they are apprehended." (Ward, *Mind*, N. S. vol. II, p. 77.)

When we pass from the intellectual to the emotional and volitional life, the reality of the subject, and the impossibility of phenomenalising it, become still more obvious. It is in the emotional and conative life that the ego may be said with unmistakable emphasis to posit itself. In the intellectual life, the subject is content to spend its entire activity in equipping us for the mastery of the object, so much so that its own existence is almost inevitably lost in the vision of the world. Feeling and activity are always subjective and sensations always objective. Hence the duality of consciousness, or the antithesis of subject and object, is fundamental. Only the extreme desire to make psychology a natural science will account for the thorough, but suicidal, simplification of the mental life which is accomplished by the reduction of feeling and volition to cognitional elements. The fundamental unity of the mental life is to be found not in the object, but in the subject, the elements of whose common life are not to be reduced to one another. And, if, in the cognitional life the subject seems to be lost in the object, in feeling and in volition the subject becomes the prime reality.

The reality of the moral life is bound up with the reality of human freedom, and the reality of freedom with the integrity of moral personality. If I am a person, an ego on my own account, I am free ; if I am not such a person or ego, I am not free.

Emotional Intuitivism in Axiology.

By

RAM MURTI LOOMBA.

Emotional Intuitivism in Axiology is the theory that values are perceived not by theoretical but by emotional intentional functions, in other words, by the activities of feeling. It is here proposed to critically examine the implications of this theory of knowledge of values, as particularly formulated and elaborated by Max Scheler.

In these emotional experiences, which are held to give us our knowledge of values, there are distinguished (i) an intentional function and (ii) a content or 'appearance' in the sense given to the term 'Erscheinung' by Stumpf. And, in the function of feeling, we are told, the value appears to us in a manner similar to that in which any object or thing appears before us in the function of perception.

Now from this it should follow that value is the content or the appearance and feeling is the function in the experiences in question. This logical implication, however, is contradicted by a further contention that we must also draw a distinction between 'the feeling of something' and the state itself that serves as the content of feeling. For this distinction makes the content or the presentation as necessarily a state of the mind, while the objectivity of values is being simultaneously maintained, tacitly in the principle of intuitivism and expressly in such statements that values are *discovered* or that values exist in all nature.¹ Moreover, a function that is emotional may have for its content an object which is not a state of the mind and also independent of the mind.

1. Max Scheler : *Der Formalismus in der Ethik*, pp. 272-273.

Scheler has sought to explain and support this distinction between the feeling of something and the state itself that is the content of this feeling by the example that we must distinguish between the feeling of pain and the pain itself. Now we do undoubtedly speak of a 'feeling of pain'. But what we mean thereby is always that pain is itself the feeling and at most also that there are several kinds of feeling of which pain is one. We never mean that pain is an object towards which a function of our mind—of the feeling-kind, as is asserted,—is directed just as there is an object towards which a function of the mind of the perception-kind is directed. Pain is certainly of an emotional character. But how can an emotion itself become the content of another emotion? Only one of the two—function or content—may be emotional. There can be no such thing, therefore, as a 'feeling of pain' which is itself emotional while its content, the pain, is also emotional. Any one emotion must absorb the whole of consciousness all at a time. And the moment it may at all possibly become the content of another emotion, it must itself cease to exist as such and must give place to at best a mere 'idea' of itself.

True, we may speak, as Scheler says, of 'bearing' or 'experiencing' or 'relishing' a pain.² But, if we consider the matter a little carefully, we shall notice that what really happens is that we 'relish' sometimes what at other times or in different circumstances would have been a pain, that when we 'suffer' or 'experience' or 'bear' a pain, we either mean simply that we have pain, in which case the pain is no longer a content but the function itself which might have anything for its own content or object, or, again, that we resign to or inflict pain on ourselves, which by

2. Ibid. p. 263.

this very act becomes something natural and non-emotional and which, though it is a content, is yet no longer a pain but just an object or an event. There is, indeed it seems, in the whole of this argument first an equivocal use of the term 'feeling of pain' and then a confusion, conscious or unconscious, between its two uses in such a manner that lends an easy plausibility to the principle of emotional intuitivism sought to be maintained. In the first use of the term, by the word 'of' we mean simply 'of the kind called,' while in the second, we mean by it 'having for its object' or 'having for its content.' According to the first use, pain is itself the feeling and thus absorbs the whole of consciousness at the time, while, according to the second, pain is something which is an object or a content of the feeling which is the function of the mind and is directed towards it as it can be directed towards any physical, or, for matter of that, mental object, which stands, as it were, at least at the time, outside of, before and, therefore, in a sense, in opposition to consciousness. And the confusion, besides the equivocation which is itself objectionable, consists in illegitimately extending the emotional character of the first to the second also, that is to say, in applying the adjective 'emotional', which is properly characteristic only of feeling in the first sense to feeling in the second, the functional sense, and in thus giving us a plausible but highly fallacious argument for emotional intuitivism in value theory.

As a matter of fact, not only is this argument fallacious ; there is an inherent self-contradiction in the conception of the thesis itself that is sought to be proved. Intuitivism, by virtue of its epistemic principle, must always exclude both the distinction of function and content in the sense in which it is applicable to the phenomena of perception and emotional feeling from the peculiar experience it takes its stand upon. Intuition is certainly a function or an act ; but it must

approach the object which is its content from the inside and not from the outside as perception approaches its object. It must, in Bergson's language, enter into the object by some sort of an identifying 'intellectual sympathy'. It should not indeed be said that it approaches or directs its activity towards the object; it by an effort just finds itself dived into the very depths of the object that forms its content. An intuitive experience must, by definition, be an undifferentiated simplicity to which a distinction between subject and object or function and content does not apply. Emotion, again, in spite of its absorbing character, also, being essentially a psychological disposition rather than an epistemic attitude, must be transcended if a really intuitive insight is to be attained. It may be said that intuitive experience is meaningful in character; but not that it is essentially emotional. Ecstatic emotion might result from intuition; it might be its constant companion or implication. But it can not be its necessary condition. For, though it is quite comprehensible that knowledge might, or, even, must, express itself in ecstasy, that because of absolute knowledge there is ecstasy, it is evidently absurd, on the knowledge of human nature which we possess, to argue that there is knowledge because of ecstasy.

Behind all these defects, there is one basic error at the very foundation of the doctrine. It consists in the conception of 'values'. Values, Scheler has held, are peculiar *qualities* forming a special kingdom of objects with certain relations and ranks.³ They stand on the same status as can not but be deduced from or understood by the earmarks and properties which themselves do not belong to the realm of values.⁴ The bearers of these qualities which are perceived through the 'theoretic' functions of the mind are *things*; and the bearers

3. Ibid, pp. 10, 248

4. Ibid, p. 9.

of valuable qualities are *goods*. A good is defined as "a unity of valuable qualities similar to a thing."⁵ Thus goods and things are equally primal data: We can not assert either that a good is the foundation of a thing or that a thing is the foundation of a good.⁶

This conception of values, however, is hardly acceptable. It is too much of a cut and dried conception which relegates things and goods to two different absolutely unconnected realms each of its own. Thus sharply severed from things, values hardly remain real and become mere phantoms or, as Lossky puts it, 'disgusting shadows'. It is a very unsatisfactory and fruitless position in which it would place consciousness, between two mutually exclusive worlds, one consisting of objects without values, and the other consisting of just bare values, nobility, purity, kindness or delightfulness without anything being noble, pure, kind or delightful. In such a system things would not be worth any attention, and values would be without any value. Even the poet and the visionary would recoil from such a prospect.

Further, to posit goods and things as two irreducible kinds of qualities standing on such an equal status that neither one can be said to be the foundation of the other is in effect to argue that things are quite as valuable as values themselves. Such a proposition is evidently meaningless and need hardly be disputed. It would set at naught the witness of experience that values are deeper and of greater moment and thus stand on a higher level than the sensible qualities of things.

On the other hand, it has also to be here pointed out that mere existence has a value in itself which it can not but be unjust to ignore. Scheler's conception is completely oblivious of

5. Ibid, p. 15.

6. Ibid, p. 16.

this fact and would confine value to a limited world of a peculiar kind of qualities existing in sharp seclusion against the rest of the system of reality.

The 'world of goods', finally, in which each good is a unity of value-qualities, is too atomic a conception for a philosophy of value. Values, or goods, if you please, are not divisible or analysable into separate unit qualities. The analogy upon which it is sought to base this atomistic view stands on a false presupposition. For an atomism of separate qualities is untenable even in the conception of a thing, a material object. How, then, can it be justified in the conception of a good, an essentially ideal, or, if you permit, a spiritual object?

Some Aspects of Belief.

By

KALIDAS BHATTACHARYYA.

There are two elements in perception—sensum and belief. Sensum is the content of perception ; it is that which is directly apprehended. Let it be understood at the outset that there is no idealistic implication here. As for belief, it means the taking the sensum as real.

Belief presupposes that the sensum is independent of the act of sensing.¹ But is it merely having such an independent sensum, or does it mean anything more ? By 'independent of ' we mean 'not constituted by.'

Many realists will answer the question in the negative : they believe that the reality of a sensum is merely its independence. The present essay refutes this view through an analysis of error. It establishes that believing is a new act of *thinking* the sensum, that reality is the character of being so thought. It also analyses the concept of reality in its constituent concepts and discusses other subsidiary problems.

That the reality of a sensum is more than its independence is evident in the case of perceptual error. When error is corrected the error sensum is still taken to be independent though the sense of reality is then gone. When the rope-snake illusion is over we cannot call the snake real. Yet we cannot deny that the snake was an independent sensum.

1. The word 'sensing' is used here and elsewhere in the sense of direct immediate apprehension and not in the limited sense of apprehension through a sense organ.

This simple conclusion should not however be established so simply. There are two objections to face. They are :—

- (i) In error the sensum is not independent of sensing, and
- (ii) There can be no error-sensum at all.

The first objection can be obviated in a few words. Since the sensum is apprehended as independent of sensing it must be regarded as so independent unless of course all objective accounts of it fail. The sensum appeared as independent. Why should we reject this primal consciousness if we can give a satisfactory account of error without rejecting this consciousness? And towards the end of this paper such an objective account will be given.

The second objection is more serious. It denies error-sensum altogether. Error, according to it has no single content—simple or complex. What is called error is really two awarenesses, both of which are correct, conceived either as going together or as non-distinguished. The two awarenesses are the awareness of a present locus and that of an elsewhere and elsethwhen object. In the case of the rope-snake illusion one of the two awarenesses is the perception of the locus rope in its bare aspect as 'this'. The other awareness is the perception or memory of an elsewhere and elsethwhen snake which is apprehended merely as snake and not as elsewhere and elsethwhen. Those who hold that error is the two knowledges *together* believe that this elsewhere and elsethwhen snake is *perceived*,² and those who hold that error is the two

2. The perception of an elsewhere and elsethwhen snake is not absurd. It happens in every case of 'complication.' When we seem to perceive the coldness of a lump of ice without touching it we really perceive an elsewhere and elsethwhen coldness. It cannot be the present coldness, for the lump of ice is not touched. This coldness, again, cannot be taken as remembered, for we feel sure that it is being perceived.

knowledges *non-distinguished* believe that it is *remembered*

Let us examine this second objection. When a new account tries to replace an old one, the new one cannot be accepted unless it is shown how the old one could at least be possible. We hold that in error we feel an error-sensum. The account given in the previous paragraph denies it. This account must therefore show how we could at all speak of an error-sensum. The non-distinguishment theorist cannot show this ; for it is impossible how two knowledges non-distinguished can at all present their contents as compounded into a single complex. To *together*-theorist however this compounding is not absurd. It is possible, he may argue, that two knowledges, combined in a certain way, can compound their contents. This seems to be rendered more plausible by the fact that the *together* theorist holds the snake to be perceived and not remembered.

But after a clear analysis it will be evident that the *together*-theorist fails equally. Two knowledges can combine their contents only if the knowledges are of the same nature. The *together* theorist recognises this necessity, otherwise he would not have insisted that the elsewhere and elsewhere snake is not remembered but perceived just as much as the locus rope in its 'this' aspect. So if the two contents—'this' (i. e. the bare 'this' aspect of the present locus) and 'snake'—have to be combined the two must both be perceived. But there are arguments to show that the 'this' aspect of a thing cannot be perceived—it cannot be a sensum.

Thisness of a content primarily means a subjectivity. It primarily means that *my attention* has been directed to the content. My attention which is subjective is here in connexion with the content which is objective. When such a connexion takes place we as a result of our general attitude being prevalingly objective, forget the subjective side ; and thisness appears as an objective character. Thisness comes to mean

presentedness as if presentedness is a purely objective character like colour, taste etc. The same thing happens in the case of knowledge in general. When *we know* a thing our knowing as a subjective act may be forgotten and the thing may appear as *known* just as though knownness is a purely objective character.

Thus the objectivity of thisness, like that of knownness, is only a transformation of a subjective act, and like all such objectivities cannot be a content, and therefore cannot be a *sensum*. Content means that which is revealed. A thing is primarily a content only to a subjective act. If this act is metamorphosed into an objective character and attached to the thing the thing is then a content to that new objective character. For, no other change has occurred except that the subjective act has become that objective character. Again, since the subjective act required nothing else to reveal itself the emergent objectivity also similarly requires nothing else. This means that the new objective character cannot be a content. In order that a thing may become a *sensum* it must be attended to.³ That is to say, a *sensum* must first be a content of the subjective act of attention. When this act becomes the objective thisness the *sensum* is then the content of this thisness. And just as the act of attention is not itself in need of being attended to just so is thisness. From all this it is evident that the 'this' aspect of a thing cannot be a content and *a priori* a *sensum*.

This impossibility of 'this' aspect being a content renders its combination with the snake content not only impossible but absurd. So the *together*-theorist fails. The second objec-

3. We are not here speaking about *sensa* beyond the region of attention - what some psychologists call sub-conscious *sensa*—, for no one of these *sensa* can be a 'this'.

tion that there cannot be an error-sensum is thus explained away. It may then be regarded as securely established that there is an error-sensum, and therefore that the reality of a sensum is more than its independence. In other words believing is something more than entertaining an independent sensum. What is this something more?

It is thinking. The determination of the precise nature of this thinking, i. e. the analysis of the concept employed in this thinking we shall undertake later. Before that we have to establish the general proposition that belief is thinking.

What is thinking? It is the awareness of or through a universal *apprehended as a universal*—and since 'of' and 'through' here will be shown to come ultimately to the same thing it may be called the awareness of a universal as a universal. A blind universal-awareness, i. e. the awareness of a universal not apprehended as a universal, is not thinking. When we sense a particular cow we no doubt sense the universal cowness. But there it is not apprehended as a universal. This is blind universal-awareness. The consciousness of a universal *as a universal* means a form of indirect awareness of particulars. For, to apprehend a point of similarity as a point of similarity to other things means that those other things are apprehended in a certain indirect way. In the blind awareness of a universal, on the other hand, there is evidently no such indirect awareness of particulars.

Thinking then may be described as indirect awareness of particulars. As such it must be a form of awareness quite different from sensing which means direct awareness of particulars. One peculiar character of thinking is that it cannot go without language, for a universal cannot be entertained in the mind without words. And conversely a word⁴ always

4 By 'word' is meant significant word. A popular name is in itself a word without any signification. The signification that seems to belong to it is forced and arbitrary.

means a universal. So an unfailing sign of thinking is that word or language has been used.

Now it can be demonstrated that in the consciousness of a sensum as real language must be used. If so, it must be admitted that this consciousness is thinking. As for the concepts that this consciousness involves they are three, viz. 'it', 'qualified' and 'reality'

The proposed demonstration is simple. Belief means that the sensum is apprehended as real. In other words the content of belief is a complex, viz., a sensum as qualified by reality. But consciousness of any complex content always involves language and concepts. So belief also involves them. Hence belief is thinking.

Consciousness of a complex involves language. In order that this truth be realised a note of warning should be given. By 'consciousness of a complex content' we do not mean a *blind* consciousness of such a complex, we mean the consciousness of such a complex *as a complex*. It may very well happen that an object *as a matter of fact* is complex though we know it as simple. It will be of help to remember the distinction if two distinct terms are used. A thing *as it is itself* may be called 'object'; a thing *as it is known* may be called 'content.' So there remains no ambiguity or confusion when we say that consciousness of a complex *content* necessarily involves language.

The truth of this proposition is a thing to be immediately realised; it cannot be established by arguments. When we sense a simple content like 'wall' (by 'wall' as a content is meant one in which there are nothing qualified and nothing that qualifies) we feel no need of language; we have no need of speaking (to ourselves at least, i. e. mentally) of the wall as an 'it' and *a fortiori* as 'it as qualified by that.' But when we sense a complex content like 'white wall' we cannot but speak to ourselves at least the words 'it as qualified by that'.

We cannot but be conscious of the content as a complex with 'it' (wall) as qualified by 'that' (whiteness), and how such a consciousness can occur except through the words 'it', 'that' and 'qualified' (or some vague synonym of the word 'qualified') it is impossible to understand. To be conscious of a complex is to be conscious of a qualified; but how can we know something as qualified if we do not speak to ourselves the words 'it' and 'qualified'?

Belief then is thinking. It may also be called a kind of judging. For a complex content linguistically apprehended is just the content of a judgment. There is indeed a difference between apprehending a content like 'while wall' and apprehending the content '(the) wall is white.' In the former any one of the two constituents might be regarded as a substantive and the other as its adjective, while in the latter they are fixed. But this difference, we may point out, does not concern the content. So far as the contents are concerned there is no difference between 'white wall' and '(the) wall is white.' In both we are aware of a complex containing a substantive and an adjective. All the difference that there is concerns our free choice; in the one we choose to take one of the constituents as a substantive and the other as its adjective, in the other we choose to keep them fixed. This is entirely a matter outside the content.

So far then as the content is concerned all thinking is judging. So belief is a kind of judgment. When a *sensum* is believed it means that the *sensum* is *judged* to be real—reality as an adjective is attached to the *sensum*.

The apprehension of a *sensum* as real then means that it is thought, i. e. indirectly apprehended through the concept of reality. In a perception that amounts to knowledge there are then two awarenesses going together—the direct awareness of the *sensum* (sensing) and the indirect awareness of it (thinking or judging).

Two types of entities have thus to be distinguished. They are mere *sensa* and real *sensa*. The mere *sensum* is a merely independent *sensum*, the real *sensum* is the mere *sensum* as believed. All our ordinary *sensa* are real unless they are contradicted, when forthwith they lose the character of reality and take their position in the region of mere *sensa*. From this point of view a simple account of error can be given. When the rope-snake illusion is corrected the snake is still a *sensum* though it has now been ousted from the region of reality and has taken its position among mere *sensa*. There is no need of propounding a theory that the snake is subjective, meaning by subjective 'constituted by the act of sensing it.' Nor need we deny our immediate consciousness and say that the illusory snake is not a *sensum* at all.

So far we have established two propositions—(i) The reality of a *sensum* is more than its independence, and (ii) The awareness of a *sensum* as real is the same as judging (thinking) it as real, meaning by this that the concept of reality is attached as an adjective to the *sensum*.

Two very important problems now emerge. One is—what exactly is meant by this concept of reality? Is it in other words a unitary concept, or is it further analysable, and if it is analysable what is the analysis? The second problem is—what is the metaphysical status of a mere *sensum*? Should it be understood as the primal entity, the real *sensum* being only one kind of a mere *sensum*? Or, should we regard the real *sensum* as primal entity, the mere *sensum* being understood in terms of it i. e. as a function of it (in mathematical language)?

To take up the first problem. When a *sensum* is apprehended as real we have the consciousness that it either will or will not survive the sensing act. In other words the question of possible permanence arises for the first time in belief. In the consciousness of a mere *sensum* this question has no relevancy.

The mere *sensum* we have in illusion. When an illusion is corrected one of the items that are denied is this 'possible permanence'. Correction of an error means the reminder that the question of permanence or impermanence has no relevancy concerning the mere *sensum*. It should be pointed out here that permanence of a *sensum* does not mean its independence of sensing, nor does independence necessarily imply permanence. Independence of a *sensum* is its being not-constituted by sensing. Permanence means its continuance in time even after the sensing is over. One implication of reality is then the concept of possible permanence.

Sometimes however in belief there is no *clear* consciousness of possible permanence. In such cases a *sensum* is still taken to be real if it is known to be causally connected with some *sensum* already believed. When we call a *sensum* unreal (i.e. mere *sensum*) we mean that it is not causally connected with any *sensum* already believed. The snake in the rope-snake illusion is, when the illusion is corrected, only a detached floating *sensum* having no causal connection with known real *sensa*. Similarly dream events are floating: whatever causal connexion they may have among themselves they have no such connection with any *sensum* already taken as real. The concept of causality also thus plays an important part in belief.

But the function of the concept of causality does not end here. Belief means not only that a real *sensum* is connected with at least one other real *sensum*. It means that any real *sensum* has a *possible* causal connexion with any other real *sensum*. All real *sensa* are thus in a very important sense inter-connected. All real *sensa* may be said to form an inter-connected group. The term 'interconnected *group*' is preferred to the term 'system', for in the latter there are many mystical implications in which we do not like to be involved. The third concept involved in belief is then 'inter-connexion.'

Whether these three—possible permanence, causality and interconnection—are the only concepts involved in belief we cannot say. We merely collect them and so cannot be sure of their completeness. Perhaps a transcendentalist will have reasons to regard the list as complete or not. Let us reserve the problem for him.

Now about the second problem: But before we take it up let us give a note of warning. It will be an error to hold that only the consciousness of reality requires concepts. It should be remembered that the awareness of any mere *sensum* requires concepts *if it is apprehended as a complex*. Some of these concepts may be quite as general and categorical as the concepts of permanence, causality and interconnection. But since here we are not concerned with them we may pass them over.

The second problem to be considered is this: Which is primal—the mere *sensum* or the real *sensum*? Which of these should be understood in terms of the other? There are some who prefer the mere *sensum*. Reality, according to them, is only a certain group of mere *sensa*. But this view, which suggests itself very easily, cannot be accepted.

If we say that real *sensa* are only a group of mere *sensa* we have first to think of the latter as being some things that *are*. We must say—*There are* mere *sensa* and some of these form a group called real *sensa*. There is no escape from thinking in this way. But then what is the meaning of 'are' in the proposition 'there are mere *sensa*'. The verb 'to be' means nothing but the reality of that which is. So the proposition 'there *are* mere *sensa*' means that mere *sensa* are real. Mere *sensa* thus cannot be thought of except in terms of real *sensa*.

But if the mere *sensum* cannot be thought of except as real what is the value of distinguishing it from the real *sensum*? We reply, the proposition 'mere *sensum* cannot be thought of except in terms of this real *sensum*' does not mean that it is

thought of as *being* the real sensum. We mean that it must be thought of only as some *function* of the real sensum, only as having a necessary connexion with the real sensum. The mere sensum we have in error only. Error means nothing but *reality denial*. So the mere sensum as the content of error cannot but be thought of as a function of the real sensum. It may be objected that error means denial only and not denial of reality, so that error need not be a function of reality. We reply that all denial is not error. The denial of an elephant on these pages is a *real* denial; it is no error. Error is a specific kind of denial, viz. the denial of reality.

Those who hold the view that the real sensum is a function of the mere sensum and not vice versa often argue that there is no difficulty in the sentence 'there are mere sensa'. The sentence, according to them, means that mere sensa are entities, not that they are real. But is this not making a fetish of the term entity? Entity cannot be called a new concept—i.e. a concept which means neither reality itself nor a function of reality—unless it can be so thought. But try as we may to think of it we always stumble upon the concept of reality.

The whole essay may be summarised in a few sentences. Belief means judging a sensum through the concept of reality. This concept can be analysed into three concepts, viz. possible permanence, causality and interconnexion. In course of the discussion it has transpired that we have to recognise an entity called 'mere sensum'. But this is nothing but a function of the real or believed sensum.

Philosophy of Life in Islam.

By

DR. S. N. A. JAFRI.

Philosophy is the intellectual view of things. Any attempt to rationalise life is conducive to that end. Conscience is a great guide ; and Islam exhorts its followers to respond to its call ; the Quran repeatedly says "Why do you not think ? why do you not use your brains, and why do you not respond to the call of conscience."

When we talk of the philosophy of life in Islam, we mean that we are to put in high relief those points in Muslim religion which will appeal to our intellect and at the same time help us in the walk of life. For instance what are the dictates of Islam about our relation with God and the material world ; about the freedom of conscience ; about faith and practice ; about Nature and God ; about the Ego and the absolute Ego ? These are the problems which have vexed the philosophers and scientists of all ages ; and even the science of physics which was expected to lay bare all the hidden secrets of this physical world, still seems to be far away from its objective. The best solution of all these problems was given by the Prophet of Arabia who decreed that the exploration of the material world was inevitable to understand the All-pervading God. It is for this reason that the Quran repeatedly asserts that nature is God's behaviour. The distinctive feature of Islam is that it takes the empirical view of life and its problems. Its commands and tenets help in keeping an equilibrium between the body and the soul.

It teaches us to face facts, and not to shrink before adverse currents. This survey of the universe and the analysis of the problem made in the Quran creates in us a feeling of intellectual pleasure, such as a scientist enjoys in his laboratory by solving the problems of physics and chemistry in the scientific crucible. The Prophet of Arabia was helped in his mission of creating this empirical attitude by the fact that it is the characteristic of the people of Arabia to hold to the positive, so much so that even in poetry, which is an inspired art, they care more for the concrete than the abstract.

The physical, political and social factors have moulded the spirit of Islam, as they have done in the case of almost all other religions.

The Quran which is the fountain-head of Islam and Muslim culture, emphasises more upon deed than idea : and thus inculcates the habit of concrete thought. In that age, which cared more for the invisible than for the visible Mohammed caused an intellectual revolution by stressing more on the visible than the invisible. It will not be an exaggeration if I claim to say that by bringing this tendency into prominence, in the development of thought, Islam laid the foundations of scientific thinking and rationalism, which ushered in the modern age. By teaching the people that Nature is God's behaviour, it brought their self in unison with the ultimate reality. It was this faith or "Iman" which enriched mankind with enthusiasm to explore the concrete facts of the Universe. This spirit of understanding the character of Nature, and acquiring knowledge, became instrumental in indirectly bringing us closer to Him. Seeing this intellectual change in the people of that time, the great German savant, Goethe, said, "You see this teaching never fails : with all our systems, we cannot go, and generally speaking, no man can go further than that."

Before the advent of Islam, it was the basic foundation of many religions that this material world was a myth ; a place to be renounced. But it was Islam which wiped off this dualism and established the idea of the Unity or Oneness of God. It showed that both the Ideal and the Real were two co-ordinating factors and not opposing ones. It brought home to the people that the ideal and the real are two sides of the same shield and that the real is there to appreciate the ideal. The Quran clearly says "We have not created the Heaven and the Earth and whatever is between them in sport, we have not created them but for a serious end". Mohammed pointed out to the element of change, order of day and night, stars, humming bees, etc., as the visible signs of that invisible Power. People were convinced that these ideas of Maya and Illusion were not conducive to the intellectual development of Society, for it would deter them from exploring the hidden treasure of Nature and harnessing them in the service of Mankind. This psychological change led them to have a new sense of appreciation and evaluation : they began to love deeds more than ideas ; and gave up the idea that ethics were making them invertebrates who were turning big castles into monasteries. The theory of "resist not evil" was changed by the orientation of another theory—"Undo evil by action, if necessary", as the Quran says.

The ancient religions and cultures failed to bring happiness to the world, for they kept their followers always closed in the vacuum of metaphysics and never allowed them to come out and feel the solidity of the earth, with the result that they were neither certain of Nirvana nor had the pleasures of *Jiwan-Mukti*. Mohammed saw the harm which this type of philosophy was inflicting upon mankind ; and therefore he advised his followers that this active temporal world is nothing but the manifestation of the ultimate Reality, or in the language of another great philosopher, is our is reflective

contact with the temporal flux of things which prepares us for an intellectual vision of the non-temporal. This attitude allowed us to have sense-perception which in turn was supplemented by the perception of *Fuad* (heart). When the Quran says that Nature is the habit of Allah it commands us that by studying Nature, our self will be establishing relation with the Ultimate Self. It will be a kind of adjustment between the self and the Non-Self. To help us in understanding the Ultimate Reality, the prophet advises us to develop the empirical attitude towards this material world ; and designed the timing and methods of prayer, to be in touch with the spiritual Being.

From the Quaranic view of the Universe and its purpose, when we come to the individual, we find that the Quran lays down three things, (a) that man is the chosen of God ; (b) that man with all his faults is meant to be the representative of God on earth ; and (c) that man is a free personality. In the light of these three factors, no one can blame Islam for inculcating fatalist tendencies, among its followers. It rather gives them that moral courage of freedom which is necessary to fight in the struggle of life ; and ensures success to those who take life seriously and believe in personal efforts. Fate in Islam is a combination of effort and faith (*Tadbir* and *Tagdir*). The Prophet's clear saying is "Ours is to try, and God's to accomplish". Islam entrusts to the Ego a directive function. It has been empowered to be refined and enlightened as the result of experience. The timing of the prayers has been so arranged in Islam as to allow the Ego to escape from the mechanism of daily worldly routines to spiritual freedom. The words '*Amr*' and '*Khalq*', which occur in the Quran, indicate how the creative activity of God reveals itself and observes the rule of inter-action. Those of us who have observed the role of the big personalities in the directions of dynamic movements, and of the historic events in affecting

the character of these people, will see how the rule of interaction is prominent both in the spiritual as well as the temporal world. It proves that the streams of causality flow into the Ego from outside ; and from the Ego to ultimate Ego. Thus we can say that both soul and body act and react on each other. The element of Destiny and Taqdir in Islam is also a partial manifestation of the principle of Amr. This has been defined by the eminent philosophers of Islam, partly of ethical and partly of biological origin. It shows to the Ego the glimpses of Reality, keeps up the courage to fight against all odds.

Then there is the crowning principle of Tauhid in Islam which demands all loyalty to God ; and thus ensures the unity of mankind under one banner. This can serve as the foundation of world unity, for it alone can help in bringing down the artificial barriers which are an impediment in developing the sense of Human Brotherhood. Since God is the real fountain-head of all knowledge and the spiritual basis of life, faith in him means the faith in Humanity. The idea of the Universe and Humanity is linked with the idea of the unity of the Godhead ; and thus the purpose of Life in Islam has been regarded only to serve Humanity. It is for this service that the exploration and the conquest of the material world has been advised. Islam in its attitude towards Humanity has even gone so far as to prefer the duty of man towards man to that of his duty towards God. Any narrowing down of this circle of humanity is foreign to the true spirit of Islam. Those who indulge in such things, should remember the following saying of the Prophet, "All Mankind are children of God. The best-liked of them in the eyes of God is one who does service to his Children." "Your service for even one minute to your brother in Humanity is better than remaining in prayer for even one year." He always deprecated the idea of dividing humanity in water-tight compartments based on colour,

blood or race. One piece of advice to his followers, even to troops, was that they should not belittle the religion of any one, or molest any non-believer. To him the whole universe was a mosque. Indeed the whole philosophy of Islam is put in a nutshell in the following words of the Prophet. It is this that God will say on the Day of Judgment. "Man, I was poor, but you did not help me. I was weak, but you did not defend me. I was sick, but you did not nurse me." Man will say—"How could Thou be poor, weak or sick and how could I help Thee?" Then God will say—"Was not so and so, your kith and kin, an embodiment of my creation in need of such help, which you refused him. If you had only helped him, you would have found Me in him." The words "Found me in him" shows the the sublimity of life in Islam.

The Freudian and the Yoga conceptions of Repression.

By

SHARSHI BHUSAN DAS GUPTA.

The dominant idea in Freud which has to a large extent influenced modern psychology, particularly in the departments of neurotic and therapeutic psychology, consists of the belief that we are born with certain unconscious tendencies, which in a way largely determine our experiences. In the course of our experiences also our passionate nature, as determined by the unconscious within us tries to manifest itself in diverse ways; but they have to be curbed by us by the means and restrictions of our social environment. These passions, thus repressed, sink back into the sphere of the unconscious and contribute additional strength to the unconscious both pathologically and psychologically. It may be assumed that, he regards the emotions as the dynamic factor of our life; but it is somewhat surprising that he should give such an undue pathological importance to the sex emotions. But however that may be, the whole principle seems to be, in brief, that repressed emotions (sex) are turned into unconscious tendencies which operate adversely on our nerves and produces, on the one hand, diverse kinds of dreams and diseases and, on the other hand, manifest themselves in the peculiar nature of the interests that we may take in different affairs of life and art. He holds that it is possible to discover the nature of the repressed emotions by an interpretation of the dreams, which are only the manifestations of those emotions in a symbolic manner. By a narration of the dreams as well as the narration of the personal history of the individual, he thinks, it is possible to discover to an individual the nature of the emotions

that he unconsciously repressed. He holds further that, by rousing the dormant emotion and bringing it into the conscious field the pernicious influence of the repressed emotions, which were sending forth their arrows from behind the arena, could be destroyed. The significance of the idea is that emotions can exercise their destructive force at their best only when they operate as parts of the unconscious mind. In certain ways it may be regarded that he also believes that the unconscious could be modified to a certain extent; but according to him, the mode of this modification consists in dissociating certain elements from the unconscious by becoming conscious of them. The hypothesis then seems to be, that whenever any element of the unconscious translates itself into the conscious, its force in the pathological or psychological nature becomes largely destroyed. Incidentally he thinks that repression of emotions by which they are forced to retire from the conscious field before being manifested in it is injurious to our system.

The Hindu view on this subject, however, tends entirely in the opposite direction. Thus Caraka, who flourished in the first century of the Christian era in the *Sūtra-sthānam* (Ch. 7) gives an enumeration of the different kinds of tendencies which are to be repressed and which are not to be repressed. Without going into the details one may not, that it is advised that the purely psychological tendencies should not be repressed, whereas the mental emotions have been strongly recommended for repression. Thus, while one should not repress the tendency for the calls of nature, one should repress the physical tendencies, if there be any, for doing harm to others and also the tendencies of sexual-intercourse, theft animosity etc.¹

-
1. Dehapravṛttirya kācidvidyate paraprāṇīya |
 strībhogasteṣa-himsādyā tasyā vegaiḥ vidhārayet ||
Sūtra-sthānam, ch. 7, verse 29.

The entire discipline of self-control, which leads to the formation of character is based upon the conscious exercise of one's own will for the eradication and repression of primitive tendencies. The scientist, the philosopher, the warrior, the politician—each one of these has fought the life's battle hard and has made strong efforts for the repression of primitive tendencies, which could have stood in the way of their success, but none of them are reported to have suffered from the pathological troubles of repression from which Freud's patients sought relief. In the case of these persons there are sources of pleasure and interest which help them in tiding over the pernicious influence of disturbing emotions; in their cases the disturbing emotions find themselves too weak in comparison with the other dominant interests, or, are consciously and deliberately overcome by an iron will.

Freud's theory is from one point of view very pessimistic; because, Freud believes that our destiny is guided by an unknown and incomprehensible unconscious over which we have no control. Again, while Freud believes that a part of our conscious or semi-conscious experience can sink down into the unconscious and be torn out from it by suggestions and be made to float in the conscious sphere, he does not think that the same process may be applied to the entire unconscious as a whole. His dynamical, economical, and topographical view of Psychological forces as well as his theory of the censor present a disjointed view of Psychology, which can not be satisfactorily worked out in accordance with any settled and consistent Psychological scheme. It is true, however, that these Psychological theories are mere assumptions, and even if they are materially changed that would not affect the general position of Psycho-analysis, which is generally concerned with the treatment of the cases of hysteria and other mental disorder. The cure of these cases of morbid patients by certain specific ways of suggestion involving the special

relation of the physician and the patient being granted, it is open for a future Psychologist to offer any other Psychological theory for such cures. The cures in themselves do not guarantee the truth of the Psycho-analytic theory and our knowledge of Psychology in other departments of life does not lend any assistance to the acceptance of the validity of the Psycho-analytic theory.

But in the present paper we are not concerned in supporting or refuting the Psycho-analytic theory. The theory of Psycho-analysis assumes the existence of the primitive unconscious, which may be equated with instincts and which are not explicable by the *a posteriori* experience of our lives. In the Yoga-theory of psychology the unconscious may be equated with the complex of "Vāsanā" and "Saṁskāra". The "Vāsanā-Saṁskāra" complex is also primitive as the Yoga asserts that it is transmitted to us in the beginningless series of previous existence in other births. Even if the theory of re-birth be admitted to be true, "Vāsanā-Saṁskāra" complex is primitive and original so far as this life is concerned. The conscious mental states can be equated with the *vṛtti* of the Yoga psychology. The Yoga psychology holds that the *vṛtti* passes into Saṁskāra and is conserved there as a power by which the Saṁskāra Vāsanā complex may at any time project that *vṛtti* in the same or a distorted form owing to the resistance of other Saṁskāras. According to such a theory, the repetition of such a *vṛtti*, increases its potential power in the Saṁskāra and increases the chance of its projection as a *vṛtti*. But it is quite possible that *vṛtti*, which has not its power strongly presented in the Saṁskāra-complex, may find itself projected in a distorted manner in association with other partially manifested *vṛttis*, or, under conditions of resistance of other Saṁskāras. Here then, we may have a theory, which may be regarded as a plausible alternative to the psycho-analytic theory, for, if by suggestion the potency of the *vṛtti* can be increased and its

mute struggle in the Satiskāra be thereby annulled, the course of the destructive vṛttis, or, the conflict in the satiskāra may also be annulled, and we may have such cures as are claimed by the psycho-analysts.

But we are not interested here in elaborating an alternative theory of the cures of morbid patients; but we wish to affirm that the unconscious and the conscious form a homogeneous whole, such that the conscious strengthens and develops the unconscious and the latter insures the recurrence and the strength of the former. Such an assumption changes the nature of the so-called un-alterable unconscious. For, though the unconscious may be original and primitive with us and in some sense beyond our control, yet it is not entirely so; for, by determining the sphere of the conscious we may determine to any extent the nature of the unconscious, which is itself a prolongation or extension of the conscious and at once homogeneous with it. If by any means the sphere of the conscious can be modified by inducing a particular kind of strain through vigorous and continued mental effort, or if certain special kind of interest may be generated by habit with reference to certain types of mental states, then the nature of the unconscious will be so modified that these elements of the unconscious which would have arrested those special kinds of mental states will themselves be annihilated and the unconscious instead of playing the part of a foe will play the part of a friend. This explains the well-known cases of mental regeneration due to good association, instruction and the exercise of a healthy moral will and also the reverse cases of moral degeneration under opposite circumstances.

One important fact that needs be emphasised in this connection is the part that is played by interest or agreeable emotions in determining an effective control of the unconscious by the conscious. The Vāsanā Satiskāra complex in itself

contains elements which are translatable in the form of emotion in the conscious sphere. It is the forces of these that gives a solidarity to the Vāsanā-Saṁskāra complex. All passions, which are associated with instincts are remarkable for supplying those elements which are designated as emotion in the conscious state. The unconscious may thus be regarded as the repository of potential passions. These again according to our formula are replenished by passions and their associated emotions in the conscious state. In order that the unconscious may be affected for the purpose of moral regeneration, it is necessary that the experiencing of passions in the conscious sphere should be dominated as far as possible; but the experiencing of passions can not be eliminated, for being of the nature of emotions, they are the real dynamic causes which rouse the unconscious to project itself into the conscious for the flashing in of mental states. It is, therefore, necessary that instead of stifling emotions (which is a very doubtful mental endeavour) one should try to habituate oneself to indulge in such emotions as are opposed to these passions or emotions which are intended to be suppressed or repressed. The moral problem thus is very closely related and associated with the psychological problem. The psycho-analyst being interested only in the case of psychological cures of morbid cases, naturally neglects the moral side of the question and is led to a very partial view of the psychological situation.

The Yoga-psychology holds that it is possible to arrest the mind on a particular conscious state, such that the constantly fluctuating tendencies of the mind in relational lines may be arrested. It further holds that such a steady arrest of the mind in a particular mental state produces a new type of knowledge (prajñā) which has a subversive effect on the Saṁskāra-Vāsanā complex. These prajñās appear in the conscious plane but are heterogeneous to the Saṁskāra-Vāsanā complex and, therefore, cannot be absorbed by it, but is, on the other

hand, attenuated or gradually annihilated by it. We have thus a concept of repression which is applicable not only to the conscious mental state, but also to their original sources, the unconscious. While partial repression of conscious mental states may be unhealthy under certain circumstances, the trained and organised repression of the conscious and the unconscious may lead to a happy regeneration of the conscious and the unconscious in a new plane of elevated existence. Our conclusion, therefore, is that the psycho-analytic theory is a very partial statement and cannot explain the true significance of repression in the application of practical psychology for the regeneration of our mind and morals.

The Concept of Liberation

By

Dr. C. D. DESHMUKH.

Analysis of the Concept of Liberation. Liberation in itself seems to be a purely negative idea ; but it implies the existence of that which is in some way limited and which can be freed from these limitations. Man knows himself to be finite owing to the many limitations of which he is always conscious. The awareness of limitation or bondage is an everyday fact which no one can deny. But this consciousness of limitation is possible only if there is some objective towards which life is striving. If a person wants to get out of a room, then alone can he have the sense of being imprisoned in that room. If he wants to remain in it, there is no sense of limitation. Most people live under a sense of limitation and restriction because of their having certain desires, which cannot be fulfilled. The sense of freedom can therefore come only in the successful attainment of some fundamental urge. If it is frustrated there is immediately the sense of limitation

Liberation and Desires. Had there been only one desire in consciousness, one could have unhesitatingly said that the freedom of consciousness consists in the fulfilment of that desire. However, we actually find in consciousness a host of desires which often come into conflict with one another. Further, most of these desires are dependent upon external things or circumstances ; and the freedom which the soul may have in relation to them is therefore not absolute but contingent. When there is a conflict, the freedom of soul makes itself felt through choice. But choice is a process of self-torture, since the person has to rule out one or more

alternative desires in favour of some particular desire. Thus, in choice the soul experiences limitation.

The search for absolute freedom, therefore, involves the search for the *ultimate purpose* of the life of the individual (Parama Purushartha). This is the *positive* aspect of liberation. This ultimate purpose is hidden by the surging of diverse desires which dominate the stream of consciousness. However, it is a mistake to think that desires are mere obstacles ; for they can, if intelligently handled, be turned into so many avenues which indirectly lead to the ultimate goal by bringing about multiform experiences and thus creating opportunities for a real understanding about the *Telos* of life.

Therefore, a purely negative method which shuns life and its experiences will not lead the individual to the perception or the realisation of the goal of life. But if the individual accepts and welcomes experience and digests it through critical understanding, he can come closer to the final fulfilment of his life. The capacity of an experience for awakening the individual depends upon how rich and profound it is. The experience which is most useful in this connection is the experience of *love*. Mostly, the experience is not strong enough to break down the walls of the prison of consciousness, because it is clouded by different factors like egotism, fear, jealousy or a selfish motive. But if the power of love is freed from these encumbrances, it can lead the individual to final release and fulfilment.

THE LAW OF KARMA. The limitations of consciousness can all be ultimately traced to the effects of past actions (which include thought and feeling) which give a specific shape and character to the temperament of the individual. Just as the flow of the river cuts its own bed so also the action of the individual leaves behind it certain mental traces which not only serve the purpose of recalling the original situations but also operate as dispositions which give a specifically directed momentum to the subsequent mental processes. The bondage

of Karma can in the last analysis be reduced to unconscious mental habits which prevent intelligent response to the rapidly changing circumstances.

It is true that with regard to many *technical achievements*, habits conserve a great deal of practical experience and usually save us from the need of fresh efforts for adjustment and co-ordination of responses, for we are there concerned with recurring problems which repeat themselves in uniformity. But mental habits have a tendency to obstruct true perception of *values* and also to hinder the release of intelligent response, because every fresh situation in the life of the individual is unique and therefore requires critical thought and unique response.

For the limiting influence of *Karma*, we have in abnormal psychology, a good analogue in *fixed ideas*, which introduce unhealthy rigidity in mental operations. But apart from mechanisation of the mind the mental habits can often limit activity from another point of view also, because most mental habits are due to ignorant and misdirected actions. They, therefore, not only make the mind a rigid and semi-mechanical instrument, but also positively pervert the mind. The problem of Liberation is therefore the problem of freeing the mind from the limiting influence of past actions.

The psychological question with which we are here confronted may be formulated as follows: 'Is the *Free Will and Freedom* mind eternally doomed to operate under the yoke of its own past, or is there any way of emancipating it from that influence?' It is futile to expect any clue from the solutions offered in connection with the problem of *free will*, where a reconciliation between Determinists and Libertarians is effected by defining freedom as self-determination, since in such solutions the self is tacitly identified with its character and the operation of what is called the "*whole self*"

can hardly be distinguished from the collective result of the totality of dispositions.

The cardinal fallacy of such solutions lies (1) in looking upon the individual as having no being other than his psychological *products* which constitute his empirical self, and (2) in hastily forming a theory of human personality without thorough investigation into the nature of ultimate values or the final purpose of human existence. Having accepted narrow empiricism, such theories have to be content with the *formal* freedom of self-determination, which secures internal harmony but fails to assure the realisation of supreme values. It is therefore not surprising that they ignore the other important condition of *positively significant freedom*, which has been beautifully expressed by Christ when he said :

"Ye shall know the Truth : and the *Truth* shall make ye free."

The chief condition of freedom therefore is *Conditions of Liberation* of that the entire personality should be illumined

by a comprehensive and unifying ideal. In the last analysis it will be found that nothing short of Infinity can bring real fulfilment to the human personality. Whatever is fragmentary or temporary must leave the soul dissatisfied. Even the ideal of Infinity merely intensifies human discontent so long as it is objectified and apprehended as something which may be realised in future, for it intensifies the awareness of existing limitations. Thus true freedom requires the transcendence of all limitations (or the bonds of Karma) and the *realisation* of one's own Infinity *here and now*.

During the process of transcending limitations, it is however necessary that the mind should be wholly centred upon the realisation of the Infinite. So long as the mind is caught up in the temporal process owing to various desires, it is neither possible nor desirable to avoid the creation and the

pursuit of the Ideal. And if the ideal is as vast as Infinity it releases in the individual that power which enables him to transcend his spiritual limitations.

After perceiving the ultimate goal, the life-force which has so far been forging for oneself the multifarious chains of trivial desires is withdrawn from all dissipating channels; and it comes to be released in a manner which will in no way create a sense of limitation. Modern psycho-analysis has not yet fully recognised (1) the possibility of completely *annulling* the effects of past experiences and actions, and the possibility of *complete sublimation of the libido*. But this is largely due to its being exclusively based upon abnormal data, and its somewhat ungenerous attitude towards the entire range of super normal experiences.

The most essential requirement for Liberation is that the individual should be able to step outside his limiting personality in the sense that his vision is no longer clouded by exclusive concentration of interest in his own self. The limitations of consciousness are ultimately rooted in some kind of deep rooted ignorance about the place and the function of the individual in the totality of Life. The understanding of life is perverted by the fact that the individual has a tendency to judge everything and to react to it from the point of view of the *ego*. The ego creates duality and all the complications of duality. It divides life into fractions and destroys its harmony and integrity. The individual, therefore, constantly lives in a sense of conflict, frustration and limitations. But if through intense love and understanding, the individual succeeds in dropping the idea of his being separate from life, he breaks through his limitations and is united with the one indivisible Reality.

Those thinkers who look upon Liberation as total extinc-

tion of life and consciousness have certainly misunderstood its true nature. This view is sometimes attributed to Lord Buddha; but there is ample evidence to believe that he looks upon *Nibbana* as a positive state of consciousness. Extinction, as such can hardly have any fascination for the individual. For those who cannot think of any life other than the life of the ego, Liberation may look like total extinction; but in fact it is an initiation into the Life Eternal, for the individual is then united with the Infinite Reality.

Even the positive conception of Liberation however differs according to whether one looks upon the Ultimate Reality as a Personal God or as an Impersonal Absolute. *Saguna Mukti*. The worshippers of Personal God believe in three kinds of Liberation :—

- (1) *Salokya*, or residing in the world of the God worshipped,
- (2) *Samipya*, or living in close proximity with Him, and
- (3) *Sarupya*, or becoming like Him in nature and form.

Liberation is here looked upon as a blissful state of *existence in some supersensible world*; and this kind of ideal can only appeal to few persons, since for most persons the existence of the other world is either a theory or a matter of faith. Further on this view all hope of fulfilment comes to be centred upon *life after death*; and the present mundane life of man tends to be deprived of all intrinsic significance since it is regarded as being merely a period of preparation for the life to come. It will also be seen that all these forms of *Saguna Mukti* consist of varying degrees of *companionship* of God. But in so far as they all equally posit irreducible dualism between God and man they do not do full justice to man's aspiration for Infinity.

The fourth form of *Mukti*, which is called *Sayujya*, is therefore looked upon as the highest kind of Liberation, since it

**Nirguna
Mukti**

consists in becoming one with the Ultimate Reality. The duality of personal relationship is here superseded by the realisation of supra-relational identity between man and the Ultimate Reality. This concept of Liberation appeals to those who look upon the Ultimate Reality as an Impersonal Absolute and who long to be merged in it. This type of *Nirguna Mukti* is not to be looked upon as result of a process whereby the individual becomes what he was not ; it is rather a culmination of a process of self knowledge whereby he realises fully what he already is, has been and ever will be.¹

According to Sankara, Liberation involves the complete merging of the individual in the Ultimate Reality so that he ceases to have any separate existence of his own ; but Ramanuja maintains that the individual retains his separate and unique existence although he comes to have the most intimate relation with the Ultimate Reality. However, in view of the fact that even ordinary experiences of love and understanding point out to a confluence or interpenetration of selves it seems probable that in the state of Liberation the individual knows himself to be the All-self.² From the point of view of *content* consci-

1. Atma tu satatam praptah apraptavadavidyaya
Tannashe praptavadbhati swakanthabharanam yatha.
(Sankara's Atmabodh)

"Like the ornament in one's own neck, although eternally obtained, the Atman looks like something not yet obtained because of ignorance and like something obtained after its disappearance."

2. Sarvabhutasthamatmanam sarvabhutam catmani
Ikshati yogayuktatma sarvatra samadarshinah.

—The Bhagavadgita VI 29.

"The self, harmonised by yoga, seeth the Self abiding in all beings, all beings in the self : everywhere he seeth the same."

ousness ; and he ceases to identify himself with the limited personality : but this articulate self knowledge of the All-self is explicitly present only in the centre of consciousness which has attained Liberation ; and Liberation is *in this sense* purely a *personal* matter.

The paradox is more intelligible to us if we remember the inseparability of the subjective and the objective factors in ordinary knowledge of the finite self. The true function of the subjective factors is to grasp, develop and intellectually appropriate the objective world and not itself as an isolated or self-sufficient centre. However owing to certain psychological factors like desires, the centre does not function perfectly and it creates a prison for itself in the form of the "I" or the ego on the basis of the bodily existence. Identification with the body is thus responsible for the illusion of separateness. But as the centre of consciousness frees itself from its limiting desires it goes beyond the artificial division between the subject and the object and realises the unity of the two. Just as the true function of a mirror is to reflect all other things but not itself ; the real value of the centre of consciousness lies in its capacity to reveal the true nature of Ultimate Reality. It is egoism which makes it identify itself with a narrow and finite empirical self ; but when the ego disappears through right understanding it knows itself to be identical with the one indivisible Reality.

In Liberation the individual transcends duality and there is therefore for him no antithesis between the self and the society. He is equally incapable of "selfish" and "altruistic" actions. But this does not necessitate the cessation of *all* action. In fact, liberation implies the release of perfect action which springs from a poise of love and understanding. It is not born of desire and is therefore not the seeking of some unrealised dream of fulfilment ; but it is at once an expression and a part of an eternally fresh and creatively self-renewing blissful fulfilment which is unaffected by the sufferings and the conflicts experienced by the unliberated soul.

The Concept of the Transcendent.*

By

S. S. JALOTA,

The concept of a transcendent reality was popularised, rather emphasised by Kant.¹ The notion is well-worn by now. Its use however has led to an ever-increasing misconception. When philosophers, even professional philosophers, talk about the transcendent ego, or reality, they seem to be talking about something that is absolutely divorced from the phenomenal apparent existence. With a curious awe they lift up their hands, and point perhaps unconsciously, to an immeasurable distance that exists between the simply sensible and the merely conceivable actual object. I have noticed the transfiguration in the tones of the speakers in this house as they pass on from the discussion of the so-called psychological 'me' to the philosophical 'I'. It seems that one of them is eking out a miserable existence, grovelling in mud and slime; and the other enjoys a lordly liberty and reigns the sole monarch of the seventh heaven.

Is this partiality justified? Some of you may think 'yes'. The one is real, permanent, and changeless, but the other is an impostor, a non-existent illusion, and a falsehood. But I believe the situation is a good deal different. Let us take the transcendent object for our consideration. It is evidently a conceptual construct. By a certain process of reasoning we

* Contributed to the 12th Indian Philosophical Congress, 1936 (Delhi).

1. Mackenzie,—Transcendence. *Encyclopaedia of Ethics and Religions*, 1921. XII, 419-425.

have arrived at a logical universal. When through our behaviour we describe it as 'above and beyond', we are treating this logical universal, this blood-less concept, as a real substantive entity. This position is evidently akin to that of mediaeval conceptualism—*universalia sunt realia antequam*—, rather than the very different transcendentalism of Kant, etc. So although we assert that the thing-in-itself is unknowable, yet our gestures betray the apotheosis of a Platonic archetype, *eidos*.

Further, to assert that reality is transcendent is not necessarily to deny that Reality is also immanent, the supporting tail of each ephemeral appearance.² The fact of the immanent aspect of reality is, however, conveniently neglected during the reverential preachings of the transcendence of reality. I submit that the concept of immanence is the result of the same process of rigorous logic, as is the concept of transcendence. So I do not see any reason why the present-day philosophers should give one-sided emphasis to a partial truth. Moreover, to me it seems that the concept of immanence necessarily includes the virtues of transcendence. For instance, Scotus Erigena writes, "When we hear God made all things, we ought to understand by it nothing else than that God is in all things, that it subsists as the essence of all things".³ Reality as outside, reality as transcendent is implied in the very concept of its immanence. Transcendence, in this sense, is the necessary corollary of immanence; unless we begin to believe that Reality as a whole is smaller than each of its apparent parts. This is fully brought out by Augustine: "...God did not withdraw from the world after He had created it, but was always filling heaven and earth with

2. Brahma Pucchaṃ pratistha.

3. Erigena, J. S.—De Divisione Naturae, i, 72.

His omni-present power'.⁴ The concept of the transcendence however is relatively speaking more limited, because it excludes the fact of relation. The 'transcendent' is a negative concept, it denies a relation with the object. The thing-in-itself is the outcome of the same logic as *naiti*. It is competent only to deny. The mystics speak of God as above all predicates,—above truth, wisdom, eternity, etc.⁵ The concept of the 'immanent' on the other hand not merely affirms, but also limits the relation. The field of the immanent reality extends to not merely within but also without the limits of any particular phenomenon. Hence, we may say with greater accuracy that Reality is immanent in which, and because of which the phenomenal 'we' live, and move, and have our being.

A student of Indian Philosophy, I hope would feel the appeal of my arguments with a greater force. The *Ātmā* is said to be *vibhu*, all-pervading. Reality is also declared to be *vibhukh prajāsu*.⁶ One can quote numerous texts like *īśāvāsyam idam sarvaṁ yatkinsina-jagatyām jagat*,⁷ etc. The *vibhu*, that which is all-pervading is necessarily immanent. But the notion of the *nitya siddha buddha mukta svabhāva sākṣin* may be interpreted in a transcendent sense. One may feel that the Pure Witness Self can only hold aloof from the agent in the mortal body. But he would be forgetting that the Witness Self is also described as the *kūṭastha*. The theory of the *kośas* would further induce our belief in the interpretation of immanence. The transcendent need not hide itself within the *ānāmaya*, *prāṇāmaya*, etc. sheaths. The transcendent may remain beyond and be veiled by *māyā*, but it would be inconsistent to describe it as engulfed in

4. Augustine—*De Civitate Dei*, viii 30.

5. Mackenzie, *op cit* 419.

6. *Yajurveda*, 32, 8.

7. *Ibid*, 40, 1.

avidyā, etc. Further, I may mention that the famous verse about 'the two birds upon a tree', etc (*Dvā suparnā sayujā sakhūyā samānam vrksam parisusvajāte* ⁸ etc.) which is supposed to be the basis of the notion of the Witness Self describes the relation between the 'akin friends' * as that of *sayujā*. This is *vyūpyavyūpikabhūvena samyuktāh*. Lastly, I may quote from Sir S. Radhakrishnan : "the true infinite self is not the self which is simply not finite. It is none of the limited things, but yet the basis of all of them. It is the universal self, which is immanent as well as transcendent." ⁹

It is a well-known fact that the recognition of immanence often leads to mysticism.¹⁰ Mysticism of course is not appreciated by the advocates of Rationalism, or the scholars of Logic. Their prejudice against a possible implication however should not go to the length of eliminating an actual central fact of every full-blooded human experience. Positive Psychology has since long been fighting shy of the nature and implications of the Ego. Modern Gestalt-psychology however is bold enough to maintain that "we have to transcend the environment and must include the Ego in a complete description".¹¹ While discussing Ziegarnik's experiments on the relative recall value of incomplete tasks, Koffka comments, "Over and above the relatively temporary sub-system which they investigated, they led us straight on to a permanent sub-system, the Self, whose tensions are much greater than

8. *Rigveda*, i, 164, 20. Quoted by Dayananda Saraswati in *Satyārtha Prakāśa*,—*Satabdi Samakurāṇa*, 1925, i 322.

* Sir S. Radhakrishnan,—*Indian Philosophy*, 1929, i, 205.

9. Radhakrishnan, Sir S.—*Indian Philosophy*, 1929, i, 157.

10. —*op cit.*, 236.

11. Koffka,—*Principles of Gestalt psychology*, 1935, 217.

those of the other sub-systems".¹² Pointing to the complexity of the Ego he continues, "One principle of organisation is the surface depth organization. The Ego has a core, the Self, and enveloping this core, in various communications with it and each other are other sub-systems, etc". We shall leave Koffka to discuss the other principles of organisation about the release or increase of tensions and stresses in the light of modern experimental research. But now we hope we will be permitted to conclude that the Philosophical 'I' is immanent in every Psychological "me". Further, whatever limitations our 'manifest' behaviour might indicate, we have every reason to believe that the immanent thing-in-itself also forms a part, albeit a 'silent' part of the total Ego-object organisation.¹³ I am inclined to think that the concept of the transcendent object is ultimately based upon the common experience of the immanent in every perception. When the individual finds that the real immanent 'I' is in every experience, then there arises in him a felt realisation of the fact that the *real I* must transcend *each* experience. Hence the transcendent notions of the subject, object, or reality may be considered as *projections* of the experience of the immanent in the perceptions of the subject, or object.

Lastly, it has been said: *Brahmavid brahmaiva bhavati*.¹⁴ I submit it is easier to agree to the above identification on the basis of the knowledge of the immanent reality, than otherwise. Because of the above reasons I hold that we should lay an emphasis upon the fact of Reality as immanent, and this emphasis should be at least as great, if not greater, than that put upon the notion of Reality as Transcendent.

12. —*op cit.*, 341-342.

13. —*op cit.*, 357 f.

14. Radha Krishnan, Sir S.—*op cit.*, 223.

Yogavasistha and Bhagawadgita

By

PRAHLAD C. DIVANJI M. A.,

There are certain striking points of resemblance and contrast between the Yogavāsistha and the Bhagwadgītā which call for a detailed comparison and contrast of the two works.

Both of them claim to be treatises on the science of Yoga. The medium of instruction in the former is a scion of the solar race of Ksatriyas and in the latter one of the lunar race thereof. The occasion for the exposition is almost the same in both, in the former, Rama being overpowered by a feeling of detachment towards all worldly pursuits and thus unable to accompany Viśvāmitra to his hermitage and protect his sacrifice from attacks by Rākṣasas and Arjuna by one of despondancy at the prospect of having to fight his own kith and kin on the battle field of Kurukṣetra. At the end of the teaching each becomes consoled and expresses his readiness to do his master's bidding. While expounding their doctrine both take stock of all the current theories as to the topics discussed therein, and agree in teaching that the right attitude towards the struggles of life is that of facing them in a spirit of detachment. Both the works are poetical compositions mostly in the Śloka metre, the monotony whereof is occasionally relieved by the employment of other popular metres. There are many identical quarter, half and complete stanzas in the two works. The Yogavāsistha also contains an Arjunopākhyāna narrated by Vasiṣṭha to Rama in a prophetic vein and Sargas 52 to 58 of the first half of the Nirvāṇa Prakaraṇa in which this has been done in order to illustrate the Asanīśakti-Yoga, contains the largest number of quarter, half and complete stanzas common to the two works.

As on the one hand there are the points of resemblance so on the other there are points of contrast too between the two works. Thus while the author of the Bhagwadgītā takes the universe as it appears to an ordinary individual and tries to explain how it has evolved in order to make the basic doctrine of monism acceptable to him, that of the Yogavāsistha repeatedly strives to impress upon the reader's mind the view that the universe as it appears does not in fact exist, that it is only an appearance due to the unsteadiness of the mind and will cease to appear when the mind regains its equilibrium, that the mind too is a modification of the pure Caitanya coming into existence without affecting its purity and that the Caitanya which is the same everywhere including even the so called inert substances is the only reality. Similarly while the former lays special emphasis on the efficacy of singular devotion to God in the form of Vāsudeva-Kṛṣṇa, though he is not averse to the path of knowledge, the latter attaches more importance to the development of one's intellect by a special human effort made on the Sāstric lines, though not disapproving of the path of devotion. It is also observable that while there are only one or two metres of 11 or 12 syllables in a line besides the Anuṣṭubh employed in the Gītā at irregular intervals, there are one or more stanzas having 14, 17, 19 and even 21 syllables in a line at the end of each Sarga and several whole or parts of Sargas in stanzas of varying lengths in the Yogavāsistha, that while the author of the former uses a simile here and a metaphor there only to make his meaning clear, that of the latter uses too many figures of speech as if with a deliberate view to make the work artistic, that while the language of the former is simple and natural throughout, that of the latter grows at places crooked and artificial and that while the former contains only one description of the mental state of an aspirant in the first Adhyāya and one vision of the Kālaswarūpa in the eleventh Adhyāya, the latter is replete

with descriptions of the states of the human mind from the stage of total ignorance to that of complete wisdom and betrays a deliberate attempt on the part of the author to attract readers towards it by digressing to describe in details the operations in battles, the afflicted conditions of lovers, and the beauties of the dawn, night, seasons, mountains, rivers, forests, trees etc.

The points of resemblance leave no doubt as to one of the two works having been indebted to the other for them as there is no possibility of a common source from which both could have borrowed ideas, expressions and stanzas. The questions for consideration that arise therefore are :—

1. Which is the earlier of the two works ?
2. How can the points of contrast be reconciled with those of resemblance ?

As for the first, there is enough evidence for the conclusion that the *Gītā* is the earlier work and must have supplied the plan, expressions and stanzas above referred to to the author of the *Yogavasiṣṭha* who seeing that they were popular may have made use of them. This may seem inconsistent with the tradition and the claim of the work to be a composition of sage Vālmiki of the age of Rāmacandra but there is a lot of evidence for the conviction that the work which has come down to us is not the work of that sage or at least not it in its undiluted form. As for the other question, the style and diction of that work present a close resemblance to the *Bhāgawata Purāṇa* in its present form which has some other features also in common with it. That work may be extant in the 5th century A. D. as claimed by Mr. Krishnamurti Sarma of the Annamalai University but it must not have received its present form till the tenth century since when only it obtained wide currency. The *Yogavāsiṣṭha* in its present form is also a work of the same time as shown by me in the papers on "The Date and Place of origin of the Yoga-

vasistha" read before the seventh session of the All-India Oriental Conference held at Baroda in December 1933. The then reviser of that work, whoever he was, must have borrowed the plan etc. from the Bhagwadgītā and the style and diction from the Bhāgawata Purāṇa—another popular work of the Vaiṣṇavas—and having combined the two gave it its present shape.

By that time the Buddhist logicians had made great headway in logic and Gauḍapāda having adopted most of the line of reasoning of the Mādhyamikas had propounded in Ajātivāda of which the main doctrine of the Yogavāsistha is only an enlarged edition prepared with the help of the doctrine of the Kāśmir Śaivites. As for the worship of Vāsudeva-Kṛṣṇa there are several episodes in the Yogavāsistha illustrating the doctrine of grace of Viṣṇu and in the Arjunopākhyāna and other places Śrī Kṛṣṇa has been recognized as an Avatara of Nārāyaṇa or Viṣṇu or Hari and as for the preponderance given to individual effort, that is in consonance with the Ajātivāda which is the central pivot round which the whole work turns.

Idealism in Practice

By

SARBESHWAR BANERJEE.

Despite the revival of popular or New Realism¹ and Pragmatism, Idealism, especially of the post-Kantian type, still holds the field in modern philosophy. This suggests at once some intrinsic merit as well as a drawback in it. I will rather choose to dwell on the latter.

The drawback, I humbly suggest, lies in this that the bearing of the Idealist's theory on the practical side of life has not been sufficiently stressed or brought into relief. It is true that Kant was for vigorous morality despite his Idealism. But it is very difficult to prove that he *deduced* it from his Idealism. The link between the thing-in-itself, especially when the unknowability of its nature is frankly made known and the question 'What ought I to do and what should I hope for' is not clearly discernible. With Sankara's Idealism, as is well known, practical morality definitely recedes in the background. With the Indians at least, this has been responsible for the association always of *a-morality* with any theory of Idealism².

This again is attributable to the stressing of the *negative* side of Idealism--the Vedantic Maya, Spencer's Unknowable, or Kant's assertion of our inability to know the true nature of the thing-in-itself, for examples. It is worthwhile to stress

1. As mentioned in S. J. Adityanath's address in the 10th Indian Philosophical Congress.

2. This will be found elaborately discussed in the writer's recently published book, "*My Ideas and Ideals*" (S. Chand & Co, Chandni Chawk, Delhi).

the *positive* side of Idealism also, the gnosticism behind it, the knowledge which intuits that nothing definite can be known of the Thing-in-itself or a perfectly rounded off concept made of it.

Critical Monism, the culmination of Idealism, is not simply negative. Kant did *not* deny the thing-in-itself although he could not describe its nature. The *Vadanti* has Sarbam Khalwidam Brahma as against its dictum, Brahma Satyam Jaganmithya. In fact what does Idealism actually negative? It negatives only the evil, the disvalues of the world. It does not negative the consciousness which it makes identical with the whole Reality. It does not negative goodness and beauty which it asserts, are the finer reflections of the Reality in life. The entire tenth chapter of the *Gita* is a stress on this. Goodness and beauty—in the ethical and not merely aesthetic sense of the terms—are the *forms*, the *signs* of the Reality as it were, just as the ring or the necklace are the forms of gold or smoke is the predicate of fire. All these are given to us by Idealism. Only evil it sets at naught. And who will demur at this? It only does methodically what is done in a fortuitous manner by religion and theism. For instance, when our son dies and we ascribe it to the will of God and are sustained by that faith, we unconsciously give out that evil is not a real factor and should not overwhelm us like the false nightmare. When we prepare ourselves to lay down our lives if need be, say for the country's cause, we give out that the world of subjection to us is nothing (*Jaganmithya*) and the good of the nation is *the* thing. As goodness is the nearest approach to Reality in embodied existence, in such cases Reality becomes practical and not merely academic. We are Idealists each one of us. Nay, the nearer the approach to Idealism, the greater will be our significance in life. Idealism is 'real' enough, pragmatic enough to preclude us from being tempted by any other realism or pragmatism. If

Monism is the culmination of Idealism, I should think it not merely an academic proposition, but a factor which constrains upon us in every walk of life which Mazzini thought was alone capable of solving the great social questions of the day, as when he said,

The dualism of your dogma transferred into your moral code, generated that antagonism between earth and heaven, matter and spirit, body and soul, which, no matter to what grade of the doctrine you belong, essentially narrowed your conception of the unity of life, and of its mission... rendering it impossible that the great social questions of the day should be solved through the help of your religion.

("From the Council to God").

What great a gain to have these dualisms settled once for all ! The summit of the mountain we have called the spirit or value, the base the matter or reality. The point of the knife-blade we have called goodness or virtue, the blunt side sin or evil. The water in the kettle on the oven we called the body or coarseness or instinct, the steam the soul, fineness or bliss. But we have never thought if we could get the summit, the point or the steam all for themselves if there were no base, blade or water respectively : whether the whole elephant was not something else than what the 'six learned but blind men of Hindostan' felt. If we felt otherwise—which means our adopting the great truth of Idealism—we shall be able to "solve the great social questions of the day" for we shall agree with Nietzsche that "man should become better and better" and that "when life is on the ascending line, Instinct is the same as happiness"; we shall not be torn between these thoughts, "why did I not perform good acts ?" "why not

3. For a fuller treatment of this theme I shall refer the readers to my work "*My Ideas and Ideals*".

refrain from bad ones" (Etam ha bab na tapati, Kimaham sadhu nakarabam, Kimaham papamakarabamiti—Taittiriya) which means our philosophy getting mingled and at one with Life and no longer remaining a tantalising pursuit of the unknown. What is more 'real' and pragmatic then what this Idealism offers ?

Shanti Devi Further Investigated.

By

Dr. INDRA SEN

Last year I had reported to the Congress the case of Shanti Devi, the girl who was alleged to possess memories of her previous life. The discussion that has followed the paper had given me a few useful ideas. During about the year that has elapsed since then some further data have been collected, which, I desire, may also be examined by this learned gathering and, I am sure, I will once again get a few helpful suggestions.

A continual watch over the developments of the girl's behaviour could not be kept. That was obviously not possible for one who also had duties at a college. I therefore had to remain content with what I could get of her from the reports of some friends, who live near to the girl and had been requested to remain watchful in regard to any developments that she might present. But I have also personally seen her a few times during this time. There is one thing that requires to be observed in regard to her general behaviour. For some time she has been assuming airs to the effect that she can foretell the future. Some speculators of the town have been going to her to inquire about the success or failure of a business. This is obviously an unfortunate development. Apart from this, she is quite normal. She attends school and is apparently not so anxious about going to Muttra as she used to be before she was taken there for the first time in November last year.

But she had also been subjected to two tests and the fresh evidence that was thus obtained is just the thing that has now to be examined. In April last she had been taken to Muttra and Brindaban a second time and her memory was tested on some new points. And then in June last the cooperation of a hypnotist had been secured, who attempted to get her recol

lections of former life in a hypnotic state. Fairly complete reports were prepared of both these tests, and I will now simply read certain portions from them.

Portions from the two Reports.

During the last year, while studying Shanti Devi, I also came to know of a number of other similar cases and four of them I did myself more or less inquire into. A brief statement of these four cases will be of some interest.

(1) It is the case of a farmer's daughter, about 8 years of age living in a small village with one pacca house only, in the Pataudi State. I had gone there to acquaint myself with the case. She is awfully shy girl. She would not, in fact, look up. However with the help of a resident of that place we managed to get replies to some questions.

None of the statements of the girl have been put to a test of verification. In fact it is exceedingly difficult to locate her former village as the information given by her is very inadequate. But what is interesting about her is that she has been brought up in a very simple environment, where publicity is no factor. Even in that village, I found on enquiring, that most of the people did not know of the extra-ordinary things that she talked about. A tutoring was out of the question and statements, though not verified, were still spontaneous and in substance the same even when called forth by different questions.

(2) This is again a girl—the daughter of a lawyer friend of mine, whom I have known for over ten years. Once, when the girl in question was about four years old, the whole family went to Sonna, the place of a sulphur spring near Gurgaon, perhaps for a bath. At one time in the day the girl said to her mother that she wanted to ease herself. The mother took her to a place at the back of the temple that stands there for the same. While she was going to sit down there to ease herself,

she cried out "Mummy, I have lived before." The mother felt naturally confused by this statement of her daughter, whom she knew, she was bringing there for the first time and therefore asked "What do you mean?" The daughter promptly replied, "Mummy, I lived here when I was an old woman." "What did you do here then?" was the next question. "There used to be a panditji too. And we would take a 'divo' and do like this". "This" referred to the movement of the hands involved in offering incense when performing 'Arti', which she made to convey her meaning. "And what happened then"? "Oh, the Pandit died. Many people came from the village, who took him away and put him into fire. And then I cried out 'hai Panditji, Hai Panditji.'"

This girl is now about 8 years old. But I learnt of the above facts only last year in connection with Shanti Devi's case. This incident of the girl's life had remained confined to a few people including Prof. Dharmendra Nath, Meerut College. After returning to Delhi where they then lived she continued to remember occasionally for about six months, the things referred to in the statements that she made at Sonu. But before she went there she never said anything that could suggest that she had any unknown recollections.

(3) This is the case of a boy now about 13 years old. At the age of about 8 years, he once fell ill, and in a state of high fever, he said, I am told, something like this "My wife is in Gurgaon, call her immediately". She was then telegraphically called. And it is said that after meeting his wife of the former incarnation he soon got well. He had at that time, told a few things about his previous life, which are reported to have been found correct. This was a striking case but it never got to the press. The boy is now reading in a local school, and his father exercises a strict control that nobody approaches the boy with a view to ask any question regarding his former life. The father told me that, that had on several occasions in the

past made him exceedingly sad. He had even developed fever and lain in bed for several days. There are several people in Delhi, who know this case personally. My own information is, however, chiefly obtained from a Post-graduate student of ours who was a neighbour to the boy, when in his illness his wife was first called for from Gurgaon.

(4) This is once again a girl—a daughter of a school master of Delhi. The girl is now about 15 years of age and is reading in the Matriculation class and has no recollection of even what she said at one time. I inquired about the facts of the case from the parents themselves. They said that at one time when they were going in a train to—they were most surprised to hear from their daughter as the train went past a town with a conspicuous red building, "I used to live in this house (or perhaps a house like this)" "With whom did you live there," One of the parents asked, when the house was already out of sight.

"We were two sisters and we lived with our Nani". (mother's mother) She also said that it was a very big house and that they had a cow also and a few things more.

The parents say that she continued to remember occasionally her former house and her Nani for about six months. But since they had got frightened by this development of the girl, they discouraged her by all means when she repeated any of those things.

None of the things that she said were verified by anybody. And it occurred to me that it might be an illustration of the hypothesis of Individual psychology; inferiority complex working out in a compensatory reaction. That a child, who lacked a big house and a cow here imagined to have them elsewhere. With this hypothesis in my mind I asked a few questions, but the information thus elicited did not confirm the hypothesis.

I have been informed of a few more cases, but the facts of those cases have not yet been reliably ascertained.

We might now attempt to develop some sort of scientific opinion from these facts. These opinions are, in fact, of the nature of reflections, since the facts are not yet sufficient and strong enough to entitle us to a definite conclusion.

I will first mention a striking similarity that I have observed in the cases that I have personally inquired into. All the four children that I have above described had been rather unusually quiet until about 3 years of their age. After that too they have been on the whole less playful and social. They have all been awfully shy and very much closed up. They seem clearly to represent Dr. Jung's introvert type. This suggested to my mind the possibility of explaining these cases on the inferiority complex hypothesis of Adler or Jung's Psycho-analytic theory. But then there is one almost insurmountable difficulty. Now whereas it is possible to spin out a story for some subjective satisfaction, but an identification of objective facts, not known before, cannot be thus worked out.

Shanti, at least had identified a number of facts. Now either the identifications have deceived us in some subtle way or else these hypotheses are inadequate, so far as these cases are concerned.

I have also sought to ascertain if any of the various pathological forms of memory will fit in here. The one known by the name of "Deja vu" comes nearest to our phenomena. But again between the two there is a clear difference. In "Deja Vu" on the first presentation of an object, the subject feels that he has experienced it before. But Shanti Devi had told beforehand what she knew in Muttra and which she later on identified. Hence one cannot classify the phenomena presented by Shanti Devi with that of 'Deja Vu'. The case of the daughter of the lawyer gentlemen, above described, could be more easily thought of as a case of 'Deja Vu'. But there

too one important thing is lacking. In 'Deja Vu' cases the sense of false recognition arises more or less as a matter of habit, repeatedly in different situations; but in the girl referred to this does not seem to have been the case. For the understanding of Shanti Devi's case a circumstance which I came to know of much later seems to be of a special significance. It is learnt that Ch. Kedar Nath, Shanti Devi's husband in her former incarnation, used to come to Delhi occasionally to purchase cloth for his shop in Muntra, before this matter at all came to be known to the public. And he used to pass through Cheera Khana, the Mohalla, where Shanti lives and would sometimes sit at a Halwai's shop for milk. On one occasion it is reported that Shanti seeing him at the shop came home and told her mother "(He is there)". But none took any interest in that. This is reported to have happened.

Now the fact could have been, at least theoretically, the starting point of the story. It might be thought that Shanti had imagined something which found a fixation point in that occasional visitor to the Mohalla. Later through the cooperation of some favourable circumstances further details of the story might have been built up. But, though in the fact of Ch. Kadar Nath's passing through Shanti's Mohalla one finds good starting point for the elaboration of the story, yet, so far I have not succeeded in discovering further steps how the entire drama might have been worked up.

Last year I had more or less reported the case. This time a better knowledge of Shanti's case and a few other cases of the same type encouraged me to offer some sort of considerations, out of which or with the help of which in course of time, some scientific opinion might be developed.

II

St. Nihal Singh, the well-known International Journalist, having come to know about Shanti Devi of Cheera-Khana Delhi, who is alleged to report from her former life, expressed to L. Desh Bandhu the desire to see something fresh and original of the girl's behaviour for himself. Accordingly, at his suggestion, a second trip to Muttra, more particularly to Brindaban, where she had not been taken before was planned. The number of persons who accompanied the girl this time was very small: St. Nihal Singh, Mrs. St. Nihal Singh, Pt. Neki Ram Sharma, L. Rang Bahadur, the father of the girl and myself. Further the idea of the visit was kept strictly confidential. The actual programme of action was to be determined by St. Nihal Singh, who wanted to test the thing in his own way.

On the morning of the 2nd of April, St. Nihal Singh, Mrs. St. Nihal Singh and myself left for Muttra by car and Pt. Neki Ram Sharma, L. Rang Bahadur, and the girl by train. The car reached Muttra earlier and therefore we waited for the train at the station. Meantime we had fixed upon our first objective. The Chauba relations of Shanti Devi's previous life own a villa sort of thing, called by them Bagichi outside the town at a distance of about 3 miles from their home. Here usually the male members and the children of the family come for bath, exercise, and prayer. During the day the cows of the homo are also kept at this place. Shanti Devi had not been taken to this place last time. St. Nihal Singh therefore approved of the idea of asking her to take us to the Bagichi. Amongst those who accompanied her I alone knew the place.

Now as we led the girl, her father and pandit-ji out of the station and stood about the tonga stand, St. Nihal Singh asked her if she would be able to take us to the Bagichi of which she sometimes talked in Delhi. And she replied, 'Yes, I can.' "All right, let us then go there first." And we prepared

to start. Except Pandit-ji who was in a tonga, we were all in the car. The chauffeur was asked to follow the direction of Shanti's instructions.

At the first crossing she directed the car towards the town rather than the Bagichi. St. Nihal Singh asked me whether she had taken the right road. I said, no. At this stage I asked the girl, "Where are you taking us?" She replied, "I want to go home first." We tried to persuade her to take us to the Bagichi first, but she could not be prevailed upon, and therefore at last, St. Nihal Singh agreed to her following the way that she chose, but instead of going inside the Hologate, where she desired to go, we went to a Hotel which is on the Holi Gate road, but about half a mile away from the gate outside. After having taken our food we once again started and asked the girl to take us to Bagichi. But she insisted on going home first. We were afraid of going to the town, as that would have inevitably raised a crowd, which would have followed us wherever we might have gone in Muttra. We gave her a bait also. We told her "Take us to the Bagichi first then we would certainly take you home." She was now getting ever more restless and would not listen to our requests and persuasions.

But we, however wanted to see her reaction to the Bagichi and, therefore, proposed to St. Nihal Singh that I might direct the car to the road that leads to the Bagichi..... Placed on the road that she must have followed for the place, she might lead us to the destination. St. Nihal Singh approved of the idea and we drove to the right road. But she was all the time protesting that she wanted to go inside the Holi Gate to her home. She did not recognise the road nor anything of the surroundings. On the way to the Bagichi there is a mosque in red stone that strikes conspicuously any passerby. We asked her if she knew that mosque. She did not.

I next proposed to St. Nihal Singh that we might now proceed to the Bagichi itself and see her reaction to the actual

site. She had failed to lead us to the place, though it must also be remembered that we had failed to secure her attention for the task.

At last, our car reached the place and stood on the road, in front of the Bagichi. I asked her, "Do you know this place?" She said, 'She had been brought out to some unknown place and that we must go back to the town.'

I next proposed that we must get out of the car and walk about on the road, so that the girl got a fuller view of the surroundings. But as we got down, Shanti Devi ran in the direction that we had come from, saying that she was going home. We had all been struck by the intense desire to go home that she had displayed since she arrived in Muttra.

Just then I saw that the father-in-law of the alleged former incarnation of Shanti Devi was in the Bagichi. We decided to call him out. He came down and stood in front of St. Nihal Singh. The girl who had run away about 200 yards was also fetched. Now as she came back and was within a distance of 10 to 15 yards from us, she looked a little baffled perhaps to see amongst us a man, who was bare-footed and had just a loin-cloth on. On coming nearer her expression clearly changed. She looked into the face of the man, bowed low and touched his feet in a clearly recognisable reverential feeling. St. Nihal Singh asked, "Who is he?" "Father-in-law. The gentleman, who also was apparently moved, picked her up and held her in his arms for a few minutes. While we all stood astonished watching that scene of tender feeling, we were also struck by the change that had taken place in the general mental frame of the girl. She had been for now a couple of hours awfully restless persistently asking us to take her home. Just in that situation uptil a little while ago she was actually angry that she had been brought to some unknown place away from her home. But on seeing that gentleman almost in a moment she looked so quiet and

pleased. It is very relevant to observe here that she met this gentleman in the situation that she was strongly complaining of. She obviously never expected to meet any one of her people there.

Now when she was quiet and satisfied, we asked her, "Can you tell what place is this?" She glanced round and quietly replied "This is that Bagichi."

We now turned towards the Bagichi and as we were approaching it, one of us asked, "Can you tell us anything about the Bagichi?" But instead of saying something in advance she walked a little more quickly apparently wanting to show us the things. We ascended a few steps and we were on the floor of the Bagichi. Standing just at the top of the steps, one sees the main block of rooms in front of him, on the left there is a small room standing all alone. Now as she came up she turned towards the left and went straight into the room. On reaching, the first thing she said was "I have lived in this room, and there" pointing to one corner "I used to cook." She looked up and pointing to the upper portion of the walls said, "Here there used to be pictures then, and they were ten in number." It may be here stated that inside the room besides the girl there were not more than 4 persons (St. Nihal Singh, myself and two more). The remaining who were about 6 or 7 stood outside in the compound. Amongst these besides the father-in-law there were 2 or 3 other chaubas who are *Birulari* relations to the above. St. Nihal Singh put to her here a series of questions to test the validity particularly of the former statement. He asked, "When did you live here? How long did you live here? Were you well or ill then?" To all these she gave replies which on the whole tallied with what the Chaubas had related to us. The Chaubas told us that when she had lost her leg and could no longer stand erect she was ill for several months. At that time she had been brought there for a change. With

regard to the number of the pictures the Chaubas said that they were not sure that it was ten, otherwise they said that her statements were correct. Having known from Chauba Mahadeva (the father-in-law) that she was a cripple when Shanti Devi lived here in her alleged former incarnation St. Nihal Singh tried to find out if she had any memory of that incapacity of hers. He asked "Were you well or ill when you were here?" "I was not well then", "What was the trouble?" "I used to get fever". "But you could go out of the room and walk about in the compound?" "No, no," came the proper reply. "I having lost my leg because of the cold I caught in Haridwar for taking 101 Parikramas of a temple in water, I could only creep while sitting". And when at last this reply came up we were all naturally much surprised.

It may be mentioned that in the above investigation as had been originally intended and planned, the girl was with St. Nihal Singh. The Chaubas had been requested, not to speak unless consulted. Now while the girl made a statement and while St. Nihal Singh kept her busy I would take a Chauba apart and asked him to give what he knew of the actual happenings. Having known from the Chauba, I would return and report briefly in English to St. Nihal Singh, causing as little distraction to the girl as was possible.

When the girl had nothing more to relate about that room and we had nothing more to inquire about it, we proceeded to the main building of the Bagichi. Now one of us inquired, "Well, what can you tell us about this part of the Bagichi?". About the middle of the main block on the front, she stopped and placed her hand at a point on the wall and said, "About here there used to be a ring, to which the cow was tied, but then we never had sun there. It remained shady the whole day and now I find sun here." She looked perplexed as she said this. Beyond that she had nothing more to tell us about the

Bagichi. She went round practically all over, but nothing seemed to awaken any other definite recollection.

To verify the above statement of the girl, I took a Chauba spart and asked him whether it was correct. This Chauba it may be mentioned, is a relation of Ch. Kedar Nath, who is in the habit of coming to the Bagichi : He seemed to know definitely the matters and circumstances that Shanti Devi was talking about. He took me and there were 2 or 3 more who followed us, to the back of the main building and stopping at a place about the middle of the entire structure said, "Here the cow used to be tied then even now it is tied here. And then (pointing to a place about 10 feet to the east of the above point) there were trees which gave shade in the forenoon and in the afternoon the wall gave protection from the sun. These trees were cut down sometime back. Until then no doubt this place remained shady throughout the day." We could see that there must have been trees over there as the stumps were still intact. We could also see that the place is at present used for the cow and we could as well be satisfied that with trees there it must have remained shady throughout the day.

It is here interesting to observe that the recollections of Shanti Devi involve an obvious confusion. She had referred to a point in the front whereas, in fact it was on the back. But she had correctly remembered that the point is about the middle of the entire length of the building. Further her statements that the place was used for tying the cow and that it remained shady throughout the day were correct.

The inquiry at the Bagichi was finished and we now prepared to go ahead with our things. For about half an hour or so Shanti Devi had forgotten about her home in Muttra. She had quietly gone about seeing the Bagichi and relating things about it. We had promised to take her home and therefore as we got back in the car we told her that she could direct

the driver to take us to her home. She directed correctly until we reached about the Municipal toll office, where she ought to have turned to the right but instead went straight past that way. But she had hardly gone about a furlong when she stopped the car and asked the driver to turn back. Now she came to the right road and directed on the whole correctly towards the Holi Gate. But at one or two places on the way she seemed to be in doubt. She did not seem to recognise the surroundings, perhaps they had actually changed since her Muttra time. We were pressed for time, therefore we could not permit her to experiment for her way, when she once fell into a serious doubt. It may be stated that this way to the Holi Gate was different from the one she had followed from the station to the gate before. When the gate emerged into view, we could see that she felt at home in the situation. Once again she actively resumed charge of the direction of the car we had now entered into the town and were going on the main Bazar of Muttra. We soon discovered that some people recognised the girl and were whispering to each other that Shanti Devi had once again come to Muttra. At last at one place in front of a lane, Shanti cried out to the driver to stop the car. But by the time the car stopped we had already reached the next lane. St. Nihal Singh asked "Shall we stop here?" Shanti looked out trying to recognise definitely and said "No, we must go back." She had correctly identified once again the lane that leads to the home of the Chaubas. Now the people began to gather and we had already covered 200 yards on the lane, when we had a crowd with us, which lengthened out into a procession behind us. Free movement was no longer possible. Men, women and children came running out of their houses as we went along and made the crowd ever worse for us. The expression and the thought of these people so far as I could read, seemed to be "Here is that Shanti Devi again." All through St. Nihal Singh was with

the girl. A crowd like this would make the selection of the right way more difficult. It not only shuts off from view the recognition marks of the turning points but more than that because of the strong emotion that it spreads it distracts. All the same, Shanti Devi correctly led the way through many lanes and by-lanes to her home of alleged former life.

As we entered the house, we closed the entrance door behind us, to prevent the crowd from following us even there. All the same good many people managed to get in. Here she showed to St. Nihal Singh and Mrs. St. Nihal Singh the well of the house, the room she used to live in and the place where she had kept her money and recognised the relations that she had met on her former visit to Muttra. This part of the drama was a repetition of what had been done on the occasion when L. Desh Bandhu and others had brought her there.

We had not informed any of the Chaubas that we were coming. Therefore they had been surprised by our visit. Ch. Kedar Nath the husband of Shanti Devi's alleged former incarnation and his son from this wife—Naunit Lal—also came running from the shop to the home.

We had now fulfilled our promise with Shanti Devi ; she had been taken to her house and met her people. We therefore now wanted to go ahead. But she still wanted to go to the house of her father of her former incarnation. The crowd had caused us such an annoyance, that we wanted to get out of it as soon as possible and therefore we came back to the car and proceeded to Brindaban. Naunit had been with us for sometime. When we proposed to Shanti that we might now proceed to Brindaban, she requested St. Nihal Singh (pointing to Naunit) that he might be taken along with St. Nihal Singh readily agreed.

And at last when we could drive out of the crowd we heaved a real sigh of relief. When we were quite within half a mile of Brindaban, I Asked Shanti "What are you going

to show to Mem Sahib, (Mrs. St. Nihal Singh) here?" "Sethji's temple and Behariji's temple." "And what more?" But she had nothing more to add. "Where shall we go first?" I further asked. "To Sethji's temple" she replied. "All right, then direct the driver to take us there" she was told.

Soon after entering into Brindaban, we saw a temple in red stone standing conspicuously on our left. "What temple is this?" One of us asked. She did not reply. "Is It Sethji's temple?" "No." All this time she was looking out of the car closely observing the surroundings. At last she stopped the car and pointing to a gate on the right said "This is Sethji's temple." But a question, 'Is it that temple or so,' made her waver. She looked a little indefinite, however she led us in. We wanted to have in advance a description of the temple and therefore one of us asked her "What can you tell us about the temple?" "It is a big temple." "Any thing more?" She kept quiet. It may here be mentioned that none of us except Pt. Neki Ram Sharma knew any thing about this temple and the other one to which we later went. So without knowing that there is a tank in Sethji's temple I asked her, "Is there any tank in it?" To this she did not give any definite reply.

At last we came to the gate of the inner compound within which the idols are kept. We now sat on the wooden cots kept on either side of the gate and began to elicit whatever information she might have to give by way of a description of the things and structures within that compound. Sitting there one could see the central temple room, and about 10 feet of the lower part of the golden pillar, that stands in front of it. Pt. Neki Ram Sharma put her here a series of questions. "Where are the holy idols kept?" Pointing to the big room that we could see from there she said 'In that room and also in the rooms that are round about it' Now all round this central room there is a passage for parikrama 'the religious duty of going round the gods installed

in a temple.) And practically all along this passage, there is a line of small rooms in which too gods are installed. The passage and the rooms that run along it were visible to us and therefore the reply struck us a little. However this kind of arrangement is on the whole, quite common in temples and therefore the idea might have been an inference and not a recollection. Another question that Pt. Nekirām asked was, "You see this brass pillar (he had called it brass instead of gold intentionally) how high is it?" To this she sharply replied? "No, no, this is of gold. It is very high." In order to know if she had any definite idea of Behariji's temple, Panditji asked, "Can you say, what is characteristic of Behariji's temple?" "The flooring there is all in red and white and then its pillars are like a snake" (she also described them by a wavy movement of hand). Panditji told us that the flooring is black and white but the pillars had been correctly described. This we later saw ourselves also. He also told us that Behari's temple is distinguished from all others in Brindaban by its spiral pillars.

We had now taken sufficient rest and there being nothing more to ask, went in to the central temple first and then round about it.

Having finished Sethi Ji's temple, we prepared to go to the other which the girl was to show us. While coming out of the last big gate here, we turned towards the stall there to look at the pictures and other fancy things that were displayed. Here Pandit Ji hit upon a valuable idea. He picked up an album, which contained pictures of many temples of Brindaban and Muttra, opened it out and asked "What things can you recognise here, Shanti?" She looked at them and passed over from one to the next indefinite as to the identity of the things, but when she came to the picture of Behariji's temple she readily identified it. Perhaps two more she identified, but we were then not interested in them. This identification

was one of the most striking things we saw of her in Brindaban.

"Will you now lead us to Behariji's temple?" "Yes I will." But we were rather pressed for time, therefore St. Nihal Singh suggested that we might go independently. But then we decided amongst ourselves to tell the girl that we would first go to some other temple. When we reached Behariji's temple, Shanti looked a little baffled; but still did not take long to say "This is Behariji's temple." Panditji suggested "No, to Behariji's temple we go next, this is some other temple on the way." This apparently confused her again, but as we reached nearer she emphatically reiterated "No no, this is that Bohari's temple."

This brought our inquiry to a close. Shanti has had only these two definite recollections of Brindaban and our time was also over.

III

DATE OF THE HYPNOTIC TEST...13th, April, 1936.

Time 8.30. P. M.

Persons present;—

1. Prof. Begg.
2. Prof. Jagdish Mitra....the Hypnotist.
3. Mr. Mahendra Singh Bedi B. A. LL. B. Vakil.
4. Two friends of the Hypnotist.
5. Dr. Indra Sen M. A. Ph. D.
6. L. Rang Bahadur...the girl's father.
7. The girl herself.

The Hypnotist began by telling the girl that he was going to show her a film. The girl was immediately won over by this suggestion and thus the first condition of the test was realised. They both sat on a mat and the Hypnotist handed over to the girl a rectangular frame with an oval blackish reflecting surface in the middle. She was told that she would find picture therein. She looked into the blackish oval place, holding the frame in her hand. The Hypnotist at this time made a few passes over her head, back to front. First of all, she was told that she would see an open ground. This she took a fairly long time to see. She had perhaps taken about 10 minutes before she began to report that she saw something in the glass piece. When she reported that she saw some open space, she was asked to order it to be swept. She then said, "Let this court be swept" (Yaha Jharu de do). Soon she reported that a sweeper appeared on the scene, who was sweeping the place. She was next told to order that a carpet be spread there. This too she immediately saw being done. Then a 'Chauki' came upon the carpet. And now she was to see Dharamraj seated on it. It took her some time before she saw Dharamraj there.

Hypnotist... "Ask Dharamraj to take you to the scene of your former life."

Girl... Take me to the scene of my former life.

(Mujhe mere pahle janam ki jagah le chalo.)

Hypnotist... Le gaya hai ?

Girl... Nahin.

(More passes.)

Hypnotist... Jor se, kaho.

Girl. ... (Says emphatically) Mujhe wahan le chalo.

Hypnotist. ... Le gaya hai ?

Girl. ... Han.

Hypnotist ... Kaya jagah hai ?

Girl. ... Yeh kaya jagah hai ?

Hypnotist. ... Kaho likha hua aye.

Girl. ... (Looks intently into the slide, but sees nothing there.)

Hypnotist... (gives more passes) Yahan kaun log hain.

Girl... Meri phuphia ssa ka larka, mera susar, aur pehle ki main, aur Jethani.

Hypnotist—In se puchho kaya jagah hai ? Kaho likha hua aye.

Girl——Yeh kaya jagah hai, likha hua aye.

Hypnotist... Repeats the passes, the girl the question and makes tremendous efforts to see something in the glass, but fails. (The effort that she made to see the thing at this stage was particularly striking.)

Girl..... (Quite by a start the reply came) Muttra gaon hai.

Hypnotist... Likha hua aya ?

Girl..... Nahin.

Hypnotist... Muttra (Mathura) gaon hai ?

Girl..... Nahin Mathura.

Hypnotist... Is larki ka kaya nam hai ?

Girl Lugdi Devi.

Hypnotist... Dharamraj ko kaha ki ise maike le jai.

Girl.....Ise maike le jao.

Hypnotist...Gai ?

Girl.....Ja rahi hai.

Hypnotist...Pahunch gai ?

Girl.....Chal rahi hai.

After sometime of herself says...pahunch gai.

Hypnotist...Apni man ko mili ?

Girl.....Han.

Hypnotist...Man ne pahchana ?

Girl.....Nahin.

(This sounds rather strange that a mother be unable to recognise her daughter, unless it be explained by reference to the recent experience of Shanti (not Ingdi) going to Muttra and calling a particular woman her previous mother, who of course must have failed to recognise Shanti as her Lugdi).....Comment of Prof. Begg.

Hypnotist... Dharamraj ko kaho wapis lejao. pahunch gai ?

Girl.....Nahin ja rahi hai.

Hypnotist.. Pahunch gai ?

Girl... . Chal rahi hai.

Pahunch gai.

Hypnotist...Yeh makan kaisa hai.

Girl.....Kalo kiwar hen.

Hypnotist...Aur.

Girl.....Safed diwar, or peete laksian.

Hypnotist...Lugdi ka kamra kaunsa hai,

Girl.....Like ke oopar.

Hypnotist...Wahan jao.

Is jagah ka kia nam hai aur in logoh ka kia nam hai ?

Girl.....Malum nahin.

Hypnotist...Kaho likha hua aye.

Girl.....Nahin torch ki roshni hai.

Hypnotist...Torch ki roshni hai, dekho tez ho gai.

Girl.....Han, ab tez ho gai. Likha hua bai magar Angrezi men.

Hypnotist...Kaho Hindi men aye.

Girl.....Hindi men aye.

Hypnotist...Aya ?

Girl.....Nahin.

Hypnotist...Phir kaho aye.

Girl.....Nahin Hindi men nahin aya.

Hypnotist.. Lugdi kitni bari hai ?

Girl.....Chaubis sal ki.

Hypnotist...Kamre men aur kon hai.

Girl.....Lugdi ka larka.

Hypnotist...Woh kitna bara hai ?

Girl.....Das sal ka,

(Lugdi, when she died, is reported to have been 24 years of age, and her child then was ten days old. It is ten years since she died. Her son, who is living must be ten years now, and not when Lugdi was 24. It might be due to the interference of a recent experience of Shanti, when she went to Muttra and saw the son ten years old).

Hypnotist. Yeh bachha kahan peela hua ?

Girl.....Haspatal men.

Hypnotist...Kis haspatal men.

Girl.....Agra ke haspatal men.

(Dr. Indra Sen tells me that after the sitting the Hypnotist told him that previous to the sitting he was not aware of the fact that the child had been born in a hospital. With due deference to the integrity of the Hypnotist, I must say that this question appears to me vital and pointed, and would have been difficult for a person to ask, who had no idea of the special circumstances of the child's birth. It is upon this

question that the rest of the setting depends and it might have been by chance, as the Hypnotist would have us believe.)

Hypnotist...Dharamraj ko kaho, haspatal me le jai.

Girls.....Haspatal men le chalo.

Hypnotist...Yahan kaun hai.

Girl.....Lugdi hai, charpai per lettee hui hai aur mere ab jaisi hai.

(That Lugdi of 24 years should look like Shanti of nine or ten does not sound consistent. Especially when Shanti had just seen Lugdi in her and declared by a look at her person...presumably that she was 24)

Hypnotist Lugdi kion lettee hai.

Girl.....Bimar hai.

Hypnotist...

(How she learns this is a problem, as in the sitting Shanti depends upon sight.)

Ab subah ho gai.

Hypnotist...Bachha kahan leta hai.

Girl..... Duere khatole par. Ab ek mem ai hai,
Lugdi ko dekhne dekh kar chali gai.
Ab Lugdi achchi hai.

Hypnotist...Ab kia waqt hai.

Girl...Ab subah phir ho gai. Sham ho gai. Bistar bichh rahe hain. Log so gai. Lugdi pehle se achchi hai. Ab phir subah ho gai.

Hypnotist...Ab Lugdi kaisi hai.

Girl...Bukhar Zeada ho gaya hai, berimem ai hi, aur khari hai, bachhabarabar ke khatole per leta hai, Lugdi usi tarha leti hai, (The Hypnotist here inquired whether the mother gave milk to the child but this was ignored by Shanti.) Phir subah ho gai Lugdi usi tarha hai. Rat ho gai, log so gai, lamp aya hai, Lugdi ko bukhari hai.

Hypnotist...Ab kia waqt hai.

Girl...Phir subah ho gai, ab mem ai hai, durrian bicheh rahi hain, phir rat ho gai. Ab subah ho gai do mard ae hain. Lugdi ko dehhne, ek to wohi larka hai. (Who can thi person be... Husband of Lugdi or the same son that was declared to be ten years old, but it is lying on the adjacent cot) aur ek us ka dost. Ab phir rat ho gai. Lugdi bohot bimari hai us ke patti bandh raho hain, mem kehtee hai yeh achchi ho jae gi. (How she could hear these words is not clear, as no sound but sight have so far been reported by Shanti). Phir subah ho gai. Lugdi bohot bimari hai us ko phal de rahe hain, almaree men se. Phir subah ho gai, Lugdi ko nehla rahe hai phir rat ho gai, Phir subah ho gai, Lugdi margai ab Lugdi charpai par se uthrahi hai.

Hypnotist...Lugdi uth rahi hai ya us ki atma, Sareer to mar gaya,

Girl...Han sareer to khatole par hai us ki atma uth rahi hai, Char admi peele langot bandhe khare hain, Unke singhasan or hadian bhi hain, Aur teen sadhu hain neeli, kali, aur safed labas men, (I must admit that this portion of what Lugdi said was not clearly audible to me.)

Ab Lugdi Bhagwan ji ke pas gai hai, us ke hath men parchi hai, woh Bhagwan ji ko woh parchi dikha rahi...Bure bure log ro rahe hain. ...door ...bohot door ...ro rahe hain,

Hypnotist...Bhagwanji kia ker rahe hain. Keh raho hain yeh tera akhri janam hai.

Girl.. Han.

Hypnotist...Ab Lugdi kia ker rahi hai.

Girl...Ab Lugdi sono chandi ke sidhe se uttar rahi hai raste men bohot hur hure admi hain.

Ab khula maidan agya Lugdi is per ht gay.

Hypnotist...Ab Lugdi ketni bari hai.

Girl · Chhati ho rahi hai, chhati si...bohut chhoti ho gai.

Ab phir subah ho gai.

Hypnotist...Ab Lugdi kahan hai.

Girl · Lugdi bohut chotti hai, chhote se bistar par letee
hai ek kamre men.

Hypnotist...Aur kon hai kamre men.

Girl... . Ek aurat betti hai, aur ek aur aurat hai.

Hypnotist...Lugdi kaisi hai.

Girl.....Mere jese hai (This sounds very strange, how a
very small Lugdi · could look like grown up Shanti).

Hypnotist...Yeh aurat kon hai.

Girl.....Molum nahin.

Hypnotist...Yeh jagah kia hai.

Girl : ...Patah nahin.

Hypnotist...Kia Delhi hai.

GirlMalum Nahi.

The sitting was then over.

N. B. Prof. Begg had been requested to take notes of the sitting. And on the basis of the same he afterwards prepared this report with his own comments.

Matrimonial Ethics.

BY

GIRDHAR GOPAL

Matrimony is a very common affair particularly in India. People get into it almost without any thinking yet its effects are diverse and important to all of us individually and collectively. The institution is not running happily and its adverse influences are apparent in the face of society. It is said, it is Reformation or Revolution period in India. A feverish activity is being witnessed to correct or convulse the existing institutions like state, society and education. But we sit tight unthinking over matrimony problem. There is no clear thinking of the very problem much less about its relations and effects on other vital problems of life and still much less an attempt to cogitate for any change if necessary. Yet one can express without any hesitation that the institution of matrimony on which depends the family life, happy or otherwise is not only one of the vital but the pivotal problem of human life. Greeks gave a prominent place to marriage and family institutions in their Political Economy. Indians raised almost the whole of their superstructure of human life on this foundation. But we have forgotten our past. Reformation, Re-construction, and Revolution are bound to fail if this pivotal problem is left unexamined and uncared for. And when others are taking an attitude of touch-it-not, some of us should apply our minds and present the problem in its true perspective and far-reaching bearings. Happy are the signs that philosophers are relating their science not to the human mind only but also to the human conduct, not only to academic abstractism but also to pressing problems. Philosophy the queen of

sciences should see its subjects fairly treated with respect to their influences for the betterment of human life nay life itself. Coordination and clarification of other sciences is the function of our science.

I confess I am not competent to do justice to the subject in its manifold aspects and over that incompetency supervenes the restriction of space. My purpose is the excitement of interest in the subject and not its full orientation which may be done by more mature minds...I only offer some of my observations for your consideration and criticism and not for your acceptance.

Firstly I may consider the elementary question, Is marriage necessary ? If it is regarded otherwise two alternatives present themselves, promiscuousness in the sexual relations and their complete absence. The first hardly needs a consideration much less a refutation. The second merits our thought. Gandhi maintains that marriage is not necessary and to the traditional argument of perpetuation of the God's creation he retorts that he holds no contract to Him (God). C. F. Andrews, on the other hand, makes it a necessary performance. Both are eminent opinions. And it is curious that Gandhi who enjoyed married life should come to conclude against it, and Andrews who is a bachelor should come in for it. Yet the contradiction is apparent and not real. Two are emphasising the two aspects of the problem. Gandhi is against marriage for it is commonly supposed, prominently, and necessarily to involve the idea of sexual satisfaction. Andrews is for it as he views the problem in its spiritual manifestation. This leads us to further enquiry as to the true definition of marriage. Is the sexual part a necessary part and a better part at that. God's creation must go on. The answer to this is simple. God's creation is going on in the animal and insect kingdoms where institution of marriage in general does not exist. Ants do not marry still they are successfully continuing

their species. Secondly, satisfaction of the sex instinct itself is considered to be the need of matrimony, I frankly confess, I fail to understand why in times of commercialised and legalised prostitution regulated and chartered on medical basis one should bear unnecessarily the responsibilities that marriage entails. If this is the correct explanation of marriage, marriage becomes a cheap license for licentiousness. Marriage as I view, is fusion or union of two souls for the general betterment of human life. I say for the general betterment. It is based on social and not on individual principle. The institution of marriage did not come to exist for sex satisfaction but for the satisfaction of the soul. Lust is the last part of love. Marriage in other words is the solution of eternal craving of the soul for permanent and private association of its complementary entity. Marriage is the highest science, which tells us how to live life by the law of love and the greatest art how to attain to the liveableness of life. Thus understood marriage is a spiritual necessity. Gandhi and Andrews will both agree to it. But unfortunately we youngmen take it as a peaceful passport for sensual pleasures, little thinking that it is a religious sacrament and a spiritual function. In all religions, religious sanction or approval is necessary for a matrimonial performance. It is indicative of its high estimation for something higher than the mere certification of sensual and sexual frivolities. Necessity being established every man should go in for marriage particularly in India. Yet I emphatically assert that if we do not go in with the proper ideal in view or the fulfilment of the ideal seems impracticable for certain objective or subjective circumstance, it is much better to ply the trade of life single handed. I say marriage is particularly necessary in India. In India, we have not the liberty or social sanction to associate intimately even otherwise with our complementary sex, which necessarily does not and ought not mean setting up sexual relations. This craving which is quite natural and

moral remains unsatisfied; and as natural when one set of emotions or instincts are blocked they do not die but only discharge their energy through some other channel, so the non-fulfilment of this craving whips the sexual activity in abundance. This is one of the explanations of sexual function coming into prominence. Yet society restricts our association for this very reason little thinking that the prescription instead of ameliorating, aggravates the disease. There is no way out of this vicious circle but that the ideologies of our youngmen with respect to matrimonial and sexual ethics should change, which the leaders of society should do through propaganda from the press and platform, by the aid of films and broadcasts. The primary question has been answered; ancillary questions remain. Whom we should marry, how we should marry, when we should marry, in what circumstances we should marry, and finally how we should conduct with our companion. I have taken nearly half the space allowed and will take them briefly.

The first point to be considered is whether we should marry whom we love or love whom we marry. Western thought is partial to the first and Indian to the second. It needs no telling that in India there are no opportunities for the first, yet if there be, what is the correct position? Philosophically judged, the Indian view requires a higher discipline. Love is the king of emotions and very hard to control, and it must be exceptionally strong character who would control it and not be controlled by it. Indian philosophy ever enjoins a rigorous course of strictly disciplined character in every department of human activity, much more rigorous for this ground whereon it has erected whole of its social building. It shows that soul is an independent entity which will not be cowed down by any circumstance external to itself however strong. But there is also social reason in favour of the Indian viewpoint. Marriage is not a personal affair; if it would have been so

where was the need of social sanction to it ? It is a social affair and its effects on society are many and serious. Society hence, does expect that marriage will not be contracted only on the personal considerations but social considerations will be given their due weightage. There can be circumstances where personal and social considerations point to different courses and the interest of the society may outweigh personal. Simple love theory will have to go out of place. The idea that matrimony is a personal and private affair must go. The second point for our notice is, what should be the equipment of our complementary. Health and character are the two primary requisites. Unfortunately both in general are not up to the mark in Indian girls. The causes of the poor health obviously are locked-up life, lack of physical culture, and after marriage sexual imprudence. By character I do not mean moral character only, with respect to it Indian girls can always raise their heads but I am not one of those who make a fetish of it; and if given this all is ruffraff. Character consists of other traits which are as much necessary as moral trait, and herein our girls sadly lack. They may be moral giants but spiritually and socially are weaklings. They possess character but not the force of character. They are not conscious of their strength: they lack courage and vitality; they live not life but drift. How the situation can be remedied ? Parents in general are not attentive at least sufficiently attentive to the girl's training and education. Some parents of higher status are, but they are in the wrong way. They think, giving their girls the modern education and sending them to colleges and universities is all they need do. Modern education in general and girls' modern education in India in particular is totally unrelated to their needs and destiny. If a corrective is not explored and used, long before waters will float over our heads. Girls of respectable families develop quaint ideas. They begin to flirt with life and their parents permit it in the wake of westernism.

Some members of higher services and some staff at the Imperial Secretariate tease and train their compeers in the way of their masters. The training becomes a false one; and the taught and teased want all the good qualities of an English lady at the same time losing their Indian virtues. Extremely unfortunate, that India should become an apish imitator of Occident. Parents must take lesson from times and give them the education which is really good and fits them for the life to come. They can do it with a little more attention. They should personally supervise and instruct their girls in morals and manners informed by the spirit of ancient Indian philosophy.

I come to the next question : when to marry. What is the proper age for marriage ? Indian view holds that we should not marry before twenty five and not later than fifty when Grihastha Ashram is to be left and Vanaprast to be adapted. This is very wholesome rule. The period between twenty five and forty years may be regarded as a marriageable period but physiological and psychological considerations point to the fact that it is better to marry on the right of thirty than in the wrong. Some educated youngmen unnecessarily postpone their marriages. Psychologically, marriage being a partnership requires reciprocal adaptations and mutual adjustments, which is only possible when we have not become hard in our habits and thoughts; otherwise harmony so much necessary for family's happiness will be jeopardised. Again phy-iologically, this is the time when the freshest yearning for the society and association of our complementary generates in ourselves and in the fulsomeness of our youth we are liable to go atangent. Moreover there should never be a greater difference than ten years between the partners and it is still better that the difference should proceed to the minimum. Physical equalities lead to psychological unities. Sarda Act is an insult to intelligent India. We must take lessons from

Mysore Government where the regulations regarding matrimonial alliances are quite reasonable and wholesome.

I take next the question : how to marry. Marriage by trustees or by parties themselves. There was a time in India when marriages were negotiated and contracted by the servant emissaries. They were then honest emissaries and as they began to mortgage their honesty for money the duty was snatched from them ; and since then parents have been discharging this duty. In recent times we are revolting against this also. Some young men steeped in western manners declare with emphasis that they have got a birthright to marry themselves. It cannot be said that the revolt is altogether unjustifiable. No doubt some parents have given offence. But the cry is outrunning its need. We have not only a birthright to marry but also to hang ourselves but our parents will not suffer us to do that, simply because if for no other reason than, that they have brought us forth. Catchphrases have a contagion. Yet some parents have been heard to say that they have a right to marry their children as they wish. This is also wrong. Firstly they have no right to marry much less as they wish. They have a duty to marry us and the duty has to be discharged consistent with its principle. In duty the interest of the other is to be considered and in right the interest of one's own self. Times when parents could physically legally murder us have long passed and spiritual murder is as much out of place as the former. Nobody will dispute their ripe experience and mature judgment if they exercise it in our interest with our consultation. It is quite futile for a beneficiary to cancel the trust if the trustees are functioning the trust in the beneficiary's interest and not in their own, simply because he has got the necessary capacity to function his trust and whereas he will lose riper counsels. Trustee theory still should hold the field only being reawakened by the alertness of the beneficiaries.

Next question for consideration is, in what circumstances to marry. This is an economic question. The idleness, a virtue in the bachelor becomes a vice with marriage, so says Stevenson. Man traditionally has been supposed to be the support of the family. Marriage is a spiritual comfort but without a material support it will not long stay, and may prove a spiritual distress. This is happening in many cases of youngmen presently. Here comes the conflict in the craving of the soul for an intimate associate and the material considerations. If we are not able to alter our material situation it is advisable to gather up our sentiments of love and affection and lock them with the key of patience ; because there is much truth in the Shavian saying that poverty is worse than crime. Yet too much emphasis on the material side is not the desideratum.

Lastly I come to the question : how we should conduct with our companion. Currently it is supposed in India that men enslave their counterparts. My own observations lead me to the reverse. Wives in general rule their husbands, however the fact be denied. Probably we due to long habit do not become conscious of our subservience ; and I will not grudge the husbands their obedience to their partners if it is in Ruskinian sense. Yet curiously the opinion prevails that the fair sex should take orders from the stronger sex ; and still more curiously the fair sex is revolting against their so called tutelage and putting up associations and organisations for its rights. One being slave thinks he is commander, the other real commander thinks that she is commanded. But the very notion of any partner's enslavement is foolish. We are not to enslave but to ennoble each other. We are peers. No counterpart is greater but every counterpart should think the other greater than itself because it has its value dependent on the other. Thus both are the greater and none the lesser. This philosophy of their mutual relations will impart a sublimity

and estheticism to their lives and fill them with sweet fragrance for the inhalation of the society. I have sufficiently taxed time, I close with a poetical quotation on marital ethics:—

"Is now your bride
The gift of heaven, and to your trust consigned ;
Honour her still, though not with passion blind ;
And in her virtue, though you watch, confide.
Be to her youth a comfort, guardian, guide,
In whose experience she may safety find ;
And whether sweet or bitter be assigned,
The joy with her as well as pain divide.
Yield not too much if reason disapprove ;
Nor too much force ; the partner of your life
Should neither victim be, nor tyrant prove.
Thus shall that rein, which often mars the bliss
Of wedlock scarce be felt ; and now your wife
Never in the husband shall the lover miss."

Philosophy And Religion.

By

J. K. DAJI.

Philosophy is search after truth for love of wisdom, religion is allegiance to truth which it calls God and personifies. The Sanskrit word for religion, viz. Dharma is defined in the Mahabharat :- "That which supports, that which holds together the peoples, that is Dharma". Religion, so understood, is a unifying power, and not a separative force. The word for religion in Zarthushtrianism and Islam, viz., Din is derived from Avesta "Daena" which means clear seeing or clear vision, i. e. undoubted immediate perception, and not mediate perception (sense perception), which is deceitful, since "Things are not in themselves as they appear to be". While religions stress right life, they do not overlook right thought, and the wedding of the two is necessary, since "Faults in the life breed errors in the brain. And these reciprocally those again". As a rule to which there are exceptions, philosophers overlook right living, some go the length of overlooking truth-speaking, with which truthfulness and righteousness ought to begin. A zealous student of philosophy and a co-delegate from Bombay at an Indian Philosophical Conference held at Poona asked for my 'best advice' to help him in his study of Philosophy. I advised him to make up his mind to speak the truth, to abstain from telling a lie. He would not do so, he wanted some practical advice. By practical advice he probably meant a list of books to read. In philosophy as well as in religion, and in school life as well as in College life, 'book-worms' are, as a rule "donkeys laden with books". They stuff their heads with "thoughts of other men", but fail to 'attend to their own' thoughts.

"Knowledge, a rude unprofitable mass,
 The mere material with which wisdom builds,
 Till smoothed and squared and fitted to its place,
 Does but encumber whom it seems to enrich.
 Knowledge is proud that he has learned so much,
 Wisdom is humble that he knows no more".

Plato says, "Knowledge of ignorance is the beginning of wisdom". In the absence of knowledge of ignorance, the history of philosophy and religion has been a history of fight for dogma. Herbert Spencer introduced 'knowledge of ignorance' in modern philosophy. He shows that absolute truth is unthinkable and surmises: "There is power behind the Universe".

Kant wedded religion to philosophy; he appended the "Critic of practical reason" elucidating 'moral law' to his "Critic of pure reason" elucidating the law of thought.

Previous to the advent of Darwin, modern philosophy was treading on slippery ground, one dogma followed and confuted another, to be followed and confuted by a third one. Idealism confuted dualism of 'the philosophy of common sense', the nihilism of Hume confuted the idealism of Berkeley, the agnosticism of Spencer confuted the nihilism of Hume. During the latter half of the last century, the mechanistic view of life and the Universe held almost undisputed sway. "According to Darwin, chance variation in species fortuitously occur, and of these variations, those which are most suited to their environments tend to survive and to reproduce themselves..." According to Lamarck, adaptation to environment is the determining factor in evolution. As environment changes, species put forth new developments to adapt themselves to it....."Now both these theories of evolution are in agreement as regards one essential point; both conceive the whole process of

evolution on mechanical lines; both find it unnecessary to postulate the existence of mind and purpose to explain how and why the process takes place. To Bergson is due the credit "of being the first to make a serious breach in that mechanistic view of life and Universe. He shows that some phenomena of insect, animal and vegetable life are inexplicable on such mechanistic principles." He points out "a very inferior organism is as well adapted as ours to the conditions of existence, judged by its success in maintaining life; why then does life, which has succeeded in adapting itself, go on complicating itself, and complicating itself more and more, and more dangerously? Why did not life stop wherever it was possible? Why has it gone on? Why indeed, unless it be that there is an impulse driving it to take ever greater and greater risks towards its goal of an ever-higher and higher efficiency?" This impulse which he calls 'elan vital' is the thrusting force behind evolution, and without it, it is impossible to explain how and why evolution should take place at all. "Biology therefore supplies us with a series of facts, which can only be explained on the assumption that the Universe is the creation and expression of a vital force or impulse whose function it is continually to change and to evolve." Bergson has also confuted the mechanist's theory of psychology, which regards mind either as the sum total of the neural correlates which constitute the brain, or as a highly attenuated material substance surrounding the brain. He points out that experiments have shown that the excision of the portions of the brain considered essential for the causation of mental activity have been succeeded by no psychological disturbance, and that the phenomena of dual personality are independent of any corresponding physiological change, and that subconscious mental activity is inexplicable on the parallelist hypothesis. He infers that the brain is the organ of consciousness, and that consciousness is the elan vital itself, which we can come

to understand by observing its operations in overselves. He says *elan vital* is a creative impulsion of endless duration but it turns back upon itself at a certain point, and that inverse movement is matter. He conceives the universe as one continuous flow or surge, and evolution as the mere movement of it. He says the method by which we arrive at metaphysical truth consists not in the exercise of the intellect, but in the deliverance of intuition, which is instinct or sympathy conscious of itself, through which we become directly conscious of the duration in which we participate. 'Elan Vital' indicates 'Brahma' 'intuition' indicates 'seership'. Western philosophy is moving along the line of 'Brahmabidya,' and physics along the line of meta-physics: life is force and matter is force. Neither is matter traceable to mind, nor mind to matter; both are traceable to nameless, undefinable life or ever-creative force or 'Brahma,' which dogmatic religions name God, and about which they proclaim conflicting beliefs.

Enlightened Masters like Zarathushtra, Buddha, Krishna and Christ instituted the sacred ceremony of initiation into the mystery of Love and Its inner guidance; their followers failed to fulfil the required conditions of the initiation. The ceremony has survived in name and form, but not in Spirit and Life. To that cause is mainly due the failure of religions to uplift humanity; and conflict, separation, and fight, in the place of harmony, unity, and peace. The required conditions are a duly prepared disciple and a duly qualified master.

1. The disciple ought to be sufficiently pure or innocent to receive instruction and influence and observe them willingly, faithfully and intelligently. Low desire, concomitant selfishness and craving for pleasure are in his way. "Man cannot serve two masters". Disciples cannot serve God, while they serve mammon; they must not serve mammon; they must not crave for sense delights; they must not live to eat, drink and make

merry, they must not tell a lie, nor do a wrong. They must abstain from low desire, and evil thought. To fulfil such conditions, abstinence from bad company and evil association is necessary. "A man is known by the company he keeps"; and he is moulded by it. In its full sense, company includes all association,—the books a man reads, the scene he sees, and the thought he thinks, and the wish he harbours. Thought is most potent, but wish generates thought. The disciple should, above all, continuously cherish some good wish, such as the highest good of all.

2. The master ought to know his business. He ought to know that his work is sacred; that it is a labour of love. He ought to know the power of intense good desire and one-pointed good thought, and know how to use them. He ought to know the mystery of inner guidance and know how to teach that. The few who know a little have been giving to a party what was meant for man-kind. That is a reason why they fail to advance. "Love knows no bounds". And it knows no party, no creed. *May their eyes open!*

A duly prepared disciple, initiated by a duly qualified master, chooses good, not evil; and becomes good, not mean. He weighs all things and holds fast that which is good. He observes purity and righteousness. When he makes mistake, he receives inner guidance, considers it, deliberates over it, and observes harmony between it and purity and righteousness. But, if an unprepared disciple, instructed by unqualified teacher relies upon his inner guidance, he runs the risk of being beguiled by deceptive imagination. Murders have been committed under such deception. Philosophy seeks truth, religion seeks God, science seeks knowledge, and man seeks happiness. Religion assures man that he will find all other things worth having, when he finds "The Kingdom of God and His Righteousness"; and advises him to seek that. Righteousness in

its full sense, comprises purity, harmony and progress. **"That (Ashem) is the best good. That (Ashem) is happiness. Happiness is to him who observes that (Ashem) for best righteousness (love and truth)".**

"Peace to all beings !"

Dreams.

(Mainly from Hindu point of view)

BY

PANDIT RAMDAT BHARADWAJ.

Most,* if not all, of us dream. Many of us experience in sleep the affairs of our waking life besides some other phenomena. One flies in the air, the other drowns in the deep sea; one becomes a king, another a beggar. Human beings laugh, weep, die, eat, drink, sing or play during sleep, and explain and interpret their experiences in various ways.

"Dreams partake of the nature of hallucinations", says Dr. Stout, "in so far as the dreamer appears to see and hear what does not really exist in the external world. But it sometimes happens that these dream-experiences are indistinct and lack impressional intensity; and in general they are without that dependence on motor activity which marks percepts. The impressional character is mainly due to their independence of subjective activity—the discontinuity and abruptness of the mode of emergence into consciousness. We are passive in relation to them in the same way in which we are passive in relation to actual objects present to the senses. Probably the hallucinations produced by suggestion in hypnotised subjects are of a similar kind. Many hallucinations are the conjoint effect of the peculiar state of the nervous system and the operation of the normal stimuli on the sense organs. So far as this is so, hallucinations assume in part the character of illusions. This holds to a large extent for dream experiences. A slight pain in the ribs makes the sleeper dream of a stab from a dagger or the bite of a dog".

* Cf. "No sleep is dreamless."

It will be interesting, I think, to mention here a nameless mental state which is both similar to and different from a dream. Whenever after an ordinary short journey I reach home or any other place where I feel quite at home, it appears to me as though I never were actually in the place I journeyed from, but have always been living in the place journeyed to. I am reluctant to call such an experience a perception, because the object of my experience does not exist before my senses. I will not call it a dream too, because such an experience is found in my waking-life. I do not like to call it an illusion, which implies a misapprehended object of the senses. I am not inclined to regard it as hallucination; for the former lacks intensity and possesses the awareness of the performance of the journey, while in hallucination there is no awareness of the reality or non-reality of the object except a wrong implicit belief. I will not call it imagination; for there is no conscious effort on my part to produce or reproduce it. I should be unwilling to identify it with an after-image or after-sensation, the latter being more or less fleeting and the former being comparatively lasting. I cannot call it a recurrent sensation even, because the latter is a sort of a reproductive image and the former is rather imageless. It seems to be a peculiar combination of hallucination and recurrent sensation, and may aptly be called a 'waking-dream'.

Though the dreams do not generally excite the motor activity, yet sometimes they do. This happens in the case of extremely vivid dreams. One of my friends dreamt of a lion with whom he was compelled to fight. During the combat he reached the roof of his house and pushed the animal therefrom. When he woke up in the morning, his mother asked him why he had ascended the roof in the night. There is another dream in instance. The dreamer, a friend, was put up in a Delhi Dharmashalla in a marriage party. He actually roamed through a few streets of the city, while asleep, and returned

to his temporary destination of repose. He was however found sleeping on the door steps in the morning. These dreams were so intense that they excited the motor activities of the dreamers in an unusual degree.

People all the world over, specially the Hindus, believe in the good and bad results of their dreams. It is Hindu belief that the dream experienced in the first quarter (prahar) of the night bears fruit in a year; in the second quarter, in six months; in the third, in ten days; and at the end of night or at sunrise, very soon. Can it be that in the case of a dream experienced in the last quarter, the immediacy of the results is due to the readiness of the sleeper's mind to receive telepathic missions? Certain Ayurvedic treatises mention that horrible, cruel and inauspicious dreams of the patient prove baneful, which is probably owing to the intimate connexion of the mind and body. Hence terrible and in-auspicious dreams lead to fear and anxiety, which tell upon the physique. Some Hindu works provide us with the means of dispelling the evil effects of the obnoxious dreams. Baths in the early morning, gift of til and gold, stay in a temple at night, recitation of the sacred lyrics and hymns, if continued for three days, are said to ward off the unwholesome bearing of bad dreams. The Markandeya Purana recommends the recital of Shri Durgamahatmya in cases of peace-restoring [shanti-karya] and vicious dreams. In the fourth chapter of Shrimad-Bhagvat we meet with the following observation: "O Parixita, I have described how Shri Krishna freed the Elephant from the jaws of the Crocodile. The hearing of this sacred tale leads to heaven and fame, removes the vices of the Kuli age, and quells the evil effects of baneful dreams". The Achara-Adhyaya of the Yajnavalkya Smriti ordains: "Whosoever has had inauspicious dreams should take his bath on the sacred day according to Shastric rituals. He should besmear his forehead with nagakesar, sandal pigment, agar, and musk; should sit on a high seat

and have the peace-invoking ceremonies [Swasti-patha] done by the learned Brahmanas; should use water mixed with holy soil, goroohana, guggula and sandal; should feast the Brahmanas after wearing white clothes and garlanding himself with white flowers and decorating himself with sandal paste; and lastly offer a pair of clothes to his preceptor". All this advice points to mental therapeutics.

Dreams have been classified as good and bad. There is a mass of divergent literature dealing with such classification all over the world. Some Hindu books mention that the dreams about good gods, royal processions, white cows and oxen, and sacred places are good. Crossing the tanks, rivers, lakes or pools full of water; defeating the enemies in battles; staying in nice places, mountains and gardens; riding the horses, chariots, etc.; wearing rich clothes and garlands are said to be auspicious. It is evident that good dreams give pleasure, which desirably affects the body. But talks and coitus with the prohibited women are also included among the good dreams. Probably here, as in the limited license of the Hindu scriptures about gambling (axa-krida) on the Goverdhana day and indecency on the Holi festival, there is a cathartic recipe on Freudian considerations.

The phenomenon of dreams has variously been explained by the erudite exponents of different schools, to which some attention is indispensable.

Freud thinks like this. "There is every reason to believe that a wish is never completely annihilated by repression, but that it continues to exist in such a form that it is ready to seize any opportunity for expression that may present itself; indeed it is only through the continued vigilance of the repressing forces that it is prevented from entering into consciousness. These repressing forces (which in their totality were called by Freud the Censor...) are less active in sleep, and the repressed tendencies (many of them dating from the

first years of life) are unable to express themselves in dreams. It is this which makes the dream...the *via regia* to the unconscious. But such manifestations of the repressed as we detect in dreams are in most cases not direct, but distorted, expressions of the original wish; and it is in this point that dreams so much resemble neurotic symptoms. Whence comes this distortion? From the action, it would seem, of the Censor, who—like his social prototype—will allow certain facts or views to be expressed provided they are suitably veiled, so as not to be easily recognisable for what they truly are. The dream product (the manifest dream content, as Freud designates it, to distinguish it from the latent dream thought), like the neurotic symptom, reveals itself, then, as a compromise arrived at as the result of the interaction of conflicting forces—repressing and repressed...The repressed material is, in the great majority of cases, either hostile or sexual, with the latter category predominating.....To turn now to the dream-example. A female patient undergoing psycho-analytic treatment dreamt that: "The tuner had come to tune the piano. He was engaged in taking out a number of seeds from the inside of the piano". Short as the dream was, its analysis occupied a whole hour's session. It revealed itself as highly over-determined, inasmuch as it gives expression to four distinguishable wishes: 1. To get rid of worry and overwork (go piano), 2. to get rid of disturbing sexual desires, 3. to give birth to a child with the help of the analyst, 4. to have sexual intercourse with analyst (i. e. to receive a child from him). It may be noted that the second wish is incompatible with, and may even be regarded as the opposite of, the third and fourth".*

Professor Freud and his followers emphasise the word sexual, because in their opinion "all human relations are either relations between persons of opposite sex or between persons

of the same sex ; that is to say, all human relations are either hetro-sexual or homo-sexual ; therefore all human relations are sexual and it is mere prudery (due to incestuous desire) to deny that your affection for father or grandfather or your little daughter or grandson is sexual". While dissenting from this view, McDougall observes that "the way in which such 'reasonings' are accepted and repeated (for the most part implicitly) is melancholy evidence of the weakness of the human intellect". He however opines that "modern research has clearly proved that even the most fanciful day-dreaming and the most chaotic dream of the sleeper can usually be shown to be the expression of some impulse, some conative trend, which is unable to attain full satisfaction in that intercourse with men and things which we naturally and properly call 'real life'."

We turn now to the physiologist who thinks that "in sleep owing to surplus blood or to lowered respiration, the blood becomes charged with carbonic acid, which may have an exciting effect on the sensory areas of the brain." It may be enough to hint at the quasi physiological theory of Bergson, who speaks of 'ocular spectra', 'coloured spots', 'visual dust' and the like as the causes of dreams. Allied to the physiological view of the west, we have the 'doshaj' aspect of dreams in the east, where we meet with slightly varied explanations. The Yajurveda says that "the mind of the waking person goes far, that of sleeper returns". The Nyaya and the Vaiśeṣika schools, which presume the materiality of the 'manas', clear the Vedic statement. "In deep sleep the manas recedes from the body and enters into the 'puritat nadi'. There it stays at the entrance and creates dreams." Such an attempt to explain the dream phenomenon seems strange to him who is not trained to believe that the mind through which the matter itself appears can be material. Through a pair of blue spectacles the world shall appear blue.

The Prashnopanishad has touched the problem of dreams rather clearly. Saurayana asks Pippalad, "O illustrious one, in the person (purusha) which of the organs sleep ; which are awake and which of these organ-gods dream ; which realises this pleasure ; and wherein do all these organs immerge after work ?" Pippalad replies, "O son of Garga, just as the rays of the setting sun recede into that shining halo (of the sun) and the rays of the rising sun again spread, so in the great god 'manas' all these organs become one. At that time this person neither hears, nor sees, nor smells, nor tastes, nor touches, nor speaks, nor grasps, nor elates, nor excretes, nor walks, but sleeps as people say. In such a dream this god 'manas' realises its greatness, because it sees whatever has been seen many times ; hears whatever has been heard several times ; experiences again and again whatever has been experienced in different climes and countries ; and also experiences the seen or the unseen, the heard or unheard, felt or unfelt, the extant, or the non-extant and sees all". The last three lines of the above quotation are significantly pregnant with suggestions of the influences of innate ideas and 'sanskaras' of this life as well as of previous lives and also of the influence of pure (creative) imagination on the dreams of human beings.

In some of the Hindu scriptures we have the evidences of what may be designated as 'imported dreams.' In the *Reva* part of *Shri Skanda Mahapurana*, for instance Bhagwan Satyanarayana gave a dream to Chandraketu. Certain passages of the code of Yajnyavalkya tell us that those with whom the gods are angry dream of frequent baths, water and shaven heads. Like the gods, the departed souls (pretas) too can excite dreams. Space does not permit to indulge in the narration of such phenomena, which the doctrine of telepathy and some of the efforts of the Psychical Research Societies tempt us not to discard without a thorough examination. Some prefer to interpret the so-called 'imported dreams' as cases

of clairvoyance in sleep, because they hold that the human soul wanders during sleep. But I am inclined to keep the two distinct in view of some of the modern researches, experiences and traditions.

I have the experience that one living human being can give a dream to another at will. By hypnotic suggestions I gave two dreams to a friend. On one occasion I suggested the murder of Julius Caesar as described by Shakspeare; on another a scene of a very beautiful garden. Both these dreams lasted for about fifteen minutes to my friend who had been induced to a slight doze both the times, who remembered nothing on waking, but who recollected his experience at my suggestions.

A question arises: Just as a dream can be induced so can it be checked? It is often observed that the very name of Shri Hanuman or some other sacred personality before sleep is preventive of dreams. Is it that, under the guise of those names, the sleepers determine not to have undesirable dreams? Can it be that this resolve arrests the dream through the unconscious, although broadly speaking there is no awareness of any mental activity at the time. People have utilised the unconscious with great advantage in solving the difficult problems, which they could not do while awake. Stevenson and De Quincey are considered to be indebted to dreams. Coleridge is credited to have composed in sleep the Ancient Mariner and the nice little poem, Kubla Khan, most of which he remembered on waking, but a part of which he forgot by the interruption of a friend.

It may be concluded that our dreams partake of the nature of hallucinations and are closely allied to what may be called 'waking-dreams'. Although dreams do not generally excite motor activity, yet sometimes they do in a very unusual degree. They are said to have effects on the dreamers and as such may be classified as good and bad; and just as they can be

induced, so they can be inhibited by charms or resolves. Dreams may be due to six causes. They are caused in sleep by the repetition of the conscious sensuous experience of the waking hours or by the subconscious experience during sleep itself. As such they may be termed as 'reproductive' or 'anubhuta' dreams. They may also originate in the conative impulse (conscious or repressed, sexual or otherwise) of the dreamer, and may be called 'conative' or 'prarthita' dreams. They may again be brought into play by the pure imagination of the dreamer, and may thus go by the name of 'creative' or 'kalpita' dreams. Besides they are caused by the affection of the sensory areas by toxins or carbonic acid or 'visual dust' etc, or any other physical stimulus, and may therefore be called 'physiological' or 'doshaja' dreams. Then again congenital ideas and tendencies of this as well as of previous lives may give birth to certain dreams, which may be called 'congenital' or 'bhabaja'. Lastly come the dreams induced by gods or human beings, living or dead, and may fitly be expressed as 'imported' or 'prerita' dreams.

Misuse of Logic.

BY

PRIYA GOVIND DUT.

The way in which Logic is being misused in every sphere of life is simply astonishing. The commonest blunders committed by most of us are of three kinds, viz., (1) we parade our probable statements and empirical generalisations as absolutely certain ; (2) we treat analogy as satisfactory explanation, and (3) we demand that ideas in order to be true should be capable of being pictorially represented and we frame questions about the fundamental verities of life requiring the pictorial representation of non-pictorial things. The first sort of blunder is not confined to the busy housewife and the ever-pushing business men but also to the learned physicians, lawyers, economists, historians and politicians. The second and the third kind of blunder are frequently committed by philosophers and all those who are philosophically minded. People who are not fortunate enough to receive any accurate logical and metaphysical discipline invariably confuse analogy with explanation. But dialecticians and theologians frequently commit the third kind of blunder often unknowingly.

Though the science of Logic is being cultivated for a long time all over the world yet the misuse of Logic is surprisingly great. Inconsistency which we are required to avoid has almost become the fashion of the day. One of its causes is our appreciation of figurative and synonymous statements in literature though these are discredited from the standpoint of truth. The dialectic argument which has produced wonderful result both in Europe and India is not free from defects of this nature. This method was at first used to bring out the absurdity and

inconsistency of a view by putting questions to and eliciting answers from the upholder of this view. Though such a method seems to be harmless yet a closer analysis shows that it is logically unsound as it invariably rests on two fallacies, viz., the fallacy of many questions and the fallacy known as *argumentum ad ignorantiam*. Occasionally it is found to involve the fallacies of composition and division. It is a matter of analysis and details to elicit the fallacies underlying such questionings. To those who cannot see through these questionings this method is really embarrassing and at the same time convincing. The *Syadvadists* however have shown to what absurd situation it leads us. Modern philosophers are not free from the lure of this popular method. Even Titchener commits this blunder when he examines the different parts of a chair and misses the reality. Such a method may be very successful in the law court but in the quest for truth it should be carefully avoided. It is unfortunate that we overlook the fact that the dialectic method is identical with the dilemmatic method and dialectic arguments invariably rest on false suppositions, unreal relations or non-exhaustive alternatives.

The modern dialectic method is different from its old form. It became really established as a method in the time of Kant, Fichte, Schelling and Hegel. From the time of Hegel it is being recognised as the fundamental esoteric method of philosophical enquiry. The *Tantras* have gone a step further by introducing this dialectic in the whole fabric of our life—religious, intellectual, and moral. Even now philosophers are using this method in their offensive and defensive movements. But how far this method of establishing this wonderful cosmos from a single concept or idea can be logically justified is yet to be seen. It has not yet been settled whether there is any fundamental similarity between this method and the dilemmatic method. But doubt about the cogency of this method has been expressed by F. H. Bradley in his famous book,

The Principles of Logic, where he says, "We must not, if we can help it, introduce into logic the problems of the dialectic view" (p. 121). Again he remarks : "Like every other question of the kind, the validity of dialectic is a question of fact, to be discussed and settled upon its own merits, and not by an appeal to so-called "principles" "[p. 151]. He has not simply expressed his doubt about the dialectic method but has explicitly condemned it as a logical method. He describes this method as a case of pure illusion [p. 392] and the dialectical conclusion arbitrary [p. 601] and defective [p. 602]. Hence we have sufficient data to conclude that we must think thrice before applying this dialectic method in our philosophical investigation.

The scientific and the ordinary people both suffer from the misconception of the evidentiary value of illustrations and so they believe that a few illustrations of a proposition are sufficient to prove it. But in many cases closer analysis reveals that the illustrations are not proper and even if they be proper they cannot prove a universal proposition or truth. It is well known that in Geometry triangles are drawn to show that the three interior angles are together equal to two right angles, though as a matter of fact no triangles can be drawn on account of the impossibility of having a plane surface and straight lines. Practical geometry which has been introduced in many of our universities rests on the foundation of improper illustration. This erroneous method of illustration appeals to the people because their minds are never satisfied unless and until they can pictorially represent all their ideas and propositions. In other words the ordinary people fail to conceive non-spatial, colourless ideas and so view all things as existing in space, occupying space, and possessing colour. The very constitution of human mind and language makes the task of rising above this temporal bias immensely difficult.

The religious beliefs all over the world are grounded on our feeling of reverence for the ancient sages and prophets and their holy books which were compiled, revealed or composed pretty long ago. So all these beliefs rest on the fallacy of *argumentum ad verecundiam*. Even in our selection of food, dress and personal embellishment we are guided by authority. In Theosophy and the practices enjoined by the modern Yoga we swallow many things in the name of experience and scientific experiments and also on account of our fear of going against the scientists and men of established reputation. In history and politics our beliefs and disbeliefs are completely dominated by authority. Exponents of Indian philosophy generally go by authority. Even the great Sankara proved his propositions by an appeal to the authority of the Upanishads.

The fallacy of *argumentum ad populum* is frequently met with in practical politics and specially at the time of the introduction of some social reform. What a great deal of trash we have to accept when an appeal is made to our national sentiment and the sense of patriotism. At the time of the introduction of the Sarda Bill and other social reforms how greatly our national sentiments were exploited! The University of Calcutta had to face this sort of fallacious appeal when reforms were introduced into the spelling of Bengali words.

The *argumentum ad hominem* is also widely prevalent. It is not only found in the law courts but in many spheres of our activity. At the time of election we generally find fault with our adversary. In the time of war the enemy state is vilified like any thing in order to prove its guilt. The arguments we come across at a public hydrant from the mouths of the weaker sex generally rest on this fallacy.

But the most striking is the world-wide application of the *argumentum ad baculum* though theoretically it is universally condemned as a method of proof. We find fault with the village *guru* for proving the roundness of the earth with

the help of the rod but we do not feel the slightest compunction when we give our votes in favour of a proposal or against it. We vehemently preach throughout the year that truth does not rest on the number of cases supporting it but on the nature of the cases, yet we give up this attitude towards number as soon as we leave our class room. We forget that number is a brute force and whenever anything is proved or enforced on the authority of number we commit the fallacy of *argumentum ad baculum*. It is childish to think of votes when one proves the heliocentric theory or the binomial theorem. The great philosophers of the world never cared to prove their propositions on the strength of the number of their followers. The great prophets of the world also never wanted to prove their religious experience and discovery on the authority of their followers—they rather preached them even in the face of the vehement opposition of an overwhelming majority of persons and in many cases they had to sacrifice their lives for the cause of truth and on account of this number.

The Aryan method of establishing truth as embodied in the Upanishads is not concerned with this kind of number. When the sages discovered any truth they used to come to the people and they placed it before them for their acceptance and guidance. They never wanted to prove their propositions on the strength of votes. But the uncultured villagers of India like the villagers of other parts of the world decided all their disputes by taking votes. Truth is not easy to attain and so it is idle to think that the majority of persons will have it and support it. Yet what enormous trouble one has to face when he goes against the decision of the majority ! Even such great men like Lloyd George and Ramsay Macdonald had to suffer much when the unsteady votes went against them.

All the democratic institutions of the world rest on the fallacy of *argumentum ad baculum* because in them every thing is decided by taking votes or by an appeal to the number of fists that can strike a blow or the number of hands that can wield a sword or hold a gun. We have been surprised to find that democracy has not any driving force to help the nation in its onward march and that it has made the human culture suffocating and stagnant. This seems to be due to the logical hollowness of the democratic institutions and on account of this hollowness democracy is always in favour of *status quo*. The meteoric rise of Mussolini and Hitler and the progress of Italy and Germany have opened the eyes of the world, but the logical eyes of the world have yet to be opened. Even now we are condemning Mussolini for applying brute force for the conquest of Abyssinia and at the same time we are doing exactly the same thing in sticking to the democratic institutions and in recording our votes in the assembly or the League of Nations which is undoubtedly the greatest of the democratic institutions of the world. Its failure has been proved effectively in the Abyssinian war, the militarisation of the Saar valley and Spanish revolt. But the League will collapse not simply on account of its practical inefficiency but on account of its logical hollowness. Many nations shall have to come to grief if they fail to give up all those institutions which are logically unsound.

The present day turmoil all over the world and in every sphere of human activity has drawn the notice of the people to the logical value of all the human institutions. Time has come when serious attempt should be made to ascertain the causes of this confusion in society and politics, in home and factory, in morality and philosophy. Philosophers in a body should now raise their voice against the black art that is being practised all over the world and the idols that have

crept in all the spheres of life and thought. The enormity of the fallacies committed all over the world is really profound. Let us hope that the logicians and philosophers of the world will devise means for eradicating these and stopping this stupendous misuse of Logic.

Philosophy of Humour.

By

S. N. Roy.

Different phenomena such as wit, satire, farce, jest and humour express themselves in laughter. It is worth while considering if there is any difference between them and determining the psychological background of Humour. With this end in view we shall first of all try to make our ideas of the phenomena mentioned above sufficiently definite. There is much confusion in most men's minds as to the exact significance of these phenomena.

We may begin with wit. It is said to be the subjective side of the comic, i. e., that part of the comic with we ourselves create. (cf Th. Lipp's *Komik & Humor*). John Galsworthy in his *Swan Song* says "My oldest friend is a judge in India. He's been there forty years. When he'd been there two, he wrote to me that he was beginning to know something about the Indians. When he'd been there ten, he wrote that he knew all about them. I had a letter from him yesterday, and he says that after forty years he knows nothing about them. And they know as little about us. East and West—the circulation of blood is different". Here we notice that a fact has been described in a witty manner, the wit certainly consisting in our subjective appreciation of the comic elements,

It has been further said that "the judgment which produces the comic contrast is wit". Our psychic world is full of inhibitions and weak points and it is through judgment that they are brought out. Speaking about Mr. Polly, H. G. Wells tells us that if he had been transparent or even passably translucent he would have realised that he was not so much a human being as a civil war. Such a man was always doubtful whether

it was eight sevens or nine eights that was sixty three, and he thought that the merit of a drawing consisted in the care with which it was lined in. Lining in bored him beyond measure.

Wit has also been described as a free 'play of ideas. It is the skill to combine many ideas which are foreign to one another. In his *Jocasta*, Anatole Franco mentions the theories of Rene Longnemare, the young army surgeon, in the following words: Virtue is a product, the same as phosphorus or vitriol. Heroism and holiness are results of the congestion of the brain. General paralysis is the only thing which makes a great man. The gods are adjectives.

Wit has therefore these characteristics namely, the 'contrast of ideas', the capacity to see sense in nonsense, and a combination of confusion and clearness. (cf. Freud: *Wit and its relation to the Unconscious*).

We shall next examine Satire. It is an expression of the sense of amusement or disgust due to a ridiculous situation or unseemly character. We jibe at personal faults and this may be said to mark the beginning of satire. The word 'satire' is very often used to mean a literary composition, generally in verse, designed to hold up a man to ridicule or scorn on account of his faults. It has often a moral purpose and its effects in most cases is the overpouring of sense of the ridiculous by rage and disgust. The bitterness of Ben Johnson's *Volpone* or the brutality of Swift's *Honnyhymns* are instances to the point. The Pardoner's *Tale of Chaucer* is another satirical piece of poetry. The Pardoner relates moral tales to cajole money out of unwilling pockets. He is a hypocrite but has an artistic touch in his character.

Next we come to Farce. It is a form of comedy in which the comic element consists in an actual situation in which a person is placed to find himself caught in the meshes of his own folly. It almost always involves a practical joke which makes

someone ridiculous in the eyes of others. It is well illustrated in the story of an old man of sixty trying to marry a young damsel for the third time and discovering at last that the person with whom he has been married is not a female but a male. Such acts and circumstances constitute the farce as expose a man's folly and make him the butt-end of laughter. A farce has no element of seriousness in it and calls for no effort on the part of the audience. Farcical scenes have been created by Shakespeare in *A Midsummer Night's Dream* in which Titania, the fairy queen is shown dallying in love with the clown having an ass's head or in *The Comedy of Errors* in which circumstances have been so arranged as to deny the married Antipholus entrance into his own house, for the inmates thought that he had been already there.

We may now pass on to Jest. Jest implies the notion of playful mirth. The object of jest is to create a pleasant situation by a clever juxtaposition of words and absurd linking of thoughts. It affords satisfaction by making possible that which reason forbids. Wishing to enroll a student named Warr in his class, a professor enquired about his age and on being told that he was thirty years of age the professor exclaimed, "Aha, so I have the honour of seeing the Thirty Years' War". A friend asked a lawyer about the latter's attitude towards his own wife. The lawyer remarked, "Well, a wife is a text book, but other women are novels and romances". In such cases we really do not know what we are laughing about. "In all obscene jokes the technique is very poor but their laughing effect is enormous". A similar joke is found in the remark 'A wife is like an umbrella, at worst one may always take a cab'.

A fun, joke or jest belongs to the same class. Pun or play on words has the same effect as jest—a pleasurable feeling is called into play and reason is thrown into the background.

We shall now examine Humour. It has been rightly said that an attempt to define humour will surely be an indication of a lack of the sense of humour. The word 'humour' means moisture. At one time it was believed that a man's character was formed of or determined by the internal secretions of the body, called the humours. We now use the word to mean ruling passion. Eccentricity is a marked characteristic of the English who are, therefore, humorous. But Frenchmen are witty, for they try to enjoy heartily the nonsensio. Bergson says, "A witty nation is of necessity a nation enamoured of the theatre. In every wit there is something of a poet—just as in every good reader there is the making of an actor". Victor Hugo has said, we enjoy 'for the mere joy of the thing.'

Humour may be said to be the perception of the comic. As distinguished from wit, humour is more subtle and more vague. It abandons all attempt at intellectual justification. Wit implies justice whereas humour implies humility. There is a sense of pain accompanying humour. Humour suppresses it and expresses itself in a feeling of pleasure.

We shall here examine the theory advanced by Dr. Freud. He says every person may be comical if he makes unnecessary movements. A clown, e.g., makes movements which are comic because there is greater expenditure of energy than is needed. The case is reverse with the expenditure of psychic energy. In the case of psychic activity it is comical if there is economy in the expenditure of psychic energy. Foolishness and nonsense are certainly inferior psychic activities.

Dr. Freud no doubt holds that the comic originates from wide spread sources but he believes that finally we may look to psychic automatism as the mainspring of the comic. Bergson also believes that the comic is a substitution of something mechanical or automatic for the natural.

Dr. Freud goes on to hold that wit originates from economy of expenditure in inhibition, comic arises from economy of

expenditure of psychic energy [i. e. thought] and humour arises from economy of expenditure in feeling. He believes that the processes involved in wit formation are the same as involved in dream work namely condensation, displacement and indirect expression. What the dream does is to overcome the censorship of the conscious mind. A fore-conscious thought is left for a moment to unconscious elaboration and there happens a displacement of the psychic energy within the material of the dream thoughts. 'This is what takes place in wit formation also, although it is true that other factors of dream such as dramatisation, secondary elaboration etc., are not found in wit. As because condensation occurs we say that "brevity is the soul of wit". De Quincey's remarks that old persons fall into "anecdotalage" is an example to the point. Again, on account of displacement our attention is diverted to a thought not prominent before. For example a horse-dealer in recommending a saddle horse to his client said, "If you mount this horse at 4 o'clock in the morning you will be in Monticello at 6. 30". The client replied "What shall I do in Monticello at 6. 30 in the morning"? The horse-dealer was trying to prove the efficiency of his horse, but the client transferred his thought to the early arrival at Monticello in the morning. Further there is indirect expression in wit. Doctors study constantly because drugs once considered efficacious are later rejected as useless, and if patients are not cured they refuse to pay the doctors. One doctor once remarked "Yes, every drug has its day". Another replied "But not every Doc gets his pay". These witty remarks are indirect expressions of the familiar saying "Every dog has his day".

Thus, Dr. Freud is of opinion that wit-formation and dream work are very similar. In wit-formation a stream of thought is dropped for a moment and suddenly emerges from the unconscious as a witticism. In humour, on the other hand, there happens, according to Dr. Freud, an economy of expenditure

in feeling. Don Quixote whose head is full of the ideas of knighthood and who with his army of a flock of sheep proceeds to fight the giants which are windmills creates in our mind a sense of humour. We cannot bear any grudge against him and all our hatred and ill-will are robbed by his humorous remarks.

Thus, Freud holds that the comic is associated with over-expenditure of physical energy or lack of mental, wit is the sudden expression of an unconscious thought through a release of inhibitions, and Humour is a defence against the painful or disagreeable. "For humour only one person is necessary, for comicality two, for wit three namely the producer of the wit the imaginary person against whom it is directed and the person who listens to it" [Dr. Ernest Jones]. Bergson also points out that "A word is said to be *comic* when it makes us laugh at the person who utters it, and *witty* when it makes us laugh either at a third party or at ourselves". But in a particular case it is difficult to say if a word is comical or witty. All that we can say is that it is laughable.

Bergson advances a biological theory of the comic and Freud supplies a psychological theory of the comic. Bergson says that rigidity is comic and laughter corrects it, Freud holds that lack of psychic energy is comic and laughter is a discharge of the psychic energy which has been previously pent up. But both the thinkers agree in holding that comic absurdity is the same as dream absurdity.

What we have held here is that no situation is itself comic but whether it is comic or not depends upon our viewpoint. We have a sense of the comic which develops with the growth of our intellect. From mere buffoonery to most subtle forms of humour there are different gradations which are expressions of our comic sense. In buffoonery the comic is created by imitation and frivolous talks and movements. In caricature it is created by exaggeration. In parody and travesty it is formed

by degradation. In a farce the comic element consists in the skilful arrangement of circumstances to expose a man's folly. In satire it is created by a display of words designed to scorn or ridicule a person. In jest there is an absurd liking of thoughts which satisfy us just as much as random play satisfies the child.

We shall now analyse the character of Shakespeare's Falstaff to explain the marks of humour. Falstaff is a pot-bellied man, old and uncouth in his postures. Such a man claims to be regarded as a youth and often complains of the most unkind treatment accorded to the young folk of his country. He is a swindler fashionably dressed and is a constant companion of the prince. In him we see a brilliant contrast of good and evil, high and low. He has a sense of degradation or humility which, however, he covers by his notion of a superior self. He is always conscious of the youth which he falsely attributes to himself. He thus lives a sort of double life—one that his exterior reveals to others and the other which he creates for himself in his imagination. His outward features create in us a feeling of disgust or hatred but his behaviour constantly tends to overpower that feeling by a feeling of pleasure. He has a bifurcation of personality so to speak and is at once an object of disgust and an object of laughter. His ingenuity lies in masking his real nature and creating a false one. He thus repels us and also attracts us. His whole existence oscillates between these two states—a state of repulsion and a state of attraction. When we identify ourselves with his lower self we feel hatred but the feeling of pain is at once diverted into a feeling of joy by a discharge of energy emanating from our sympathy with his higher self.

Psychologists have not adequately explained the mechanism of humour. It is not enough to suggest that humour effects economy of feeling. It is useful no doubt to learn that a pent-up feeling of pain, anger, or the like is suddenly transformed

into exuberance of mirth by humour. But we ask : what is the mechanism through which this transference is effected ? We hold that the humorous person has a double personality. In one he is the object of derision to himself but the consciousness of pain arising from this personality is skilfully deflected towards the other. His second personality supplies adequate impulse to change that state of pain into pleasure. He at first collides with himself so to speak but next moment he overcomes this collision and gets rid of the consequent pain by a skilful manipulation of his psychic energy. A feeling of tension is followed by a feeling of relaxation. The psychic energy flowing in one direction is suddenly diverted into the opposite direction. Straining-relaxing emotions are always sudden as Titchener points out. But the suddenness is due to the fact that the impulse to relaxation overpowers the feeling of tension.

We the onlookers of a humorous character or situation feel ourselves so to speak into the situation. We have an empathic experience and all the attacks made on the humorous person are considered to be attacks on ourselves and then as the situation changes we have a relief from the feeling of tension due to our empathic attitude. We burst out into laughter and we experience a feeling of sympathy for the man laughed at.

Falstaff speaks to the Chief Justice who came to accuse him of robbery, "You that are old consider not the capacities of us that are young". The Chief Justice replied, "Do you set down your name in the scroll of youth that are written down old with all the characters of age. Fie, fie, fie, Sir John". Falstaff said, "My lord, I was born about three of the clock in the afternoon with a white head and something a round belly". After this the Chief Justice went away wishing Falstaff God-speed in his expedition. Sir John Falstaff's intelligence and quickness of perception could easily relieve the tension of the

situation. The function of wit on the other hand consists in releasing a fund of psychic energy available at the moment by doing away with inhibitions. In it the first person does not laugh, an attack is made against the third person and the second person laughs and enjoys. When we make a wit we cannot ourselves laugh, but we laugh so to speak through others. The first person cannot laugh because there is no discharge of pleasurable energy, that is, there is no release of inhibitions. The second person is used as a tool in hands of the first person, reacts upon the first person and enhances the pleasure of the latter. In the third person the psychic energy is at first dammed and then released. The inhibition which the wit aims at overcoming is first roused in the third person, as if an army is mobilised for war, and then it is discharged through laughter.

Bergson believes that when we contrast the real and the ideal, i. e., what is and what ought to be, we get two forms of the comic. If we state what ought to be done and pretend to believe that this is just what is actually being done, then we have *irony*. But if we describe minutely what is being done and pretend to believe that this is just what ought to be done, then we have *humour*. In humour then we describe evil with the most cold-blooded indifference and contrast it with good. "A humourist is a moralist disguised as a scientist".

Thus, according to Bergson, the source of humour is the contrast of evil with good and humour is a form of the comic because it reveals the same sort of callousness and automatism as characterise every comic character or situation. In vice and also in virtue the comic element is that by which a person unwittingly betrays himself in a gesture or unconscious remark. Absentmindedness is always comical and we notice systematic absentmindedness in Don Quixote.

It is true we laugh at rigidity or absentmindedness, but does it signify mechanisation of life? The chief cause of rigi-

dity has been said to be inattention to one's self and the world. But we laugh at rigidity only when we look upon it as something incongruous, i. e., inconsistent with our rational standard. We laugh at it not because it is itself comic but because it represents a mode of our expression of the incongruous. Irony again excites laughter because there is representation through the opposite, i. e., the speaker means to convey the opposite of what he says.

Dr. Freud's theory of humour seems to be justifiable. Humour is a means of self-defence against the attacks of an unfriendly world. We describe that person as lacking in the sense of humour who is extremely sensitive to jokes, shuns society and takes the world too seriously. The cause of lack of humour has been said to be the repression of exhibitionistic impulse. This seems to be more than what we can support. It is characteristic of Freudian psychology to associate almost every mental phenomenon with homosexuality, narcissism and the like. But the reasons for too much sensitiveness, delusions of presentation and seriousness may be explained as results of social influence. We do not propose to deal with this question here, but we can readily accept Freud's theory that humour effects economy of feeling and we have tried throughout to support his theory. Humour is a defence against the painful. "The energy that would otherwise have produced pain is transformed into a source of pleasure", (Dr. Jones.)

We shall close with a short remark against Mc Dougall's theory of laughter. He believes that laughter is an instinctive reaction to the incongruous and the feeling of amusement is its affective side. He is obsessed with his theory of Instinct and its relation to Emotion. But if laughter is an instinct, why is it that we do not see the tendency to laugh in every creature? Further, can we say that the feeling of amusement is a special kind of emotion to be associated with the instinct of laughter? Is it not true that varieties of feeling get their expression

through laughter such as sympathy, pain, anger and the like ? George Meredith in his "*An Essay on comedy*" speaks about "Comic perception". He says that capacity for comic perception can be estimated "by being able to detect the ridicule of them you love, without loving them less ; and more by being able to see yourself somewhat ridiculous in dear eyes, and accepting the correction their imago of you proposes". We agree with him in this and we are sure that "a society of cultivated men and women" only can acquire this capacity.

The Doctrine of Relations.

(As viewed by Bradley and Bosanquet)

By

JYOTISH CHANDRA BANERJEE.

The "*Speculative Philosophy*" of Bradley and Bosanquet is well-known as a very sound form of Idealism in the history of the contemporary philosophy. It is founded on the same tenet of Idealism, though Bosanquet condemns such a school of thought as equal to Panpsychism or Mentalism. This type of Philosophy, unlike the common sense view, never separated mind from its object, 'nor even at the end attempted to bridge over the gulf of this difference like fatal dualism. From the very start this considers consciousness as involving a subject-object relation. The position is quite clear from its doctrine of ideas'. An 'Idea', according to this theory is nothing but the "name given to a mental state when referred to something objective" which is universal in its nature. The mind employs this as a symbol or meaning. "The difference between mental states and ideas with a meaning," Bosanquet remarks "lies in the 'use' of the former" (Log. Vol. II. P. 296). Further he adds, "There are no ideas which are not directly or indirectly affirmed of reality and therefore *a'fortiori*, none which are not symbolic or significant" (Ibid P.296). To sum up in one idea, 'there is no other world than that of minds's objective reference.' A judgment is the simplest act of mind and "Every idea has its existence in the medium of judgment" (Bos. Log. Vol. I, P. 36). Psychical states are the mind's response to modifications of the bodily organism. These psychical states are interpreted, they are 'ideas' or meanings, and every idea has an objective reference. But this must not

be misinterpreted that all psychical states must have to be 'named' and that therefore no psychical state can exist without becoming a 'fixed reference'. As a matter of fact sensations are existing without being 'named' and sensations are all psychical states but certainly not to be misunderstood as merely subjective. This is in short the position of Bosanquet. Such is the theory more or less of Bradley also inasmuch as he argues similarly in his *Logic*, Chapter I and also *Essays* Chapter III—on "Floating Ideas and the Imaginary". Bradley further answers the question as how '*my world*' becomes the common world of all by showing the similarity of the evidences for the existence of one's own private self and that of other selves. There is an objective aspect, according to him, viz., 'the aspect which refers an ideal content to reality' as well as a 'subjective' aspect. And thus he avoids the difficulty of the Subjective Idealism. Moreover this position is quite clear inasmuch as the 'subject occupies an equal position with the object in the subject-object relation which constitutes consciousness' as we have marked before. This philosophy is undoubtedly free from getting itself imprisoned in the water-tight compartment of the individual's 'block-universe', in so far as it teaches us not to apprehend '*ab extra* something finished and complete apart from us.' This school of Idealism further establishes the continuity of thought and its objects by arguing that consciousness as such has the form of a continuous judgment and that 'consciousness always appears as holding things in relation.'—This is in short the 'speculative Idealism' of Bradley and Bosanquet.

It is rather interesting to note here that Neo-Realism may be said to be a valid reaction against such a view-point of Idealism which is based on the doctrine of internal relations as we shall see presently. The doctrine of Neo-Realism may be said to be consisting in two aspects—the negative and the

positive ones as depicted by Ralph B. Perry and Edwin B. Holt respectively. Perry urges against all forms of idealistic conclusions as being "founded on the assertion of the primacy of consciousness" and further adds that such an argument involves a fallacy, called "fallacy of argument from the *ego-centric predicament*." Though the argument may be said to be lodged against the subjectivism of Berkeley, yet Perry has referred it against all forms of Ontological Idealism also.

According to this argument from the 'ego-centric predicament,' as Perry contends everything and anything is defined by its relation to a cognitive or experiencing subject. Taking S for the subject, and P for the predicate or object and r , the relation, the Idealists, as Perry remarks, assert that $S-r-P$ defines P. Or, in other words, what Perry means to suggest here is that the relation involved is a 'specific relation.' But from this it follows that anything which we mention or to which we refer is a 'content of experience' in the wide sense of the term which alone is relevant here i. e. it is in the relation— r to P. Everything falls under the relation to the knower. If we eliminate the relation in question we cannot see what happens. What Perry means to say here is that we introduce ourselves when we turn to any object or thing and that it is possible simply because things exist quite apart from our turning to them and studying them. P may be out of the relation $S-r-P$ as well as in it. (Ref-*Journal of Philosophy and Psychology*, 1910-p-8). Elsewhere he has said that the 'ego-centric predicament' conveys no new information about things. To say that 'every mentioned thing is an idea' is 'redundant' like the expression—"every mentioned thing is mentioned" (Ref—the '*Present Philosophical Tendencies*'-Chapter VI and '*Mind*' 1910-'*The Cardinal Principle of Idealism*).

To put in short—what we have in any form of consciousness is in things in relation—either spatial or temporal or both and that all relations are internal and equally relevant. But how far can we accept the doctrine? We may not side with Perry on the point at issue as mentioned before. As regards his first difficulty concerning the relations of the Idealists, it may be pointed out that in the relation $S-r-P$, he takes S in the wide sense. The whole of the perspective will be different if we ask Perry to identify S with some individual act of knowledge. If it indicates something which is not relative to knowledge at all, of course the difficulty cannot be denied. But it may also indicate something which is not relative to our present act of knowing; the predicament in that case, cannot vitiate the Idealist's stand-point. In other words, when 's' stands for a definite and individual knowledge, the 'predicament' which is involved is a form which can be got rid of by another act of knowledge.

So also his difficulty regarding r is of the another type. If we understand this r as a particular method of apprehending objects then in that case the predicament is not formidable, inasmuch as there are also other modes of knowing left. Moreover the 'ego centric predicament' cannot justify us in inferring that things come into existence when they are apprehended and disappear as the apprehension ceases. I can think of past, distant and future happenings through my mental images and thereby may be aware of their facthoods or actualities. It can, by no means, be proved that the existence of a 'thing does depend on the fact of being apprehended'. An apprehension that comes and goes is a limited case of knowledge; it is not all knowledge. So when Perry speaks of a "star of the eighth magnitude depending on being seen through a telescope" or of a "cell on being stained," certainly he takes r in a limited sense only.

Moreover his half-realism does not prevent us from thinking that a thing is not quite independent of the subject. On the contrary his evidence applies only to the case where *S* is a particular ego or act of knowledge and not when it is a general term for knowing as such. And hence the predicament cannot so easily be discounted as Perry suggests. The second part of his objection—that the proposition from the ego-centric predicament is a tautology may also be proved, as not very sound. Every judgment involves a subject-predicate relation. If I say, 'the table is perceived by me', I speak of a perceived table and thereby I put the complex whole into a judgment and not into a single term. So also if we say, 'everything is relative to a subject,' we are to take the whole judgment to express myself; and hence true or untrue, it is not tautology.

Another problem which is closely connected with this one, is Perry's 'doctrine of Independence.' By '*independence*' Perry means '*non-dependence*.' Independence is not the same as absence of relation in general. It is the 'whole-part' relation which is recognised as the case of dependence—the whole depending on its parts. All 'simples' are independent realities—only the complexes which they constitute are dependent—dependent on the simples which are their parts. (Ref-*The New Realism*.) What Perry has done here is that he has given a negative definition of 'independence' and not a logical one. In order to defend this position he needs give us an exhaustive list of dependence which he fails and fails since he cannot. To put it in the remark of F. C. S. Schiller,—“to assert therefore that 'entities are independent unless they are proved dependent' is to go far beyond Perry's brief; it can be inferred only (as in the similar case of the chemical elements) that 'entities' which have not yet been proved dependent ('composite') may be independent ('elementary').” (*Mind* 1914, p. 390).

Thus we may not have sufficient evidence for supporting Perry's objections, but does it thereby make Bradley's position

safe? The relations, according to both Bradley and Bosanquet are internal or organic. The Ab-solutists' contention views all relations as equally relevant. Bradley has always asked us to conform to experience: and if accordingly we look to our everyday experience, we find that a man always perceives an object from his perspective only. He can not and does not perceive the object in all its conceivable relations—which are only possible in the conceptual world. His perception is 'always relevant to purpose.' If we abstract the concept of relation out of the perceptual world of relations and if we go on thinking about the nature of relation then of course one relation is needed to be hooked on by another relation and this second one by another third, and so on *ad infinitum*. But such an '*infinitum*' is never felt in the concrete experience. Apart from the consideration of relations in the Absolute or Reality if we take up the relations as based on the finite experience, all relations are to be viewed as purposive—i. e. 'relations are relevant to purpose.' Reality to be an Absolute Reality must be an alogical principle and hence beyond any such relations. Relation always means the relation we have in the perceptual world. Such a doctrine of 'relevant relations' indeed supports the view of the internality of relations—wherever any such relations exist; but it shall never proclaim—nor it is wise to do so—the equal relevancy and the internality of all relations of the purposes with which objects are perceived; some are so trivial that they make some relations irrelevant and hence as good as external. The Neo-Realists do not readily dismiss the internality of relation, rather hold, that "The fact is that the theory of internal relations does not have a universal application." (*The New Realism*, 167) On the other hand, they maintain that some relations are external and hence do not affect the terms related. To some extent this is not true as is obvious from the doctrine of purposiveness of relations just mentioned before.

Bosanquet refutes the doctrine of Neo-Realism showing its mistake of bifurcating the reality, into two—the mind 'here' and the 'object there.' He further adds, "Mind is never confronted by one object only." "If there is a mind on the one side, there is at least a complex of objects on the other." "Mind takes itself *ab initio* as a world, not as an object in a world." And from this doctrine of consciousness as a world we get the clue to Bosanquet's theory of the continuity of thought and its objects. Here also the doctrine of internality and equal relevancy of all relations, as indicated from Bosanquet's position, is based upon the concept of Reality as a concrete individual whole. The Universe around us is no doubt a unity—one and rational. True that our thought proceeds by identity in difference' and also equally true it is to hold that the concreteness and unity is the very nature of thought, but is it not too much to conclude—therefore Reality must be a concrete individual whole as bereft of all discreteness? (Vide my paper on '*Thought and Reality*' as viewed by Bradley and Bosanquet—in the *Proceedings of the Calcutta Session of the Indian Philosophical Congress 1935*). From Bosanquet's theory of the reciprocal and indispensable character of mind and object also we can hardly maintain the theory that only the whole is real. It has been rightly remarked that Bradley has the tendency to over-emphasize the 'difference' aspect of thought to the neglect of the 'identity' aspect, whereas Bosanquet stresses on the latter to the neglect of the former. To us their importance is of the same level. When any relation is bereft of difference, we find no justification for accepting 'identity' or conversely. We must hold where identity stands, difference is his left wing and when 'identity vanishes difference must follow.' As against the doctrine of internal relations, W. P. Montague has remarked, "That fallacy consists in the assumption that the nature of the parts of a complex depends upon

the nature of the whole complex, and consequently, that knowledge of merely a part of the truth must as such be false..... We do not leave to have all truth in order to have some truth. I can misapprehend some qualities of an object without misapprehending its other qualities." (*The New Realism* p. 299).

Whatever criticism might be put forth by the Neo-Realists, mind must be given a due credit in the construction of the world—rather it must be given a place in the heart of Reality. Pure external relations are meaningless and unthinkable. But equally meaningless and unwarranted by experience to assume the doctrine of equal relevancy of relations as indicated by the views of Bradley and Bosanquet. Relations are internal no doubt but can we not also suppose the varying degrees in the internality of relationships as Leighton has expressed ? (Vide *Phil. Rev.* 1914, Vol. 23). Such a suggestion can perhaps preserve the valid rights of human purpose and endeavour, which may be called the only 'world' or 'whole,' since such a world's reference can keep us within the possibilities and actualities of our experiences. It matters little whether our consequences become Absolutism or no Absolutism.

The Dynamics of Indian Philosophy.

By

M. V. V. K. RANGACHARI.

Belief in static perfection is not supported by experience. Evolution, (Parinama) was recognised by the Samkhya system. The recognition of 'Apurva' as a super-sensuous principle sustaining causality in apparently disconnected events implied movement within the Purva Mimamsa school. The Nyaya-Vaisheshikas believe in the disturbance of atomic equilibrium wherefrom resulted the creation, and while it moved the universe lasted, while the restoration of the static equilibrium meant Pralaya (dissolution). In its dynamical aspect the Yoga system is hardly to be differentiated from the Samkhya thought, whatever the difference in the Sadhana advocated. For one thing, Yoga may be said to be more dynamic than the renunciatory scheme of Samkhya-sannyasa. The sixth school of Vedanta started with Brahman, the Perfect Being; according to Sankara, the Perfect Being was truth, knowledge, and infinity (Satyam, Gnanam Anantam Brahma). It was Truth, Knowledge and Bliss (Sat chit ananda). There is no second entity. The visible universe is illusion (vivarta). The Perfect Being is without qualities and of the nature of consciousness (Nirvisesha, chinmatra). But under Ramanuja the icy cold perfection is qualified by the reality of the universe, which is a fraction (amsa) of the Supreme Being. (Padasya visva bhutani, tripadsya amrutamdivi, in Prusha Sukta, and Visthabyaham idam kritanam ekamsena sthitho jagat, Gita, X, 42). The logical sequence of such a starting point was the introduction of Parinama (evolution) into the Vedanta thought also, and support was found in the earlier Bodhayana Vritti

which Ramanuja expressly followed. To attribute reality to the moving creation is to acknowledge the dynamic aspect of life, and replace the contentment of perfection by a conscious individual and social endeavour (Prusha prayatna).

The essential substance (reality, Satyatva) of eternality (nityatva, lastingness) is not stoppage, but movement and progress. The march on the railroad of life comes across many a level-crossing. The composite experience in any point is not released from spatial considerations anymore than the train may ignore the clock. Social life is like all events in the space-time continuum, conditioned by and inter-related with other events spread out on the one canvass of outstretching time and expanding space.

To acknowledge relativity is not to belittle the homage due to the past. The process of time-thinking when it helps the historical elements having a survival-value to assert themselves should on the other hand become helpful to social evolution. But the tendency to identify all modern movement with space-thinking is not an adequate presentation of the case for progress. But somehow, it is soon becoming the fashion to raise a ghost using the name of Karl Marx in quarters where his thought is least considered. Aspects of social, economic and political philosophy have only to mention a name to bring wholesale condemnation over their head. This perversion is due to Avidya (ignorance) of the essential character, conditions and limitations of a system which is now named Dialectical Materialism, but which is the fruit of Hegel's method of approach to life and the universe.

To understand that the ideology of Marxism drew largely from the Hegelian Dialectics of Thesis, Antithesis and Synthesis and further to realise what close parallelism runs between Sankara's Vedanta and Hegel's philosophy may help as proof against a judgment *ex parte* in condemnation of a cause least attempted to be understood. Marxism claims to show

that the general trend of political and social developments cannot run counter to economic forces. These in their turn do not run counter to the more unconscious development of science and technique. The idealism of Hegel leaves the world in the dreamland of abstraction. Marx and Engels evolved a plan of collective life in the practical surroundings of western society, with its class-wars and industrial exploitation.

From the Marxist point of view, thought and action form an inseparable unity. The stratification of a group of people who produced thought without action was the result of the emergence of class-societies. The priests or theorist-philosophers mostly helped to cloak over the inequalities of wealth and power in society by mythological or metaphysical formulations. Attached to and living on the wealthy, these myth-makers and theorists acquired for their modes of abstract thought the prestige that attaches to wealth and power. Marxian analysis cut across their claims. The industrial worker of the Marxian period furnished him with the model of the unity of thought and action. To correlate thought and action is not to slip history down; rather it is to enliven history, to infuse freshness and life into theoretical forms verging on extinction. To quicken the philosophical sense and make it flow in practical channels is furthering the cause of history and by no means causing the loss of the historical sense. Marx, at any rate, was no space-thinker.

The universe is an inter-related changing process. We apprehend it in parts, separating out, in thought, certain partial processes. Such aspects as society, means of production and similar words may be named as isolates. They are things that we drag from their environments in space, time and matter. They are mere fictions, for dialectically nothing is free of its environment. The experiment and observation of physical science is based upon this isolation of phases, rendering them neutral to the rest of the changing universe. Analysis

and experiment would be impossible unless the thing analysed or experimented upon remained immune from external changes. Care is taken for instance that electricity is insulated so that the tests sought to be applied may respond with precision. The isolates of science are measurably immune from the personality of the scientist. The personal factor does not enter into the experiment. The core of the scientific process is the investigation of cause and effect, of discovering the principles of determinism, of finding out complementary isolates forming a neutral combination. Cause and effect are thus dialectically interlocked.

The application of these very principles to human psychology, and to social life, by chopping off the object of investigation, disconnecting it notionally with the rest of its environment for purposes of study and better concentration is the method of social science gradually gaining in importance in our time. But the scientist would be committing a mistake if he fail to restore the isolate in its original setting as when he forgets to put back the apparatus or to return the books he has borrowed out of the library.

Any isolate, be it a physical object, a live animal, an individual mind, or even a whole nation, operates simultaneously in two different modes. It functions under the influence of its environment, and it is itself the dynamic that reacts on its environment. There is not a dog that is born, but has softened a human breast while eating crumbs that fall from the human hand.

Events are thus not merely the passive recipients of the environment, but are also the active agents affecting its shape. Even so, the time-thinking habit of the Indian mind may have reacted in the past, as certainly it does now, on the environment. The intellectual heights of Hegel, Spinoza, Emerson, Shelly, Carlyle and Wordsworth may have had something to do with Vedanta. The atmosphere of oriental

metaphysics was not sealed so as not to flow into Alpine surroundings. Hegel may have imbibed the idealism of the Gangetic plains or breathed serene Himalayan airs. If to understand Marx, we read Hegel's philosophy, to reach Hegel, we should in logic look to Spinoza. The universal substance according to Spinoza was a kind of static but objective reality from which mind and matter both proceeded by some mystic differentiation. This static conception is akin to Sankara's Brahman, but for the negation of objectivity of matter implied in the Vivarta doctrine. Spinoza's Substance was a basic unity interpenetrating all features of the universe, even as God pervaded the universe and yet remained. (Vishtabhyaham idam kritenam ekamsena sthitho jagat,--Gita, X, 42). On the background of this idea of a universe inter-related through the medium of Substance, Hegel superimposed his conception of continuous dialectical movement, a changing, developing, evolutionary universe. While Hegel stood for evolutionary change in an objective reality much as Ramanuja did in Visishtadvaita Vedanta, his emphasis on Idealism placed him in the company of Sankara whose static Brahman is the predecessor of Spinoza's substance. Karl Marx inverted Hegel's dialectical procedure and discovered in the economic need of man in material surroundings the prime mover of all ideas. By the impact of ideas and the action they lead to on the economic structure is all social change effected. History is not merely the biography of great men, it is in essence social history. The necessities of social life are the basis on which communities develop, and in this economic setting, the laws of changing society must be studied.

Even as Ramanuja and Madhva were historically and logically the successors of the ideal monism of Sankara, Hegel's philosophy led in dialectical sequence to the practical socialist ideas of Marx. While Sankara, and Hegel detached

themselves from the determinism of practical life, Ramanuja and Madhva in the east, and Karl Marx and others in the west brought to bear their theories upon the problems of collective life. The differences in the results were shaped by history, by the variations which affected the dialectical movement. Ramanuja did less violence to the pre-existing form of social thought, economic structure, and allegiance to textual authority, while evolving a scheme for mass-emancipation, whereunder caste was assigned a secondary position, and social service (prapatti) was put in the forefront. Economic collectivisation was also started in temples and mutts that afforded food and culture on the group-basis (Goshthi). If the balance of social economic and philosophical tradition was maintained under him, it was because reform at pedestrian pace fulfilled the social need of his hour. But the indication of active reform is patently marked, whatever the turn social changes took since then.

Karl Marx was faced with different material. The level of production, the state of technical development, and the fact that ownership and control of machinery were vested in a class determined his approach to the problem. Population was socially and economically stratified, and the class-structure resting on exploitation of the property-class does not remain static. History witnessed the emergence of internal forces giving rise to passage to new phases of society. It is undialectical to ignore history, as much as to suppose that history affirmed status quo, irrespective of present conditions. One who is not aware of the social conditioning of his thought feels that he can reach a final and universal truth. He thinks he can start with some principle which is absolute, certain, having a universal validity, and open for all time. He overlooks that relativity of knowledge prevents the discovery of such 'absolutes'. Under the same social conditions there may be room for considerable variety

between one system and another, as under the Vedanta from the textual triad (Prasthanā triya) the Acharyas drew up different systems. But between all these there is a common bond, arising from the social conditions in which they were formulated. A recognition of the social conditioning of philosophy at once reveals the absurdity of claiming absoluteness for any of its phases. Dialectical Materialism is conscious of this social reference. It is materialist because it defines the central problem of modern society as a material problem and hence insists that any philosophy which is conscious of reference must start at this point. It gains support in this regard from all systems that do not abrogate totally from the the realistic basis of the universe and of man's place therein. The Vivarta of Sankara tended to a fatalistic unconcern with the realities of life. They are no cold unreal phantoms, but are a fraction (amsa) of the Purna (entirety). Service of humanity (prapatti) is the duty whereby the evolution of higher stages of existence is accomplished. While all the Acharyas seek to allay the Buddhistic catastrophe upon Vedic authority, the march of ideas between themselves *inter se* is no less dialectical.

In Europe on the other hand, science and its application for social purposes through technology has emerged in response to the needs of production. Its first stage was the investigation of material nature, in Physics, Geology etc., the second stage was concerned with life in the organic world (Biology, etc.) and lastly it is now concerning itself with consciousness (psychology, sociology etc.). The small-scale production in pre-capitalist era based on private ownership of tools by the worker was replaced by factory-production and social science presented fresher qualities of adjustment. The scientific machine was a new social venture that went on increasing in quantity. Capitalist accumulation proceeded until the many small capitalists were replaced by the few. The expropria-

tion of the many and the formation of huge combines like Steel-Trusts etc., and industrial concerns in England, Europe and America concentrate business and capital in a few hands. The workers are driven to amalgamate, through unemployment and misery, and the spirit of revolt developed. The concentration of means of production and the organisation of labour reach a point where they burst their capitalist covering. When private property is dissolved, the expropriators are expropriated. The dialectical movement exemplifying the negation of the negation is seen where through over-expansion, the capitalist that negated the small-scale producer negates his own system falling a prey to the clamours of labour. Through excess, even nectar may prove injurious as venom (*amritopamam pariname vishamiva*, Gita, XVIII, 38). From the capitalist, the centre shifts on to the peasant and worker who attain prominence in social organisation. The return of the small-scale producer of the pre-capitalist period into power in the guise of the mass-producer in nationalised factories and farms, is the negation of the power of capital, that itself negated the importance of the workers of the earlier stage. The rule of negation of negation is the paraphrase of the homeopathic formula 'similia similibus curantur' (Cf. *ushnam ushнена seetalam*). Treatment by similars in collective application is the method of Dialectical Materialism.

The paradox of social order negating itself is accomplished through an invisible process. Action through inaction, and inaction, in visible action is the formula (*Karmanyakarmayah paryedakarmanicha karmayah*, Gita, IV, 18). Astronomical bodies are not determined by apparent motion. Seemingly at rest, a body may be undergoing rapid changes, like the sleeping top. This dynamic sleep is Yoga, alive and active in the stillness of night while the ordinary pre-occupations of life convey no sublime significance (Cf. *Yanisa sarvabhutanam, yasyam jagrati samyami* : Gita, II, 69). Sunlight reveals

objects on the earth, but it screens from view, the brilliance of the stars. The darkness of night closes down the world but displays the glory of the heavens. Darkness is the negation of the sun, but starlight is the negation of that negation. Vice versa, starlight is negation of darkness but the sun is the negation of that negation. Marxian dialectics are simply the application to social life of the principles of Hegel's idealism. But the application of the formula of negation need not stop there. Fascism agrees in principle that the economic structure of society shapes the political structure. As democracy does not correctly reflect the capitalist industrial society, the Fascist would construct a political form in the Corporate State which does express the economic structure. There again arises the application of the formula of negating the negation. If Socialism is the child of capitalism, Fascism is yet another issue in the pedigree. The movement of economic life not only determines but is determined by social conditions, as any isolate has been stated already to operate in that double manner.

The operation of the law of negation of the negative does not result in the return to identity with the past, for that is impossible on the fleeting canvas of time-space. It expresses similarity in a wide sense, with due regard to history, much as the drug which the homoeopath prescribes for known symptoms of disease after strict proof and on valid potentiation. The cure by similars in crude form may not help. Herein we discover the second of the laws of Dialectical Materialism, the transition of quantity into quality. Heat applied to water beyond a point converts it into steam. The withdrawal of the same form of energy below a point freezes it into ice. Here then is the principle that variations of quantity are capable of producing qualitative differences, as ice, water and steam are qualitatively very divergent.

The emergence of new qualities by repetition of constant practice (abhyasa) is alluded to in the Gita : *Abhyasat ramate yatra dukkhamtanoha nigachati, yattadagre vishamiva pariname amrutopamam*, XVIII, 37. Even venom may be brought down into use as nectar, by varying the dose, or frequency. For the apparent divergence in the nature of the effects produced is but the quantitative difference at the source, translated in sequence of the causal chain. To get at the origin of this qualitative evolution we should look into the structure of the isolate itself. The extreme complexity of any unit under examination will reveal itself readily. An economic collective unit called society is the best example. In the capitalist era, production is for profit rather than for social service. The need of a constantly expanding market for its products chases the producer over the whole world. It must nestle everywhere, settle everywhere, establish connection everywhere. This exploitation of the world market, gives a cosmopolitan character to production, and consumption in every country. It has drawn from under the feet of industry the national ground on which it stood.

Capitalism strove toward higher prices and scarcity. The scientific movement on which it was founded on the other hand functions from its very nature for plenty. Here then is the fundamental law of the interpenetration of opposites. Capitalism calls into being and becomes interpenetrated with something that must assist its own contradiction or annihilation. Technology works for mass-production, which is detrimental to scarcity and dependent on profit. As a growing organism carrying its own seed of decay, as the magnet has two inconsistent poles, as bodies are charged with positive and negative current, the *Dvandas* of life interpenetrate, coexist, and complicate all objects of study. The Gita speaks of immortality and death, Being and Non-Being in one. (*Amritanchaiva mrityuscha, sadasatohhaham*, IX, 19). Scientific mass-produce-

tion and the profit motive *dehors* social service co-exist not as static unchanging isolates, separate and unconnected, but the one evoked for the support of the other. But for scientific technology, capitalism would not have been where it has come to stay. But for the capitalist impetus, science would not have invented so richly in her time. Scarcity stands for the well-being of the privileged few, as it meant larger dividends. The increase of technical application: worked in the contrary direction. Science has turned to be a danger to society in more than one way. The great mass of low-paid labour lost the purchasing power. Mechanical appliances and labour-saving devices increased unemployment. While the employment of martial genius has been greatly responsible for unprovoked wars of aggression and wholesale destruction. Vice versa, capitalism itself would frustrate science, by endeavouring to restrict production to safe-guard rich returns for the investment. Many a capitalist enterprise would sigh relief if science were given a holiday at least temporarily. For, even while machinery and plant were being installed for producing into market a given article, the expert in another laboratory comes forward with improved editions of the same based on some new discovery. The contradictions involved in the capital-labour problem of the western class-society are the collective presentation in society of what is inborn in individual constitutions. The human body is a conflict of contending forces, pulling and pushing in opposing directions; to treat the person it needs to diagnose the several tendencies of the complex entity. The preponderance of any disposition for a time determines the character of the individual at that stage, even as the frequency of his pulse on Vat, Pith or Cough goes to characterise the malady. Our innate qualities of reason, impetuosity, or inertia (Satwa, Rajas, and Tamas) are themselves alternating factors (Gunas) dependent upon the temporal conditions of nourishment, culture and discipline,

Through the variation in the play of these forces, operating externally as also from within, characters and dispositions individual as well as collective exchange their places to be replaced by others. The exploration of human personality is the latest phase of the western science.

The movement of social interest from the material world to the world of organic life and then to the world of human personality is the rhythmic development of science from physics through biology to psychology and social science. The ultimate aim of humanity is not the production of the factory-hand for turning out profits and dividends under individualist capitalism or collectivised economy. The recognition of the supreme claims of humanity places Indian thought in the forefront of all ideology. "Prushānna param kinchit sã parāgatih" says the Katha Upanishad (I. iii, 11). Nothing is superior to the Purusha, that is the end, that the supreme goal. The conception of universal life as Hiranyagarbha wherein are aggregated infinite individual souls is an Indian product. Collectivised life is promoted not by competitive profit-motive, but through the realisation of the unity of existence conceived as the highest duty. The cosmic self is superior to the short-sighted calculations of profit and loss within the economic understanding of the machinist mind. There is nothing nobler than man, repeats the Mahabharata. "Na manushat sreshthataram hi kinchit". Duty to the race and the interests of the larger life are recognised as the one motive valid for all human enterprise. "Karyamityeva yatkarma niyatam kriyaterjuna, sangam tyaktava, phalamchaiva satyaga sajvikomajah," (Gita, XVIII, 9). The sense of duty towards humanity, relinquishment of selfish attachment, and also the elimination of the profit-motive is the highest form, the pure Satwic activity. Non-intervention pacts based upon fear of suffering, or of loss of possession and prestige does not obtain the true fruit of Tyaga. Humanism was the axis on which

the Indian systems rotated. The social purpose of science is bound to gain greater recognition while the dictatorships of the modern world crushing human liberties under iron heel are passing reactions. The profit-urge in all forms defeats its own purpose as there are limits to which all Rajasic and Tamasic activity may tend.

Yoga is skill in action that maintains the balance. Human skill, the collective genius of the race discovers the true centre of gravity that should maintain the balance, irrespective of the minor considerations of happiness and pain, profit and loss, success and defeat in provincial limitations (*Sukha dukhe samekritva, labhalabhau, jaya jayan*). In the process of that discovery some disturbing forces may be ruled out, but negation if not proceeding from selfish motive, where reason is not contaminated, is no obstacle to social evolution. History is witness to evolution moving at pedestrian pace, running downhill at accelerating speed, leaping across a stream in the valley and climbing slowly up the next slope. It depended on the setting in which the feet were laid and the momentum of forces that drove onward. The springs of endeavour were free from the taint of exploitation for gain and the crushing of personal life and freedom among people wholly content with what came, not very particular of possessing the home, yet firm in devotion. (*Santhushtho yenakenachit, aniketasthiramathih, Gita, XII, 19*). The collective national home in the west, and the hotel life in America is breaking up the home, but the difference lay in the urge behind. Detachment, not to identify oneself with son, wife or home, equilibrium when events wished-for and un-wished for occurred (*Gita, XIII, 10, Asaktiranabhishwangah putra dara grihadishu, nityancha samachittatvamishthanishthopapattishu*) is far removed from the state-nurseries, companionate alliances, and collective messes of the world in our time. Back of the modern social forms, capitalist or collectivised, is the rush of

speed, the feeling that somehow one division of humanity is put to compete in a race with another, a mad unbalanced strain upon tolerance springing through fear of internal dissension and aggression from without. The aftermath of the machine age forgets the human hand behind. The message of scientific humanism is yet to open a page before the dynamics of Indian Philosophy stands revealed.

Sri Sankaracarya's Commentary on the Yogasutrabhasya.

BY

Prof. C. KUNHAN RAJA, M. A., D. PHIL. (OXON).

(University of Madras.)

In studying the philosophy of a person, one should study the works of that philosopher and to that extent the present article has an interest from the philosophical point of view. There is a very interesting commentary on the Yogasutrabhasya of Vyasa and in the colophons the work is attributed to the Great Sankaracarya. Only one manuscript is known and there are transcripts of this in the Government Oriental Manuscripts Library, Madras (R No. 2783.) and in the Adyar Library (39.C.13). The original manuscript has been returned to the owner.

There is a colophon at the end of each of the four Pādas. The colophon is exactly identical at the end of the first and the second Pādas and it reads :

iti govindabhagavatpūjyapādaśiṣyasya paramahaṃsapari-
vrājakācāryasya śaṅkarabhagavataḥ kṛtau pātāñjalayoga-
sūtrabhāṣyavivarāṇe etc. etc.

At the end of the fourth Pada the colophon is the same, except that there is "iti Sri Govinda" instead of "iti Govinda". At the end of the third Pada, the colophon is very short and reads "iti patanjalaḥśāstravivarāṇe bhagavatpādiye etc."

The name of the commentary is not given in the colophon. The commentary is not known to the world. There is only a passing reference to the work in an article by Dr. Haradatta Sarma in the Indian Historical Quarterly, Vol. V. P. 430. There is also a notice of it in an article by Mr. M. Ramakrishna

Kavi in the Quarterly Journal of the Andhra Historical Research Society, October 1927.

There are many works of Sankarācārya included in his collected works and even among them, the authorship is questioned in the case of some. There are others which are assigned to the Ācarya by tradition but which are not included in his collected works. Such are the various Jayamangalā commentaries on (1) the Kamasutra (2) Kāmandakiya (3) Bhaṭṭikavya (4) Arthasastra and (5) Sankhyakarika. The present work too belongs to the group, though it does not bear the name of Jayamangalā.

The commentary on the Kamasutra and on the Kamandakiya must be by the same author. The opening verses are more or less identical. But according to the printed edition (Chowkamba Series), the commentary on the Kamasutra is not by Sankaracarya. The colophon reads : Sri vātsyayaniyakamasutratikayam jayamaṅgalābhidhayam vidagdhanganavirahakatareṇa gurudattendrapadabhidhena yaśodhareṇa ekatra kṛtasutrabhasyayam etc. In the Jayamangala commentary on the Kamandakiya (Trivandrum Sanskrit Series), it is seldom that the name of Sankaracarya occurs and when it occurs the usual wording "govindabhagavatpujyapada etc" does not occur. The commentary on the Bhaṭṭikavya may be by another person, since in the opening verse we do not see the same similarity which we see in the other two commentaries mentioned above. The colophons assign the commentary to Sankaracarya but without the "govindabhagavatpujyapada etc". In the case of the Jayamangala commentary on the Arthasastra, there is only a fragmentary copy, a transcript of which is available in the Government Oriental Manuscripts Library, Madras (R. No. 5208) and another in the Adyar Library (39. A. 10) The name Jayamangala does not occur in the opening verse as in the case of the above three. There is no mention of Sankaracarya

in the colophons and only once does the name of Jayamangala occur.

The Jayamangala on the Sankhyakarika gives the name in the opening verse and the name of Sankaracarya occurs in the colophons in the familiar style of "govindabhagavatpujyapada etc." The commentary on the Yogasutrabhasya attributed to Sankaracarya has two introductory verses at the beginning. But the name Jayamangala is not given there. The opening of the commentary proper has some similarity to the commentary on the Sankhyakarika. The opening verses read :

yasmin na staḥ karmavipākau yata āstām
kleśā yasmai nālam alaṅkhyā nikhilānām
nāvacchinnaḥ Kāladiśā yaḥ kalayantyā
lokeṣān taṁ kaitabhaśatrum praṇamāmi

yaḥ sarvavit sarvavibhūtiśaktir
vibhadosopahitakriyāphalaḥ
viśvodbhavāntasthithetur lāo
namo 'stu tasmai gurave gurūṇām

These opening verses too have a close similarity with these in the Jayamangala commentary on the Sankhyakārika. The commentary proper begins : athetyadi patanjalayogasastravivaranam arabhyato tatraanakhayasambandhaprayojanam na purusaprayatniniivrttibhyam paryapnoti iti sutrakarabhiprote purusaprayatniniivrttibhuto sambandha prayojane purvam pratikriyete. This too is closely related to the beginning of the Jayamangala on the Sankhyakarika. The author of these two commentaries must be the same and must be different from the author of the other Jayamangala commentaries.

There is a commentary on the Vyasabhasya on the Yogasutras by Vacaspati ; there is also a commentary on the Sankhyakarikas by Vacaspati. In the article on the Jayamangala commentaries by Dr. Hara Datta Sarma (mentioned

above) the Doctor has shown a passage in the commentary on the Sankhyakarikas by Vacaspati which must be a reference to the Jayamangala. Vacaspati criticises a certain view without mentioning the author whom he is criticising and there is considerable force in Dr. Hara Datta Sarma's argument that the person criticised must be the author of the Jayamangala. But it is not conclusive.

There is a passage in the commentary on the Yogasutras by Vacaspati, which appears to be a reference to the commentary now under consideration. In explaining the Sutra, "pracchardanaividharanabhyam vā pranasya" (Sutra 14, 1st Pada), Vacaspati says, "vasabdah vaksyamanopayantarapeksah, na maitryadibhavanapeksaya ; taya saha samuccayat." Here he explains the purpose of the word "vā." Usually he gives the meanings of such words without any comment. This comment suggests that there is a previous commentator who has given the purpose otherwise ; and actually in the Commentary now under consideration, the purpose is given exactly as what Vacaspati says it is not. This is what we find in the Commentary, "vasabdo maitryadibhavanopayantaravikalparthah." It is likely that Vacaspati had this commentary in view when he made the remark quoted above.

But there are serious difficulties in accepting this Commentary as earlier than Vacaspati. If a passage in Vacaspati presupposes a passage in the Commentary of Sankara, there are many passages in the Commentary of Sankara which presupposed Vacaspati. In explaining the 7th Sutra in the 2nd Pada, Sankara accepts a reading which is different from the reading accepted by Vacaspati. The usual reading of the Sutra is, "sukhanusayi ragah"; the next Sutra is "dukkhanusayi dvesah." The commentary of Sankara is "sukhanujanma ragah ; anujanma anutpattih yasya sah." Here the manuscript is a little corrupt ; but there is no doubt that the reading accepted by Sankara is "sukhanujanma ragah." Then

Sankara says, "anyesam paṭhaḥ sukhānusaṃyāgi rāgaḥ, duḥkha-nusaṃyāgi dvesaḥ iti." Then he adds, "ubhayathāpi anujanma-taiva tacchilyam. "Here too the manuscript is corrupt ; but what is interesting is that the reading assigned to anyas (others) by Sankara is the reading which Vacaspati accepts. Similarly in the 17th Sutra of the 1st Pada Sankara says, "rupasabdō matrarthah api tarkadipurvadharma-traya vaiyi-tatvakhyāṇanarthah." This is a direct criticism of Vacas-pati.

But there is no direct reference in the one to the other. Vacaspati simply comments on the Yogabhasya of Vyasa ; but Sankara, in addition to commenting on the Yogabhasya, enters often into elaborate discussion of the points. During one such discussion Sankara makes a statement which makes me think that he is later than Vacaspati. In discussing the problem of God in the section beginning with the Sutra "Isavarapranidhanād va", he gives various arguments and then in the end he says, "samastalokavirodhan cāpi, sarve eva anarigopalam samvyavaharāmanah satatam sivanarayanadi-namna pranihitacetasaḥ pratishedhatsvapi sambhinnabuddhisu akanikṛtatatpratisedhavisayapallavaḥ paramesvaram pranata-murdhanah kusumanjaliprabhrtibhir arcyate." This is a concealed reference to the Nyayakusumanjali of Udayana. The passage too has a close resemblance to the opening passage in the Kusumanjali.

Weighing both sides, the probability is that Sankara is post-Vacaspati, that he is identical with the author of the Jayamangala commentary on the Sankhyakarika. He cannot be the same as the Great Acarya ; but must be a member of his śiṣyaparampara. Most likely he is a Svamin of the Trichur Mutt. The work closes with a reference to the Great Acarya thus :

prāṇamāmy abhujāṅgasaṅgraham

bhagavatpādam apūrvasaṅkaram.

This work, along with many others, though assigned to Sankara, is not the work of the Great Sankaracarya.

The Problem of Appearance and Reality: Phenomenal and Absolute Standpoints.

By

MANUBHAI C. PANDYA.

The phenomenal universe with its richest variety and innumerable seeming differences has given rise to philosophical problems of no small importance as regards the determination of its nature whether apparent or real. To the realists the physical world with its seeming solidarity and differences is real from a phenomenal point of view and as tested by the evidence of the senses. To the idealists it is an appearance only and is unreal from an absolute point of view. It will therefore be interesting to examine which side the truth lies.

What is Phenomenal Knowledge ?

It may be stated at the outset that all knowledge of the outside universe and the objects thereof reaches us by means of our senses and mind and not direct. Therefore the truth or otherwise of the said knowledge is dependent on other factors outside the said objects and it cannot be absolute. In fact all knowledge of the phenomenal world that is derived by us through our senses and mind is relative only and it gives us only a partial truth of the said objects within certain limits of time, space and causal relations which have no objective and absolute reality. The Greek word "phenomenal" is defined by Webster as "An appearance ; anything visible ; whatever is apprehended by observation." The seers of India however have proclaimed time and again that "the phenomenal world was but a series of changing shifting forms and events, nothing being, abiding, or permanent. To the mind of the sages, none

of these phenomenal things was or were 'Real' in the sense of existing, fixed, permanent or constant, just as we use the term in connection with Real property,—Real estate—Reality etc., in law to-day. And accordingly, the sages bade their students recognize that the Phenomenal universe was not 'Real' in the philosophical sense of the word."

Test of Reality.

However pure reason must convince the philosophical mind that there must be something real behind the phenomenal universe of names, and forms, otherwise the latter could not exist even in appearance and that there must be a background of Reality which the philosophers call the Absolute which is permanent and unchanging (*Kūṭastha*). No material object in this phenomenal world could be said to be absolutely real (*Vastu-sat*) as it is an effect and subject to changes (*Vikāra*) and every change is temporary. The proper test to determine whether an object is real is not whether it is perceived by the senses but whether it endures permanently in the same state without undergoing any change. It is said "Whatever exists not in the beginning or in the end exists not really in the present"¹

Two-Fold Consciousness of Experience.

"Every part of experience involves two-fold consciousness viz., the consciousness of the real (*Sat*) and the consciousness of the unreal or appearance (*Asat*). Now that is said to be real of which our consciousness never fails, and that to be unreal of which our consciousness fails."² There must be an absolute reality which is neither a cause nor an effect. For what is fleeting must be unreal and what is constant must be real. The absolute reality which

1. Gaudapada Karika on M. U. 4-31.
2. Shankara Bhashya on B. G. 2-16.

transcends time, space, and causal relations is not conditioned by causality and therefore the perception of the series of causes and effects must be illusory. In fact the reality and the unreality of things are thus to be inferred from our own experience. "Now in all our experience a two-fold consciousness arises with reference to one and the same substratum. Of these two, the consciousness of an object, e. g. a pot, is temporary as pointed out above but not the consciousness of existence. Thus the object e. g. a pot, is unreal because the consciousness is temporary ; but what corresponds to our consciousness of existence is not unreal because the consciousness of existence is unfailing."³ From the circumstance that an object e.g. a pot on the ground, has disappeared, one cannot say that the consciousness of existence has also disappeared as the consciousness of existence which corresponds to the attributive and not substantive cannot arise in the absence of the substantive and not that there is no objective reality present corresponding to the consciousness of existence. Even in the case of the disappearance of an object e.g. a pot on the ground, the consciousness of existence still arises in conjunction with the absence of a pot. When we say 'there is no pot,' existence is signified by reference to the place where the pot is said to be absent. We find the two-fold consciousness arising with reference to one and the same substratum even though one of the two objects corresponding to the two-fold consciousness is unreal as in the case of a mirage where our consciousness takes the form 'this is water' and the object corresponding to the consciousness of water is false.

The Absolute does not deny the Relative.

It will be thus seen from the above, that although all physical objects in this phenomenal world which are perceived by the senses are an appearance only and relatively real, yet there

is a universal objective reality called the Absolute present everywhere corresponding to the consciousness of existence which is the substratum and ground of the phenomenal universe which has a relative and transitional reality only and which is not denied by the Absolute but has its being within the Absolute by its mysterious potential power and which alone is real and self-subsisting from a philosophical point of view. The real existence however is not something material but it is a pure spirit in its pristine purity which is the source, ground, and destination of the phenomenal universe and has for its essential attributes eternal existence, knowledge, and bliss.

Evolution of the Idea of the Absolute in the Upanishads.

The above idea of the Absolute in its essence was evolved in the Upanishads by slow degrees as meaning Sat (existence), Chit (consciousness or thought) and Ānanda (Bliss). It is also described in the Taittiriya Upanishad as existence (Satyam) intelligence (Jñānam) and infinity (Anantam). The nature of reality being infinity, it is not possible to describe it in positive terms but it is described negatively only as 'not-this not-this'. The above predicates of existence, knowledge, and infinity are not attributes of the Reality or Absolute as it is attribute-less but they constitute its essence ontologically. The Absolute in essence is infinity. Hence it is not possible to limit it by defining it as possessing attributes which constitute limits to its essential nature which have a place in the phenomenal plane only and not transcendental one.

The Essence Of Reality.

The only thing that can be predicated of the attributeless Reality for certain is that it is not *Asat* (non-existence) but that it is *Sat* (eternal existence). It means that the Absolute is a Being having existence as its nature but not as its attri-

bute or quality. It may be stated here that the empiric world of names and forms is also called *Sat* which means real from the phenomenal point of view. But the Absolute is distinguished from all material objects also called real(*Sat*) by the predicates of eternity, indestructibility, and unchangeability. So it is called *Satyasya Satyam* or the essence of reality as distinguished from the empiric world which is simply called (*Satyam*) which means relatively real. ⁴ This doctrine of the real and the unreal may be traced so far back as the Rig Veda (See the Nāsadiya hymn, ⁵ of the Rig Veda which also contains the earliest germs of the doctrine of Māyā Vāda or the illusoriness of the world). The second essence of the Absolute reality is intelligence which is also not its attribute or quality. This essential attribute distinguishes the Absolute from material objects thus suggesting that it has intelligence as its essential nature which again is identical with essential being. The third essence of the Absolute is bliss or happiness which also constitutes its essence and not attribute thus distinguishing it from the embodied soul of the phenomenal world which undergoes many privations and sufferings and migrates from one bodily existence to another in endless cycles of births and deaths until true philosophical knowledge dawns upon it.

Conclusion.

It may be concluded that the Absolute is the only essential reality from a philosophical point of view and that it has a distinct objective existence separate from nature and man and having the attributes of eternal existence, intelligence, and bliss as constituting its essence and real nature while all other objects of the phenomenal world are an appearance only and which have only a relative reality and being within the Absolute.

4. (B. U. 2-1-20.)

5. (R. V. 10-129.)

Straight and Crooked Thinking.

By

SHANKAR RAO.

Straight thinking is very rare. Crooked thinking is very common. Perhaps it was this idea that prompted Oscar Wilde to exclaim : "I wonder who defined man as a rational animal. It is the most premature definition ever framed. Man is many things but not rational."

On the other hand, man takes pride in being rational. He lays claim to the sole proprietary rights over the faculty, called Reason, which he denies to the rest of the creation. Is his pride just, when he often turns, twists, and even mangles truth by crooked reasons and fallacious arguments ? Is his claim rightful despite the manifold errors, and glaring fallacies that he frequently commits ?

The privilege of answering this question is left entirely to you. I have no intention of establishing or disputing man's claims to Reason by means of reasons. I shall content myself simply with pointing out a few instances to show that Alice in Wonderland behaved not half so amusingly as Man in Blunderland does.

I will recount before you some of the crooked ways of thinking, and a few of the common, dishonest tricks in our arguments. You would see for yourselves how easy it is to avoid these errors and how blindly we swallow some of the validity-coated pills of false conclusions.

One of the commonest of errors is that of "Emotional thinking". It is the use of emotionally-toned words in a piece of argument. I shall call this the fallacy of "Coloured Thinking".

This fallacy consists in the use of emotionally-toned words

in scientific, political, moral, and religious discussions. Appeal is made to the heart, rather than to the head. Such words arouse strong emotional reactions, suffusing the whole of our consciousness, and overpowering our reason so completely that the cerebral activity is hardly called into play.

What is meant by an "emotionally-toned word"? There are two kinds of words :—

1. *Objective*, or Denotative, or Constitutive.
2. *Subjective*, or Connotative, or Epistemic.

1. The *Objective* or *constitutive* words denote some object, person, property, or relation. They stand for something. They are symbols or verbal signs used to indicate objects.

2. The *subjective*, or *Epistemic* words indicate some one's attitude towards an object or person. They imply something more than the surface meaning. They are essentially suggestive, evoking many ideas and associations in our minds in addition to the ideas of objects for which they stand. They might be called emotional words or emotion-ridden words.

The distinction between the *Objective* and *Subjective* words would become plain if we consider a few examples. e. g. The word "dog" has an objective meaning, or we might say a neutral, and colourless meaning. It denotes a four-footed domestic animal, kept as a pet. The word "cur" means a dog but it means something more too. Analysis of its meaning would yield the equation: cur—dog+mongrel, or inferior breed+ a flavour of disapproval+contempt. The word "cur" does not merely denote a 'dog', but also evokes emotions. It is an emotional word. 'Dog' is relatively colourless, but 'cur' is coloured with emotion.

Similarly the word "nigger" points to a member of a dark-skinned race, and arouses at the same time the feeling of strong disapproval and contempt. Take another word 'native'. At first it meant simply an original inhabitant of a country, then it took on the sense of a member of non-European or

uncivilised race, later on its import conveyed hatred and contempt. It was this word, no less than anything else that widened the gulf between the Indians and the British.

In still another group of words : 'firm,' 'obstinate', and 'pig-headed,' the objective meaning is the same, viz : to be steady, and to stick to one's purpose despite obstacles ; but the subjective meanings are quite different. 'Firm' carries a suggestion of approval ; 'obstinate' of mild dis-approval ; and 'pig-headed' of strong dis-approval.

Again what is "invincible heroism" in the case of our allies becomes "ponderous foolhardiness" in the case of our enemies. In the Great War, the British newspapers contrasted 'the spirit of our Tommies' with the 'mentality of the Huns'. In the recent Italo-Abyssinian war, some papers described the Ethiopians as patriots and the Italians as cruel monsters. A fluent and forcible speech by one of our own party is eloquent, a similar speech delivered by one of the opposite party is called a harangue.

From the above-quoted examples it would be clear that there are two kinds of words : 1. Those in which the objective meaning predominates ; and 2. Those in which the subjective attitude or emotional attitude predominates. The fallacy called "Coloured Thinking" for want of a better name occurs when the subjective words are used where objective words are required, and emotion takes the place of reason, and poetry the place of Logic. In asking you to avoid this fallacy, I do not mean that one class of words should be sacrificed for the other class of words, or one might be thrown out of the dictionary altogether. What I contend against is the misuse and abuse of words—i. e. the use of emotional words in the solution of scientific, social, or political, or religious problems. I believe that in very many cases the real truth is obscured by emotional words

I think that one of the chief reasons for the great progress

and advance made by Mathematics is that it steered clear of all the bogs of emotions and sentiments, and built its magnificent edifice of knowledge upon the solid rock of Reason. It avoided words as far as possible and made a very liberal use of figures, symbols, and notations. As it was not burdened with emotion-ridden words, it made rapid progress, and took the reasoning processes to the dizzy heights of Trigonometry, Differential and Integral Calculi. It would be equally true to maintain that the great advance made by Chemistry, Physics, and Biology was due no less to the very sparing use of emotionally-tinged words than to the experimental method. Was not Biology checked in its march of progress, when the traditional "nobility of man" was threatened by his proposed "base origin" in the form of the "Evolutional Doctrine"? "The Descent of Man from the Apes"—that little phrase—gave a greater set-back to the theory than all other counter-arguments put together. In olden days, when gold and silver were known as noble metals (mark the emotional words), Chemistry could make a very little headway, because the use of such words made dispassionate thinking impossible. The introduction of dry, and clear-cut formulæ— H_2O , H_2SO_4 , KNO_3 , etc. was a step taken in the right direction.

This slight digression was made to show that the growth and advancement of the modern sciences, and the exactness of the conclusions reached by them, have been very largely the result of their ridding themselves of all such terms as suggest emotional attitudes, and their restricting themselves to those objective words or symbols that merely indicate objects, properties, or relations.

The proposition that I wish to maintain is that the common use of emotional words in scientific, political, and religious thinking is as much out of place as would a chemical, or an algebraic formula be in the middle of a poem, e. g.

"A thing of beauty is a joy for ever,

$$a^2 - b^2 = (a+b)(a-b)"$$

I do not certainly mean to deprecate the role of feeling and emotion in our life, art, poetry, and literature. Far be it for me to minimize its value. But I do want to assert with all the force at my command, that science, morals, politics, religion, and most of the practical problems of life require a cool, calm, balanced, and logical thinking. Questions of tariffs, international wars, social ownership, strikes etc., need sober and dispassionate logic. Thomas Carlyle voiced the same idea, when he said to the great poet, Lord Tennyson, "Alfred, my man, whatever you have to say, say it in prose."

Emotional thinking has its place, but its proper place is not where important decisions are to be made. Its legitimate place is in poetry, romantic prose, drama, and fiction, where the chief aim of words is to produce certain emotions. But if we discuss our political, scientific, and social problems emotionally and also desire to arrive at true conclusions, we shall be trying to reach East by travelling West.

Let me now show you by a few concrete examples how the emotionally toned words lead us into the absurdest of errors.

Notice what John Ruskin said of Whistler's Picture "Nocturnes", "I have heard and seen much of Cookney Impudence before now, but never expected to hear a coxcomb ask two hundred guineas for flinging a pot of paint in the public's face." It is indeed a beautiful cascade of words, a brilliant criticism of the picture. But it is a rapidly flowing stream of emotional words that drift us away from truth. Reason is swept off its feet. Paraphrasing the piece in objective and colourless words, we get : "I have heard and seen much of the insolent behaviour of a native of London before now, but never expected a conceited fellow like this painter ask 200 guineas for painting a worthless or a meaningless picture."

Plainly not much is left of Ruskin's scathing criticism except that Whistler had asked too high a price for his picture.

Take another example. Sometime back an article appeared in the Tribune under the caption : "Crazy croakings of a crass communalist." This crass communalist was M. Ali and the crazy croaking was his speech. You can see how the very title prejudices the mind of the reader. Take another article from the same paper under the heading : "Peeping parcels and moving tents": These peeping parcels were women wearing burquas or veils. By citing this example I neither defend nor condemn the purdah system, but I merely try to invite your attention to the principle that emotionally toned words should not be substituted for argument. Appeal to reason is different from the appeal to passion.

In another paper one of Churchill's speeches was characterized as 'Mischief-maker's gall.' In a debate in the House of Commons about the boycott of foreign cloth by Indians, Churchill asked if it was a duty of parliament supinely to allow matters to drift till Lancashire was ruined. He maintained that the present policy was injurious to India and ruinous to Lancashire. Boycott, whether political, social, or economic should be proclaimed to be illegal. "Boycott was a fruit of weakness and the lack of confidence in British duty, and the British mission, and poisoned Hindu-Muslim relations". If we subject this passage to logical test, we shall discover that it is a mere collection of conflicting statements, unsupported by reasons. It is a fallacy-combed structure painted with emotion.

Let us take an extract from an article in the Sphere, entitled ; "India's future—The Report of the Joint Select Committee." by Mauser. It reads thus : "It is a paraphrase and an apologia to White Paper. The outcome is a farrago of give-and-deny, a patchwork of admissions and hopes and an avowal of root-incompatibilities in the warring interests which it sets out to solve, an attempt at constitution-making in the

best democratic manner for an immense sub-continent many thousands of miles away, the instincts of which at every essential point diverge from those of the West and which is only today learning the barest jargon of a system for the very names of which it has to borrow from our language...Verbose and over-scholarly in its representation, it lacks pith and point." Here again we find words which carry more or less strong suggestions of emotional attitudes in the discussion of political matters of such grave importance.

From this vice philosophical writings, which should in the fitness of things, be based on Logic, are not free. Take, for instance, Thomas Carlyle's criticism of the theory of utilitarianism. He called it "the mechanical profit and loss theory" : an upholstery and cookery conception of morals. He goes still further and describes it as "Pig Philosophy" which regards the universe as a 'swine trough' in which virtue is thought of as the attainment of the maximum quantity of 'Pig's wash.' Again, apostrophizing man, he says, "Art thou nothing else than a vulture seeking after somewhat to eat ; shrieking dolefully because carrion enough is not given thee ?" Very brilliant expressions, but argument nil. Coming down to the bare bones of statement, all these epithets simply mean that utilitarianism is the theory which maintains that we should always aim at the "greatest Happiness of the greatest number." The emotional words lead us astray and blind us to the real point at issue.

Another writer condemns Kant's Philosophy by dubbing it as "ghastly ballet of bloodless categories." Boiling down the statement, the underlying objective meaning is that Kant tries to explain the universe by the application of certain forms or categories of thought.

Take another example, how Joseph Jastrow characterizes Freud's theory of Psycho-analysis. He calls it "talking cure ;" "Chimney sweeping": Parodying Longfellow's famous lines :

"Dust thou art, to dust returnest, was not spoken of the soul," he says "Sex thou art, to sex returnest, was decidedly spoken of the Freudian soul". Freud's dream theory is described as a "boot-leg traffic in repressed desires." It smuggles its wares by wrapping them in camouflaged packages, and employing ingenious dramatic disguises, at times with as little regard for the moral as for the logical properties.

If we scratch even but slightly external varnish of those quotations, we shall find very little of sense or logic underneath. I think that these examples are quite enough to show how emotionally-toned words distort truth in social, political scientific and philosophical writings.

All and some Fallacy—Making a statement in which all is implied but 'some' is true.

It is time that I shall pass on now to another dishonest trick in our arguments: viz: "fallacy concerning the Indesignate Proposition." It springs up from the uncertainty as to whether the predication is made of the entire subject or a part of the subject. This is a very common fallacy. No other error, I believe, has been the cause of so much cruelty, injustice, and bloodshed throughout the history of the world as this error. It might sound strange, but it is nevertheless true that this piece of crooked thinking lies at the bottom of many of your communal riots, affrays, feuds and fights among different factions, wars and general massacres. History bears impartial testimony to the fact that the statement is no exaggeration. Take the case of the wholesale massacre of Protestants in France on St. Bartholomew's Day and examine the little mischievous imp of an argument that inspired it and drove it on. "Protestants are bad". The proposition is indesignate. It is neither universal nor particular. It is silent as to whether "all" or "some" protestants are bad. But we can safely declare that some protestants may be bad,

but certainly not all. The murderers however never stopped to consider, whether "bad" can be predicated of 'protestants' to an entire or a partial extent. In the Great War the slogan was "Down with Germans. They are wicked and murderous people. They should be exterminated—men, women, and children." Massacres of Jews in the middle ages, of aristocrats in the French Revolution, of communists, and anti-communist of our own time—all these are examples of the readiness of men to act on the proposition that all A'S are evil when A stands for men of another nation, race or creed. The truth is that some A'S are evil, but certainly not all. I do not, of course, wish to go so far as to say that all general statements of the form "All A is B" must necessarily be false. That itself be a general statement that was certainly false.

A question naturally crops up : Why are people so anxious to use and understand "all," when "some" is rightly implied ? The explanation for this, so far as I think, is that a sentence with 'some' says so little, and most people think that it was hardly worth saying at all. For instance, a man says, "some A'S are white". If the total number of A'S is 1000, then 'some' may apply to any figure between one and 999. This tendency to use 'all' where 'some' would be more proper, is chiefly due to an inordinate desire on our part to give force and weight to our statements.

It is strange that we forget that universal propositions, being more comprehensive, and all-embracing is vulnerable at a large number of points than a particular proposition. The former is in greater danger of being refuted than the latter. The universal proposition may be easily disproved by pointing even one instance to the contrary. e.g. A person maintains that 'all Jews are Cowards', his opponent need point to only one brave Jew, and the case is overthrown. If he had maintained the more moderate proposition that "some

Jews are Cowards," his proposition would have been safer and better fortified.

So we should be careful in making universal statements. We should be still more careful in dealing with 'indesignate propositions', and should not treat them as universal, when only the particular is true.

Appeal to authority.

Appeal to authority instead of Reason is another common fraud masquerading as truth. It is the trick of making a statement by a reference to a learned authority trusting that one's opponent will not challenge the proof. Invoking the aid of authority to strengthen an argument is not itself illegitimate. A fallacy may be charged only when proof is required, and nothing but authority is given. The trick lies in trying to overwhelm an opponent with shame at his temerity in opposing a great authority. "Reporters who interview successful business men, inventors, popular actresses, and famous generals for the purpose of getting the last word on Economics, science, sociology, or politics are guilty of this fallacy."

We attach too much importance to "Who" said this, to the utter neglect of *what* he said, and *what* proofs he gave. In the realm of reasoning the props to prestige—such as the titles of distinction, Fellowships of Royal Society, University degrees, morning coat and top-hat and Rolls Royce—are quite out of place. We should always stand on guard, with the club of logic in our hand, whenever any one tries to speak to us in "Thus saith the Lord" manner. These prestiges and pretended authorities are often abused. Respect authority by all means, but do not give it undue respect which should lead to neglect to examine the evidence for and against a given proposition.

Let me point out some of the many mischiefs made by this little dishonest trick of argument. The prestige of learned men and great writers has been frequently used to

crush many movements of Scientific discovery at their beginning. A striking example of the intellectual idolatry with which the schoolmen regarded Aristotle was that one of them denied the existence of spots in the sun, as the same was not mentioned in the works of Aristotle. Copernicus discovered that the earth moved round the sun and was cast into a dungeon for his pains, because his theories ran counter to the authority of the Holy Books.

The authoritative voice of the learned world delayed the acceptance of Harvey's discovery of the circulation of the blood for a whole generation. Lister's discovery of the use of antiseptics in surgery was similarly opposed by established medical authority. The great scientists ridiculed Edison's great invention, the phonograph, and on the occasion of its first demonstration, he was accused of playing the trick of ventriloquism.

So we find that authority becomes tyrannical and irrational unless it is constantly brought to the tribunal of facts and subjected to the criticism of others. A man however highly placed he may be, should never say, "As an authority on this subject, I know that these results are totally wrong". He ought to investigate the matter thoroughly before he has any right to pass a judgement on the work of another scientist.

This undue respect for authority is also used to exploit the multitude by the advertisers of quack medicines and promoters of public companies. A judge of a High Court, or a University Professor, or an Engineer recommends a particular *Surma* or ointment, or allows his name to be inserted in the list of Directors of a limited concern. The advertisers freely use the names of these well-known people to attract and win public confidence to the goods or shares they have to sell. The form of the argument involved would seem to be, that A is a man whose opinion on *many subjects* is of weight, therefore his judgement is of weight on all subjects. What the gullible

public forgets is that a professor of English Literature may be an authority on Shakespeare, Milton, or Bernard Shaw, but he knows precious little about medicines or insurance companies. We have to learn that men are to be trusted exclusively within the limits of their own experience, and in their own profession and pursuit.

So we should never allow authority to be substituted for reason.

To sum up: we have so far dealt with three common tricks in arguments.

1. The use of emotional words in arguments. The remedy is to translate them into objective words.

2. Wrong interpretation of an indesignate proposition. We should not make a statement in which "all" is implied when 'some' is true.

3. Appeal to authority.

Authority can never serve as a substitute for reason.

Badarayana On Subtle Body.

By

Pt. Krishna Dutta Bharadwaj.

A liberated soul can assume¹ several bodies simultaneously, and it can give² them up at its own will. When the emancipated soul (atman) is in a body, it enjoys the worldly things as we, the ordinary people, do in our waking³ periods with the organs of the sense. The case is similar when it is in more than one bodies. The difference between that soul and us lies in the scope of freedom and power. While we can not take up and refuse bodies at our will, the Mukta Jiva is free to do such miraculous deeds.

When not in a body or bodies the liberated soul enjoys worldly things through its mind only, just as we do in our dreams.⁴

The above description is easy to grasp. Enjoyment through a body of the five elementals is without any question. All of us experience this state of affairs during the day. Like-wiso, enjoyment through mind alone is also understandable, because we also feel pleasure in happy dreams at night through mind only. Here mind may mean mind alone or it may signify the inner body which constitutes the subtle elementals and Indriyas.

When an Atman ascends the path of salvation whence there is no⁵ return, it goes not alone, but is accompanied by the subtle⁶

1. भावं जैमिनि विक्ल्पामननात् (4, 4, 11)

2. अभावं बादरिराह छेदं (4, 4, 10)

3. भावे जाग्रदत् (4, 4, 14)

4. तन्वभावे सन्ध्यवदुपपत्तेः (4, 4, 13)

5. अनावृत्तिः शब्दात् (4, 4, 22)

6. प्रतिषेधा दिति चेन्न शारीरात् (4, 2, 12)

body. It should not be mistaken by what I have said above that a Mukta Atman, while not in a body, can think only. No, it can speak, see walk and so forth. That it can speak is clear from a passage of the Upanishad which describes a talk' between the ascending Purusha and its guide. So the mind with the liberated soul stands for the subtle body.

Now a question arises. Does the emancipated Atman reject this subtle body also ? It is a very perplexing question, and an unbiassed study of the Brahmasutras has led me to opine that, according to Badarayana, there is no separation of the subtle body from the Atman during salvation. All the subtle elements accompany the soul up to the abode of Para-Brahma.*

The Sutra which is very positive on this subject is अविभागे वचनात् 4. 2. 16. i.e. "non-separation, the scriptures say so." The scriptures say that the emancipated soul enjoys the objects by help of the mind" मनोऽस्य देवं चक्षुः मनसा पश्यन् रमते "The Sutras preceding अविभागे वचनात् discuss the subtle body and the following Sutras indicate the state of ascending the path of the Divine Abode. So the context shows that this Sutra is describing the relation between body and soul.

The following passage of the Prashna-Upanishad is worth quoting here in this connection :—

असौ परि द्रष्टुरिमाः षोडश कलाः पुरुषायणाः पुरुषं प्राप्यास्तं गच्छन्ति । It is said that the extract means that the subtle body of an emancipated soul leaves it. Let us examine the statement and apply our daily experience to it.

The English translation of the Sanskrit text would read like this : The sixteen Kalas having their seat in the Purusha,

7. तानि परि तथा ज्ञाह (4, 2, 15)

8. तं प्रतिब्रूयात्स्वत्वं ब्रूयात् (उपनिषद्) ।

lose themselves (lit. set) when they meet it. The 'Kalas' seem to stand for the inner body which constitutes the five organs of the sense, five organs of the action, five subtle elementals and one mind, which amount to sixteen.

Our daily experience shows that our different organs are absorbed in Atman leaving no trace of their separate entity during sleep. At that time their different names⁹ and functions are all stopped, though temporarily. Since these Kalas come out again after a few hours and resume their work as before, we cannot infer that they leave away the Atman. On the other hand, one is inclined to believe that they do exist with the Atman.

The above statement is applicable to the state of the Nirbij¹⁰ Samadhi also because there too the Yogi's organs cease to operate and not forsake the Atman.

Now if the above passage of the Upanishad is applied to the state of salvation, it would simply mean that during that period also the Indriyas of the emancipated soul stop their functions. The Sanskrit expression असं गच्छन्ति cannot convey the sense of absolute separation.

So it seems, from the study of Brahmasutras that Badarayana was of the opinion that the individual soul stands in an eternal and indissoluble connection with mind which represents a refined form of Prakriti. He perhaps could not think of the Atman residing without mind or Purusha without Prakriti. If Atman were the subject, the mind would be the predicate; and both Atman and mind make one complete unit, each one of them being incomplete. Badarayana's view seems to be very sound, and it is based on the scriptural texts also. "Just as the spokes are always associated with the navel of a working wheel, so does the mind with the soul."

9. भिद्यते तासां नामरूपे पुरुष इति बोध्यते (उपनिषद्) ।

10. तस्यापि निरोधे सर्वनिरोधाच्चिर्वाजः समाधिः (योगसूत्रं १-५१)

Acharya Ramanuja thinks that the soul is accompanied by the subtle body until it has reached Para-Brahma ; and after that it is the pure soul residing in the body of शुद्ध सत्त्व which enjoys the Divine Presence.

Acharya Shankara believed in the possession of subtle material body by the emancipated soul and its residence in the Divine City. But he thinks that this salvation belongs to the lower stage, and also speaks of a higher stage which is beyond description. Shankara's Ultimate Reality is indescribable, and to him the famous definition of Brahman अन्नाद्यस्य यतः "meant Brahman, the inferior.

With Badarayana, salvation is of one kind only. Even his superior Brahman is describeable, and so are the released souls that keep up their subtle bodies and rejoice in enjoyments similar to the Divine enjoyments¹¹ except some such privileges as the creation¹² of the universe.

—————

11. भोग-मात्र-साम्य-सिद्धाच्च (4, 4, 21)

12. जगद्-व्यापार-वर्जं प्रकरणादसंनिहितत्वाच्च (4, 4, 17)

THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE FOR 1935-37

Sir S. Radhakrishnan,

Chairman.

H. D. Bhattacharyya (Dacca University),

Joint Secretary and Treasurer.

S. S. Suryanarayana Sastri (Madras University),

Joint Secretary.

Dr. Saroj Kumar Das (Calcutta University),

Librarian and Editor of Proceedings.

Principal Dr. W. S. Urquhart (Scottish Church College,

Calcutta).

Principal Dr. J. McKenzie (Wilson College, Bombay)

Prof. A. R. Wadia, (Mysore University)

Prof. Dr. N. N. Sengupta (Lucknow University)

Prof. R. D. Ranade (Allahabad University)

Prof. G. C. Chatterji (Government College, Lahore)

Rao Saheb N. Venkataraman (Maharaja's College,

Vizianagram)

Dr. D. M. Dutta (Patna College, Patna)

Prof. Dr. S. Z. Hasan (Aligarh Muslim University,

Aligarh)

Dr. R. V. Das (Indian Institute of Philosophy, Amalner)

Miss A. L. Halder (Allahabad University)

Members

PRESIDENTS OF THE SESSION

Dr. S. N. Dasgupta (Sanskrit College, Calcutta),

General President

Prof. M. M. Sharif (Aligarh Muslim University),
President, Logic and Metaphysics Section,

Dr. D. M. Datta (Patna College),
President, Indian Philosophy Section

Dr. S. K. Maitra (Calcutta University),
*President, Ethics, Social Philosophy and
 Religion Section*

Dr. B. Hivale (Wilson College, Bombay),
President, Psychology Section

Chairman of the Reception Committee

Rai Bahadur Ram Kishore,
Vice-Chancellor, Delhi University

PRESIDENT OF THE WORKING COMMITTEE

Rai Bahadur N. K. Sen (Delhi University)

Local Secretaries

Dr. N. V. Banerji (Ramjas College, Delhi)

Dr. Indra Sen (Hindu College, Delhi)

LIST OF MEMBERS (1936)

Permanent Members.

**Bhattacharyya, Haridas, Dacca University, P. O. Ramna
Dacca.**

Bharadwaj, Ramdat, A. V. P. High School, Kasganj (U. P.)

Chanda, Miss Bhaktilata, Ravenshaw Girls' Hostel, Cuttack.

Damle, N. G., Fergusson College, Poona 4

d'Andrade, J. C. P., Elphinstone College, Bombay

Datta, Dr. Dhirendra Mohan, Patna College,

P. O. Mahendru, Patna.

Datta, Priya Govinda, D. J. College, Monghyr.

Hiriyanna, M., Lakshmipuram, Mysore.

**Langley, G. H., "Senchal", Shepherd's Hill, Merstham,
Surrey, England.**

McKenzie, Rev. Jhon, Wilson College, Bombay.

Radhakrishnan, Sir S., Spalding Professor,

Oxford University, Oxford, England.

Sarma, M. S. Srinivasa, National College, Trichinopoly

(Madras)

Sastri P. P. S., Presidency College, Madras.

**Sastri, S. S. Suryanarayana, Madras University, Limbdi
Gardens, Royapettah, Madras.**

Sathe, S. G., 779, Bhamburdah, Poona 4

Sen, Dr. Saileswar, Andhra University, Waltair,

Dist. Vizagapatam.

**Shetty, Dr. M. Venkatrao, Director, N. Powell & Co. Ltd.,
Bombay No. 4**

Sinha, Dr. Jadunath, Meerut College, Meerut.

Wadia, A. R., Mysore University, Mysore.

Durkhal, J. B. Esq. Vithaldas Thakordas

Hindu Gurukul Athwa Lines Surat.

Sessional Members, (1936).**B**

Jyotish Chandra Banerji, Asutosh College, Bhowanipur,
Calcutta

Phanindra Krishna Basu, 3A Huree Pal's Lane, Calcutta

P. M. Bhambani, Agrn College, Agra

Krishna Datta Bharadwaja, Modern High School,
New Delhi

Harimohan Bhattacharyya, 3 Tara Road, Kalighat,
Calcutta

Kalidas Bhattacharyya, 4 Panchanantala Lane, Serampore,
Dist. Hughli

D

Dr. J. K. Daji, Cottage Lane, Santa Cruz, Bombay

Dr. R. V. Das, Indian Institute of Philosophy, Amalner
(East Khandesh)

Dr. S. K. Das, 181 Cornwallis Street, Calcutta

Miss Vasanti Dasgupta, Indraprastha Girls' College,
Delhi

Suresh Chandra Datta, Cotton College, Gauhati

Dr. Dhirendralal De, Women's College,
83 Baranasi Ghose's Street, Calcutta

Dr. C. D. Desmukh Morris College, Nagpur

P. C. Divanji, First Class Sub-Judge, Broach
(Bombay Presidency)

G

K. V. Gajendragadkar, H. P. T. College, Nasik
(Bombay Presidency)

Girdhar Gopal, Bharistan, Kasganj, Dist. Etah

Surendranath Goswami, Bangavasi College,
Scott Lane, Calcutta

K. C. Gupta, Ramjas College, P. O. Delhi Cloth Mills,
Delhi

H

Miss A. L. Halder, Mazda Mansion, Canning Road,
Allahabad

Dr. B. Hivale, Wilson College, Bombay

J

Dr. S. N. A. Jafri, Bureau of Public Information,
Government of India, New Delhi
Shyam Swaroop Jalota, Opposite Gour Ashram, Rishinagar,
Lahore

L

Ram Murti Loomba, Ramjas College, Delhi Cloth Mills,
Delhi

M

Haripada Maiti, Kerbala Tank Lane, Calcutta
Dr. S. K. Maitra, Quarters No. D/8, Benares Hindu
University, Nagowa, Benares
Dr. Sushil Kumar Maitra, Asutosh Building, Calcutta
University, Calcutta

David G. Moses, Hislop College, Nagpur
A. C. Mukherji, 576 Daragunj, Allahabad
O. V. Srinivasa Murti, Maharaja's College, Vontikoppal,
Mysore
T. R. V. Murti, Benares Hindu University, Nagowa,
Benares

N

P. S. Naidu, Annamalai University, Annamalainagar. Dist.
South Arcot

N. A. Nikam, 23, Third Cross Street, Basavangudi,

P

Bangalore.

Manubhai C. Pandya, C/O Manubai & Co, 24-26, Dalal

Street, Fort, Bombay

Kali Prasad, Lucknow University, Lucknow

R

Dr. C. Kunhan Raja, Madras University, Triplicane P. O.
Madras



- Dr. P. T. Raju, Andhra University, Maharanipettah,
Waltair (Dist. Vizagapatam)
- R. Ramanujachari, Annamalai University, Annamalaisagar,
Dist. South Arcot
- R. D. Ranade, 2 Beli Road, Allahabad
- M. V. V. K. Rangachari, Pleader, Coacanada (South India)
- G. Hanumantha Rao, Maharaja's College, Mysore
- Shankar Rao, Government College, Shahpur Sade, Panjab
S
- S. S. Suryanarayana Sastri, Madras University, Triplicane
P. O. Madras
- Dr. Indra Sen, Hindu College, Delhi
- M. M. Sharif, Sir Syed Hall, Aligarh Muslim University,
Aligarh,
- P. N. Srinivasachari, Pachaiyappa's College, Madras



